Famine, disease, medicine and the state in Madras Presidency (1876-78). by Sami, L.
FAMINE, DISEASE, MEDICINE AND THE STATE IN 
MADRAS PRESIDENCY (1876-78).
LEELA SAMI
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYUMI Number: U5922B8
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted.  Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U592238
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013.  Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved.  This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml  48106-1346DECLARATION OF NUMBER OF WORDS FOR MPHIL AND PHD THESES
This  form  should  be  signed  by  the  candidate’s  Supervisor  and  returned  to  the 




Famine, Disease, Medicine and the State in Madras Presidency (1876-78)
College:  Unversity College London
I confirm that the following thesis does not exceed*:  100,000 words (PhD thesis)





The maximum length of a thesis shall be for an MPhil degree 60,000 and for a PhD 
degree  100,000  words  inclusive  of footnotes,  tables  and  figures,  but  exclusive  of 
bibliography and appendices.
Please note that supporting data may be placed  in an appendix but this data must 
not be essential to the argument of the thesis. In other words, examiners are not 
necessarily required to read beyond the 100,000/60,000 word limit.*
Theses must be submitted to Senate House, NOT directly to the examiners. 
Failure to submit your theses to Senate House will delay your examination.
‘Candidates should check with their department as some departments may have a lower word
limit than the University word limit stated above.
Date  °
.Date.Thesis Abstract
The thesis is a critical examination of the relationship between different levels of the 
colonial state and its medical services in the relief of famine in Madras Presidency 
during 1876-78. The state was irrevocably divided in moral, administrative and 
financial terms in its responses to famine and the provision of famine relief during this 
episode These divisions made for inconsistencies in the relief of distress, and resulted 
in widespread suffering and starvation. However, they also allowed for considerable 
latitude by the Provincial Government in the implementation of Imperial famine 
policy, and for the medical profession to gain administrative authority by claiming 
expertise in the scientific determination of standards of state support for the famine 
stricken.
This famine heralded the beginning of organized all-India state intervention in famine 
processes through the institution of famine codes and organized bureaucratic 
machinery for the early prevention of agrarian distress through prompt state 
intervention. To this extent, this particular episode was a ‘prime mover’ in the history 
of the medical profession and the history of state intervention in famine relief in India.
The thesis seeks to address critically several problems in the historiography of famine, 
colonial medicine, disease and the state in modem South Asia through this case study. 
It attempts to do so through a critical re-examination of material used by previous 
authors and the use of some hitherto unused sources from the Provincial archives.
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11Introduction: Famine, Disease, Medicine and the State in Madras 
Presidency (1876-78)
This study examines the relationship between different levels of the colonial state and 
its medical services in the provision of official famine relief during 1876-78 in 
Madras Presidency. My main aim in writing this thesis has been to show the great 
complexity of official responses to famine in colonial India, both medical and non­
medical, and to look at the consequences of these responses for famine relief and 
famine mortality.
My thesis focuses on a specific historical event, through the study of which I hope to 
test some of the generalizations made by other historians of famine in nineteenth 
century India. The ‘Great Famine’ of 1876-78 is one of the best-documented famines 
of the late nineteenth century. Affecting an area of 20,000 square miles and a 
population of 36 million people in three provinces of British India, this famine led to 
the formation of the Famine Commission  _   The latter’s Report of 1880 has 
widely been seen by modem historians as one of the first statements of an all-India 
famine policy which stressed the need for early detection and prevention of agrarian 
distress through the agency of local and Provincial officials.1  The Commission’s 
Report was a statement of the need for a preventive program of extensive state 
intervention in agriculture and in agrarian society in order to stall the process whereby
1  See K. S. Singh, ‘The Famine Code: Context and Continuity’ in J. Floud and A. Rangasami, Famine 
and Society, New Delhi,  1993; P. Robb,  ‘The Colonial State and Constructions of Indian Identity: An 
Example on the Northeast Frontier in the 1880s’, MAS, 31, 2 (1997): 245-83; L. Brennan , ‘The 
Development of the Indian Famine Codes: Personalities, Policies and Politics’ in B. Currey and G. 
Hugo, Famine as a Geographical Phenomenon, Dordrecht,  1984 and D. Hall- Matthews,  ‘The 
Historical Roots of Famine Relief Paradigms’ in H. O’Neill and J. Toye (eds.), A World Without 
Famine? New Approaches to Aid and Development,  1998.
12distress led to starvation and mortality on a wide scale. However, as a document, the 
Report also stressed the limits to state intervention.2 Both the Report as well as the 
Famine Codes of the 1880s reflected the debates that had marked the official 
provision of relief during 1876-78. This episode, therefore, had direct consequences 
for the codification of state intervention in a particular form
Further, the Famine Codes issued by each Province at various points in the 1880’s 
differed widely in their adaptation of the main recommendations of the Famine 
Commission’s Report itself. Thus, famine policy as it developed after 1880 was 
predicated essentially upon two sets of tensions which had occurred during the course 
of the famine of 1876-78. These were firstly, the tension between different layers of 
the state over the moral and ideological basis of intervention in famine relief; and 
secondly, the tension between different agencies of the state over the financial and 
administrative arrangements for this intervention. These tensions marked official 
responses during the Great Famine and were then carried forward into the Famine 
Codes.
The Great Famine generated enormous amounts of official data, which have been 
used extensively in general histories of famines in colonial India, in order to argue a 
number of points in connection with famine policy, famine demography, causes of 
famine and popular responses to state intervention in famine relief.  Judging by this, it
2 Thus, although the Commission’s Report stated the responsibility of the state to prevent mortality, a 
major concern was also to prevent the ‘demoralization’ of the peasantry through the institution of strict 
tests of need for applicants for relief. (Report of the Indian Famine Commission, Part 1 Famine Relief, 
p. 35, IOR/V/4/Session 1880/Vol. 71). See also A. Rangasami,  ‘Systems of Limited Intervention: An 
Evaluation of the Principles and Practice of Relief Administration in India’, in Floud and Rangasami, 
Famine and Society, op. cit.; Brennan, ‘The Development of the Indian Famine Codes’ op. cit, and 
Hall-Matthews,  ‘The Historical Roots of Famine Relief Paradigms’, op. cit.
3 B. M. Bhatia, Famines in India: A Study in Some Aspects of the Economic History of India, Delhi, 
1968, see especially pp. 93-96;  S. Ambirajan ,Classical Political Economy  and British Policy in India,
13would appear that this famine has been adequately dealt with by modem Indian 
historians. The need for yet another account of this famine, therefore, might be 
questioned. However my study explicitly focuses on the following issues which have 
hitherto been relatively under-researched in histories of colonial famine policy in 
nineteenth century India.4 
The ‘Heterogeneous’ State 
The first relates to the idea of the colonial state as a layered and heterogeneous 
collection of individuals and administrative institutions, whose interactions were not 
always harmonious and where official political authority was largely determined by 
proximity to local elites and influential indigenous people, rather than residing in the 
military force or political dominance of the European official and his allegiance to the 
Government of India. While it would require a separate monograph to discuss these 
issues in depth, it is enough to state that earlier historiography tended to assume that 
state responses to famine were unitary or homogenous, and that political authority 
flowed from ‘the colonial state’ (as embodied by the Government of India, backed up 
by the political force of the India Office in London). The ‘colonial state’ pushed forth
Cambridge,  1976, pp. 93-97; Idem,  ‘Malthusian Population Theory and Indian Famine Policy in the 
Nineteenth Century’, Population Studies 30,  1(1976): 5-14, especially pp. 6-8; I Klein  ‘When the 
Rains Failed: Famine, Relief and Mortality in British India’, IESHR. 21, 2 (1984): 185-214 (see 
especially pp.  195-200); R Lardinois, ‘Famine, Epidemics and Mortality in South India: A Reappraisal 
of the Demographic Crisis of 1876-78’, Economic and Political Weekly, XX,  11 (1985): 454-465 ; M. 
Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World, New York , 
2001, Ch.  1,  ‘Victoria’s Ghosts’; T. Dyson,  ‘On the Demography of South Asian Famines Part 1’, 
Population Studies 45 (1991):5-25; D. Rajashekhar , ‘Famines and Peasant Mobility: Changing 
Agrarian Structure in Kumool District’, IESHR 28, 2 (1991):  121-150.
4 For the purposes of this thesis, it seems appropriate to define famines as crises of subsistence and 
mortality, although an appropriate definition of famine has been the subject of academic as well as 
policy debates between scholars of a variety of disciplines. For a review of definitions of famine, see 
M.K. Bennett, ‘Famine’, in D.L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 5, 
New York, 1968. See also A.K. Sen, Poverty and Famines, Oxford,  1984, Ch. 4; A. Maharatna, The 
Demography of Famines, Delhi,  1996, p.  1; and S. Devereaux, Theories of Famine, Hertfordshire,
1993, Ch. 2.
14programmes of famine relief which did little to prevent the mass mortality caused by 
subsistence crises.5
In a sense, this historiography took off from nationalist accounts, which saw famines 
as the direct result of adverse economic and social changes wrought by British 
colonialism, particularly its land revenue and trade policies.6 While not primarily 
concerned with debates around causation, our account suggests that official responses 
to famine were more subtle and variegated than this historiography suggests, and 
often in conflict with each other. In addition, ‘state’ policy was not always determined 
by officials in the India office or the Government of India. Provincial and district 
level officials played a more significant role than has been hitherto recognized in the 
formation of policy.
In a sense, the bias in analyzing famine policy towards an emphasis on ‘Imperial’ 
decision making might be said to have derived from a focus on Northern and Eastern 
India. Historians of south India have long been aware that there were significant gaps 
between Imperial and Provincial injunctions and local and regional political and 
administrative practices. The Government of India had much less to do with goings- 
on in the south than it did in the north. Further, within the Province, decision making 
processes relied far more on local and indirect influence, rather than on the direct 
force of Fort St. George.
5 A classic account of this view of famine policy is to be found in Bhatia, Famines in India, op. cit; 
Ambirajan, Classical Political Economy, op. cit., and Klein,’ When the Rains Failed’, op. cit.
6 Classics in nationalist economic historiography include R. Dutt, India in the Victorian Age: An 
Economic History of the People, 1904; idem, Open Letters to Lord Curzon on Famines and Land 
Assessments in India,  1900; and W. Digby, ‘ Prosperous" British India  A Revelation from Official 
Records, 1901.
15The concept of a ‘segmentary’ state was coined by Burton Stein to describe the 
character of political influence in medieval South India.7  Although concerned with 
pre-colonial political forms, Stein’s concept is worth elucidating because of its 
resonance for a later period and for understanding how a layered political structure 
influenced the formation of policy and its administration in South India.8  Authors who 
have studied nineteenth century south India have made similar points regarding the 
fragmented structure of political authority and its influence on policy and 
administrative practice.9  For example, both David Washbrook and R.E .Frykenberg 
describe the enormous bureaucratic maze that Fort St. George’s governance rested on, 
and its implications for control and authority in the mofussil. While Fort St. George 
exercised a strict watch over the interior through its European civil servants, these 
servants, particularly district collectors, were heavily dependent on locally influential 
Indians for information, which was crucial for working the state machinery.1 0  These 
works thus enable us to critically question assumptions about a homogenous and 
unitary colonial ‘state’, and its relationship with politics and policy formation. Yet, 
very few works have examined the divisions and interrelationships within the state in 
responding to crisis. We seek herein to re-examine some of the generalizations about 
‘the colonial state’ in existing accounts of official responses to famine in India, and 
particularly the provisions made during this famine.
7 B. Stein, Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India, Delhi,  1980.
8 Here, it must be mentioned that Eugene Irshick argues that the state ceased to be ‘segmentary’ after 
1795 in that the government tried to introduce a bureaucratic society and institutions based on an idea 
of a fixed hierarchy. (E. Irschick, Dialogue and History: Constructing South India 1795-1895, 
Berkeley,  1994, pp. 69-70).
9 D. Washbrook, The Emergence of Provincial Politics: The Madras Presidency 1870-1920, 
Cambridge,  1976. Chris Bayly’s work is a good reference point for the North Indian context, albeit for 
an earlier period than ours; see for example Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in 
the Age of Expansion 1770-1870, Delhi,  1983. On south India, see also R. E. Frykenberg, Guntur 
District 1788-1848: A History of Local Influence and Central Authority in South India, Oxford,  1965.
10 Washbrook, The Emergence of Provincial Politics, op. cit.
16Influences on Famine Policy
Further, we also seek to critically examine the range of historical influences on famine 
policy. Existing accounts of the formation of famine policy have tended to emphasize 
the role of ideological factors- particularly commitment to non-interventionism as 
based on the principles of classical political economy as elucidated by Adam Smith, 
and espoused by other influential political thinkers in late eighteenth and nineteenth 
century England- shared by European officials as a dominant influence on Indian 
famine policy. According to the accounts put forth by scholars like S. Ambirajan, Ira 
Klein and David Arnold, laissezfaire ideas- derived from classical political economic 
theories enunciated by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus and J.S. Mill and taught to ICS 
officers- shaped the intellectual world of British civil servants. These ideas were 
directly put into action in the form of non-interventionist policies.1 1
However, there are other factors- financial expediency, political strategy, and what
Lance Brennan has termed ‘personalities and politics’- which have also been held to
1  ^ account for the way in which famine policy evolved.  ~  We seek to explore the 
interaction between these various factors. In the first chapter, therefore, we trace out 
the way in which the different levels and agencies of the state responded to this 
famine, and attempt to assess how ideological, administrative, moral and logistic 
factors shaped these responses.
The nature of political governance in Madras was a crucial factor determining systems 
of official famine relief. The administration of the ryotwari system and the nature of
1 1 Ambirajan, Classical Political Economy, op. cit; idem,  ‘Malthusian Population Theory and Indian 
Famine Policy in the Nineteenth Century’, op. cit; Klein, ‘When the Rains Failed: Famine, Relief and 
Mortality in British India’, op. cit, D. Arnold, Famine: Social Crisis and Historical Change, Oxford, 
1988, p. pp.  105-112.
12 Brennan, ‘The Development of the Indian Famine Codes’, op. cit.
17land tenures made the district officials and the Madras Board of Revenue important
players in the debates between the Provincial Government and the Imperial
Government. (The ryotwari system referred to the system of land revenue
administration that predominated in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, whereby
land revenue was paid directly by the cultivator to the agents of the Provincial 
1  ^ Government).  Further, Madras itself was remote from the seat of Imperial rule, and 
this often made it easier for the Provincial Government to flout rules- seemingly 
based on knowledge of administrative systems in Bengal and Bombay- laid down by 
the Government of India. The Provincial Government, however, dependent upon the 
Board of Revenue and a variety of district and local officials for information 
regarding the state of the crops and the condition of people and cattle, often was 
hopelessly misguided in its knowledge about processes in the interior. This proved a 
crucial factor in allowing certain kinds of information to gain administrative privilege. 
We argue that this episode was the first where famine came to be seen as a 
specifically medical phenomenon, to be measured in terms of death statistics, a 
measure that continues to be used in the definition of famine till date.
Medicine and the Making of Famine Relief Policy
The third theme that this thesis addresses is at the role played by one individual, W.R. 
Cornish, the Sanitary Commissioner of Madras in 1877, in the shaping of famine 
policy in Madras. As will be shown in chapter 2, Cornish was prominent in the 
debates on famine policy in 1876-78, and was also directly involved in the creation of 
the first Provincial famine code in the 1880s. A study of his professional and personal 
attributes enables us to address the interaction between the ‘state’ and its medical
13 On the ryotwari system, see N. Mukherjee, The Ryotwari System in Madras 1792-1827, Calcutta, 
1962; and K.G. Sivaswamy, The Madras Ryotwari Tenant, Part I: An Economic Survey, Madras,  1948.
18services in a nuanced and detailed manner, addressing a set of debates in the literature 
on ‘colonial medicine’.
A prominent theme in the literature on colonial medicine is the extent to which 
European colonial medicine was a ‘tool of empire’.1 4  Earlier studies saw colonial 
sanitary and medical services as working primarily to make the tropics a more 
habitable place for European civilians and troops through sanitary and medical 
improvements and control of epidemic diseases, and thereby serving the interests of 
the Imperial state.1 5  Some sites, which were strategic to the maintenance of colonial 
economic and military power- notably the army, the prisons and the plantations-  were 
provided for in medical and sanitary terms by the state, while the health and medical 
needs of the general population was neglected completely. However, the outbreak of 
epidemic diseases and sanitary theories of disease causation from the 1860s focused 
the attention of the colonial state on the health needs of the general population. From 
this period onwards, therefore, attempts by state medicine to intervene in the health of 
the general population through preventive sanitary science was spurred by attempts to 
control the outbreak  of epidemic disease in the cantonments and prisons. While 
sanitary science served the needs of an expansionist state, the medical profession had 
a profound influence on the way in which colonial power investigated, understood 
and ultimately attempted to manage indigenous society’.1 6  Thus the medical
14 The term ‘tool of empire’ derives from D. Headrick, The Tools of Empire, and Technology Transfer 
in the Age of Imperialism, Oxford,  1981. See also D. Arnold, Colonizing the Body: Epidemic Disease 
and State Medicine in Nineteenth Century India, Princeton, 1993; Idem, Imperial Medicine and 
Indigenous Societies, Manchester,  1988 and M. Harrison, Public Health in British India: Anglo-Indian 
Preventive Medicine  1859-1914, Cambridge, 1994; B. Pati and M. Harrison (eds.), Health, Medicine 
and Empire: Perspectives on Colonial India, New Delhi, 2001.
15 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, op. cit; Idem, Imperial Medicine, op. cit; Harrison, Public Health in 
British India, op. cit; Idem., Climates and Constitutions: Health, Race, Environment and British 
Imperialism in India, New Delhi,  1999. See also R. Headrick, Colonialism, Health and Illness in 
French Equatorial Africa 1885-1935, Atlanta, 1994.
16 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, p. 291.
191  7 profession was a ‘handmaiden to the Imperial state’  , and ‘doctors and surgeons 
helped to form and give a seemingly scientific precision to abiding impressions of 
India as a land of dirt and disease, of lethargy and superstition, of backwardness and 
barbarity- and to contrast this Orientalized India with the cool-headed rationality and 
science, the purposeful dynamism, and the paternalistic humanitarianism of the
| Q
West’.  David Arnold sees medicine’s colonizing power as emerging from its 
association with the military and political force of the colonial state. In the end, 
however, medicine helped consolidate that power through its cultural dominance and 
claims to ‘scientific status’, although this status was contested both from within the 
profession and by non-medical administrators.19  While mentioning the low 
professional and administrative status of European medical men, Arnold’s account 
seems to overemphasize the symbiotic nature of the relationship between colonialism, 
state power and the European medical profession, a problem also inherent in Mridula 
Ramanna’s recent monograph on public health in colonial medicine.20
Other studies have suggested a different view of the medical profession’s relationship 
with the colonial state and Indian society. For example, Mark Harrison argues that 
colonial medicine was more limited than Arnold and Ramasubban assume in its 
ability to intervene and shape Indian society. In fact, medicine itself was moulded by 
its social and political context, and its links with imperial power far more tenuous 
than Arnold and Ramasubban assumed. The depth of medical intervention was limited 
by contests within the Imperial order itself; between different conceptions of Empire, 
and between different political, economic and cultural imperatives of local
17 R. Jeffery, The Politics of Health in India, Berkeley,  1988, p. 64.
18 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, p. 292.
19 Roger Jeffery on the other hand states that medicine’s limitations came from its bureaucratic 
structure and its status as handmaiden to empire. The Politics of Health in India, p. 64.
20 M. Ramanna, Western Medicine and Public Health in Colonial Bombay 1845-1895, 2002.
20administrations.21  Harrison’s study argues that the medical profession in India 
suffered from low professional status as well as indifference from the colonial 
administration.22  The profession was deeply divided on questions of disease 
causation and medical theory. To this extent, the ability of ‘colonial medicine’ to be 
or become a tool of empire through the extension of preventive medicine to the 
general public was limited.
Moreover, the reluctance of non-medical officials to interfere in the social and 
cultural practices of the indigenous population limited the ability of colonial medical 
officials to push forth programmes of sanitary reform; while their limited curative 
ability did little for the administrative or professional status of European medical 
officials in India. Harrison sees Indian support or opposition as actively involved in 
the process whereby public health schemes were implemented. Our study resonates 
several of these themes. It investigates Cornish’s role in the ‘medicalization’ of 
famine and famine policy from the point of view of personal, professional and 
administrative factors. We argue that medicine was not so much a tool of Imperialism 
as a competitive player in debates between different levels of Government and strands 
of Imperial thought and administrative practice, in a crisis situation.
Vital Statistics, Public Health and Interventionism
An important aspect of Cornish’s prominence and his success in supporting an 
interventionist famine policy was his use of vital statistics as indices of the efficacy of
21 Harrison, Public Health in British India, op. cit. See also S. Bhattacharya, ‘Re-devising Jennerian 
Vaccines? European Technologies, Indian Innovation and the Control of Smallpox in South Asia, 
1850-1950’, in Pati and Harrison, Health, Medicine and Empire, op. cit.
22 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
21state famine relief. Vital statistics were intended as Imperialist tools in the sense that 
registration was initially the basis of efforts to improve European military health in 
India. However, not only were vital statistics a fiction of officialdom in many cases, 
but they were also used to bring ignominy on Imperial famine policy by Cornish.23 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 look at historiographical debates around colonial statistics and 
famine mortality, and thus follow upon each other. Chapter 3 examines debates 
between different levels and agencies of the state over the accuracy of vital statistics 
during the famine; Chapter 4 uses mortality statistics to suggest a hypothesis 
regarding famine mortality, with an awareness of their imperfections; and Chapter 5 
addresses the influence of administrative, social and medical responses to subsistence 
crises on famine mortality.
Chapter 3 of the thesis attempts to address historiographical debates around the links 
between knowledge, power and Imperialism in colonial India. While vital statistics 
were flawed tools of sanitary medicine, they nevertheless were important political 
weapons in contests between different visions of empire and public health
Starvation, Disease and Medicine
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between famine and disease, using the vital 
statistics for the famine years. In doing so, it examines critically the ways in which 
previous scholars have dealt with the mortality statistics for this famine. We argue 
that the evidence tends to support a ‘starvation’ model of famine mortality as against a 
‘health crisis’ model.
23 Debates around colonial statistics have tended to divide scholars who saw them as forms of 
knowledge which were intrinsic to the knowledge/ power Imperialist project, against those who viewed 
them as weak and ineffectual tools of governance, and those who saw them as positive outcomes of 
colonial rule. See Chapter 3 for further details.
22Finally, in Chapter 5,1 examine social, administrative and medical responses to 
subsistence crises in exacerbating famine mortality. My study indicates that the 
effects of population movements on famine mortality, and the role played by colonial 
institutions in exacerbating disease through encouragement to migration and 
confinement of famine stricken people in insanitary conditions, need to be more 
carefully investigated than has hitherto been done. Further, medical responses to this 
famine reflected medicine’s competitive ‘playing’ of administrative divisions as well 
as its therapeutic impotence in the face of mass starvation.
What follows therefore is a thematic study of selected questions in the historiography 
of famine and of colonial medicine, using this episode of famine as a case study. 
Ultimately the aim is to investigate the interactions between the colonial medical 
profession and colonial administrations in a time of crisis; as well as discuss the 
relevance of this particular crisis in a longer-term history of colonial medicine and the 
state in Madras. This interaction, it is argued, had important consequences for famine 
policy; while medicine’s involvement in famine gave it a new professional and 
administrative status in the post-famine interventionist state.
A Long term Economic Crisis?
A brief review of literature on the economic trends in Madras sets the stage for our
analysis. The period between 1855 and 1875 has been seen as a period of agricultural
prosperity by historians of southern India.24 Yet, this prosperity does not seem to have
been generalized and there were large divides of wealth, income and status in most
24 See D. Kumar and T. Raychaudhuri (eds.) The Cambridge Economic History of India Vol. 2, c.1757- 
c.1970, Cambridge, 1983 (henceforth CEHI), p. 230 and Washbrook, The Emergence of Provincial 
Politics, op. cit.
23areas. The distribution of water supplies was a particularly important factor in 
understanding the agrarian economy. While the great irrigation works built in the 
1850’s transformed the northern districts of Kistna and Godavari into richly watered 
and prosperous areas, and Tanjore benefited from the perennial water supply of the 
Kaveri river, the ‘dry’ districts remained poor and marked by great inequalities. The 
worst off were the Ceded districts of Bellary, Cuddapah and Kumool, as also Nellore
25 and North Arcot.  These were the districts which suffered the most in the famines of 
the late nineteenth century.
In terms of landownership, Dharma Kumar has indicated that between 1862 and 1880, 
the rate of evictions of tenants by landlords increased by 45%, pointing to a process of 
increasing vulnerability among sharecroppers and tenants, and possibly an increasing 
concentration of wealth amongst large landholders.26 In addition, the social 
composition of Madras was marked by a very large proportion of landless agricultural 
labour castes, in positions of hereditary slavery. In 1900, they formed almost a quarter
97 of the population of the Presidency.  Although wage series are available only from 
1873 onwards, Kumar also finds that the real wages received by these labourers 
declined in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. (Kumar attributes this decline to 
population growth through increased fertility amongst the untouchable labouring 
castes. Her arguments are convincing, but lack direct evidence regarding trends in 
fertility).
25 Bellary became a cotton exporting district in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but the 
concentration of economic resources in the hands of commercial farmers meant that cropping decisions 
were dictated by commercial rather than subsistence agriculture. This thesis, propounded by 
Washbrook, has been questioned by Dharma Kumar who argues that there is little evidence for the 
view that land was increasingly passing into the hands of rich farmers and moneylenders and that in 
fact land was increasingly becoming fragmented rather than consolidated, through population growth.
26 CEHI, p. 237.
27 D. Kumar, Land and Caste in South India: Agricultural labour in the Madras Presidency during the 
Nineteenth Century, Cambridge,  1965, p.  173.
24Kumar’s arguments regarding a decline in wages are corroborated by David 
Washbrook, who also finds that if wages were moving at all, they were moving 
downwards. Washbrook argues that commercialization of agriculture deepened 
existing divides in Indian society.  Finally, there was a steady rise in food prices 
from 1862-63 onwards.29 This would indicate that the 1860s and 1870s were periods 
of considerably precarious existence for large numbers of people, although economic 
data tends to indicate that there was upward mobility amongst some groups.  David 
Washbrook’s thesis- that the severe impact of the famine on the population of Madras 
was largely due to the structure of agrarian political-economic relations which was 
marked by sharp inequalities of wealth, landownership and status- appears to hold 
considerable weight. Cornish’s study of the links between the food supply system, 
rural social relations and vulnerability to famine also indicates a sharply unequal 
social structure, in which the entitlements to food amongst the poorest sections were 
always precarious.31
28 CEH1 p. 238; also Washbrook, The Emergence of Provincial Politics, p. 81.
29 Between  1862-63 and 1865-66, the percentage rise in prices was as follows: Rice: 24.5%; Paddy 
26.1%; Cholum 29.3%;Cumboo 37%; Ragi 32%; Varagu 18%; Wheat 56%; Salt 3%. In the next year 
(i.e. between  1865-66 and 1866-67) the prices rose as follows: Rice 21%; paddy 23%; Cholum 29%; 
Cumboo 21%; Ragi 35%; Varagu 27%; Salt 21%. Note that the largest increase was in the price of 
ragi, cholum and cumboo, the staples eaten by the poor. (Calculated from figures given in 
Administration Report of the Madras Presidency 1866-67, Madras,  1867, p. 33. See also 
‘Memorandum on Scarcity and Drought 1866-67’ in Administration Report 1866-67, pp. lxxiv-lxxxiv).
30 CEHl, p. 230-1; See also Washbrook, The Emergence of Provincial Politics, Ch. 2. Washbrook notes 
that inequalities between different groups increased over the course of the nineteenth century and that 
the wealth of large landholders increased over this period. This process was particularly marked in the 
‘dry’ regions, although it occurred in Tanjore and other parts of the Kaveri delta as well.  It was only in 
the Kistna and Godavari deltas, transformed by Arthur Cotton’s engineering genius in the mid­
nineteenth century from dry, disease and famine ridden districts to rich, irrigated, commercial centres, 
that sharp inequalities of landownership, cultivation and status were replaced by the emergence of a 
substantial middle peasantry. Washbrook’s later work on Bellary district, a classic ‘dry’ district, shows 
that the commercialization of agriculture in the region in the late nineteenth century in fact deepened 
the economic divides that existed. See D. Washbrook, ‘Economic Change and Agrarian Organization 
in ‘Dry’ South India: A Reinterpretation’, MAS. 17,  1 (1983): 59-78.
31 Wasbrook, The Emergence of Provincial Politics, pp. 76-7; W. R. Comish, ‘The Sanitary and 
Medical Aspects of Famine’, Fourteenth Annual Report of the Sanitary Commissioner  for 1877 
(henceforth SCR 1877), Madras,  1878, Ch. II,  ‘Food, labour and wages in non-famine times’.
25In these circumstances, a strong welfare state or a comprehensive system of private 
charity which intervened to protect the rights of the dispossessed or to preserve the 
labour force in times of scarcity might have prevented subsistence crises. But neither 
existed in colonial Madras, and famine ‘policy’ throughout the nineteenth century was 
in reality a compromise between a set of stated (but variously interpreted) principles 
and the exigencies of a particular historical situation.
Famines and State Intervention: The South Indian Context
As for most other Provinces, the colonial archive contains few references to 
pre- nineteenth century famines or famine policy in South India. As Sanjay 
Sharma remarks in the North Indian context, the paucity of information was often 
construed by European administrators as a lack of a historical sense among pre­
colonial rulers and the state.32 For example, the Godavari district gazetteer 
remarks that ‘There are no references to early famines except vague ones by 
native historians.’33 However, Jesuit missionary records contain some references 
to famines which occurred in 1633,  1648, 1659-62, 1677 and 1709.34  The Tanjore 
district gazetteer also mentions the existence of a scarcity during the Chola period 
at Alangudi, south of Kumbakonam in 1054.35
At Koviladi, also in Tanjore district, in the eleventh century, ‘times became bad, 
the village was ruined and the ryots fled’, but there was no mention of loss of life.
32 S. Sharma, Famine, Philanthropy and the Colonial State: North India in the Early Nineteenth 
Century, New Delhi, 2001, p. 3.
33 F. R. Hemingway, Godavari District Gazetteer, Madras,  1907, p.  137
34 W. Francis, Imperial Gazetteer of India Provincial Series Madras I, Calcutta, 1908, p. 79.
35 F.R Hemingway, ICS, Tanjore District Gazetteer Vol.  1, Madras,  1906, p.  147.
26Another famine was mentioned in the Periya Puranam in the seventh century, 
whereupon the saints Sambadnar and Appar were helped by Lord Siva to relieve
36 distress.  Ferishtha, a Persian traveller, mentioned two famines which occurred in 
Bellary and the Deccan in the 15th century.37 Thomas Munro, one of the pioneers 
of the ryotwari settlement in the late eighteenth century
also mentions a scarcity in Bellary in 1756.38
A detailed record of famines and state famine policy in Madras from the late 
eighteenth century onwards was compiled from Revenue Board records by R. A.
'J O
Dalyell, a Madras civil servant, in 1867.  Dalyell observed that pre-colonial 
famine policy was based on a notion of the moral duty of kings and rulers to 
provide for their subjects in times of distress. Further, the eighteenth century was 
demarcated from the nineteenth century in that prior to 1804, there were no moral 
or administrative strictures preventing state intervention, either in terms of 
regulating the grain trade or in terms of the provision of work and food for 
starving people upon the failure of monsoons. Thus, non-interventionist ideals as 
guides to state policy can be dated to the late eighteenth century. In addition, even 
in the nineteenth century, administrators like Dalyell interpreted the occurrence of 
famines as the failure of a previous native ruler to protect the country against 
drought or their extractions from the ryots in terms of plunder and land revenue. 
Thus a famine in 1733 was described by Dalyell as the result of the neglect of 
irrigation works since the agents of the Moghul emperor had taken possession of
36 Ibid, p.  147.
37 W. Francis, Bellary District Gazetteer,  1916, p.  128.
38 Ibid.
39 Robert A. Dalyell was a member of the Indian Civil Service who was one of the steering members of 
a private charitable fund for famine relief during 1866. He went on to become the Secretary to the 
Government of Madras, which post he held during the 1876-78 famine.
27the country.40 Further famines took place in the course of the eighteenth century, 
but there is little information regarding them
The following account is based largely on Dalyell’s account in order to discuss the 
relationship between ideas regarding non-interventionism and state intervention in 
economic processes during the famines of the nineteenth century.
A History of State Intervention in Famine Process in Colonial Madras
Non-interventionist ideas based on the classical political economic ideal were 
espoused by European administrators as guides to the limits of state action in 
economic processes from the end of the eighteenth century.41 However, as will be 
evident from the following account, financial expediency, strategic concerns, threats 
to property and life of administrators by starving multitudes, and humanitarian 
impulses on the part of local administrators and private charity all limited the extent to 
which the state could afford not to intervene in famine relief and in the grain market 
in times of crisis. (See Table 0.1) In addition, it is worth remembering that in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the notion was fairly common among 
administrators that famines were caused not just by a collapse of the employment 
economy but primarily by a scarcity of food and the means to remedy local scarcities, 
i.e. that the scope of state action covered the need to provide adequate food supply 
and not just the facilitation of the grain trade. This notion changed towards the middle 
of the nineteenth century. The arrival of the railways meant that private trade came to 
be seen as capable of mitigating local crop failures by stimulating imports of grain 
into areas where there was scarcity.
40 R. A. Dalyell, Memorandum on the Madras Famine of 1866, Madras, 1867, p.  10-11.
41 Ambirajan, Political Economy and British Policy, op. cit.
28State intervention in famine process during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries took a variety of forms. These included the remittance of duties on grain 
imports; government control of distribution of grain in select urban areas where the 
maintenance of a steady supply was essential to public order; and encouragements to 
import by private merchants. Occasionally, the purchase of grain on Government 
account for distribution as wages was also permitted. From the late eighteenth 
century, the Government of Madras began to provide work for a wage in order to 
enable people to buy food, and to distribute cooked food to the poor in towns as the 
main measures of relief. It appears from the accounts of early colonial famine relief 
measures that these measures were adopted largely according to official perceptions 
of threat to the social, political and public orders, particularly in towns. In many cases, 
reports of distress by local and district officials were disbelieved initially by either the 
Madras Government or the Madras Board of Revenue
and there were frequent clashes of opinion between 
these three bodies as well as between local officials and higher authorities. Thus, 
official strategies to intervene in situations of monsoon failures and consequent social 
distress were often delayed responses to local reports of distress, and within months, a 
particular strategy could shift dramatically in response to shifts in official perceptions 
of the seriousness of the threat.
The structure of governance in Madras was a crucial factor in shaping the way in 
which ideological considerations were played out. Three members- a Governor and 
two  Indian Civil Service members, all of whom were appointed by the Crown-
29constituted the Local or Provincial Government. The business of the Local 
Government, which was headed by these officers, was conducted through a secretariat 
which was subdivided into several departments, managed executively by bureaucrats 
from the ICS.
A key Governmental body concerned with the management of everyday matters 
connected with revenue administration under the ryotwari system was the Madras 
Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue had considerable influence over daily 
administration at the district level. It consisted of four members, of whom two usually 
controlled matters connected with land revenue, a third had charge of revenue 
settlement and a fourth supervised revenue from salt, akbari (liquor licensing) and 
separate revenue. Most letters regarding revenue administration were addressed to the 
Board and not to the Government. The Board was the key Provincial body concerned 
with the extremely complex matter of revenue settlement and assessment, particularly 
the land revenue which constituted the largest source of Governmental income and 
varied from year to year under the ryotwari system. It was also the first point of 
contact with Provincial Government for district Collectors and their subordinates.42
Throughout the course of the nineteenth century, the relationship of the Madras Board 
of Revenue with the Madras Government (and prior to 1858, the Court of Directors) 
shaped state intervention in famine relief.  In addition, it is worth noting that until 
1865, the Madras Government was the sole financial and administrative authority to 
whom local requests to assist in interventionist measures were addressed. It appears
42 W. Francis, Imperial Gazetteer of India, Simla, 1908, p. 82.
30that governance and management of famine relief in Madras was in practice separate 
from the Government of India, and from the other Local Governments.
According to Dalyell, the first serious famine of which detailed accounts exist took 
place in 1781 and 1782, consequent to Hyder Ali’s invasion of Madras. In 1781, the 
Madras Government remitted import duties on grain; appointed a Grain Committee to 
superintend the daily distribution of grain in Madras city and fix the prices at which 
grain should be sold. In early 1781-2, the Government deemed it necessary to 
undertake purchase of grain on Government account, a directly interventionist 
measure. This action, notes Ravi Ahuja was not prompted by a neglect of the 
principles of non-interventionism, as much as by the dependence of the Government 
on a steady supply of food in order to remain in control of labour markets.43
In 1791-2, a famine occurred in the Northern districts of the Presidency, particularly 
in Ellore, Rajahmundry, Masulipatam (the naval base of the Madras Government) and 
Condapilly.44 The famine also affected Bellary district and was known as the first 
famine during which an Indian Government provided relief in the form of 
employment on public works for the famine stricken.45 During this famine, Thomas 
Munro, then Collector of Bellary, apparently decried the tendency of native revenue 
officials to extract land revenue from the ryots despite their suffering.46 From the 
evidence, it is impossible to state whether state intervention was forced by popular 
action and the threat of a disruption of social and political order. There was some 
degree of intervention in the form of suspension of import and transit duties on grain,
43 R. Ahuja, ‘State Formation and ‘Famine Policy” in Early Colonial South India’, in S. 
Subrahmanyam (ed.) Land, Politics and Trade in South Asia, New Delhi, 2004, pp.  147-185.
44 Dalyell, Memorandum, p.  17.
45 W. Francis, Gazetteer of the Bellary District, Madras, 1916, p.  128.
46 Ibid.
31and later, prohibitions of export of rice from Tanjore except to the distressed districts. 
During this famine, the Collector of the Ganjam district was authorized to feed the 
poor with cooked food paid for from Government funds and to open relief works 
where they would be paid wages in grain.47
In early 1799, there was ‘considerable distress’ in Dindigul in Madura district (in the 
southern part of Madras) and the Collector was permitted by the Government of 
Madras to purchase grain on Government account for the purpose of retail sale. If the 
famine were to grow more severe, he was to dispose of the grain he had in store at a 
loss in order to lower the general price of grain.48 The lack of evidence makes it 
impossible to state whether ideological, strategic or financially expedient factors were 
the main causal factor behind state intervention during this famine.
Five years later, towards the end of 1804, there was severe distress in Tanjore and 
South Arcot districts. Prior to Government sanction, the Collectors of both districts 
took it upon themselves to sell grain at low prices to people on Government account, 
to prohibit grain export, and to import grain. As will be seen below, this was the first 
instance in which ideological objections to state intervention shaped official famine 
policy. However, the actual shape of events belied any strict adherence to these 
ideological considerations, a phenomenon which was increasingly common in state 
responses to famine in the later years of the nineteenth century. During this famine, it 
was also reported that the Collector of South Arcot district in consonance with
47 Dalyell, Memorandum, pp.  18-19.
48 Ibid,  See also W. Francis, Madura District  Gazetteer, pp.  161-2, Madras, 1914.
32Brahmin priests performed an abhishekham ceremony ‘for the propitiation of the rain 
god’.49
In 1804, the Government of Madras expressed ‘objections’ to any interference with 
the grain market, unless absolutely necessary, but left the question of prohibiting 
exports to the district Collectors. In 1805, as the famine dragged on, the Madras 
Board of Revenue laid down a set of principles upon which Government policy 
should be conducted. Briefly, these were to prohibit any interference with the grain 
market either in terms of fixing prices, importing grain or selling it on Government 
account; and to prohibit any embargo on exports. The Board of Revenue advocated 
the employment of people on public works, with payment in cash, as the only suitable 
means of intervention. (This appears to contradict Sanjay Sharma’s assertion that the 
1837-38 famine was the first occasion when relief ‘on modem principles’ was begun 
by the state through provision of ‘works of public utility’).50 The Government, 
concurring in the proposals submitted by the Board of Revenue, however, authorized 
grain payments instead of cash due to the existence of the Government reserve. Two 
years later, the Government of Madras under Lord Bentinck ordered that a fixed price 
to be paid to merchants on the import of grain. Bentinck, a disciple of Jeremy 
Bentham, had in fact recommended that a bounty (or bonus) be paid instead of a fixed 
price as it was less dangerous to Government, but later conceded to his Council on the
49 W. Francis, Gazetteer of the South Arcot District, Madras,  1906, p.  179. Governmental involvement 
in such religious ceremonies does not seem to have occurred in the nineteenth century, indicating 
perhaps a growing reliance on the notion of ‘scientific’ administration which was increasingly 
juxtaposed by Europeans against a ‘superstitious’ and ‘unscientific’ native mind. See also Arnold, 
Famine in Peasant Consciousness, p. 73.
50 Sharma, Famine, Philanthropy and the Colonial State: North India in the Early Nineteenth Century, 
Delhi 2001, p. ix.
33issue of a fixed price as ensuring a greater security of supply.51 Later that year, a 
Committee appointed to inquire into grain riots in Madras city, recommended that 
grain merchants be protected in selling by measure. They also authorized the 
employment of the able-bodied poor in the neighbourhood of Madras. Thomas 
Munro, as Collector of the Ceded districts (Bellary and Cuddapah) strongly 
deprecated any Government intervention in the grain trade, either in importing on 
Government account or by prohibiting exports. The Government also made 
considerable outlays on public works and considered establishing grain depots in the 
districts of North Arcot, Chingleput and Nellore.52
In 1809, the Government of Madras decreed that interference in the grain trade was 
justified ‘under some circumstances’. Yet, on a further occasion of distress in 1811-14 
in the southern districts, the Board of Revenue deprecated any state interference in the 
grain or labour markets in times of drought.53 Proposals by the Collector of Canara to 
store grain on Government account during this period were not approved by the 
Government of Madras.54
In 1824, the failure of the monsoons caused the Commercial Resident at Masulipatam 
to compel merchants to sell rice at fixed prices in the naval town. The Resident also 
wrote to the Bengal Government requesting that a cargo of rice be sent to him on 
Government account. The Madras Government however censured the Resident for his 
actions, and repealed the request for assistance sent to Bengal. Two months later, 
however, in December 1824, the Government realised that its estimation of distress
51  Dalyell, Memorandum, p. 21.
52 Ibid, p. 23.
53 Ibid, p. 26.
54 Ibid.
34had been woefully wrong, suspended duties on grain imports, and instructed
Collectors of the Ceded districts, Guntoor, Salem, Vizagapatam, North and South
Arcot, Madras, and Nellore to open public works. Later in 1824, the Government also
opened feeding houses for the relief of starving migrants to the large towns.  During
this famine, the Government of Madras, and particularly Thomas Munro, recorded
written statements affirming their faith in non-interventionism as a famine policy. In
response to a query on whether merchants were to be allowed to sell at their own
rates, or whether Government would intervene and fix prices, the Collector of the
North Arcot district was told that he was to be ‘guided by the true principles of
political economy’.55 Munro wrote:
The interference of Government on such occasions as die present is often very prejudicial, 
and I know of no way in which it can be safe or useful, unless in suspending all duties on 
grain- giving perfect freedom to its transit by sea and land, and securing the grain dealers 
from the violence of the people.56
The next instance of famine was what Dalyell called ‘the most serious famine’ with 
which the Madras Presidency has been afflicted since the British accession.57 This 
was what was known as the Guntoor famine of 1832-34.  The Guntoor famine 
affected, besides Guntoor, the districts of Nellore, Masulipatam (later Kistna), 
Rajahmundry, Nellore, Bellary and Cuddapah. There were reports of monsoon failure 
late in 1832, and the Board of Revenue addressed the Government of Madras to 
recommend that import duties on grain be remitted, a request which was acceded to. 
The Government of Madras directed that district Collectors should ‘exercise their
58 influence’ on local merchants to reduce prices, but not use any means of force.  As 
the famine wore on in Bellary and Guntoor, the Board of Revenue recommended that
55 Ibid, p. 29.
56 Ibid, p. 26.
57 Later writers state that the 1876-78 famine was worse. See Bellary District Gazetteer, p.  135, 
Madura District Gazetteer, p.  163.
58 Dalyell, Memorandum, p. 26.
35‘special inducement should be held out to traders to import grain’.59 Clearly threats to 
the property and life of traders and Government officials were significant issues 
during this famine: the Government in 1833 authorised an increase to the police force, 
and also authorized district officials to authorize the distribution of cooked food and 
the employment of able-bodied people on useful public works. Yet, the Government 
refused requests by the Collectors of Masulipatam and North Arcot to import rice on 
Government account from Bengal. Early in 1833, the Government also issued strict 
injunctions against any interference with grain transport or force within the markets. 
However, a large expenditure was sanctioned on public works in Salem, Trichinopoly, 
Coimbatore, Cuddapah, South Arcot, Bellary, Nellore, Masulipatam and Guntoor to 
provide employment, and on the distribution of cooked food in Guntoor,
Masulipatam, Nellore and North Arcot. However through 1833, large numbers of 
starvation deaths were reported from Guntoor, Masulipatam, Tanjore and Madras city.
Captain Best, an Officer of the Madras Engineers (the pre-1852 Public Works 
Department) estimated that in Guntoor, 150,000 persons out of a population of 
500,000 people died during the famine. His account also described the pathos of 
famine deaths:
We are apt not sufficiently to consider, in reading of 150,000 people killed by famine, how 
much individual wretchedness is indicated by those six digits. We shrink from the six 
hundred tales of broken up village communities, the uncultivated lands, the uncelebrated 
feast, the fierce contest at the well, the thronged burning ground, the unburied dead. We 
like not to contemplate the spectacle presented in thousands and tens of thousands of 
families, the herdsman with his uncomplaining cattle dying around him, stripping the 
coarse thatch from his roof which for years have been the grateful object of his care, the 
sheep burnt to death with the withered grass, the hungry children and their starving 
parents, the famished mother unable to moisten the parched throat of her dying infant, or
59 Ibid.
36the hard struggle between the strong ties of kindred and the stronger instinct of self- 
preservation.60
In 1854, the next famine of which there is record occurred in the Bellary district. At 
the beginning of 1854, prices of food were ‘double the usual rates’. State intervention 
consisted in the first instance of employment on the construction of a road from 
Bellary to Hyderabad. State intervention appeared to have been prompted by the 
influx of starving migrants into Bellary town, and by famine crime.61 However during 
this famine, the Government did not take any other steps to intervene in the distress 
except to provide employment on public works for a cash wage. The relief works 
consisted almost entirely of earth work on new roads and were chiefly controlled by 
military officers working under the civil engineer.
In 1866, there was a famine in the districts of Ganjam and Bellary, which was the first 
instance of famine after the reorganization of the state in 1858. In part the famine was 
a domino effect of the Lancashire cotton famine and the outbreak of the American 
Civil War in 1861. The demand for Indian cotton had risen to such an extent that 
speculating ryots grew cotton wherever they could. In 1865, the American War ended 
and the price of cotton fell equally suddenly, leaving the farmers vulnerable to 
economic depression. There was a failure of both monsoons (north east and south 
west) during 1865, and district officials reported late that year that the price of food
S ')
had increased greatly.  The Collectors of these districts set out some measures to 
alleviate distress, including buying up local stocks of grain in order to ration the 
European and Indian troops and prevent a mutiny. In addition, the occurrence of grain
60 Captain Best, Extract from an article on the effects of the Famine of 1833, in the Madras Journal of 
Literature for 1844-45, quoted in Dalyell, Memorandum on the Madras Famine, p. 40-41.
61 Dalyell, Memorandum, pp. 45-6.
62 Ibid.
37riots also appears to have been a spur to district level efforts to begin small relief 
efforts in Berhampore town, where people were employed in sinking wells. However, 
these early district level efforts met with displeasure from the Government of Madras, 
who stated that they were ‘open to grave objections on general principles’.63 By the 
end of March 1866, the Collector of Ganjam was making desperate attempts to tackle 
the crisis, largely through the employment of the poor on relief works set up from 
local and private funds, and through the provision of cooked food in kitchens.64
It was only in June 1866 that the Government of Madras began to recognize the 
seriousness of the impending disaster and what had been till then been a purely local 
crisis now received Provincial attention. On the 1st of June, Rs.  10,000 was placed at 
the disposal of the Collector of Ganjam to supplement the subscriptions locally 
raised.65 On the 11th of June, the Government directed the Marine Superintendent to 
despatch 1500 bags of rice to Ganjam by steamer.66
The organization of famine relief reflected notions of state charity that combined 
ideas about the ‘deserving poor’ that emanated from debates within English Poor 
Law, Protestant philosophy and an ideology of improvement, as well as colonial 
incorporation of what it termed ‘caste prejudice’.  The amount sanctioned by the
63Proceedings of the Madras Government, Revenue Department, Fort St. George, No. 382, dated 20th 
February 1866, Copies of Papers Relating to the Famine in Madras Presidency in 1865-66 
IOR/V/4/Session  1867/Vol. 52.
64 Proceedings of the Government of Madras, No.  192, dated 12th April 1866, No.  1120, Copies of 
Papers Relating to the Famine in Madras Presidency, IOR/V/4/Session  1867/Volume 52
65 Letter from Government of Madras to Secretary of State for India, dated 7th July 1866, Copies of 
Papers Relating to the Famine in Madras Presidency, IOR/V/4/Session 1867/Vol. 52.
66 Ibid.
67 Official famine relief in nineteenth century India was based on the principle that people should work 
for a living even in times of crisis, and that the state should not provide food but work, except in the 
cases of those too weak to work. In cases where people were too weak to work but whose caste status 
prevented them from accepting gratuitous relief in the form of cooked food, raw rice was offered.
38GoM was used for three main objects: firstly, the feeding of the ‘really poor’ classes- 
beggars and labourers - at relief kitchens. There were nine such establishments in 
June, and the monthly expenditure on these was Rs. 3,000. Secondly, the poorest 
families in ryotwari villages were given raw rice weekly at their residences. These 
were small landowners who considered it demeaning to join the beggars and labourers 
at the relief houses and would ‘starve in their houses sooner than join the crowd of 
paupers who are fed at the relief houses. ’ Thirdly, the 1500 bags of rice and financial 
outlay of 1500 rupees (about a hundred and fifty  pounds) were to be utilized for 
employment of the poorer ryots for three months. These three forms of relief- feeding 
of the destitute and untouchable poor in kitchens, distribution of uncooked grain to 
what were seen as more respectable classes of the starving poor in order to 
accommodate caste objections to commensality, and employment of the able bodied 
poor on famine relief works- continued to be followed during the famine of 1876-78.
In addition, a sum of 20,000 rupees (2000 pounds) was sanctioned by the Government 
of India in July 1866 from the surplus of the North Western Famine Relief Fund 
which had been collected during the famine of 1861.68 However, the relief provided 
seems to have been a classic case of “too little, too late”. There were already reports 
that ‘famine and disease, cholera and smallpox, are ravaging the north of the district, 
and not only can no sensible relief be afforded until the harvest, some five months 
hence, but until that time, the distress must increase and extend to wider limits.’69 The
68 Proceedings of the Madras Government, Revenue Department, July 6th,  1866, read letter from the 
Revenue Department, Fort St. George, to the Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 
Copies of Papers Relating to the Famine in Madras Presidency, IOR/V/4/Session  1867/Volume 52.
69 Ibid. The Madras Government forwarded this letter to the Secretary of State for India in London as 
well, and this indicates that the Government of Madras had begun to panic.
39distress had also started extending to the lower paid officials of the Government itself, 
and brought home the reality of the famine to the Madras Government.70 
During this famine, private charity was extremely active in Madras, and indigenous 
businessman and large ryots played a significant role on husbanding funds for famine 
relief. Buddha Ranga Reddy, a landholder of Uyyalavada, and Sakri Kardappa, a 
substantial cotton merchant, were both active in Bellary district in feeding the starving 
poor. In Ganjam district, the Zamindars of Callicote, Chickati and Mundasa opened
71 relief houses within their estates in order to feed the poor.  Similarly in Salem town, 
private subscriptions were raised and a ‘kanji-house ’ opened where between two and 
three hundred people were fed daily.72 The Monegar Choultry, a poor relief house set 
up during the famine of 1791-2 in order to feed the starving, continued to provide 
gratuitous relief to famine migrants into Madras city though this, and all other 
famines.73 In addition, temples across the Presidency provided charitable relief during 
the famines.
The migration of the famine stricken poor to Madras city raised public awareness of 
the existence of famine among the wealthy of the town. On the 21st of July 1866, a 
public meeting was held at Madras where twenty thousand rupees was collected for 
the relief of the starving poor in the districts, and also for the relief of the poor in 
Madras. This meeting marked the beginning of systematic and joint efforts by local 
officials and private charity towards providing relief through a centralized system 
The Government of Madras resolved to contribute an equal sum to the relief fund and
70 Thus, the GoM sanctioned an addition of two rupees to the monthly pay of all Government servants 
in the principal division of Ganjam district, from July 1st 1866 for a period of 3 months.  An increase in 
the salaries of Government servants in Bellary was also sanctioned.
71 H.E. Grigg, ‘A Short Account of the Ganjam Famine of 1866, with a Brief Note of Previous Years of 
Scarcity, and Appendices, by an Officer of the District’, drawn up by Mr. Grigg, Assistant to the 
Collector of Ganjam, Mr. Forbes, Copies of Papers Relating to the Famine in Madras Presidency, 
IOR/V/4/Session  1867/Vol. 52.
72 F. J. Richards, Gazetteer of the Salem District, Madras, 1918, p. 364.
73 Dalyell, Memorandum.
40in future, similar sums to those raised in Madras would be thus contributed from the
public treasury. These grants were to go towards ‘the relief of the old, the infirm and 
the young’. Simultaneously, employment for the able-bodied was to be provided on 
‘useful public works’, although it is not clear what works these were. They were to be 
selected so as to allow people to be employed in gangs of moderate strength, either at 
or in the vicinity of their own villages.74 These works were to be supervised by 
revenue officers of various grades, aimed at improving the communications or sources 
of irrigation, and at the same time suitable for unskilled labour.75 Both financial and 
sanitary considerations influenced the type of works chosen. The Madras Government 
held that ‘in the present state of the public health, it is desirable to avoid as much as 
possible the collection of large bodies of labourers, and as the rate of wages should 
not exceed that required for their maintenance, it is not desirable that they be required 
to leave their homes’. Besides these measures of relief in the districts, works were 
undertaken in Madras town for improving the water supply of Madras, and for
74 Ibid. The choice of ‘large’ or ‘small’ works was intimately tied up both with notions of disease 
causation as well as with the desire of the Government of India to save money. This debate occurred 
throughout the famines of the nineteenth century and took place at all levels of Government. 
Constructing large works at a distance from the homes of labourers, would satisfy concerns that people 
were willing to travel long distances to work, but were seen as running the risk of being conducive to 
outbreaks of epidemic disease. On the other hand, the Provincial and district administration favoured 
small works which were easier to manage and could also include hospital facilities.
75 The supervision of relief work was a bone of contention not only between the Provincial 
Governments and the Government of India, but also between the Public Works Department (PWD) and 
the Revenue Department within the Provincial Governments during the late nineteenth century. IN 
Madras, the Public Works Department had, from the 1850s, been the main Governmental department in 
the Presidency responsible for constructing large irrigation works and railways in non-famine periods, 
and labour was recruited according to ability to perform tasks. During famine periods, public works 
were divided into ‘PWD works’ and ‘civil works’ intended to provide employment to the famine 
stricken poor.  Essentially Revenue or ‘civil works’ were to be run on the principle that none who 
applied for employment could be refused; wages were also supposed to ensure that people were paid 
enough for subsistence but no more; and works were organized and supervised by district Collectors 
and other revenue officials who were supposed to ensure that starvation and disease was prevented. 
Employment on PWD works during famine periods was offered at rates that assumed that the worker 
was maintained in complete health and strength to put in a full day’s work; but at a lower rate than in 
non-famine periods. PWD works were generally supervised by the District Engineer of the PWD. In 
times of famine, the able bodied poor were sent to PWD works, where all who could perform the task 
were employed. For those too weak to perform the full PWD task, employment on ‘civil works’ was 
intended to provide a subsistence wage without running the danger of ‘demoralizing’ the famine 
stricken poor through the provision of gratuitous relief. Classifying a work as a civil famine relief work 
was intended to ensure that even those who were weakened by hunger and disease would be assured 
employment.
41forming a tank in the town.  The sources for this famine also indicate that special 
medical measures were undertaken to tackle epidemic disease in the wake of this 
famine. Hospitals were set up to treat cases of starvation where possible and cholera 
and fever medicines were distributed to the well-off. In addition, the Madras 
Government pursued a policy of setting up small relief works under the management 
of district Collectors. These works were to be close to the homes of people in order to 
prevent the outbreak of epidemic disease, which, it was feared, would result from the 
massing of labourers on large relief works.
This account of state intervention in famines in Madras prior to  1876 makes clear a 
number of things. First, as Robert Dalyell remarked, the Madras Government 
intervened in the grain trade only in the first two cases of famine (in 1782 and in 
1791).  From the beginning of the nineteenth century, therefore, state intervention was 
provided only in the form of employment on ‘useful works’ and the distribution of 
gratuitous relief. Of these forms of relief, the latter was increasingly seen as 
undesirable and as encouraging dependency and demoralization, reflecting ideologies 
of political economy which had previously shaped the Poor Law in England in the 
early nineteenth century.77
However, the extent to which these principles were applied in Madras varied greatly.
It appears from this account that there was great uncertainty between different levels 
of Government over the rigid application of non-interventionist policy at two levels.
76 Proceedings of the Madras Government, Revenue Department, 25th July 1866, enclosed in GoM to 
SoS, dated 11th August 1866, No. 35, Copies of Papers Relating to the Famine in Madras Presidency, 
IOR/V/4/Session  1867/Volume 52.
77 On the principles of reform of the English Poor Law in 1832 and the administrative bodies concerned 
with its implementation, see G.E. Royer, An Economic History of the English Poor Law,  1750-1850, 
Cambridge, 1990.
42First, the Government of Madras^the Madras Board of Revenue
. varied in their opinion on the extent to which 
non-interventionist policy was to be applied. While imports of grain on Government 
account were almost universally frowned upon, other forms of intervention- such as 
encouragement to importation, the provision of employment on public works and of 
cooked food- were less likely to be rejected. Second, there seems to have been no 
form of relief that was agreed upon by any means. What was viewed as expedient and 
suitable depended, as far as is discernible from existing sources, on a variety of 
factors. These included the initiatives of local officials, the influx of starving and 
diseased migrants into the main towns and urban centres, interactions between local 
officials and traders, and the actions of Indian and European people in husbanding 
private resources.
It also is clear that non-interventionism was interpreted differently between different 
levels of Government, with district officials often mounting stringent critiques against 
non-interventionist policy and delayed Governmental responses to requests for 
financial assistance and sanctions to begin relief measures. Remarkably, during the 
famine of 1866, two officials in the Ganjam district published at their own cost 
reports of official relief which were severely critical of the Government of Madras’
no
response to famines.  These criticisms of Government policy were voiced on three
78 These two were R. A. Dalyell and Mr H.E. Grigg, Assistant to the Collector of Ganjam. Grigg 
published a pamphlet entitled A Short Account of the Ganjam Famine of 1866 with a Brief Mention of 
Previous Years of Scarcity, which was apparently circulated amongst Government officials and sent to 
the Government of India. The pamphlet was enclosed in the official correspondence between the 
district officials and the Government of India on the subject of the famine, which correspondence was 
later sent as a volume of Parliamentary Papers to the Secretary of State for India. Grigg was severely 
critical of the fact that the Provincial Government responded to district appeals only in June 1866, 
when the pressure of famine had been gauged and communicated to the Provincial Government as 
early as January 1866. He published this pamphlet with assistance from the Collector of the Ganjam 
district, Mr. Forbes, and copies were printed and circulated to the Government of Madras, the Secretary 
of State for India as well as the press. The Government of Madras, understandably, responded with
43counts: first, notions of state responsibility for life based on ‘Christian charity’; 
second, that Indian social conditions were not suitable for the pure application of the 
laws of political economy; and finally, that the application of the ‘laws’ of political 
economy were themselves open to differing interpretations and applications by 
statesmen themselves. Such criticism reveals firstly the deep fissures over the 
principles to be followed in famine relief; and secondly, the fact that lower 
government officials were not so rigidly controlled as to be unable to publicly voice 
an opinion critical of Provincial Government policy.
Finally, it is also important to note two aspects of official famine relief which are 
significant for the way in which the events of 1876-78 panned out. The first, the 
Government of Madras was the final authority for all decisions regarding famine 
relief right until 1866. This authority was questioned and criticized at the district level 
and slow to respond in times of crisis. Yet, the links between Madras and the 
Government of India in managing famine relief were hazy, and despite the tenuous 
control of the Provincial Government over district matters, Madras remained the 
nominal authority for all matters relating to famine relief. Second, famine relief 
measures were overwhelmingly managed by district collectors and other revenue 
officials, on small works close to the homes of the people of affected districts. The 
conduct of famine relief was thus intimately linked with the official agency for the 
administration of land revenue settlement under the ryotwari system This agency was
much displeasure at the’ irregularity’ of Mr. Forbes to allow ‘the use of official records for the 
compilation of a narrative to be printed at his office, and circulated by him without the permission of 
Government as an authoritative statement of facts’. (Copies of Papers Relating to the Famine in 
Madras Presidency, IOR/V/4/Session  1867/ Vol. 52.) Dalyell also criticised the non-interventionist 
policy of the Government of India as being inconsistent with the expectations of a ‘Christian 
Government’.
44to play a strategic role in the evolution of the structure of preventive medicine within 
the state in the 1860s.
Medicine and the State in Colonial Madras
This section will attempt to describe the evolution of European medicine in Madras 
between the 1760’s and 1880. It attempts to discuss the changing structure of the 
medical services, from a focus almost entirely dictated by the demands of commerce 
and military expansion to one which was the Province of a peace- time Government 
and involved a  web of relationships with a bureaucratic and complex
government machinery, a military force which maintained a modicum of Imperial 
control, and a stratified Indian population.
The Early Period: the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
Although the Madras Medical Department came into existence only at the end of the 
eighteenth century, there is evidence of dispensaries and hospitals organized on 
‘European style’ by the Portuguese rulers in Goa and San Thome in Madras in the
79 middle of the sixteenth century.  The Portuguese were the first European nation to 
visit and settle in India, although they were soon followed by the Dutch, the French,
on
the Danish and the English.
The first British medical men who set foot in India were the barber and two surgeons 
who constituted the medical staff of every ship sent out by the East India Company 
from December 1600.8 1  The first reference to an English surgeon landing on the
79 D.V.S. Reddy, The Beginnings of Modem Medicine in Madras: The Dawn of Modem Medicine in 
Madras, Calcutta, 1947, p. iv.
80 D.G. Crawford, A History of the Indian Medical Service 1600-1913, London,  1914, p. 4.
81 Ibid, p.  1.
45Coramandel Coast was in 1621.82 At this stage, there were three grades of medical 
men available according to the importance of the ship or factory. The highest grade of 
official was the trained chirurgeon; in some there was a physician or apothecary who 
had trained at an English or Scottish university, and finally, on smaller ships there 
were ‘Surgeons mates’ in whose hands were left the life and health of sailors and 
factories. These men carried with them chests of drugs and remedies, of which strong 
liquors, ‘China root’ (sasparilla) and Bezoar stones were important components.83 
Humoural theories of disease causation and internal medicine based on a notion of 
constitutional disorders shaped the therapeutic focus of European medicine at this 
stage, as it did the focus of Indian therapeutics.84 
European Medicine and Native Rulers
It appears that the Mughal aristocracy knew and appreciated the remedies of the 
English medical men. During the seventeenth century, a number of European medical 
men found employment as Surgeons or physicians at the Courts of Indian and eastern
85 rulers.  Shah Jahan is reported to have written to the English Governor at Surat in 
1640 asking for grape wine. In 1636, Governor Methwold sent Asaf Khan and Afzal 
Khan two jars of China roots each.  This indicates a certain degree of elite 
indigenous appreciation of European therapeutics in the seventeenth century. 
European Medicine and Indian Bodies
During the seventeenth century, European medical skill- consisting largely of 
remedies for maladies and rudimentary surgical operations- was not reserved for the
82 Ibid, p. 4.
83 Ibid, p.  10.
84 The account contained in this chapter contains relatively little on the evolution of medical ideas 
during the period undo-  study, and focuses more on structures. However, this is by no means to deny 
the epistemological value of ideas regarding health and disease, or their links with changing 
professional and administrative structures.
85 Crawford, A History, p. 7.
86 Reddy, The Beginnings, p. 9.
46factories and ships alone, but was also extended to Indians. In October 1636, a 
‘historic operation’ (an arm amputation) was performed by an English surgeon on a 
Brahmin boy as a ‘purely humanitarian service.’ Apparently, the child survived.87
Territorial Expansion during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the European settlement on the 
Coramandel Coast grew gradually. The earliest settlement was built at Masulipatam in 
what was the kingdom of Golconda in 1611.88 Later, the English obtained a piece of 
ground at Armegon in Nellore district where they built a fort and factory in 1626. 
However, here too they had difficulties and Messrs Francis and Day finally obtained a 
site adjoining Madraspatam In 1641, the Garrison of Fort St. George consisted of 35 
Englishmen and 35 Native surgeons. By 1644, this English settlement was equipped 
with an English Surgeon. In 1653, Fort St. George or Madras was made an 
independent Presidency and remained so until placed under Bengal when Warren 
Hastings was made Governor General of India and Calcutta became the headquarters 
and capital of the entire subcontinent.89 A decade later, in 1664, what is now the 
Madras General Hospital was established at Fort St. George in order to care for sick 
European traders and sailors.90 However, the hospital, funded from Company 
Revenues and charitable donations, was not restricted to the employees of the East 
India Company, but was opened to ‘all truly necessitous patients, whether belonging 
to the Garrison or the town’.9 1
87 Ibid, p.  10.
88 Ibid, p.  13.
89 Crawford, A History, p. 80.
90 Ibid, p. 23.
91 Ibid, p. 32.
47During the first half of the eighteenth century, the Company remained a trading 
corporation, with factories in the three settlements of Bengal, Bombay and Madras. 
Although the work of the medical staff was largely confined to the care of soldiers 
and company servants, Indians also received some medical care particularly in the 
hospitals of the company. There is mention of epidemics and famines during the 
eighteenth century during which ‘both Europeans and Indians suffered greatly’.  In 
1711, it was noted that the Madras General Hospital was overcrowded due to an 
‘unhealthy season’.92 The following year, in 1712, the hospital was said to be under 
construction and it was planned by the Englishmen in charge to ‘have a fund for the
93 hospital to relieve the poor at as little expense to the Company as Egmore building’. 
The Structure of the Medical Services 1763- 1857
The Bengal Medical Service was founded in 1763, by which individual medical 
officers then serving in the Bengal Presidency were combined into a regular medical 
establishment as employees of the East India Company, with fixed grades and definite 
rules for promotion from grade to grade.94  The Madras and Bombay Medical services 
also appear to have been constituted around the same time. In 1786, the Indian 
Medical Department came into existence at an all-India level as a medical department 
attached to the East India Company and its surgeons constituting a salaried medical 
establishment. The administrative body co-ordinating the medical services in each 
Presidency was a Medical Board. It is a little difficult to gauge the exact nature of the 
activities of the Boards, but it appears that recruitment and indents for drugs and 
supplies were routed through them to England.
92 Ibid, p. 35.
93 Ibid, p. 38
94 Crawford, A History, p.  198.
48The administrative body from 1764 in the Madras Presidency was the Madras 
Medical Board. The military orientation of the Medical Boards noted by other 
historians for Bengal and North India was also true of the Madras Medical Board in 
the eighty years of its existence.95 By this time, the English East India Company itself 
had metamorphosed into a territorial and military power rather than merely a trading 
company, and for several years in the late eighteenth century IMS surgeons held joint 
commissions as army officers in combat and professional medical men.96 The early 
professional activities of IMS surgeons consisted of vaccination, the maintenance of 
military hospitals for the medical and surgical care of European military men, the 
collection of a limited amount of medical statistics and inquiries into the causes of 
epidemics.
Preventive Medicine and Medical Aid to Indians 1830- 1860
From the 1830’s and 1840’s there was a greater degree of medical intervention for 
Indians as a regular part of European state medical activities. From the 1830s, there 
was an expansion of civil hospitals and dispensaries funded by the Provincial 
Government. These institutions were open to all civil employees of Government, as
Q7 well as the general population.  Funded partly from Governmental revenues and 
partly from charitable donations, endowments and subscriptions given by European 
and Indian people, these institutions grew slowly and unevenly in number through the 
first and second quarters of the nineteenth century.  From the 1840’s, preventive
95 See R. Ramasubban, Public Health and Medical Research in India: Their Origins Under the Impact 
of British Colonial Policy,  1978; Arnold, Colonizing the Body, Ch. 2, Harrison, Public Health in 
British India,  Ch.  1.
96 Crawford, A History, p. 223.
97 It is worth noting that famines and epidemics often spurred the growth of charitable medical 
institutions in Madras Presidency. This was in part largely due to private charitable movements in the 
wake of collective disasters.
49military medicine took the form of medical topographical studies intended to find 
salubrious sites for army stations in consonance with miasmatic theories of disease.98 
The Reorganization of the Medical Services in 1858
In 1857, medical services were reorganized. The Medical Boards were 
abolished and Provincial Medical Departments instituted in Bengal, Bombay and 
Madras. (See table 0.2). While nominally a part of the Indian Medical Department, 
the medical department of each province retained its distinctive character. Assistant 
Surgeons were recruited from English, Scottish and Irish universities through the 
Indian Medical Service to a Provincial Medical Department to which they remained 
attached through their career. Further, it also seems that while nominally a part of the 
state, the professional autonomy of medical men was retained: they were not mere 
puppets of state Governments and frequently expressed public opinions against 
Governmental policy. At the same time, professional rivalries and disputes could mar 
a young Assistant Surgeon’s career, if he came too much into conflict with older and 
more senior medical men in the Department.99 The health of armies and prisoners 
formed an important part of the duties of the young assistant surgeon in general. 
However, after the first two years of serving as doctor to an army division, medical 
men were free to pursue their own researches and professional interests among the 
civil population.
98 On medical topography and its significance as reflecting ideas about and shaping colonial expansion, 
see Harrison, Climates and Constitutions Ch. 3. See also idem, ‘Differences of Degree: Representations 
of India in British Medical Topography,  1820-c.  1870’, in N.A. Rupke (ed.), Medical Geography in 
Historical Perspective (Medical History Supplement No. 20), 2000.  Harrison argues that the 
topographical studies reflected the insecurity of Europeans regarding their ability to withstand the 
Indian climate, which they saw as the main obstacle to imperialism  Richard Smith, argues directly in 
contradiction to Harrison, that the Madras topographical studies were ‘not just products of (a single) 
imperial system but also logically ... .a corollary to the role of knowledge in the exercise of imperial 
power.’ (R. Smith,  ‘Rule- by- records and rule- by- reports: complementary aspects of the British 
Imperial rule of law’, op. tit.)
99 For an example of this, see J.C. Hume on A.C. De Renzy’s career in Punjab:  ‘Colonialism and 
sanitary medicine: the development of preventive health policy in Punjab,  1860-1900’, MAS, Vol. 20, 
1986, pp. 703-724.
50The Structure of State Medicine 1860-1880
State medicine in the 1860s and 1870s consisted of a conglomeration of bodies, at 
different levels of Government, involved in the knowledge, control, prevention and 
cure of disease. As will be seen from the table below, the divisions were of three 
kinds. The most important of these was the division between military and civil 
medicine, with Assistant surgeons being required to be in readiness to abandon their 
civil duties for military ones in case of emergencies. Between 1858 and 1880, the 
division between military and civil medicine continued in the separation of the 
departments for European troops from that for native troops and the general 
population.100 The department for European troops was called the Army Medical 
Department and that for the Native troops and the civil population was called the 
Indian Medical Department. The former was headed by a medical officer designated 
as the Surgeon-General, Army Medical Department; and the latter by the Surgeon- 
General, Indian Medical Department (also called the Surgeon General with the 
Government of Madras). Civil medical services before 1880 were looked after by the 
Indian Medical Department, which was entrusted with the control and 
superintendence of medical establishments attached to the Judicial, Revenue, and 
Police Departments; Medical Store Depots, and Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries. 
This Department was most often called the Madras Medical Department in referring 
to the functions of the Provincial arm As mentioned earlier, the Provincial Medical 
Departments all maintained their separate existence and professional autonomy, 
despite the Surgeon General with the Government of Madras nominally being 
subordinate to the Surgeon General with the Government of India.
100 The amalgamation, however, was only administrative. The executive medical duties of European 
troops were still entrusted to the Army Medical Department officers; and those of Native Troops with 
the IMD.
51The Madras Civil Medical Department had three tiers. At its head was the Surgeon 
General with the Government of Madras; who was subordinate to the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Native army, thereby still retaining what was an originally military 
character. Under him were four Deputy Surgeons General who were entrusted with 
the medical superintendence of a circle. (It is somewhat unclear how a circle was 
constituted or defined administratively). Within each of the four circles was an 
establishment of executive officers consisting of 11 Brigade Surgeons; 64 Surgeons- 
Major and 100 Surgeons. At the district level, a civil or Zillah surgeon was entrusted 
with the responsibility of affording medical aid to all Government servants in the 
Revenue, Public Works, Judicial, Police, Forest and other departments. This official 
was designated the district medical and sanitary official and was entrusted with the 
responsibility of inspecting and supervising the vaccination and conservancy 
establishments; dispensaries, jails and lunatic asylums at the district headquarters; the 
frequent inspection of minor dispensaries; the checking of all indents for drugs and 
for submitting these to the Surgeon general. There also existed a Subordinate Medical 
Department, which employed 3 classes of medical subordinates for service in 
provincial and district hospitals and dispensaries. The Indian Medical Department 
also recruited a select number of native practitioners from 1847 onwards, apparently 
with a view to ‘extending the benefits of European medical science generally among 
the native population in the several collectorates’.1 0 1
101 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated 14th February 1878, Nos. 
66-67, TNSA.
52Preventive and Curative Medicine
The other type of division was between preventive and curative medicine, a 
division which came to be personified in the separation of the sanitary and medical 
departments after 1864. It also changed the way in which vaccination was 
administered. From 1875, vaccination, which had hitherto had a separate sub­
department within the Medical Department, came under the Sanitary Commission, 
while the management of civil hospitals and dispensaries, indents for drugs, 
deployment of personnel, payment of salaries and provision of medical care and 
advice to other civil departments continued to be administered by the Medical 
Department. The transfer of the Vaccination Department as a Sub-Department of 
the Sanitary Commission in 1875 was also accompanied by what was effectively a 
demotion of status for its executive head, the Inspector General of Vaccination, to 
the post of Assistant Sanitary Commissioner. The Assistant Sanitary 
Commissioner’s duties were widened to include general supervision of sanitation, 
conservancy and cleanliness in cantonments and municipalities, a shift which was 
resented by the incumbent, Dr. John Shortt, who had headed the Vaccination 
Department for several years prior to this, and saw it as a devaluation of his 
specialist and technical knowledge of vaccination. The Superintendent General’s 
post was abolished, and he was made a direct subordinate of the Sanitary 
Commissioner of Madras. His title was changed to Deputy Sanitary Commissioner 
and the scope of his duties widened to include general sanitary inspection of the 
districts he visited. Further, from this year, the selection, appointment and payment 
of vaccinators and superintendents, the payment of batta to mothers, and the 
submission of returns became legally the responsibility of the Municipalities and 
Local Fund Boards that were set up under the Towns Improvement Act of 1865
53and the Local Fund Boards Act of 1871. What this meant in actual terms was that 
the distinctive departmental character of vaccination activities within the medical 
department was submerged; and that Shortt’s already tenuous control over the 
subordinate staff was diluted by the new bodies.  Shortt tersely wrote in his last 
report as Superintendent General of Vaccination in 1875-76:  ‘While held 
responsible for the work of the Department, I am kept in ignorance of (changes in 
staff). It is urgently necessary that Government should decide finally as to the 
management and control of the Vaccine Department. The duties of the Inspector of 
Vaccination should be clearly defined and the extent of control (of the Inspector of 
Vaccination) over Superintendents and Vaccinators should be clearly stated to 
prevent misunderstandings.’102
The Sanitary Commissions
Towards the 1860s and 1870s, we see therefore the growing dominance of the 
Sanitary Commissioner’s position within the administration of state medicine. In 
1863, the Report of the Royal Commission on the Sanitary State of the Army in India 
recommended that sanitary commissions be appointed in each Presidency, consonant 
with growing support for ideas that high mortality rates among British soldiers were 
due to unhealthy climatic and environmental surroundings, and that the proximity of 
army cantonments to native civilian settlements meant that measures to address the 
health of soldiers could not be undertaken without reference to the health of civilian 
populations, who lived in what were seen as grossly insanitary surroundings.
The establishment of the Sanitary Commissions at an all-India level in 1864 has been 
seen by colonial historians as a turning point for the beginning of serious involvement
102 Annual Report on Vaccination in the Madras Presidency for 1875-76, Madras 1877, p. 29.
54with civil health on the part of the state.10 3  This has also been seen roughly as the 
point at which notions of disease as caused by filth took precedence among medical 
men over those of climatic causation. It has however been noted by Mark Harrison 
that climatic theories never quite lost their appeal amongst European medical men, 
and that filth and climate co-existed in the minds of several European men in order to 
explain the occurrence of epidemic disease in Indian settings.104
Medical officials were already gradually becoming involved with the health of
Indians for several years prior to this, a point made by annoyed IMS officials who saw
the Sanitary Commissions and their great responsibility and recognition within the
Provincial Government as unduly under-representing the contributions of other
medical men and state medical bodies.105 In July 1869, Dr. James Shaw, a former
Principal Inspector General of the Madras Medical Department complained that
Measures for the amelioration of the sanitary condition of soldiers, prisoners and the 
population generally, are no novelties in India... .many things in past years have been 
accomplished, the fruits of which we now trace in the improved health of our troops...106
Shaw went on to state that the role played by measures of sanitation and conservancy 
in improving the health of the troops had been overestimated by the Royal Sanitary 
Commission of 1859, whose report had spurred the setting up of the Provincial
103 Jeffery, The Politics of Health in India, p. 93; R Ramasubban, ‘Imperial Health in British India, 
1857-1900’ in RM. Macleod and M. Lewis, Disease, Medicine and Empire,  1988, pp.39-42; Arnold, 
Colonizing the Body, pp. 96-97; Harrison, Public Health in British India, p. 8.
104 Harrison, Climates and Constitutions, Ch. 3.
105 See Harrison, Public Health in British India, on this point. Harrison dates the beginning of state 
involvement in public health to the Report of the Royal Commission in 1859 and the setting up of the 
Sanitary Commissions in 1864, but argues that such involvement was limited in its scope by a number 
of political and administrative imperatives.
106 ‘Memorandum by James Shaw, F.R.C.S., Late Principal Inspector General, Medical Department, 
Madras’, Measures Adopted  for Sanitary Improvements in India up to the end of 1867, together with 
Abstracts of the Sanitary Reports Hitherto Forwarded from Bengal, Madras and Bombay, 
IOR/V/24/3675.
55Sanitary Commissions in India. While arguing that the Medical Department had for 
several years been involved in more general measures aimed at the improvement of 
dress, food, and lighting in barracks, as well as vaccination and the provision of 
medical aid through civil hospitals and dispensaries, Shaw also suggested that 
improved knowledge regarding the treatment of ‘certain tropical diseases (especially 
the malarious fevers and dysenteries)’ was the main reason for improvements in the 
health of the European army’.107 Shaw further argued that vaccination, vital 
registration and the provisions of medical aid had long been functions of the Medical 
Department, functions which were now being seen as novel functions of the newly 
formed sanitary commissions.
What was seen by the Government as a new concern with the health of the general
population was also viewed by the Medical Department as impractical, given the
extremely small cadre of trained IMS men available in the Presidency. In 1866, upon
a charge by the then ICS Sanitary Commissioner that there was inadequate medical
aid available for the population of Madras during a cholera epidemic, the Principal
Inspector General of the Madras Medical Department wrote to the Secretary of the
Board of Revenue, stating that he did not see how there could be any
.... systematic ‘organization for affording Medical advice and relief during cholera 
epidemics’, considering the wide tracts of country involved, the almost constant presence of 
cholera in the country, and the very insignificant establishment of the Medical Department. 10 8
This official went further to question the aims of the Government, which, he believed, 
should ascertain
107 Ibid.
108 Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue, dated 29th October 1866, No. 8829, IOR/P/440/33. 
There were 67 such institutions in 1866, of which 15 were in the Presidency town. The remaining 
number included a specialist leper and smallpox hospital in Cochin, a hospital for seamen in Cocanada 
(Godavari district), a branch dispensary in Nellore, an asylum in Ootacamund (a hill station in 
Coimbatore district), and two  lunatic asylums in Trichinopoly and Vizagapatam district respectively.
56whether it is to be expected that Medical aid is to be afforded under direction of the 
Government Medical establishment to the entire population, or whether the efforts of the 
Medical establishment are to be mainly directed in the future, as in the past, to providing 
aid for the Military and Civil Establishments, and finding subordinates for duty in the 
Civil Dispensaries already or hereafter to be established.1 0 9
The Inspector went on to review the difficulties in establishing a scheme of medical 
relief for the general population. He argued that the Medical Department was 
woefully inadequate in terms of staff and logistics; and that extending medical aid to 
the general population would take several years.
The population of Madras Presidency may be reckoned at about 24 million, and that of 
Great Britain 28 millions. In the former, we have a Medical Establishment of all ranks 
numbering 736; in the latter, it is calculated that 20,000 educated and legally qualified 
medical men find employment in ministering to the health of the population. The contrast 
just made is in point of fact not quite a fair one, for the Madras Medical Establishment 
furnishes officers and subordinates to the Provinces of Mysore, Coorg, Travancore, 
Hyderabad Assigned Districts, a portion of the Central Provinces, Burmah and the Straits 
Settlements; and if the population of these districts are taken into account, it will be found 
that the Government Establishment of 736 individuals are the only persons available for 
the Medical Relief of a population... .(almost) as large as that of Great Britain. A 
considerable number of the ‘Hospital Assistant’ Class, moreover, are not fitted, by 
experience or by training, for anything more than carrying out of orders for the preparation 
and exhibition of medicines, so that practically the numbers given are not really available 
for giving medical Assistance to the civil population.11 0
The institution of the Sanitary Commissions in 1864 was thus not the novelty that 
some medical historians have made it out to be, and definitely was not so in the eyes 
of the Madras Medical Department. However, it did mark the beginning of non­
medical recognition of the value of medical men in general administration of the 
subject population, a phenomenon that was spurred by military and civil European 
anxiety over cholera- the most politically prominent disease of the 1860s, if not the 
epidemiologically most significant. (See Chapter 4 for more details). The newly 
formed post of Sanitary Commissioner of Madras was initially occupied by an Indian
57Civil Service officer in the first two years of its existence before, in 1866, being 
entrusted to an IMS man because the previous system (whereby an ICS officer headed 
the Sanitary Commission) had resulted in great friction between the Medical and 
Sanitary Departments.
The main functions of the Sanitary Commissioner were to inspect the general 
condition of cantonments and prisons, supervise the work of district sanitary and 
medical officials and to compile vital statistics obtained from town and district 
mortuary officials into a comprehensive annual report for the guidance of the 
Provincial Governments. The Sanitary Commissioners, although possessed of no 
legislative power, were nevertheless the first point of contact for the Provincial 
Government on legislative and other matters connected with the health of the 
European military and civil, and that of the general populations from 1864 onwards.
The Involvement of Local Bodies in Sanitary and Medical Administration
The third type of division was between different levels of administration, Provincial, 
District and Local. During the period under study, the proportion and number of local 
and district agencies concerned with the health of civilians gradually increased, while 
the health of the two armies remained the responsibility of the British and Indian 
Medical Departments. As medicine widened its professional horizons beyond the 
army and prison domains after 1865, the involvement of non-IMS personnel in 
matters of health, sanitation and medical aid and the necessity of co-ordinating with 
local revenue officials increased. This process gained momentum after 1865, when 
local bodies were formed under the Towns Improvements and Local Fund Boards 
Act. Sanitation and the management of civil hospitals and dispensaries were handed 
over to the local bodies from this date.
58Essentially then, the Province and the district were the main levels at which civil 
medical institutions were administered. Centralization and amalgamation of the 
military and civil divisions at an all-India level came in only in the 1880’s, and the 
district medical and sanitary officer was responsible for the supervision of medical 
institutions and co-ordination with local bodies such as the municipalities and Local 
Fund Boards for the provision of sanitation, conservancy, vaccination and medical aid 
services. Similarly, while there was some interaction and communication between the 
British and the Indian Medical Departments, the broad racial bifurcation of the 
services remained a significant feature throughout the nineteenth century.
Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries from 1858 onwards
The institutions through which state medicine reached the civil population consisted 
of civil hospitals and dispensaries. These institutions, started in the 1820’s and 1830s, 
provided medical aid and advice to civil officials of the various Government 
departments, but were open to the general public as well. Prior to the passing of the 
Town Improvement and Local Fund Boards Act in 1865 and 1871, they were funded 
largely through Provincial revenues and charitable donations and subscriptions both 
from Indians and Europeans. Between 1865 and 1871, the institutions were on a more 
stable financial footing, because the local bodies funded them from a regular system 
of taxation based primarily on land cesses. Prior to this, they had been funded partly 
by the Government of Madras and partly by charitable donations and subscriptions, 
which fluctuated from year to year. Secondly, it meant that they began to be managed 
to a greater extent by medical subordinates and other non-official medical men, whose 
salaries were cheaper than IMS men and were often therefore preferred by the local
59bodies. This phenomenon was frowned upon by the IMS, but there was little that 
could be done about it.1 1 1
However, this did not automatically guarantee the survival of these 
institutions. Most of their income was derived from land cesses. Therefore in times of 
drought or epidemics, when land lay fallow and labourers migrated, starved or fell ill, 
the revenue could not be collected and these institutions sometimes suffered.112 Over 
the long run, the number of civil medical institutions in a district was usually 
commensurate with agricultural prosperity. Tanjore, a district which was fortunate to 
have a perennial supply of water from the Kaveri river, had the largest number of 
dispensaries in 1871, while Kumool, Cuddapah and Nellore, all dependent on natural 
rainfall, had only 3.113 The spread of a network of civil dispensaries was also 
dependent on two other things: firstly, the acceptance of European medical aid among 
a significant number of people, and secondly, the efforts of medical officers, native 
medical men and subordinates, and revenue officials in supporting these institutions 
both politically and financially.
This brings us to the question of the indigenous acceptance or rejection of 
western medicine. It must be stated at the outset that until the mid-1860’s at least,
111 Although we do not have figures for all the years under review, the following will give an idea of 
the grade of medical officer in charge of Government Hospitals and Dispensaries. In 1877, there were 
24 First Class Hospital Assistants,  17 Second Class Hospital Assistants,  19 Passed Hospital 
Apprentices,  16 Surgeons- Major with 20-27 years service (the most experienced of the range), 14 
Surgeons with 5 to 9 years of service,  12 Private Hospital Assistants, 11 Surgeons Major with 10-19 
years of service,  10 First Class Apothecaries, 8 Pensioned Hospital Assistants, 6 Native Surgeons, 4 
Medical Missionaries and Pensioned and Second Class Apothecaries, and 3 First and Second Class 
Apothecaries. The above list shows that by 1877, most of the institutions were run not by IMS officials 
but by members of the Subordinate Medical Service.
112 In 1877, when the entire Presidency was engulfed by famine, the Provincial Government stepped in 
with extra funds, but these were mostly for institutions in the vicinity of temples and European 
settlements, such as Ootacamund, Coonoor, Conjevaram, Madura and Srirangam In this year, although 
the amount of money raised by Government and Municipal and Local Funds increased, the amount 
realised from all other sources- including interest on capital, private donations and subscriptions and 
the sale of medicines decreased greatly. {Annual Report on Civil Dispensaries in Madras Presidency 
for 1877, Madras 1879).
113 In 1879, Tanjore, a rich district irrigated by the perennial waters of the Kaveri river and growing 
surplus rice, had  23 dispensaries, while Kumool and Cuddapah, both in the ‘dry’ zone, had 3 and 6 
each. {Annual Report on Civil Dispensaries in Madras Presidency for 1879, Madras 1880).
60civil medicine did appear to struggle against a lack of legitimacy particularly amongst 
the elite, although both acceptance and ‘resistance’ to state initiatives varied widely 
between districts. Because of the nature of the evidence, it is difficult to come to any 
firm conclusion regarding indigenous ‘resistance’ or ‘acceptance’. However, some 
tentative conclusions are possible on this count, with the usual qualifications.
In 1866, in response to criticism by an ICS official regarding the availability 
of European medical aid for the general population, a proposal was mooted by the 
Medical Department to train native doctors and nurses in European medicine. The 
Madras Government opined that such a scheme would be too expensive to fund from 
Provincial revenues but agreed to solicit popular responses on whether the scheme 
could be funded from local taxation.114 There had been attempts to start similar 
schemes in Punjab and parts of Bengal a little earlier.115 However, the scheme was not 
well-received by either the district administration or by local elites, for a variety of 
reasons. One of these was the inability of district officials to convince people of the 
therapeutic effects of European medicine, in which it was proposed to instruct the 
hakeems and vaids. Another obstacle to this plan was that in some districts, attempts 
to get people to contribute to the building of a dispensary had incited violent reactions 
from the people, who resented the imposition of a further tax. Thirdly, all the district 
Revenue officials unanimously agreed that people in the Madras districts would not 
consent to pay a ‘voluntary tax’ and that if such a scheme were instituted; it would
114 Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue dated September 6th, 1867 No. 5976, Replies to the 
Board’s Proceedings dated 15th July 1867 No. 4425, IOR/P/440/39.
115 However, even in these areas, the scheme met with varying degrees of success. It was adopted 
successfully in Syalkote district of Punjab and ran on public subscriptions till the 1880’s. In Bengal, 
however, the scheme was stalled and continuously altered. This was due to disagreements between the 
Lt. Govern ex of Bengal, the Sanitary Commissioner, and the Civil Surgeon of Nuddea district 
regarding the type, nature and length of training to be provided, the source of funding and the 
involvement of non-medical personnel. See Bala, Imperialism and Medicine in Bengal, pp.57-59 and 
A. Kumar, ‘The Indian Drug Industry Under the Raj  1860-1920’, in B. Pati and M. Harrison (eds.), 
Health, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on Colonial India, Hyderabad, 2001.
61have to be imposed on them through legislation. A major obstacle appeared to be the 
great poverty of the cultivators, both in ryotwari and in Zamindari tracts.116
The Collectors of Tinnevelly and North Arcot districts, both predominantly 
ryotwari districts, believed that the mass of people would not pay a special tax for the 
education of Native doctors in Western medicine. The Collector and Sub Collector of 
North Arcot had just quelled a riot in Vellore, which was sparked off by their attempts 
to obtain supplementary private contributions from people for building a Dispensary 
at Vellore. They reported ‘.. .there is a general feeling of irritation and discontent on 
the subject of taxation which would render an appeal of this nature absolutely 
unsuccessful’.117 The Sub Collector of North Arcot wrote that ‘although the public 
peace has been restored, there still remains a deep rooted aversion in the minds of the 
people to Municipal taxation.. .1 would therefore suggest.. .postponing all efforts in 
this direction until the public mind... regain(s) its wonted contentment and 
serenity’.1 1 8
The Collector of Tinnevelly rued the fact that
The mass of people care nothing for public charity in our sense of the term.. .the hospitals 
and dispensaries established by the British Government, though intended as such, are not 
really public charities, for the public will not accept them; and only certain classes who 
have no prejudices, or are driven by necessity to conceal them, consent to be benefited by 
what we consider to be the noblest form of charity.119
116 The ryotwari system had its supporters and detractors, but a common view in the nineteenth century 
was that because it was based on a fluctuating and high assessment and taxed the individual cultivator, 
it reduced the cultivator to great poverty. Certainly there was a variety of systems of cultivation across 
the Presidency which included a large amount of indentured labour and sharecropping, and the bulk of 
the peasantry was poor. The zamindari areas in the Presidency however do not appear to have 
experienced any greater levels of prosperity.
117 Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue dated September 6th,  1867 No. 5976, Replies to the
Board’s Proceedings dated 15th July 1867 No. 4425, IOR/P/440/39.
62Further, he added that
Special taxes are specially disliked; an increase in the price of salt or stamps would be
accepted without a murmur, but.... direct taxation  however small, is felt by all to be a
burden, and I doubt the possibility of persuading the people to tax themselves for anything 
further.120
In the Kistna district, which was largely settled under ryotwari principles, the 
Acting Collector claimed that though people were willing to contribute to the 
education of Native doctors and nurses, the tax would have to be made compulsory. 
However, it was in Vizagapatam, a district covered by large portions of Zamindari 
tracts, that the widest range of responses was received. The Acting Collector of the 
Vizagapatam district, Mr. J.H. Master, concurred in the widespread view among 
district officials that a voluntary tax would be as good as none, as ‘the people would 
not pay a single fraction voluntarily; and that is anything is required, it would have to 
be realized by a Legislative enactment’.1 2 1
Master enclosed copies of the replies to his inquiries from four Zamindars 
within the district, including one female Zamindar. These responses reveal awareness 
amongst local elites regarding caste as well as poverty as obstacles to the spread of 
European medicine. The Maharaja of Vizianagaram, a substantial Zamindar began his 
letter by stating that caste determined the practice of medicine, and that there was ‘a
199 Brahmin physician, a Vaisya physician, and a Sudra physician’.  He argued that a 
scheme for training native doctors in European medicine, which worked well ‘in the 
populous district of Syalkote in the Punjab, would not do so in Vizianagaram, which 
was small, poor and sparsely populated, unless augmented by wealthy individuals and 
by the Government itself.123 He also argued that the cess would be looked upon as a
122 Letter from the Maharaja of Vizianagaram to the Agent to the Governor, dated Vizagapatam, dated
15th August 1867 No. 34, Proceedings, MBOR,  12th October 1867, IOR/P/440/40.
63new tax by the people and it would be difficult to realize the money without 
legislative sanction.
The Zamindar of Jeypore wrote that ’in this talook, there live ryots from 
Gunipur to Malakangirir who are poor and barbarous, some of whom cultivate land 
with advances from the Zamindar, and others already indebted to me for a great deal 
of money. ’ He was afraid that if the demand for one and a half annas were made, the 
ryots would abandon their land and run away, the money remaining uncollected. He 
however suggested that four or five hundred rupees be collected from ‘respectable and 
common people’ from Gunipur. He cautioned that the money should not be collected 
through a sub- magistrate, as this would cause ‘great disturbance’ in the talook, but 
that he personally would collect the tax and deposit it in the Collector’s office.124
The Zamindar of Bobilli flatly stated of the inhabitants of his Zamindary 
‘being uncivilized and having a taste for, and reliance on the treatment of Native 
doctors and midwives, which has been in vogue from the time of their ancestors, have 
not consented to pay.. .at one and a half annas for a house, or any other rate’.125
Finally the Proprietrix of the Anakapalle Estate, Sri Gode Janakaiya Garu, wrote that 
she had organized a meeting of ’all the principal inhabitants of this place, as well as 
the Respectable portion of my tenants and Inamdars’.  She reported that her tenants 
were at first unwilling to ‘the introduction of English medical science amongst them, 
as affecting their caste and prejudice’.127 Some had opposed the scheme of training 





126 Inamdars were landlords who were given land free of revenue, or at very low rates in return for 
services rendered to the Government. Village servants were often remunerated through the provision of
inam land.
127 Ibid.
64claimed, went against their caste principles’.128 Others claimed that ‘the Native 
constitution was more adapted to Native treatment and European constitutions to 
European medicine’.129 Still others claimed that native treatment was milder and less
130 dangerous’.  Garu reported that although she had succeeded to a great extent in 
quelling their fears, it would be advisable to bow to their wishes in the matter of the 
caste of their doctors:
They object a great deal to having Pariahs for their Doctors, or Hindus of no caste, and 
object to sending patients to a particular Depot for their treatment, as it interferes with 
their caste. They are for having doctors under the new system treat them at their own 
homes, as also for training up the sons of their present doctors. As to subscribing one or 
one and a half anna per family, they are quite willing to do it. I myself think that it is not a 
bad plan to give in a little to their prejudice at the commencement, and work the system 
upon their own scheme. I should be most happy to collect the fees, but cannot calculate 
upon them unless there be an Act passed by the Legislative Council making it 
compulsory.1 3 1
Under the circumstances, it seems likely that in large parts of the Presidency, 
government medical institutions were viewed with suspicion by significant numbers 
of the population, for a variety of reasons. It is of course quite difficult to separate a 
rejection of European  medicine as a philosophical and cultural construct from the 
more mundane aspects of medical administration, such as the fact that Government 
was unwilling to subsidize a scheme for training native doctors, and expected people 
to contribute towards this objective. Yet, it appears likely that government hospitals 
and dispensaries were not looked upon very favourably by either medical men or by 
‘respectable natives’. A survey in 1879 indicated that the largest proportion of 
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sagapatam, dated :
6623, IOR/P/440/40
Vizagapatam, dated 19th August 1867, enclosed in MBOR Proceedings dated 12th October 1867, No.
65very poor, who could afford neither medical advice nor aid.132 Senior medical 
officials were disapproving of the fact that these institutions took in what, to them, 
were a very large proportion of cases which were not strictly medical. These 
institutions were thus often seen in pejorative terms by medical officials themselves. 
For example, Samuel Johnstone, the Inspector General of Hospitals in 1872 wrote, 
‘The Municipal Dispensary system narrows the operations (of the Medical 
Department) and (municipal dispensaries) are little other than pauper houses’.1 3 3
Yet, there were exceptions to this rule. By the end of the 1870s, certain districts such 
as Tanjore had experienced considerable growth of European medical institutions, 
largely, it seems due to popular acceptance. In 1879, a large hospital was set up in 
Tanjore district and called the Raja Mirasidar Hospital. The hospital was built upon 
private contributions of a large number of mirasidars, who were intermediary native 
landlords, aided by contributions from the charities of King Sarabhoji, a former ruler 
of Tanjore. The land for the hospital was contributed by the Princess of Tanjore and 
the foundation stone was laid by the Collector of the district. The hospital ‘was 
intended as a thank-offering for the exemption of the district from the famine of 1876-
77 m
132 In 1879, the Madras Medical Department instituted an inquiry into the class of patients who 
attended government hospitals and dispensaries in connection with a proposal to levy a fee for medical 
advice and medicines. The inquiry stated that the ‘great bulk of the people who visited the hospitals 
and dispensaries were really poor and unable to pay for either medical advice or medicines.’ 
(Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department No. 79 dated 21st January 1879, 
G.O. No. 41, TNSA).
133Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency fori872, Madras 
1874, pp.55-56.
134 W. Francis, Tanjore District Gazetteer, p.  158.
66Missionaries and the Medical Department: Collaboration, Competition and 
Conflict
Another notable exception to the general disfavour with which Government medical 
institutions were viewed were institutions run by missionary organizations.
Missionary organizations had been functioning in Madras Presidency since the 
sixteenth century and included both Protestant and Catholic denominations from a 
variety of organizations. From the third decade of the nineteenth century, increased 
missionary activity was a direct result of the interventionist stance taken by the East 
India Company’s Charter Act of 1833.1 3 5  Within this broader framework, medicine as 
a means of evangelism was a strategy explicitly advocated by the Protestant American 
Board of Foreign Missions, which sent out trained medical men from 1836 
onwards.  The coming in of the American mission can be seen as a historical 
moment when evangelical and civilizational goals of the missionaries and the 
government coalesced and led to the explicit linking of medical work with that of 
saving souls. By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, there was a small 
missionary involvement in state medicine, both among self- avowed missionary groups 
who ran some of the state dispensaries and hospitals, as well as amongst senior IMS 
officers who believed that the inclusion of missionaries in state medicine would prove 
to be beneficial both for the state and for the people.
Medical missions played a role in the expansion of civil hospitals and 
dispensaries after the reorganization of the Indian Medical Department in 1858. This 
was due to several reasons, relating both to the desire of missions to propagate 
Christianity; as well as the official view that civil hospitals and dispensaries were a
135 G. A. Oddie, Religious Conversion Movements in South Asia, Surrey,  1997.
136 G. Smith, Medical Missions and Their Applicability to India: A Letter to the Rev. W. P. Powell, 
Madras,  1852.
67form of state charity. Civil hospitals and dispensaries had a precarious existence 
because of the limited Governmental investment in them137  After 1858, the 
Government of Madras expected that while medical personnel and drugs would be 
provided by grants from the Provincial Government, other costs such as food, clothing 
and nursing would be provided from yearly subscriptions and interest on donations 
from the native and civilian European population. In the early years after 1858, 
district officials complained about the lack of interest of the wealthier native 
population in contributing to the maintenance of hospitals and dispensaries.13 8  
Medical officers in charge of dispensaries complained that unless civil officers 
(district collectors in particular) took an interest in running these institutions, the 
people would not follow suit. These institutions suffered greatly from fluctuating 
fortunes. They were dependent on erratic donations and subscriptions from the small 
civilian European population and from wealthy Indians for their non-medical costs.
After 1871, these institutions ran on a more secure financial footing. 
Municipalities and Local Fund Boards began to pay the entire cost of medicines and 
medical salaries. Yet, to the displeasure of senior officers of the Indian Medical 
Department (IMD), local bodies preferred to hire members of the Subordinate 
Medical Service, such as hospital assistants and apothecaries, to run the institutions. 
Their salaries were cheaper than full- fledged Assistant Surgeons of the IMD. The 
Government of Madras, the IMS and the local bodies therefore welcomed medical 
missionaries, trained doctors who ran dispensaries and were paid by their parent
137 This was particularly true for institutions outside of Madras city. While the Presidency town had 12 
institutions in 1865, it received Rs.  1, 91,289 from the Government, while the 67 mofussil dispensaries 
received a collective Government allotment of Rs. 70, 466. After 1871, Government contributed 
overwhelmingly to the city institutions, while local boards, whose collection of taxes was heavily 
dependent car rural prosperity, funded the rural dispensaries (Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and 
Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency for 1865, Madras 1866).
138 For example, in 1865, the Principal Inspector General complained that ‘until the wealthier Naives 
interest themselves more in the local charities, many of them will continue to be on very unstable 
foundations’. (Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency for 1865, 
Madras 1866, p. 4).
68139 bodies.  Sometimes, in addition to trained medical personnel, missionary 
organizations offered the use of mission buildings at no charge. Therefore, the offer of 
missions to provide either medical personnel, or buildings, or both, in the running of 
dispensaries was gratefully accepted by the Government. While their number was 
small, their influence on  the state medical structure was quite disproportionate.
Some IMS men admired or even advocated the combination of evangelism with
corporal healing. For example, the Inspector General of Hospitals, Dr. William
Johnstone, wrote in 1872:
(The principle on which) these dispensaries are governed is that, in association with efforts 
to diffuse Christianity in India.. .the practice of medicine and surgery occupies a 
prominent place ...  medical missionaries work as skilled representatives of the science and 
art of modem medicine and surgery.... (and thus contrast it to) the foul product of 
ignorance and superstition which dominates the people of India.... To proclaim the truth 
that the art which they practise, equally with the civilization with which it has been 
associated.. .both have had their true source in that Christianity which it is the disinterested 
object of (the missions) to diffuse.140
Other officials explicitly advocated medicine as a strategy to win over more converts
to Christianity. Two decades prior to Johnstone’s report, George Smith, then a young
IMS officer, had written to Henry Powell, the Archbishop of Madras, to requisition
greater attention to medical missions as a means to propagate Christianity amongst the
Hindus in Madras presidency. Smith wrote:
Medicine carries in its hands a gift, the value of which the Hindu recognizes. It brings that 
gift to him at a time, not when the heart is hardened by health, but when it is softened by 
disease and pain and suffering; at a time when man, shrinking into himself, feels that he is 
but a child- a child in power at least... .at a time... when (he) earnestly looks to external 
help and sympathy and when the natural attitude is dependence upon , and confidence in
something external to itself  To the heart in this impressionable state, the aid of the
medical man is peculiarly acceptable, and however bigoted the Hindu mind may be, yet at 
such a time these feelings do predominate, and then the Christian is forgiven- is pardoned 
for being a Christian, because he is a physician. The heart, acted upon by feelings of
139 It has to be mentioned that their numerical presence was very small: out of a total of 76 dispensaries, 
the number run by missionaries was 4. (Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in the 
Madras Presidency for 1872, Madras 1874.).
140 Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency for 1872, op. cit.
69gratitude for health restored and life preserved is more likely to listen with patience to the 
terms of that more necessary healing which affects the soul.  ‘When 1 speak’  said a Chinese 
Christian,  ‘to the natives in the bazaars and streets of Jesus Christ, they treat me with scorn 
and contempt; when I speak to them in the hospitals; they listen to me with serious 
attention’.141
George Smith later went on to become the Surgeon General of the Madras Medical 
Department in the mid-1870s, indicating that the practice of ‘colonial medicine’ was 
intimately linked to that of Christian evangelism in Madras. A cholera remedy 
patented by Dr. Paterson, a medical missionary who had established a dispensary in 
Madras town in the 1840’s, was the prescribed medicine distributed by the 
Government of Madras, despite complaints of its inefficacy. This presents further 
evidence that medical missions seemed to have had a fairly close relationship with the 
Government of Madras and its Medical Department from the late 1830s onwards.
Yet, this relationship was also marked by competition. Medical officers were always 
aware that Indian elites in general did not respect European medicine for its 
therapeutic qualities; and that it was very poor people of the untouchable castes, who 
resorted to the Government institutions. Because poverty and disease were 
irrevocably intertwined in many of the persons who attended these institutions, 
dispensaries and hospitals that were run by local bodies were felt to include a great 
proportion of these ‘non-medical’ cases, in contrast to the large and increasing 
population of the better-off, who visited hospitals run by missions.
For the Madras Government as well as its Medical Department, there were two 
reasons to desire the admission of ‘upper caste’ people into government dispensaries. 
Firstly, diet costs formed the second largest item of expenditure on hospitals, after 
medical salaries, between 1858 and 1880.142 Throughout the period, the Provincial
141 Smith, Medical Missions and Their Applicability to India, op. cit.
142 Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency, various years.
70Government paid for the salaries, except in the case of medical missionaries who were 
paid by their parent bodies. The diet costs were paid by the Government of Madras 
until 1863, when it put a ceiling of Rs. 50 on the amount it would contribute towards 
the diet of patients in each institution. However, this ceiling remained on paper as 
district surgeons and medical subordinates often debited Provincial accounts by 
putting these costs under other heads. From 1865 in towns and 1871 in Local Fund 
Board Circles, the entire cost of the dispensaries was borne by municipalities and 
Local Fund Boards.
Upper caste people usually refused to be fed at Municipal or local fund board 
hospitals, bringing their own food with them Their presence then meant the limitation 
of Government expenditure under this head. A Native Surgeon in charge of the civil 
dispensary at Cochin wrote in 1870 of the encouragement of self-feeding patients in 
hospitals:
This method of combining economy with utility.. .reflects much credit on the management 
of the dispensary. While it enables the Dispensary to show the admission of a large 
number of in-patients, it also relieves the hospital funds from being saddled with heavy 
expenditure.143
The second reason was that IMD officers saw upper caste use of government hospitals 
and dispensaries as “the truest test” of the prestige of European medicine in the 
estimation of Indian society.144 Protestant missionaries, who had long grappled with 
the caste issue in their congregations, found a way out of the situation. From the 
1860’s onwards, they began to build separate wards for high caste natives where they 
could cook their own food.
The adaptation of medical science to what the Government termed ‘prejudice’ 
was adopted in civil dispensaries and hospitals after senior medical officials wrote
143 Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency for 1870, Madras 
1872, p. 26.
144 Annual Report of the Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency for 1872, p. 55.
71approvingly of its results in missionary institutions. The President of the Governing
Council of Madras wrote in 1871:
The time has now come for Government to initiate a change in the plan of our Provincial 
dispensaries which has long been deemed requisite by the most competent authorities and 
partially carried out by the Medical missionary agencies.. ..I allude to the system of 
separate hutting facilities.. ..a provision of this nature would have the excellent effect of 
inducing respectable natives to avail themselves of the benefit of European medical
145 treatment.
This led to formal arrangements for separate hutting facilities for the use of high caste 
natives within the main hospital compounds.146 These arrangements, it was felt, 
contributed to the prestige of the institutions, and enabled them to perform the dual 
functions of charity and medicine more successfully.147 That the ‘separate hutting’ 
system was seriously taken up by Government is also evident in the fact that ini 880, a 
special caste ward in  the Nellore civil dispensary was inaugurated by and named after 
the Governor of Madras, the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos.148 Further evidence 
of the competitive element between missionaries and the medical department is 
provided by the fact that when the Scudder family took over a dispensary at Arcot, 
they promised to show ‘in two months a larger number of in-patients and out-patients 
than any other institution in the Presidency’.149
While the interaction between the Madras Medical Department and medical 
missionaries seems to have been generally smooth, the inability of the Provincial 
Government to impose rules on medical missions could -and did- make for rough 
weather. This was particularly so in the case of the American mission dispensary at




148Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency for 1880, Madras 
1881, p. 73.
149 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated July 20th 1866, Nos.  112- 
113, G.O. No. 729, TNSA.Raneepet. At various points from its establishment in 1866 to its closure in 1880, 
district officials complained that the Scudders were more interested in evangelical 
activities than in running the dispensary. For example, in 1877, an Engineer of the 
Public Works Department was severely injured and was brought to the Raneepet 
dispensary for emergency treatment. On arriving there, his companions found that Dr. 
Scudder had gone away to a missionary conference, leaving his box of medical 
instruments locked away in a cupboard. The engineer’s death caused the Collector 
and President of the Local Fund Board, Mr. Whiteside, to complain about Dr. 
Scudder’s lack of accountability and ask the Government to clarify and articulate its 
financial relations with the American mission. He argued that if there was no scope 
for ensuring that a medical officer was available at a dispensary in emergencies, then 
it posed a grave threat to the public health.150 The Scudder dispensary at North Arcot 
was finally handed over to the Local Fund Board in 1880.151 Thus, by the end of the 
period under review, civil medical institutions were largely run by local bodies and 
the Madras Medical Department and the IMS had generally relinquished their control 
over these institutions. By this time, there appear to have been wide differences in 
Indian responses to European medicine.
150 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated February 12th 1877, Nos. 
51-54, G.O. No.  159, TNSA.
151Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency for 1880, Madras 
1881.
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76Year Districts Purported Nature of Price of Mortality and
Affected Causes State food crime
Response grains
1865- Ganjam, Failure of Despatch of Average 4,50,000 or
66 Bellary, rains in 3000 bags of increase in double normal
South Arcot, 1864-65 grain by the price of rate. Few
North Arcot, Government raggy: starvation deaths
Trichinopoly, and 2000 46%, in 12 out of 19
Salem, bags by local across 19 districts; 11,000
Madura, merchants; districts; starvation deaths
Coimbatore sanction of increase in in Ganjam In
Rs.  10,000 prices of Bellary: 50,357
for rice: 34% deaths in 1866
employment over 19 (4% per mille.).
of poor in districts. Non agricultural
November Note: In classes suffered
1865; relief Bellary: most, especially
by Ganjam raggy in persons on fixed
zemindars in creased by salaries.
Berhampore 247 % Mussalman
from April to between population
November; September suffered
May 1866: : 1865 and severely in
Formation of September many districts.
General 1866;and Zemindary
Famine relief rice estates suffered
fund August: increased more severely
Relief depots by 131% . than Govt.
(food and villages due to
medicines) impoverishment.
opened in Apparently no
Bellary, increase in
Salem, North violent crime,
Arcot, South but in nearly
Arcot and every district,
Coimbatore. number of grain
Relief thefts and
houses for robberies
aged / infirm increased.
in Bellary, (Sanitary
Kumool, Commissioner’s
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77Table 0.2 Governmental Agencies Involved in Health, Medical Relief and 
Sanitation in Madras (1786-1880).
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81Chapter 1 State Intervention and Famine Relief Policy in Madras 1876-78
Introduction
A prominent theme in the literature on famine relief in colonial India pertains 
to the influences on colonial famine policy. The debate on influences on famine 
policy has tended to divide those who emphasize long-term ideological and moral 
influences against those who suggest that ideas about interventionism amongst 
colonial officials were mere excuses for decisions that involved financial expediency, 
the advancement of personal aims and political careers and the control of threats to a 
public, political and social order.
Examples of the former include Srinivasa Ambirajan who argues that the 
famine policy of the Government of India during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century was based heavily on Malthusian doctrines which were imbibed by colonial 
civil servants as part of their training.1  Ira Klein also touches upon the issue of non­
interventionism as justifying inadequate provision of relief, which then became the 
precipitating cause between a failure of the monsoons and excess mortality.  David 
Arnold also writes that ‘during the famines and shortages of the early and mid­
nineteenth century, the provincial governments adhered firmly to the principles of 
Free Trade, reproving officials who tried to fix market prices or who sided with 
hungry and frightened consumers against the grain traders’.3
1  Ambirajan, Classical Political Economy, p.  13. However, Ambirajan’s view of policy formation is 
slightly different in his  1984 book on monetary management in India. In the former, Ambirajan argues 
that belief in classical political economy was a dominant influence on policy processes.  In the latter, 
Ambirajan asserts that political and administrative processes involving the actions of pressure groups 
within and outside the government could modify the way in which ideas were carried forward into 
policy’. S. Ambirajan, Political Economy and Monetary Management: India 1766-1914, Madras,  1984.
2 Klein,  ‘When the Rains Failed’, op. cit.
3 Arnold, Famine, pp.  113-4.
82More recent studies have, however, critically questioned the extent to which 
state intervention derived from shared ideological beliefs- particularly in non­
intervention or laissez faire- that were constant over a long historical period. Some 
studies, noting that ‘theoretical considerations’ played some role in official debates, 
argue however that these were mere facades for a reluctance to spend money on 
famine relief. 4 B.M. Bhatia, for example, argues that the concern not to undermine 
the British hold on the landowning and mercantile classes lay behind the British 
desire  to keep famine relief as cheap as possible, for fear that fresh taxes would 
estrange these classes.5  Lance Brennan, while giving some room to both theoretical 
concerns and financial expediency argues that ‘personalities and politics’ were the 
decisive factors in shaping what went into the Famine Codes.6   David Hall-Matthews 
also favours financially expedient concerns over theoretical ones, and argues that 
long-term policy was shaped by the individuals and circumstances in a particular 
historical moment.7 On a slightly different note, Sanjay Sharma suggests that 
‘political economy’ was a theoretical smokescreen for bureaucratic uncertainties with 
regard to intervention, and that the state consolidated and standardized its bureaucratic 
and infrastructural basis through its non-interventionist famine relief measures in the 
1830s.8  Similarly, Ravi Ahuja argues that political expediency- the strategic and 
critical importance of control of the labour market for the Government of Madras in 
the face of a labour scarcity and a strong ‘Native’ political enemy- prompted
4 G. Patnaik, The Famine and Some Aspects of British Economic Policy in Orissa, 1866-1905, Cuttack, 
1980.
5 Bhatia, Famines in India, op. cit.
6 Brennan, ‘The Development of the Indian Famine Codes’, op. cit.
7 Hall- Matthews,  ‘The Historical Roots of Famine Relief Paradigms’, op. cit.
8  Sharma, Famine, Philanthropy and the Colonial State, p. 58.
83intervention by Fort St. George during a famine episode in late eighteenth century 
Madras, despite an awareness of Adam Smith’s treatise on political economy.9
Our aim in the following chapter will be to evaluate the weight of ideological, 
administrative, political and personal factors in determining the way in which famine 
relief was provided in Madras during 1876-78. We suggest that while beliefs 
regarding non-interventionism were espoused as justifications for particular courses 
of action, there existed a deep tension between non-interventionism and 
interventionism in official responses to famine, which shaped Provincial famine 
policy in a very definite way. Moreover, there were substantial gaps between policy 
and implementation at any given point of time. These gaps were due to logistic and 
administrative factors involved in the implementation of famine relief policy. 
Considering all the evidence, it does appear that these emergent factors had more 
causal weight in the way in which famine policy developed.
We will, further, develop Hall-Matthews argument with regard to the structure of the 
state as it shaped famine policy. Hall Matthews argues that the colonial state, although 
not monolithic, was a basically hierarchical and therefore a relatively stable structure. 
We will instead argue that the hierarchy was essentially uneasy, and that there were 
deep divisions- ideological and administrative- between different levels and agencies 
of Government over the possibility, desirability, nature and extent of intervention in 
famine processes.  There thus appear to have been two faces of Imperial famine 
policy- the first minimalist and non-interventionist; and the other humanitarian and 
interventionist.
9 Ahuja, ‘State Formation and “Famine Policy”’, op. cit.
84Further, administrative systems in Madras appeared to be unconducive to the 
implementation of the Government of India’s system of famine relief. Thus, the 
colonial state was essentially divided in its responses to famine.
The First Phase: July 1875 to October 1876 
The Signs of Distress
Reports of impending famine began, as in most south Asian famines, with a series of 
monsoon failures and requests by district officials for financial assistance for famine 
relief works. The southwest monsoon in 1875 was ‘scanty and late’ and unfavourable 
reports of the state of the season were received by the Government of Madras from 
the Collectors of 11 districts out of 19 in July 1875.10 However, the distress was 
particularly acute in two talooks of Bellary district (Ghooty and Raidurg).1 1  In August 
1875, the Collector of the Bellary district arranged with the District Engineer to 
execute road repairs as famine relief works at a cost of Rs. 3,000, which was financed 
from a grant from Provincial Revenues.12  In October, the Collector reported to the 
Madras Board of Revenue that if the north east monsoon failed, distress in these two 
talooks would continue. The Board of Revenue reported this to the Government and 
directed the Collector to prepare a scheme of works in anticipation of a failure of the
10 Madras Famine Review^ Madras, Government Press, 1879, p.  1.
1 1  Letter from Secretary to the Government of Madras, Fort St. George, to the Secretary, Government 
of India, No. 900, dated 4th  July 1876, enclosed in letter from Government of India to Secretary of State 
for India, No.  13 of 1876, Correspondence between the Secretary of State for India and the 
Government of India on the Subject of the Threatened Famine in Western and Southern India 
[Henceforth Famine Correspondence]  1, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
12 Governmental revenue and expenditure was classified under three heads: Imperial, Provincial and 
Local according to the nature of the control exercised: whether the funds were administered exclusively 
by the Government of India, mixed control by the Imperial and Provincial Governments, exclusive 
control of the Provincial Government, and from 1871, for special or local objects, or under such 
circumstances that they were excluded from the accounts of the empire as a whole. {Madras Manual of 
Administration, Madras 1883).
85north east monsoon.1 3  The rationale stated by the Board of Revenue was decidedly 
utilitarian:  ‘early and liberal expenditure on works may avert the necessity for 
distributing charity, which should be avoided by all possible means.’1 4  Accordingly, 
the Government of Madras authorized the Collector to extend and maintain relief 
works where necessary.
Debates raged between different levels of Government over the form and 
nature of famine relief to be provided. The Madras Board of Revenue and the Bellary 
Collector clashed over the size of relief works. The Collector selected two roads on 
which he proposed to mass labourers. He also asked to be allowed the discretion of 
starting small works near villages and asked for a grant of Rs.  12,000 for this purpose. 
The Board of Revenue refused this last request on the grounds that relief was to be 
provided in the form of large works of utility, and that small projects such as road 
repairs would be impractical and wasteful. (This view was also put forth by the 
Government of India later the following year, in refusing requests by the 
Governments of Bombay and Madras for starting railway projects as relief works). In 
the meantime, the Collector reported that rain had fallen and that people were 
beginning to cultivate their lands.
However, two months later, in December 1875, after a personal inspection of 
the two talooks, the Collector repeated his request for Rs.  12,000, stating that after the 
harvest, the people would find it difficult to obtain the means of subsistence.1 5  This 
time, the Government of Madras sanctioned the grant after a recommendation was 
passed by the Board of Revenue, illustrating that grants of financial assistance often
13 The Madras Board of Revenue was responsible for the daily intimate functioning of the state in the 
districts. Technically related to the Provincial Revenue Department, the Revenue Board exercised 
much greater influence than any other department of Government over district, talook and village level 
affairs. All matters connected with district and village level taxation, annual settlements under the 
ryotwari tenure, the management of temples went through the Revenue Board.
14 Madras Famine Review, p.  1.
15 Ibid.
86had to be made several times by subordinate officials, thereby delaying the provision 
of famine relief.
In the meantime, despite rainfall in August and September 1875, the weekly 
seasonal reports from the end of October 1875 showed slight or partial rainfall in 
several other districts in the Presidency. By January 1876, the prospects of the 
northeast monsoon season in several districts had begun to look bleak. The dry 
Northern districts of Bellary, Cuddapah and Kumool were particularly affected by the 
drought. On the 20th of January, the Provincial Government wrote to the Imperial 
Government that they expected a very extensive loss of crops.
Thereupon the Government of India, alarmed at the tenor of the weekly season 
reports, asked the Government of Madras to ‘report more fully’ on the state of affairs. 
In reply, the Provincial Government wrote to the Government of India that they 
expected ‘loss of crops, large scale remissions and high prices’; and that ‘relief works 
funded by Imperial revenues’ might become ‘inevitable.’1 6  Four districts were 
affected in particular: Bellary, Cuddapah, North Arcot and South Arcot.
Cries for help from other districts
In February 1876, revenue officials in other districts began to petition the 
Government of Madras for financial assistance to open relief works. The response of 
the Government of Madras to these requests was uneven. Requests for financial 
assistance were routed through the Madras Board of Revenue to the Madras 
Government. In many cases, financial grants for relief works were sanctioned or not 
sanctioned according to the extent to which the Revenue Board believed a request 
from a district collector was legitimate and justified. The persuasive power of district
16 Telegram dated 24th October 1876, from Secretary, Madras to Commerce, Simla, Famine 
Correspondence 1, IOR /V/4/Session 1877/Vol.65.officials played a significant role, thus, in determining whether relief works were 
started or not in a particular district. The Collector of the Salem district reported to the 
Government of India that the season was exceptional, and requested a grant of Rs. 
12,000 to start relief works in two talooks of the district. The Madras Government 
refused this request on the grounds that they did not consider the situation serious 
enough to justify applying for Imperial funds.1 7  By May 1876, lists of relief works 
had been referred by the Madras Government and approved by the Government of 
India in the districts of Cuddapah, Tinnevelly, Chingleput and South Arcot. In the 
meantime, relief works were started in another talook of the Bellary district. The 
Collector of Nellore was asked to draw up a list of works to be kept ready for 
execution in case of monsoon failure. In June 1876, the Collector of Madura district 
reported ‘distress’ on the failure of the north east monsoon, but also stated that there 
was no sign of the distress turning into scarcity. The following month, the Collector of 
Cuddapah reported that there was ‘every chance of distress amongst the poorer 
classes’ and asked for a grant of Rs. 25,000 from the Provincial Government. In reply, 
the Government of Madras placed Rs. 10, 000 at the disposal of the Collector through
1  R the Board of Revenue, stating that the demand seemed ‘very sudden’.  The sub- 
Collector of Cuddapah advocated that the Government of Madras purchase grain in 
order to pay the famine stricken labourers as they would otherwise be ‘unable to 
purchase food except at exorbitant prices’. At this stage, both the Government of 
Madras and the Board of Revenue turned down the idea of grain imports on the 
grounds that ‘such interference would disorganize trade’ and that ‘the Government 
could not purchase or carry grain as cheaply as native merchants’.1 9
17 Madras Famine Review, p.l.
1 8 Ibid.
19
88Provincial Demands for Imperial Assistance
In August 1876, the Government of Madras telegraphed the Government of 
India asking for sanction for the expenditure of Rs. 41,000 for relief works already 
begun in the districts of Bellary and Cuddapah.20  This request was acknowledged by 
the Government of India only in October 1876, and thereupon summarily refused.2 1  
Relief was initially provided on large public works run by the Madras Public Works 
Department.22
In September 1876, however, the Government of Madras received requests 
from the Collectors of these districts (Bellary and Cuddapah) to open public works 
under their personal supervision instead of that of the Public Works Department 
(PWD) as the PWD system of employment was believed to be unsuitable for relief of 
agricultural distress where daily payment was a necessity.  For example, the Collector 
of Bellary reported that ‘coolies would not go to works run by the Public Works 
Department as the training and organization of its officers was not adapted to a system 
requiring daily payment of labour’.23  From this point onwards, the Madras 
Government provided relief mainly in the form of works run by district Collectors and 
the Madras Board of Revenue. These works were called ‘civil’ works and they were 
funded from the ordinary revenue of the financial year in question.
By the end of October 1876, there were 83, 000 people on relief -mostly civil 
works- in Bellary and Cuddapah. By December 1876, civil works under the 
supervision of district Collectors were opened to employ famine relief labourers at the
20 Madras Famine Review, p.  12.
21 Ibid.
22 ‘Large works’ were defined in the 1883  Madras Famine Code as those estimated to cost over Rs.
2500 and employ a 1000 people continuously for three months.  (Madras Famine Code, Madras,  1883 
p.jj). However, during 1876-77, there was considerable confusion between the Government of India 
and the Provincial Governments over what constituted ‘large works’ and there appeared to be no clear 
definition for purposes of undertaking relief works within a given administrative and ecological 
context.
23Madras Famine Review, p .12-
89rate of 1  V 2 lb. of grain per man per day (women and children were paid 1  lb., and 
children 3 4 lb.) In fourteen districts, covering an area of 80,000 miles, distress was 
felt: people began to leave their homes in search of food, to crowd into towns and 
chhuttrums\ and seek employment on relief works.24 There were also reports of 
‘distress’ and ‘scarcity’ from the districts of North Arcot, South Arcot, Salem and 
Nellore. Simultaneously, the south west monsoon had failed in Bombay, Mysore and 
Hyderabad. In December 1876, the Government of Madras was forced to open centres 
for the gratuitous relief of people through distribution of food in relief camps.
From October 1876, the Government of India headed by Lord Lytton began to 
be alarmed about the likelihood of heavy Imperial expenditure on famine relief in 
Madras, Bombay and Mysore, all of which had experienced extensive and severe crop 
failures.25  On the 27th of October 1876, the Government of Madras wrote to the 
Government of India stating that Provincial funds had been exhausted and that 
Imperial expenditure was now unavoidable.26 The Government of Madras had already 
expended Rs. 3, 77,770 on famine relief. Over 50,000 famine stricken people were 
employed in Bellary district alone. The Government of Madras requested the 
Government of India for permission to employ people on building a railway line 
between the towns of Bellary and Guduk in accordance with the principles of relief 
followed during the famine in Bengal in 1873-4, which were to employ all who 
sought work on payment of lower wages than if the works was to be conducted on
24 W. Digby, The Famine Campaign in Southern India Vol. 1, Madras 1878, p.  11.
25 The extent of the famine was at the time unknown, but three months later, in January 1877, the 
Government of India estimated that in Madras,  18 million people over an area of 80,000 square miles 
were affected and in Bombay 5 million people over an area of 54,000 square miles were affected. 
(Secretary of State for India to Government of India, Letter No.  16, dated Revenue Despatch No. 6,
12th January 1877, Famine Correspondence Part 1, IOR/V/4/Sesson  1877/Vol. 65.) The Government of 
Madras estimated the financial loss due to the famine at two crores and thirty two lakhs of rupees (Rs.
2,320,000 or £ 232, 000) in December 1876. (Letter No.  14, from Government of India to Secretary of 
State for India, dated 8th December 1876, Famine Correspondence l, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65).
26 Telegram dated 24th October 1876, from Secretary to the Government of Madras to Secretary 
Commerce, Simla, Famine Correspondence 1, IOR/V/4/Session 1877, Vol. 65.
90ordinary terms. The Government of India vetoed the suggestion, stating instead that 
the Provinces should employ persons on smaller works closer to their homes, instead 
of starting large works, which were’ unlikely to be required ‘after a short period’. 27
The Imperial Government thus initially disbelieved the reports of distress sent in from 
Madras, just as the Madras Board of Revenue and the Madras Government 
disbelieved reports of distress sent in by the district Collectors. Current political 
conditions and individual political personalities at the helm of affairs were important 
determinants of the willingness of senior officials and bodies to believe and acquiesce 
to the demands of subordinate officials for financial assistance. Yet, debates over 
famine relief in the immediate past also coloured the actions of the Imperial 
Government.
During the Orissa famine of 1866 (which also affected the Northern districts of 
Madras to a great extent) the Governments of India and Bengal had failed to intervene 
in the situation in time, despite warnings from district officials early on in 1865. This 
led to at least a million lives being lost in Bihar and Orissa and at least 400,000 in 
Madras. In 1873-4, the Government of India under Lord Northbrook began to import 
grain in November 1873, as soon as district officials reported distress. In 1876, the 
Government of India under Lord Lytton was determined that the 1873 policy could
not be repeated without running the risk of bankruptcy, and this led to strict
28 injunctions against monetary waste.
27 Letter from the Government of India (Gol) To the Secretary of State for India (SoS), No. 28 of 1876, 
dated Calcutta, 17th November 1876, Famine Correspondence 1, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
28 P. Brumpton, A Selection from the India Office Correspondence of Robert Cecil, Third Marquis of 
Salisbury, 1866-67 and 1874-78, Lewiston, 2002, p. 21.
91Provincial Governments were also erratic in their assessments of crisis situations. 
Although the Madras Government swung into action late in 1876, their initial reaction 
was slow, unresponsive and even irresponsible. As we have seen ear  her, requests 
from the district collectors for funds to start relief works were granted on an ad-hoc 
basis, depending on the ability of district collectors to convince the Madras 
Government rather than on any well-considered and reliable system of information 
and review.29 In addition, there was a tendency amongst higher administrative 
authorities to mistrust the judgement of those lower down in the hierarchy, 
particularly when faced with requests for financial assistance to carry out famine 
relief works. This tendency was endemic to the colonial state as a whole; it marked 
the responses of the Government of India to the requests of the Provincial 
Governments; the Provincial Government and the Madras Board of Revenue to the 
district collectors under the ryotwari system; the district collectors to the Tahsildars 
and the village officials. This mistrust seems to have been pervasive not just in the 
responses of European administrators to native subordinates, but within the 
bureaucracy as a whole.
In early October 1876, the Governor of Madras, the Duke of Buckingham and 
Chandos, left Madras on a long tour to the Andaman Islands, Rangoon and Ceylon.30 
The Duke took with him most of the members of his council, leaving the reins of the 
administration in the hands of Sir William Robinson, whom Lord Salisbury, the
29 This point (that Imperial sanction for relief measures tended to be made on an ad-hoc basis according 
to how convincing a district official could make his appeal) has also been made by Elizabeth 
Whitcombe. (E. Whitcombe,  ‘Famine Mortality’, Economic and Political Weekly, XXVIII, 23 (1993): 
1169-1179.)
30 W. Digby, The Famine Campaign in Southern India Vol. 1, pp.4-5. Digby wryly added that (the 
purpose of the Governor’s tour) in the last named place (Ceylon) was ‘to inquire about a railway which 
will not be wanted for a century.’
92Secretary of State for India privately described as ‘a most unfortunate phenomenon 
(with) a narrow provincial patriotism’.3 1   The departure of the Governor apparently 
led the Government of India as well as civil servants and journalists in Madras to 
believe that nothing was amiss and that the scarcity was being tackled satisfactorily.32
Phase II: November and December 1876 
Provincial Defiance: The Import of Grain
However, the Duke, in constant telegraphic correspondence with Robinson, 
soon became alarmed by reports of suffering and starvation in the Presidency. Grain 
riots took place in the Cumbum talook of the Kumool district and Cuddalore town in 
South Arcot in October 1876.33 Two officials- Mr. Thornhill, of the Madras Board of 
Revenue, and Mr. Arbuthnot, of the Madras Council, were deputed to visit Bellary 
and Kumool respectively. Mr. Thornhill reported that Bellary district was ‘full of 
grain’ but that merchants were reluctant to contract either for sale or transport. There 
appeared to be a danger that once the certainty of the north east monsoon ended, 
merchants would refuse to sell grain altogether. In the meantime, the Government of 
India directed that all large projects requiring an expenditure of over Rs. 2500 should 
be avoided and prior sanction sought by the Provincial Governments before allowing 
district Collectors or the Madras Public Works Department to begin such works.
31 Letter No.  15 from Salisbury to Lytton dated May 4th 1877, Letters to the Secretary of State, Lytton 
Collection, IOR/MSS/Eur 218E/4A.
32 Digby, The Famine Campaign in Southern India Vol.  1, op. cit., p. 5.
33 No.  1,599 A, From the Secretary to the Government of Madras (GoM) to the Secretary to the 
Government of India (Gol), dated 7th November 1876. There were also grain riots across the Bombay 
Presidency during 1876 October, and this perhaps alarmed the Government of Madras. (Note on the 
condition and resources of the districts in the Bombay Presidency which are threatened with scarcity; 
dated Simla, October 21st,  1876, Famine Correspondence 1, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65).
93In late October 1876, the Government of Madras took a step that was openly in 
defiance of the policy of non-intervention in the grain trade imposed by the 
Government of India and the Madras Board of Revenue. Thornhill and Arbuthnot’s 
report on the Ceded districts indicated that the drought had led to great distress and 
hunger. There was a ‘marked increase in crime’; and despite the very low rates 
offered as wages on local relief works, ‘large numbers of people resorted to them, 
including respectable ryots and heads of villages’.34  Alarmed by reports of starvation 
and grain riots, the Governor of Madras wrote privately to Robinson to sanction the 
import of 30,000 tonnes of rice from Bengal through the agency of a commercial firm, 
Arbuthnot and Company, in a secret transaction.  The Government of Madras 
intimated the Government of India of its action on November 4th, 1876, requesting 
that the Imperial Government foot the bill of Rupees 32 lakhs (Rs. 3,200,000).35
The import of grain was a direct reversal of the non-interventionist policy laid
down by the Government of India and the Madras Board of Revenue since the early
nineteenth century as guides to famine relief policy. It incurred the wrath of Lord
Lytton, the Viceroy, Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India and several of the
members of the Council of the Government of India. The Government of India wrote,
In the present state of the finances, such a measure should only have been resorted to upon 
the strongest grounds of proved necessity, and not.. .until full explanation of the necessity 
had been submitted to, and accepted by the Government of India, upon whom rests the
entire responsibility for the financial administration of the Empire  if local
Governments are to be permitted to embark in financial considerations of such magnitude
34 Letter from the Government of Madras (GoM) to the Government of India (Gol), No.  1599A, dated 
7th November 1876, Famine Correspondence 1, IOR/V/4/Session  1877/Vol.65.
35 The Government of India (Gol) wrote to the Secretary of State (SoS) for India on 17th November 
1876, that they had received a telegram from the Government of Madras (GoM) on the 4th of 
November intimating that the latter had contracted confidentially with a local firm for the purchase of
30,000 tonnes of rice at a cost of Rs. 32 lakhs. The GoM requested the Gol to pay this amount at the 
rate of Rs. 4 lakhs a week. (Gol to SoS dated November 9, 1876, No. 27, Famine Correspondence 1, 
IOR/V/4/Session  1877/Vol. 65).
94without the permission or knowledge of the Government of India, the most serious 
embarrassment must ensue.36
Imperial administrators were resolutely against intervention in the grain market.
Salisbury would later write privately to Lytton:  ‘  In its uneconomical views about
the supply of grain the Madras Government went incorrigibly wrong, and there it was 
absolutely necessary to resist’.37 Others were more vocal in their displeasure. O.P. 
Bume, Lytton’s personal secretary, would write to Louis Mallet, Under Secretary of 
State for India:  ‘I should like to hang or shoot a great many people in South India if it were 
allowable!’3 8
In its defence (provided much after the transaction had been made), the Madras
Government pleaded that this form of state interference was justified by the
extraordinary circumstances:
In consequence of extreme uncertainty grain stores in distressed districts, and 
extraordinarily high prices  prevailing in distressed districts in Madras, and difficulty in 
obtaining food for money, this Government have confidentially secured a Government 
reserve (of grain).39
Clearly, concerns about threats to public order were intermingled with fears of mass 
starvation and death in the Governor’s decision to import grain as a reserve for 
distribution as wages to labourers on famine relief works. (At the same time, it is 
noteworthy that the imported grain- rice- was intended as a reserve for distribution on 
famine relief works, rather than for gratuitous distribution. Much later in the course of
36 Letter, Gol to SoS, No. 28 of 1876, dated 17th November 1876, Famine Correspondence 1, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
37 Letter from Salisbury to Lytton, No. 22, dated June 15,  1877, Letters from the Secretary of State, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4A.
38 Letter from O.P. Bume to Louis Mallet dated Coimbatore,  10th September 1877, Letters to Sir Louis 
Mallet, Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/48b.
39 Letter, GoM, Revenue Department to Gol, Financial Secretary dated 4th November 1876, enclosed in 
Gol to SoS No. 28 of 1876, dated 17th  November 1876, Famine Correspondence 1, IOR/V/4/Session 
1877/Vol. 65.
95the famine, relief officers in Bellary district complained that rice was insufficiently 
nourishing for the sustenance of famine relief workers.)40 In a later letter, the 
Government of Madras also referred to the ‘seriously threatening circumstances’ in 
the famine stricken districts and stated that the import of grain was necessary in order 
to guard against the risk of ‘great disaster and loss of life’. It also stated that ‘there is 
no longer room to doubt that distress, which is even now threatening to culminate in 
famine requiring extraordinary State measures, must for some months be experienced 
by the poorer portion of the population’. 41
The Government of Madras almost unanimously supported intervention, both 
in terms of importing grain and in terms of providing famine relief, when the 
magnitude of the impending famine became known. (The Executive Council in the 
Government of Madras consisted at this time of the Governor, the Duke of 
Buckingham and Chandos; Sir William Robinson and Alexander Arbuthnot).The 
reasons for this interventionist stance were complex, but it can be argued that one was 
a genuine sense of responsibility for human life on the part of the individuals who 
formed the Madras Council, the executive body of the Government. Salisbury wrote 
to Lytton in late April 1877 regarding the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, who 
was the Governor of Madras at the time:
I have told you by telegraph of Buckingham’s state of feeling as disclosed by his letters....
whatever may be the case with his advisers  He is genuinely shocked at the suffering he
sees and hears of, and is anxious as to the future  he dreads being held responsible... .for
some terrible calamity.42
40 The Sub Collector of Gooty talook in Bellary district complained to the Talook Famine Relief 
Officer that ‘the grain being boiled rice, labourers would not thrive on it, whereas it would do very well 
for the people who are fed in camps.’ (Reply to Memo dated 26th October 1877, enclosed in 
Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated 31st December 1878 Nos. 
212-213, G.O. No.. 2634, TNSA).
41 GoM to Gol, dated 13th November 1876, enclosed in Gol to SoS, No. 30 of 1876, dated 24th  
November 1876 (Famine Correspondence 1, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.)
42 Letter No.  14 dated April 27th, 1877 from Salisbury to Lytton, Letters from the Secretary of State, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4A.
96What emerges from this extract is that one cannot generalize, (as have some writers 
on the basis of sources for other famine periods) that state intervention emerged only 
or even primarily when distress caused people to resort to theft, arson and attacks on 
European officials.43 Undoubtedly the threat posed by grain riots did result in many 
district officials petitioning the Government of Madras for famine relief. However, we 
have seen that these requests were not always granted, and so to credit ‘popular 
action’ with such causative power would, we suggest, overstate the extent to which 
these actions could generate official responses. Officials responded to a situation of 
crisis for a variety of reasons, not all of which were congruent or consistent with each 
other. It appears that one cannot entirely discount a genuine sense of humanitarian 
responsibility on the part of individual administrators.
In evidence was also fear amongst administrators sitting in London and Simla, 
regarding the situation in Madras. Deep in the south, it appeared as strange, remote 
and ungovernable territory, and its bureaucrats, albeit European, difficult to control. 
Salisbury remarked:  ‘As to the Madras Government, I feel I know so little I can
hardly criticize  Madras seems to be a very peculiar country!’44 The larger context
of Madras within the Government of India seems to have made the defiance of 
Madras a source both of displeasure and trepidation by the Government of India.
43 There is a large literature on food riots and peasant revolts in times of famine, both in the Indian and 
European contexts. The interested reader is referred to Sharma, Famine, Philanthropy and the Colonial 
State, op. cit. Ch. 3
44 Letter No. 22 dated 15th June 1877, Letters from the Secretary of State, Lytton Collection,  IOR/MSS 
Eur/E218/4A.
97The Precedent for Intervention: Richard Temple’s Import of Grain in 1873-4
The import of grain, however, was not the first instance of a Provincial 
Government acting in contradiction to the ideals of non-intervention and laissez-faire 
that had governed the utilitarian teaching that many civil servants learnt during their 
training since the beginning of the nineteenth century.45 There was a recent precedent 
for Provincial interventionism, which had been supported by no less than the previous 
Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook. This was in Bengal during a threatened famine in 
1873-4.46
The timely import of grain and relief work by the Bengal Government had 
prevented a large-scale calamity in 1873-4.47 In late 1873, Lord Northbrook, the 
Viceroy of India at the time, had sanctioned a request by Sir Richard Temple for 
importing 100,000 tonnes of rice from Burma. Temple, who was the Famine 
Commissioner, later became the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in 1874. Temple in 
particular came under fire for overestimating the amount of grain required to feed the 
distressed population. His generous estimates of the amount of food required daily by 
a labouring adult had led to the Government being faced with huge amounts of left 
over stocks of grain after the famine.48 He had been singled out for criticism by
45 The classic work on the intellectual trends informing colonial thought in the nineteenth century is E. 
Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, Oxford, 1959. See also C. Dewey, The Mind of the Indian 
Civil Service, Mumbai,  1993.
46 Madras Famine Review, op. cit., p.  12.
47 Here it must be mentioned that the 1873-4 course of Government action was itself a reaction to the 
disastrous failure of a strictly non-interventionist state policy which had led to large scale mortality in 
Bihar and Orissa in 1866 and Rajputana in 1869. See J.C. Geddes, Administrative Experience Recorded 
of Former Famines: Extracts From Official Papers Containing Instructions for Dealing with Famine, 
Compiled Under Orders of the Government of Bengal. Calcutta, January 1874.
48 An anonymous pamphlet writer (most likely a Bengal civil servant) wrote that Temple had estimated 
that the relief measures had cost the Government of India £ 4,400,000 and that the total imports 
amounted to 460,000 tonnes of grain, of which 435,000 were left untouched at the end of the famine.
(The Black Pamphlet of Calcutta: The Famine of 1874 by a Bengal Civilian, London:  1876.)
98members within the India Office and the Government of India for the huge 
expenditure that had prevented the scarcity from snowballing into a famine.49
During this famine, there were ‘only’ 23 deaths. Paradoxically, the limited 
scale of mortality during this famine caused the Government of India to doubt 
whether it amounted to a famine at all.  Even more strikingly, each and every course 
of action of the Bengal Government- particularly Temple- to prevent mortality- 
whether it was the import of grain or the prompt and generous system of relief put 
into place- was later criticized by several civil servants as extravagant.50 The authority 
given by the Government of India to local Governments to undertake famine relief 
measures upon the apprehension of distress had come under intense scrutiny 
following upon this famine.
It was now three years later, and the Madras Government defended its action on the 
basis of the Bengal precedent. In a review of the famine in 1878, the Madras 
Government wrote, ‘It was impossible for the Government of Madras to choose any 
other course of action but that followed by Lord Northbrook’.5 1  This caused a great 
deal of friction between the bureaucrats of the Imperial and the Provincial 
Governments. O.P. Bume, the Personal Secretary to Lytton wrote to Louis Mallet, the 
Permanent Head of the India Office:
.. .Millions have been utterly wasted and the Madras people rest their defence... .on the 
wretched famine policy  left us as a legacy by Lord Northbrook, (!).. .on the irresistible cry
of humanitarianisni  fortunately my violent language does no one any harm as I shall
not be in India to write the history of the famine or to expose to derision Lord
49 The cost of the Bengal ‘famine’ was £ 6,333, 333 (about Rs. 63, 333, 330), while there were ‘only’ 
23 deaths. See Hall-Matthews,  ‘The Historical Roots of Famine Relief Paradigms’, op. cit.
50 The Black Pamphlet of Calcutta, op. cit.
51 Madras Famine Review, p.  15.
99Northbrook’s principles and declarations, which would otherwise have given me a vast 
amount of pleasure to do so!52
After a series of acrimonious exchanges with the Madras Government, the 
Government of India decided to send a representative to supervise relief operations 
there. The subject of the choice of a delegate to Madras was much debated amongst 
officials gathered in Delhi to celebrate the proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress 
of India.5 3
The Third Phase: Temple’s Deputation in January 1877
In the light of Richard Temple’s interventionist policy in 1874, it came as a surprise to 
many when he was deputed by the Government of India in January 1877 to advise the 
Madras Government on economy in famine rehef. However, Lytton had a deeper 
understanding of Temple’s character. He wrote to Mallet in January 1877, after the 
selection had been made:
Our best course (was) to send Temple in the character of our Commissioner with adequate 
powers to Madras. Temple is leaving to retrieve his reputation for extravagance in the last 
famine, by showing how efficiently he can work an economical policy... he carries with him 
great authority, and I don’t think we could have found in all India at the present moment a 
man more likely or better able to help us to save money in famine management.54
The Government of India sent its delegate with an explicit brief. Temple’s 1874 
dictum that ‘no expense should be spared in order to save lives’ was inverted in 
January 1877 by the Government of India. Temple was instructed that
52 Letter from O. P. Bume to Louis Mallet dated Poona 23rd  September 1877, Letters to Sir Louis 
Mallet, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/48b. Louis Mallet, 
Under Secretary of State for India, was a passionate supporter of a free market, and authored a number 
of essays on the subject. See L. Mallet,  ‘Free Exchange’, London, 1891.
53 The incongruence of the lavish ceremony in Delhi to commemorate the Queen’s accession to the title 
at a time when millions were starving in southern and western India was commented upon both among 
the press and the Madras bureaucracy. See Digby, The Famine Campaign Vol.  1, op. cit., p. 56.
54 Lytton to Mallet, dated Benares 11th January 1877, Letters to Sir Louis Mallet, Lytton Collection, 
IOR/ MSS Eur/E218/48b.
100Even for the object of such paramount importance as the preservation of life, it is obvious that 
there are limits imposed on us ... .we must plainly admit that the task of saving life, 
irrespective of the cost, is one which it is beyond our power to undertake.5 5
Clearly, Lytton, along with other bureaucrats in the Government of India such as 
Richard and John Strachey, O.P. Bume and Louis Mallet were intent on enforcing a 
strictly non-interventionist famine policy. However, it is difficult to make definitive 
statements about whether they were motivated by belief in classical political 
economic theories or merely by mercenary concerns of saving the Government from 
what they saw as serious financial embarrassment. Bume and Mallet were passionate 
ideologues of non-interventionism as a tenet of governance. Mallet was the author of 
a number of tracts and essays on free trade, while Salisbury was a loyal member of 
the Conservative party.56 Yet, they were also deeply concerned about the state of 
Imperial finances, as famine relief was seen as constituting a Provincial drain on 
Imperial revenues. Clearly, for these individuals, ideological beliefs did play some 
role in shaping responses to famine. However, the weight of the evidence seems to 
point to financial expediency as a dominant influence on the Government of India’s 
policy decisions in 1877.
Salisbury had written to Lytton in April complaining against the humanitarianism of 
the Madras Governor, ‘Of course there is a calamity of a totally different kind: the 
emaciation and starvation of the Budget next week- to which he (Buckingham) pays 
little attention, and on which he wastes no anxiety’.57
55 From the Secretary to the Government of India to the Hon. Sir Richard Temple, Bart, K.C.S.I., Lt. 
Governor of Bengal (on a Special Mission), dated Calcutta the 16th January 1877. (Famine 
Correspondence 2, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.)
56 See Mallet’s posthumous collection of essays,  ‘Free Exchange: Papers on Political and Economic 
Subjects’, London, 1891.
57 Letter from Salisbury to Lytton, dated April 27th 1877, Letters to the Secretary of State, Lytton 
Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4A.
101Lytton in turn wrote to Mallet:
I anxiously hope you will not encourage any humanitarian (impulses) in England about the 
famine- that is now our greatest danger- if the British public insists on our keeping ryots 
alive ‘regardless of expense’ and imposes on us a  ‘life at any cost’ policy- the British 
public might in fairness find us the money (which we have not) for satisfying the
co
commands of its cheap sentiments.
It appears from this extract that a nebulous ‘public opinion’, both in England and in 
India, had begun to play a significant role in shaping official famine policy. (As the 
famine wore on, both Lytton and Salisbury became more and more worried about the 
public image of official famine policy. This preoccupation is evident in the official 
correspondence, although a study of newspapers and journals would have further 
enabled a detailed critical view of this issue). Further, although this point cannot be 
substantiated with detailed evidence, it does appear that famine policy began to 
acquire more and more of a ‘public image’ as the nineteenth century wore on, 
possibly in large part due to the development of printing and circulation of 
newspapers, journals and pamphlets both in English and in vernacular languages.
By December 1876, the Government of India had received estimates stating that the 
financial cost of the famine in Madras alone was computed at Rs. 2 V 2 crores. A 
complete failure of the monsoons in Bombay, and reports of starvation and distress in 
the princely states of Hyderabad and Mysore signalled a vast Imperial financial 
outlay. Salisbury wrote to Lytton that ‘.... I am afraid you have had a terrible time 
with the famine. It is a sad blow to all our financial castles in the air’.59
58 Lytton to Mallet, dated Bewares 11th January 1877, Letters to Sir Louis Mallet, Lytton Collection, 
IOR/MSS Eur/E218/48b
59 Salisbury to Lytton, Letter No. 2, dated February 9, 1877, Letters from the Secretary of State, Lytton 
Collection,  IOR/ MSS Eur/E218/4A.
102At the end of 1876, over a hundred thousand people were employed on relief works 
across Madras Presidency, consisting mostly of repairs to roads, wells and river 
works. These works were managed by district Collectors and opened to all who 
sought employment at a wage that was lower than the wage paid to able-bodied 
labourers on ordinary Public Works Department works. The Government of Madras 
had also begun to distribute food gratuitously in relief camps and kitchens to starving 
people in the vicinity of Madras city.
Private Charity and State Relief: An Uneasy Relationship
Private Indian charity appears to have had an uneasy relationship with the 
provision of Government sponsored relief. From an early stage onwards, ‘native 
gentlemen’ were active in providing gratuitous relief in their houses or in the streets 
of Madras.  There was official recognition from an early stage onwards that 
Government relief operations were woefully inadequate. Yet, private charity was 
viewed with suspicion and disapproval, on several grounds. The first of these was that 
it attracted huge crowds into the main cities, such as Madras, which the Government 
was anxious to keep free of starving migrants.60 ‘Indiscriminate’ private charity was 
believed to attract people in unmanageably large numbers to these towns, where such 
relief was mostly given. Cornish complained that private charity caused ‘rumours to 
fly about the neighbouring districts that in Madras, there were ‘mountains of rice and 
rivers of ghee’ awaiting the arrival of the hungry.61
60 Despite these allegations, it appears that the failure of the Government machinery to provide 
adequate relief in the more far-flung and remote rural areas was the main factor which induced 
migration of people to the towns. This failure is evident from the responses received by the Indian 
Famine Relief Fund for financial assistance from September 1877. (See later in this chapter).
61 Fourteenth Annual Report of the Sanitary Commissioner  for Madras for 1877,  {henceforth SCR 
1877), p.  191.
103Another complaint was that relief was given indiscriminately- that those who received
it were not (in the eyes of European officials) truly in need. Therefore, private charity
was seen to encourage dependency amongst the undeserving poor. In his sanitary
report for 1877, Cornish remarked that from around October 1876 onwards, native
gentlemen of means and position opened kitchens of their own account, where ‘if the
relief was indiscriminating, much food was also given away to the really deserving’.62
Private charities were also seen as less amenable to supervision and
standardization. Cornish complained,
In these private feeding kitchens, no attempt was made to issue a standard allowance of 
food. A certain amount of grain was cooked daily, and whether the applicants were 1000 
or 3000, an attempt was made to divide the dole between the whole number. Those who 
were strong and robust, and who by sheer strength could scramble earliest into the feeding 
places, got best served while the weak often had to put up with a scanty ration or none at 
all.63
Finally, private charities were seen as providing an unscientific or inadequate diet. 
In February 1877, Cornish complained that ‘relief was given in such a form as to do 
but little good.. ..the quantity of grain appeared to be insufficient but being made up 
of with buttermilk and a strong sprinkling of hot condiments.’64 He continued:  ‘at one 
of these private charities, the rations, in my opinion and in that of Dr. Thompson’s, 
did not equal half a pound of rice in each ball of cooked food.’65 Yet, he also 
expressed a belief that Government relief operations were ill-equipped to deal with a 
tragedy on the scale of the famine, and suggested that private individuals be 
encouraged to contribute food to Government relief camps.66 Thus, private charity 
was discouraged by the Government if the relief houses was managed by non­
governmental or private agencies, but private charity as subsidiary to Government
62 SCR 1877, p.  191.
63 Ibid.
64 SCR 1877, p.  181.
65 SCR 1877, p.  191.
66 Ibid.
104relief operations was seen as essential for the state was to tackle the famine 
satisfactorily. Cornish later remarked that he could not ‘help concluding that it was a 
grave mistake to dry up, at an early stage of the famine, the springs of private 
charity’.67
This account of official responses to private charity during the famine would 
confirm Sanjay Sharma’s assertion that the colonial state was willing to encourage 
and recognize indigenous efforts if they conformed to a more formal and institutional
idea of charity. Sharma suggests that indigenous practices were sought to be shaped
68 according to new principles deriving from Christian charity and standardization.
Yet, as will be clear, at a later stage in the famine, provincial officials themselves rued 
this drive as having the effect of severely limiting the scope of operations.69 Thus, we 
might state that a drive towards standardization and assumption of the sole right to 
give ‘appropriate’ charity was quickly contradicted from within the state itself during 
the famine of 1876-78. Official attitudes towards philanthropy, while seemingly 
aimed at standardization and institutionalization, were in reality marked by uneasy 
and contradictory attitudes regarding the interaction between private charity and 
official relief and the ability of official relief to undertake the task of preventing 
starvation.
Thus, state famine policy was marked by deep divisions between Centre and Province 
over three aspects of famine relief. First, there was a concern over whether the state 
had a moral duty to undertake to feed the famine stricken or merely to employ them 
(deriving in part from debates over whether there was a famine of work or food, and 
the ability of private trade to overcome local shortages of food through
67 SCR 1877, pp.  191-2.
68 Sharma, Famine, Philanthropy and the Colonial State, pp.  177-  192.
69 Ibid, p.  187.transportation). Secondly, there were divisions over the nature of relief works: their 
size, management and purpose. Which Government Department was best suited to 
manage famine relief works? Should relief should be ‘charitable’ or ‘profitable’? How 
large should they be, given the topographical and administrative realities of a 
particular region? Finally, was the Imperial Government was to place a ceiling on 
local and Provincial expenditures on relief and demand bureaucratic scrutiny of 
district level demands, or allow district level administrators the administrative and 
financial freedom to respond quickly to a situation of agrarian crisis. While non­
interventionist policy formed a core ‘shell’ around which state responses to famine 
were organized, it is evident that unbridled non-interventionism had a number of 
official detractors, both for moral as well as expedient reasons. However, the 
existence of humanitarian impulses did not effectively prevent starvation. In the 
districts and villages, a slow tragedy unfolded. (See Table 1.1).
106Table 1.1: Districts Affected by Famine, January 187770
DISTRICTS Area in sq. 
miles






Bellary 11,007 1,668, 006 23,43,386 6,89,841
Kumool 7,358 959,640 14,27,653 3,31,272
Cudappah 8,637 1,351, 194 17,71,726 2,07,108
TOTAL first 
tract
26,732 3,978,840 55,42,765 12,28,221
Kistna 8,036 1,452,374 38,46,936 1,64,585
Nellore 8,462 1,376,811 24,73,598 89,773
Chingleput 2,753 938,184 16,32,688 1,57,129
North Arcot 7,139 2,015,278 26,91,778 3,15,342
Salem 7,483 1,966,995 21,88, 827 3,06,113
Madura 9,502 2,266,615 19,24,196 1,37,974
Coimbatore 7,432  ' 1,763,274 25,01,180 2,80,718
Trichinopoly 3,515 1,200,408 15,54,787 1,49,363
Tanjore 3,654 1,973,731 39,89,490, 4,94,555
TOTAL 
second tract
57,976 14,953,670 2,17,03,480 20,95,582
GRAND
TOTAL
84,708 18,932,510 2,72,46,245 33,23,803
Temple’s Recommendations
In the meantime, Richard Temple began his tour of the famine stricken districts of 
Madras. Sent as a delegate, Temple had the sanction of the Imperial Government to 
recommend changes in administering famine relief. Lytton proved to be astute in his 
assessment of Temple’s keenness to show his ability to ‘work an economical famine
70 Only seven districts in the Presidency were considered ‘free from famine,’ in January 1877. These 
were Tinnevelly, Malabar, Ganjam, Godavery, Vizagapatam, Nilgiris and South Canara. In two of 
these- Tinnevelly and Malabar-there were reports of high prices and ‘distress’. (Letter, Gol (Revenue, 
Agriculture and Commerce) to SoS, No. 2, dated Calcutta, 12th January 1877, Famine Correspondence 
2, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.) While a discussion of the various grades of distress or necessity for 
intervention recognized by the state and the politics of ‘famine certification’ would be extremely 
insightful, such a study is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, Amrita Rangasami has discussed 
the role of the bureaucracy in the classification of famine and distress. (A. Rangasami:  ‘The Masking 
of Famine: the Role of the Bureaucracy’, in Floud and Rangasami, Famine and Society, op. cit.) New 
Delhi, 1993. See also P. Brass, ‘The Political Uses of Crisis: The Bihar Famine of 1966-67’, JAS, 
XLV, 2 (1986): 245-265.
107policy’. Temple set about his duty of economizing relief measures in Madras in full 
earnest.
Temple went over the famine stricken districts of the Presidency at breakneck speed, 
finding the time to pen over two hundred elaborate minutes and memoranda in the 
course of his tour He secured the approval of Lytton and the Government of India.
But in Madras, Temple ruffled many feathers and even Salisbury, the Secretary of 
State for India, was alarmed at his revolutionary zeal. In these minutes and 
memoranda, Temple made a series of recommendations to the district collectors, 
engineers and the Government of Madras. These recommendations were aimed at 
economizing expenditure on famine relief. However, to officials in Madras, they also 
seemed to have been penned with a determination to convince the Government of 
India that nothing was amiss in Madras; the people were not suffering; and the
71 Government was doing all it possibly could at the lowest possible cost.
The keystone of Temple’s proclaimed famine policy was that the Government 
could undertake to save lives, but it could not prevent distress. In addition, financial 
considerations, rather than humanitarian ones, were to take pride of place in the 
principles of provision of state relief. All but those who would be in danger of losing 
their lives unless given state aid were to be declared ineligible for famine relief. 
Temple’s recommendations included the restriction of employment to those who were 
proven by physical examination to be in real need; the substitution of money wages 
for grain wages; and the discontinuation of small relief works and the concentration of 
labour on large works at a distance from people’s homes. He insisted that the system 
of managing relief works through the agency of district Collectors was to be
71 Digby, The Famine Campaign, Vol.l, p. 66.
108overturned, and the Madras Public Works Department be made responsible for famine 
rebef. The Madras Government had already, in December 1876, created a famine 
department under the secretaryship of the Collector of South Arcot, Mr. H.H. Garstin, 
which Temple asked to be dismantled.72 Temple further insisted that in keeping with 
the Government of India’s policy of concentrating labour on large, ‘well-supervised’ 
works under the stewardship of the Public Works Department, famine relief labourers 
were to be ‘patiently and firmly’ transported from Bellary, Kumool and Cuddapah to 
the East Coast Canal Works near Nellore district.73  Additionally, Temple ordered 
that task work was to be strictly imposed on relief works. Labourers who refused to 
work for the reduced wage were, in his opinion, not entitled to receive state aid.74
Temple secured the approbation of the Government of India (Lytton was later
75 to declare that he had ‘behaved very well indeed’).  However, in Madras, his visit 
created much anger and dissatisfaction amongst members of the Government and the 
bureaucracy. The Governor of Madras expressed a fear that Temple’s sweeping 
economy would result in much suffering. On February 22nd, 1877, the Governor 
issued instructions stating that rules regarding the exaction of tasks on relief works 
were not to be too strictly applied; and that due care was to be taken by famine relief 
officers to ensure that no harm came to relief labourers; and that wages were not cut 
in case of those who were too weak to work.
By February 1877, Temple had succeeded in rubbing the entire bureaucracy 
and press in Madras the wrong way. Three of his recommendations came under
72 Digby, The Famine Campaign Vol.  1, p.26
73 Minute regarding the Nellore district, dated Coimbatore, 6th March 1877, Famine Correspondence 3, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
74 Memorandum on the Condition and Prospects of Relief Affairs in Bellary District as ascertained by 
Sir Richard Temple’s conferences with Local Officers on the 17th  and 18th of January 1877, No. 8 of 
Famine Correspondence 2, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
75 Letter from Lytton to Sir Louis Mallet, dated 13th  September 1877, Letters to Sir Louis Mallet,
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/48b.
76 Digby, The Famine Campaign Vol.  1, pp. 88-90.
109particular fire.  The first was the reduction of the wages for adults on famine relief
works from 1  Vi lb. per day for an adult male to 1  lb a day (famously known as the
Temple ration). The second was to dismiss all labourers who did not seem to be in
dire straits or poor physical conditions, from the relief works. The third was to make
village officials responsible on pain of punishment for detecting and preventing all
cases of starvation by bringing people on a system of gratuitous relief, either in closed
relief camps or in relief kitchens where cooked food was distributed to the poor.
The One Pound Wage
Upon his arrival in the Bellary district on the 19th of January 1877, Temple
wrote to the Government of India stating that relief on works and in relief camps in
the famine districts was being conducted on far too liberal a scale. He advised that the
wage for labourers on civil (Revenue) famine relief works- which constituted the bulk
of the relief works in Madras- be reduced by a third. This ‘experiment’, he confidently
assured the Governments of India and Madras, would result in a saving of Rs. 30
lakhs over the following 4 months. Temple wrote:
I myself think that one pound per diem might be sufficient.. .and the experiment ought to 
be tried.. .There might indeed be a question as to whether life cannot be sustained with one 
pound of grain per diem.... one pound ought to be made to suffice.77
The wages payable on famine relief works after Temple’s reduction were as follows. 
For workers on civil (revenue) relief works, the wage was reduced from the amount or 
cash equivalent of  1  Vi lb. of grain per diem in addition to a small cash allowance for 
condiments and fuel, to 1  lb or cash equivalent thereof. For those on PWD works 
(which formed a very small proportion of relief works in Madras), the wage was to
77 Minute by Sir Richard Temple, No. VII dated 19th January 1877, Famine Correspondence 2, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1877, Vol.65.
110remain at a pound and a half of grain and a small cash allowance.78  Anticipating 
protests from Provincial officials regarding this reduction, Temple pleaded that the 
reduced wage be given a fair trial, as it was an experiment on which the precious 
cause of saving public money revolved. Accordingly, on the 31st January, the 
Government of Madras passed orders stating that the reduced wage be adopted on
79 civil works throughout the Presidency.
Within a short period, however, there were protests from medical, revenue and 
public works officials in Madras as well as in Calcutta and back in England regarding 
the insufficiency of the Temple wage. The wage in turn became a symbol of a harsh 
and difficult famine policy, and was criticised severely. These criticisms ranged from 
the utilitarian (people could not work up to their maximum potential on the wage; and 
to employ them on such terms was a waste of public money) to the humanitarian to 
the pragmatic. They seemed to have had an influence on the Government of India and 
the India Office. Indeed, Salisbury cautioned Lytton:
I am entirely of your opinion as to the necessity of bringing the demand for relief in case of
famine under some sort of regular system; otherwise we shall demoralize the people  But it
must be done in language the British people can understand. Sensibility is a strong political 
force just now- just as honour used to be- and you must  phrase the resolution decently so as 
not to shock their ears with the (undue phrase?) of political economy.80
The most trenchant critic of the one pound wage was Dr. William Robert 
Cornish, the Sanitary Commissioner of Madras. Between February 1877, when 
Cornish returned to Madras after absence of leave in England, and May 1877, there 
was a fierce exchange of letters in the official papers between Temple and Cornish. 
This exchange centred primarily on discussions of how much food was necessary to
78 Minute No. VII by Richard Temple, dated Bellary,  19th  January 1877, enclosed in letter from 
Government of India, Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce to the Secretary of State for 
India, dated Calcutta, 26  January 1877,  Famine Correspondence 2, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
79 Letter No.  10, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated Calcutta, 2nd February 
1877, Famine Correspondence 2, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
80 Salisbury to Lytton, Letter No. 2, dated February 9th 1877, Letters from the Secretary of State for 
India, Lytton Collection, IOR/ MSS Eur/E218/4A.
Illsupport a labourer in health and strength; the effectiveness of the agency by which 
starvation and starvation-related sickness was reported; the ‘scientific’ status of 
Temple’s experiment; and the moral responsibility of the state in times of crisis.
The debate was, as we shall see in the following chapter, keenly followed by 
journalists, politicians and medical professionals in India and England. Cornish’s 
criticisms of the ‘Temple ration’ were widely reported and acclaimed in the English 
and vernacular press; and in medical journals.  Despite the Government of India and 
the Secretary of State for India publicly approving the wage, however, Temple’s 
severe economy alarmed senior Government officials. Salisbury wrote to Lytton in 
May 1877:
Temple has been so baffled by the enthusiastic prodigality of the Madras officials that he 
has leant more vehemently towards economy than he would naturally (have) done.... we
are beginning to be alarmed lest he should have overdone it..............The apprehension that
(his) ration was insufficient was I think shared by all Indian members of Council including 
our General Strachey who takes the severest economical view on these questions.8 1
The ‘Shroffing’ of Works
In response to some of the criticisms, Temple conceded some ground. Thus, 
when it was pointed to him that the reduced wage would not suffice to feed families 
where there were young children dependent on an adult bread winner, he ordered that 
young children of labourers should be given a separate allowance. When it was 
further pointed out that people on the works received a wage only six days a week, he 
ordered that they receive a Sunday wage as well.  Yet, Temple’s enthusiasm indeed 
seemed to have overtaken him. Between January 14th and 19th, he visited the districts 
of Bellary, Kumool and Cuddapah and ordered the district officials stop admitting
81 Salisbury to Lytton, No.  15, dated May 4th, 1877, Letters from the Secretary of State for India,
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4A.
82 Minute LVII by Sir Richard Temple, on the subject of giving subsistence allowance to the younger 
children of relief labourers, No.  145, and Letter from Dr. Cornish, the Sanitary Commissioner for 
Madras, to the Chief Secretary to the Government, Fort St. George dated Madras 6th April 1877, No. 
209, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/ V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
112people to relief works; to dismiss all those already on relief works who were not 
already in severe want (which he termed ‘shroffing’ the works); and to make village 
officials responsible for detecting and preventing starvation deaths.83 He then 
travelled to North Arcot district, where the district Collector had not opened relief 
works in this district, and where no gratuitous relief was being given. Temple praised 
the Collector for his economy and contrasted the district favourably with the state of 
affairs in Bellary and Cuddapah. 84 He then visited Coimbatore, Trichinoply, Madura 
and Tinnevelly in five days and further made comparisons on the cost at which relief 
was being provided.  He went on to Salem, Chingleput and Madras, taking several 
trips of each of these districts in four months.
In sum, Temple ordered a host of measures intended to enable the market to 
operate freely and to minimize state intervention. These measures included restricting 
entry to relief works only to those ‘in real danger of starvation’; encouraging private 
activity in the grain trade by augmenting existing railway lines and building new 
ones; and the medical examination of all entrants to relief works and relief camps in 
order to test the veracity of their destitution. Temple ordered that wages for labourers 
on famine relief works should be paid in money rather than grain; and that gratuitous 
relief was to be strictly limited.85 In response to criticism from Provincial and district 
officials in Madras about the inability of the famine wages to support workers, he 
conceded firstly that young children accompanying their parents on the works should 
be paid a small money dole of 3 pies; and that workers should be paid for seven days 
although they were not required to work on Sundays. At the same time, he refused to 
see evidence of slow starvation and suffering around him in the course of his
83 Digby, The Famine Campaign Vol.  1, p. 55.
84 North Arcot district was later to supply a steady flow of starving, emaciated and sick people to the 
relief camps in Madras city. It was one of the worst affected districts.
85 Minute by Sir R. Temple on his third visit to the North Arcot District, Famine Correspondence 3, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
113whirlwind tour through the famine districts of Madras between January and May 
1877.8 6
In the meantime, conditions in the famine stricken districts worsened. As 
people were thrown off relief works, they drifted into weakness, debility and 
starvation. The mortality from starvation and disease rose steadily upwards through
87 December 1876 and January 1877, to five times above the quinquennial average.
Village Officials and the Burden of Detecting Starvation
In response to fears expressed by district and Provincial officials that his 
drastic policy of turning off the so-called ‘undeserving’ from the works and relief 
camps would lead to large scale starvation, Temple made his third main 
recommendation. In order that no case of dangerous destitution or starvation was to 
go undetected, he urged upon the Madras Government the need for a system whereby 
every house in the famine affected districts was to be visited by village officials. In 
this, Temple sought to continue the pursuance of an order that that been passed by the 
Governor of Madras in 1869; that village revenue officials- the Karnam, Patel and 
Munsiff- were to be held responsible, on pain of punishment, for reporting every 
single case of dangerous starvation and emaciation, especially amongst ‘wanderers’ 
and bringing these people on a system of gratuitous relief in the villages so as to 
prevent starvation deaths.8 8
86 An English newspaper, the Madras Mail, reported on March 13th 1877 that Temple and his 
companions came across a man dying in the neighbourhood of Madras while on their tour. The man 
was within a quarter of a mile of a police station, and a Local Fund Dispensary. A few yards later, the 
party came across the dead body of an emaciated child. Temple was informed that an adult male had 
died at the same spot a day earlier. (Digby, The Famine Campaign, Vol.  1, p. 94).
87 Letter from Dr. Comish, Sanitary Commissioner for Madras, to the Chief Secretary to Government, 
Fort St. George, dated Madras, 6th  April 1877, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session  1877/ Vol. 
65, No.  144. (See Table 4.3).
88 Minute by Sir Richard Temple, respecting passages in the Report of the Sanitary Commissioner of 
Madras, dated Cuddalore, the 18th April 1877, No. 218,Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 
1877/Vol. 65.
114Temple’s suggestion was met with cynicism amongst revenue officials and medical 
men who believed that the local authorities were not likely to feel compelled to report 
deaths from starvation because of their relative autonomy from Provincial control and 
influence. Secondly, the enforcement of this suggestion would, it was feared, lead to 
the fudging of death returns from starvation, inasmuch as the agency which was to be 
punished for the occurrence of starvation deaths was the same agency which recorded 
causes of death in the village registers.89 It was thus feared that the suggestion would, 
instead of making the subordinate agencies more accountable, lead to a weakening of 
an information system that was vital for the prevention of starvation, and defeat the 
purpose of vital registration itself. From the available evidence, it appears that these 
fears were quite well-founded, particularly in Nellore, of which Cornish wrote in 
August 1877:
From the returns, no one would guess that Nellore is a famine district, but the more
accurate municipal town registration shows a death rate of 93 per mille.90
Responses to Temple: Medical Opinion and Provincial Concern
Whilst Lytton and his allies were very pleased with Temple, his visit was a 
thorn in the side of the Madras Government. Colonial medical officials in Madras and 
Bombay were deeply divided on the question of the nutritional adequacy of the ration. 
By April 1877, the weight of medical opinion was that the existing ration provided
89 On death registration as part of the duties of village officials, see chapter 3 of this thesis. On 
Cornish’s criticism of Temple’s third recommendation, see letter from Dr. Comish, the Sanitary 
Commissioner for Madras to the Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, dated Madras, 6th  
April 1877. Digby also presents a stringent critique of the village agency. See Digby, The Famine 
Campaign Vol.  1, pp. 96-103 and p.  139-140.
90 Letter from W.R. Comish, Sanitary Commissioner of Madras, to the Chief Secretary to the 
Government of Madras, dated 1st August 1877, enclosed in Proceedings of the Government of Madras 
in the Public Department dated 11th  August 1877, G.O. No.  1069, TNSA. See Chapter 3 of the thesis 
for a further discussion of the issue of accuracy during famine periods.
115both in camps and on works was dangerously insufficient.91 On May 22nd 1877, the 
Madras Government finally discontinued the ‘Temple ration’, quoting the cautious 
support of Salisbury for Provincial independence in regard to famine relief matters 
and stating that the weight of medical opinion in the Presidency was averse to the 
continuation of the wage.92  This was widely seen as a significant victory for the 
Madras Government and in particular for Comish.93 (However, we shall suggest in the 
following chapters that specific role of the Temple wage in exacerbating the total 
mortality during the famine can be questioned on several grounds).
The Fourth Phase: May to September 1877 
Temple’s Departure
At the time of Temple’s departure from Madras in early May 1877, the 
condition of the Madras districts was critical. District and Provincial officials waited 
anxiously for the south west monsoon rains in June. If these rains were copious, then 
the famine would end in October, but if the rains failed, then the suffering caused by 
the famine would intensify.
Temple reported to the Government of India in April 1877, that everything 
was under control in Madras; that human lives had been saved at the lowest possible 
cost; and starvation had been successfully combated.94 However, despite an official
91 Report of Drs. Gordon and Smith on the Monegar Choultry Camp, Fourteenth Annual Report of the 
Sanitary Commissioner  for Madras, pp. 205-208.
92 Salisbury wrote to the Government of India expressing ‘serious fear that insufficiency of relief food 
on famine works, especially in Madras, is producing diseases of exhaustion, and will end in great 
mortality.’  He also stated that it was preferable not to place too much restriction on the Local 
Governments. (Letter from Secretary of State to Government of India, No. 43, dated India Office,  10th 
May 1877, No. 251, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/ Vol. 65).
93 William Digby, Editor of the Madras Times, wrote in his account of the famine that several 
Provincial officials asked Comish at an official dinner in May 1877,  ‘Are you sure that Sir Richard 
Temple has really left the Presidency?’ (Digby, The Famine Campaign Vol.  1, p.  132).
94 Temple reported as early as February 1877 to the Government of India that ‘Over the whole of the 
Madras Presidency, famine is successfully combated and starvation prevented.’( Famine 
Correspondence 2, IOR/V/4/Session  1877/Vol. 65.)
116statement that famine had been successfully contained, the India Office was beginning 
to be anxious about the effects of Temple’s economy. Salisbury telegraphed the 
governor at the end of April cautioning that ‘humane principles’ were to be carried 
out and that ‘no scale of rations would be sanctioned which was inadequate to 
maintain famine labour.’95
The price of food grains rose steadily upwards in early May, and along with them, the 
number of people on relief works and gratuitous relief also rose.96
The Closure of the Buckingham Canal and the Censure of Madras by India
On May 8th 1877, the Government of Madras passed orders that forced emigration of 
labourers to the East Coast Canal in Nellore was to cease; and that the Bellary-Hubli 
railway line, long vetoed by the Government of India as unsuitable for relief purposes, 
was to commence as a relief work. This seems to have marked a shift in the 
Government of India’s perception of the seriousness of the situation. Prior to this 
point, the Government of India vetoed suggestions both from Madras and Bombay to 
commence the construction of railway lines as famine relief works, on the grounds 
that these would remain unfinished if the crisis lasted just a few months. 9 7
.In the meanwhile, in early May, the Government of India passed an order of censure 
against the Government of Madras for its alleged delay in informing the Imperial 
Government of the impending famine, and its exaggeration of the extent of distress.
95 Madras Famine Review, p. 42.
96 The numbers on state sponsored famine relief were as follows. In March 1877, the numbers on relief 
works was 664,000, and those on gratuitous relief were 97,000. In May 1877, there were 671,000 
people on relief works, but the numbers on gratuitous relief had increased to 329,000. (See Famine 
Correspondence Parts 2-4 IOR/V/4/Session  1877/Vol. 65 and IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59 for 
numbers at various points.)
97 Madras Famine Review, p. 43.
117Comparing the way in which the famine had been handled in Bombay and Madras, 
Lytton observed of the Madras bureaucracy that
His Excellency in Council is willing to make the most ample allowance for the irksomeness 
and difficulty which must have been felt in submitting detailed statistics by officers who were 
labouring under the practical difficulties of organizing relief for starving and clamouring 
multitudes, but is constrained to observe that had they more generally grasped the imperative 
need of temperate and thorough diagnosis of the condition of affairs around them at a very 
early stage of the famine, the exaggerated impressions which were received, and the excessive 
and uncalled for relief which was consequently given, might have been alike avoided, and the 
general policy of the Government might have been, in important particulars, different from
Q g
what it was.
The Imperial Government implied, though this memorandum, that Madras district
officials and the Madras Government had been alarmist in estimating the extent of
relief required, and had consequently been excessively generous in their estimation of
relief requirements, unlike the Bombay Government." This censure had the effect of
pushing the already strained relations between Madras and India almost to breaking
point. It was rumoured that the entire Madras Government was in danger of resigning
from office. Salisbury had to step in to avoid political disaster in May 1877. He
cautioned the Government of India publicly against being too strict about enforcing
measures of economy, stating that the matter of the reduced wage on relief works
‘required extreme vigilance’ and that it was ‘better not to place too much restriction
on the Local Government’ in the matter of the ration.100
Privately, however, Salisbury wrote to Lytton:
I felt bound to tell you of the Duke’s soreness as a guide to conduct for there is no doubt 
that his resignation on a matter of insufficient relief would have done immeasurable harm. 
But I do not think you can in any way blame yourself for such a state of feeling. It is one 
of the inevitable consequences of the important difference of opinion between superior and 
subordinate. You can no more assail some friction and mortification in governing than you
98 Extract from Proceedings of Gol DRAC, dated Simla, 5th May 1877, Famine Correspondence Part 3, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
99 David Hall-Matthews in his account of the famine in Ahmednagar district shows that the assumption 
that official relief measures prevented further starvation in Bombay was mistaken. See Peasants, 
Famine and the Colonial State, op. cit.
100 Revenue No. 36, Secretary of State for India to the Governor General in Council, dated India Office, 
26th April 1877, and No. 251, from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General in Council, 
Revenue No. 43, dated 10th May 1877, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
118can avoid breaking eggs in making an omelette and losing men in war. Governing means 
making men go the way they would otherwise not go and they don’t always like it.101
The result of this friction was a relaxation of Imperial attempts to control Provincial 
famine relief measures. On the 21st of May 1877, the Government of Madras 
withdrew the one pound wage and substituted it with a higher ration of 1  Vi lb on the 
grounds that ‘the weight of medical evidence (in the Presidency) was adverse to the 
maintenance of the lower scale.’102 The higher scale of 1  Vi lb rice in addition to  1  
anna in cash was made applicable to labourers on all relief works.
Suspensions or Remission: William Robinson v/s Richard Temple
In the middle of June, there was a steady downpour of rainfall and prices declined. 
However, from this point onwards, mortality rates began to rise again. In the 
meantime, Temple began to focus on more ways to limit the financial loss caused by 
the famine. His fourth suggestion was with regard to the cultivating peasants or the 
ryots, who suffered almost as much as the artisans and the labouring classes. From 
February 1877, he attempted to force the Madras Government to take steps to ensure 
that the full land revenue for the financial year 1876-77 was collected from the ryots. 
Temple recommended that the collection of the annual land revenue demand should 
be deferred rather than cojnpletely given up. This raised the hackles of district 
Collectors and the Madras Government in general. Sir William Robinson, a member 
of the Madras Council, exchanged a series of letters and telegrams with Temple where 
he dwelt at length on the customary principles of land revenue collection in south 
India. Robinson stated that the principles of the ryotwari system of land revenue
101 Letter from Salisbury to Lytton dated May 19,  1877, No.  19, Letters from the Secretary of State, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/ MSS Eur/E218/4A.
102 Ibid.
119collection was especially demanding and left no margin in ordinary years for the 
vicissitudes of a bad season. He further stated that it had been customary in years of 
famine to entirely remit rather than merely defer the collection of the land revenue.
He believed that Temple’s proposals were ‘contrary to the principle of a ryotwari 
settlement and customary immemorial law of the country’, and ‘specially unjust under 
the circumstances of the season and of the agricultural population at a time like 
this’.1 0 3
Temple’s insistence on forcing the Madras Government to promise suspensions led 
him into further disrepute with the Madras Government. He attempted to quote his 
personal interviews with the Collector of Chingleput district as being in support of a 
temporary suspension rather than a complete remission of the land revenue. The 
Collector in turn refuted Temple’s proclamations as misquoting him.104 Things came 
to a head when Temple was refused permission by the Madras Government to view 
papers relating to the systems of land revenue settlement in the Presidency. In a report 
to the Secretary of State, the Government of India complained that ‘the tone and tenor 
of the Government of Madras letter of 10th April appear to indicate a very 
extraordinary misapprehension on the part of the Government of Madras of their 
position in relation to the Government of India.’ 1 0 5  In the end, however, the Secretary 
of State for India and the Council of the Government of India were forced to concede 
to a full remission of the land revenue.106
103 Minute by the Honourable Sir W. Robinson, No. 247, Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 
1878/ Vol. 59. In the light of the fact that Madras was the most highly taxed Province in the entire 
Presidency, Robinson’s caution appears to have been well-founded.
104 Demi-official letter from the Secretary to Sir Richard Temple to the Collector of Chingleput, dated 
Madras,  13th March 1877, No.  160 of Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
105 Government of India, Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce, to Secretary of State for 
India, dated Simla, 25th June 1877, Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
106 Minute by the Honourable Sir W. Robinson, K.C.S.I., Extracts from the Proceedings of the 
Government of Madras, dated 9th February 1877, No.2, IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
120Relief in Madras in May 1877
In May 1877, famine relief in Madras continued to consist of a system of small relief 
works managed by district Collectors close to the affected districts. This was in direct 
contrast to Bombay, where from a very early stage onwards the PWD managed 
famine relief works. (It was also in contradiction to the Government of India’s belief 
from January 1877, that large works were more economical). Work on two large 
works- the Bellary-Hubli railway line and the East Coast Canal, for which labourers 
from Bellary, Cuddapah, Kumool and Nellore were transported- had begun since 
early March.107 However, as the conditions of those on relief works worsened; and the 
numbers of people who were too weak to work rose steadily, relief camps- where 
residence was imposed as a condition of relief- and relief kitchens- where food was 
distributed to people who were granted relief tickets as residents of a certain locality- 
became increasingly common.1 0 8  Simultaneously, the heads of villages and towns 
were authorized to grant temporary relief and medical care to migrants who were 
travelling in search of work and food.
Relief Works Under Public Works Supervision: the Debate between Madras and 
India
Besides moral questions over the necessity of intervention and debates about financial 
devolution and control of relief operations, there were also divisions between Madras 
and India over the agency best suited to manage relief. In a resolution dated June 14th 
1877, the Government of India issued a Resolution stating that relief works could be
107 Minute LII regarding the Nellore district, dated Coimbatore, 6th March 1877, No.  138, Famine 
Correspondence Part 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
108 On the 12th of June 1877, there were 730,000 people employed on relief works across the 
Presidency. (Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated June 1, 1877, No. 39 
Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59).  Three months earlier, in the third week of 
March 1877, these numbers had been 664,000 on works and 97,000 people on relief works.
121most conveniently and economically supervised by officers of the Public Works 
Department.  This system had been followed in Bombay since the beginning of 1877 
and was seen by the Imperial Government as conducive to ensuring that adequate 
work was extracted for the wage.
However the Government of Madras continued to concentrate the 
management of relief works largely in the hands of district Collectors working under 
the orders of the Famine Department, as a sub-department of the Board of Revenue 
till August 1877. Thus, administrative as well as financial management was a source 
of friction between the two Governments. When the south west monsoon, which 
began in June, failed again, the Government of Madras ordered that a scheme of large 
works managed by the Public Works Department (PWD) was to be set underfoot. 
Whilst the Government of India and Temple himself believed that works run by the 
Public Works Department were more efficiently and economically managed than 
those managed by district Collectors, there was considerable ambiguity even within 
the Government of India regarding what constituted ‘large works’ and whether large 
works or small works were to be the basis of an economical famine policy. Early on 
in the famine, this ambiguity had resulted in a sharp confrontation between the 
Governments of India and Bombay. The Government of Bombay had requested 
sanction for starting two railway lines as relief works late in 1876, a proposal which 
the Government of India had turned down on the grounds that the distress was not 
severe enough to justify undertaking a work of such magnitude. By February 1877, 
the Government of India, on Temple’s suggestion, suggested that the Madras 
Government employ people on piece work rates under PWD officers.109 Thereafter,
109 Local. No. 21e.-86 of 1877: Secretary, Government of Bombay, Public Works Department, to 
Secretary., Gol, Department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce, dated 18th January 1877; Extract 
from the Proceedings of the GoB, dated the 26th of January 1877; Minute XXXI by Sir Richard
122Temple attempted to force the Madras Government to concentrate labour on large 
irrigation works, of which there were but few in Madras, except for the Chilkha Canal 
and the East Coast canal Works. On the 8th of May 1877, the Government of India 
admitted:
There is some confusion as regards the term ’large works’. In so far as it extends to 
undertakings of primary magnitude such as the East Coast Canal and other irrigational
projects, there may be  some difficulty in devising them in the Madras Presidency, or at any
rate, in doing so in time to be of use at the present juncture.110
The unfamiliarity of the Madras Public Works engineers with local 
geographical and social realities also made for difficulties in negotiating local 
hierarchies and setting up an efficient system of relief in Madras. To complicate 
matters, the divisions between the Imperial and Provincial Governments made for 
conflicts of command. For example, Temple had insisted in February 1877 that the 
Madras Government forcibly transport large numbers of labourers from the small 
works in and around the Ceded districts (Bellary and Cuddapah) and Nellore to the 
site of the Buckingham Canal, one of the only works which was classified as a ‘large’ 
work. Despite Temple’s enthusiasm for the work, however, workers were not keen to 
go to the Canal. Temple wrote to the Governor of Madras suggesting that workers be 
ordered to proceed to the Canal, with the threat of dismissal if they did not comply. 1 1 1  
Although the threat was not put into effect, it appears that subordinate officials were 
unclear about whether labourers were to be forcibly transported or not. A few months 
later, Captain Vernon, an official of the Public Works Department, was summoned by
Temple, dated 10th February 1877;: LXXV Minute by RT on the Labour Test and the Wage Test, 
dated Sholapur, March 18th 1877, Famine Correspondence Part 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
110 Letter dated Simla, 8th May 1877, Additional  Secretary, Government of India to Additional 
Secretary, Government of Madras, No. 423, Part 3 of Famine Correspondence, IOR/V/4/Session 
1877/Vol. 65.
111 Minute XLVIII, by Sir Richard Temple about drafting off relief labourers from the neighbouring 
districts to the East Coast Navigation Canal, No.  128, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 
1877/Vol. 65.
123the Madras Government on charges of assaulting a man, Pagoda Balaya, in Giddalore,
a village en route to the works. In his defence, Vernon stated that he had struck
Balaya because the man had approached the group of labourers whom he (Vernon)
was escorting from Nellore to the East Coast canal works near Kumool district.
Balaya approached the group and spoke loudly in Telugu. Thereupon, a great crowd
assembled, and there was a verbal altercation between Vernon and Balaya, which
created further unrest. In a melee that ensued, the crowd pelted stones and verbal
abuses at Vernon, whereupon, Vernon struck Balaya twice in the eye. Pleading
forgiveness from the Madras Government, Vernon admitted that the disturbance
would not have occurred if not for his own indiscreet conduct. He further stated that
owing to his ignorance of Telugu, he ‘misinterpreted an excited remonstrance’ on
Balaya’s part as an indication of violence and assault, and thereupon struck Balaya.
The Government readily accepted his apology for striking Balaya and his assurance
that he acted in self-defence against a perceived threat of bodily harm Yet, the
records for this particular case included a pencilled note from the Secretary of the
Revenue Department which stated that ‘the police report shows that Captain Vernon
was to blame  his own account shows that he was taking the labourers against their
112 will to another part of the country, and that the villagers protested. ’  Accordingly, 
Vernon was censured for his use force in transporting the labourers against their own 
will- a course of action enjoined by Temple!1 1 3
The Vernon case also reveals the extreme fear of local outbursts of anger that 
famine relief officers faced. Quite clearly, it required men who were well-versed in 
the ways of local communities to manage famine relief, and this, the Madras
112 Letter from Captain Vemon on Famine Relief Duty to Acting Collector, Kumool, dated Cumbum, 
13th May 1877, enclosed in Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Judicial Department dated 
February 27th, 1878, Nos.  182-184, G.O. No. 438, TNSA.
113 Ibid.
124Government (rightly, it appears) felt, PWD men could not do as efficiently as district 
Collectors.
The Fourth Phase: June to September 1877 
Relief in Madras City
By June 1877, famine stricken migrants were thronging the streets of Madras 
city. Relief within the city of Madras became a priority for the Government of 
Madras. The Committee of the Monegar Choultry, the main poor house in Madras 
city, wrote to the Government of Madras stating that existing structures of relief were 
inadequate and that large numbers of the high caste poor were being left out of a 
system of state relief due to considerations of status. The Government of Madras then 
put in place a system whereby a central committee would control and manage relief 
operations of the entire city under the Madras Municipality.
The Madras Town Relief Committee was formed and headed by the 
Commissioner of Police in Madras. Existing relief kitchens would continue to provide 
cooked food to destitute residents of the city who were provided tickets by police 
officials. Relief camps on the outskirts of the city provided food for ‘wanderers’ from 
neighbouring districts who reached the city, exhausted in search of food. There also 
existed closed workhouses wherein conditions of light task work and residence were 
imposed on people who were weak but still able to do some work, in return for 
feeding. Finally, for the high caste poor of the city, who were reluctant to accept food 
in kitchens and camps, relief would be given in the form of a money dole of 1  anna 
per adult and Vi anna per child. In some of the relief kitchens of the city, separate 
feeding areas were also marked off for the high caste poor.
125The Failure of the Monsoons in July 1877
By the end of July 1877, there was panic regarding the critical state of the season. The 
rains which had begun promisingly at the end of June ceased entirely in July. Fears 
regarding more expenditure in Madras were translated into Imperial pronouncements 
on financial and administrative efficiency.  Lytton telegraphed Salisbury on the 28th of 
July communicating his deep anxiety regarding the ‘enormous and fruitless 
expenditure’ that was likely in Madras. 114 Simultaneously, there was widespread 
public criticism of the Government of India’s policy, particularly the effects of the 
one pound wage. Newspapers in Madras and Calcutta had begun to carry reports of 
the great mortality that had occurred on account of the Government of India’s 
‘economical policy.’ Cornish’s remonstrance against the one pound wage provided a 
rallying cry for the public opinion and caused much alarm for Salisbury and Lytton.
The Government of India and the Press Opinion
It is difficult to provide a comprehensive view of ‘public opinion’ or ‘press opinion’  
as this account has relied primarily on official sources. However, even from these 
sources, it appears that there was very vocal criticism of the Government of India’s 
famine policy in the press. This raises the question of whether we can see this critical 
public opinion as a causative factor in shaping famine policy, and if so, whether we 
can trace this to improved communications and information networks across the 
Presidency in the latter half of the nineteenth century. These are important questions, 
but cannot be answered satisfactorily within the scope of this thesis.1 1 5
114 Telegram from Lytton to Salisbury, dated 28th July 1878, Famine Correspondence 4, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
115 Yet, we know that the press  in current day situations can play a significant role in eliciting 
Governmental and public responses to food crises, or on the other hand, of suppressing the existence of
126Salisbury had written to Lytton in May that
Information of the outside world is not reassuring. All newspaper correspondents seem to 
agree that the ration is exhausting the people and that mortality from disease and 
exhaustion is assuming alarming proportions. The extracts from native newspapers which 
have just come home, take the same line.11 6
As the months went by, it was clear that ‘the Madras people,’ as Salisbury termed
them, had no intention of letting up on their demand that the Government of India
support financially their attempts to effect a humanitarian and liberal famine policy.
Nor did the press let up in its criticism of the Government of India’s severe economy.
Salisbury attempted to quieten Lytton’s fears regarding public opinion in June 1877:
I do not think you rate sufficiently low the importance of the attacks one or two 
newspapers here occasionally make on you. Everyone with an active feeling must present 
points of attack and every newspaper having to furnish a certain number of articles daily 
requires points of attack. As the bee to the flower so flies the sleepy distracted article 
writer to the statesman whose activity promises to supply him with material for the copy 
which within two hours he must inexorably render.1 1
On August 10th, however, even Salisbury was forced to admit what the Imperial 
Government was working against:
The general feeling with respect to the famine is very much what might have been 
expected. The Feeling of all those who express it is that every effort should be made to 1  1  Q
save life, however inconvenient the financial results may be.
a famine, as in China in the 1970s. With the advent of photography since the 1860s, photographs and 
other visual images of starving people circulated in the press have had an even greater impact on 
‘public opinion’. In recent years, some of the responses of journalists and reporters to famine have 
come under intense public scrutiny. The paradox of representation versus involvement has generated 
much debate and criticism. This paradox is epitomised perhaps by the success and tragic suicide of 
Kevin Carta-, a journalist who won a Pulitzer Prize in 1993 for his haunting photograph of a starving 
little girl crawling to a relief centre, published in the New York Times. Carter received international 
acclaim for the aesthetics of his photograph and his depict Almost immediately after the acclaim,
Carter was faced with a barrage of hostile public opinion for his failure to save the little girl and this, 
amongst other things, led him to take his own life in 1994. See ‘Wanting a Meal’, a web entry on 
Carter’s life:  (www.flatrock.org.nz/topics/odds  and  oddities/ultimate  in  unfair.htm); or 
www.kevincarterfilm.com, the official website for Dan Krauss’ 2006 film,  ‘The Death of Kevin 
Carter’.
116 Letter from Salisbury to Lytton, dated May 4th, 1877 Letters from the Secretary of State, Lytton 
Collection,  IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4A.
117 Letter from Salisbury to Lytton dated June 15,  1877, No. 22, Letters from the Secretary of State, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4A.
118 Letter from Salisbury to Lytton dated August 10,  1877, No. 32, Letters from the Secretary of State,,
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4B.
127The failure of the monsoons in July 1877 meant that the long and weary wait for the 
end of the famine would be extended. Even Salisbury was forced finally to admit that 
the stringent policy of non-interference of the Government of India might be 
dangerous.
Of course there is a practical point beyond which it is not safe to rely on the trade. In a 
longer or shorter time demand will attract supply; but the longer time may be long enough 
to starve a population.119
A month later, Salisbury reiterated:
... .1 quite agree with.... a general aversion to any interference with trade. But all absolute 
dogmas in human affairs are a mistake and in the present instance there are considerable 
cases where the assumptions might involve a vast calamity.120
It was clear that yet again, the differences between the Madras Government and the
Government of India were heading towards a crisis. Accordingly, it was decided that
the Viceroy himself should undertake a visit to the famine affected districts in
Madras. On the 28th of July, Lytton wrote to Salisbury that unless immediate
measures were taken, ‘a great catastrophe as well as enormous and fruitless
expenditure of money’ was imminent.1 2 1
Salisbury concurred with Lytton on the need to manage the political crisis with urgent 
measures. Accordingly, Lytton himself was to visit Madras and Mysore, which 
Salisbury believed would ‘settle many controversies’ and ‘greatly satisfy the public 
mind’.1 2 2  As Lance Brennan has remarked, when a Viceroy had to step in at this level 
of administration, the situation was indeed extremely serious.123
120 Letter from Salisury to Lytton dated September 13,  1877, No. 37, Letters from the Secretary of 
State, Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4B.
121 Telegram from Lytton to Salisbury, dated 28th July 1877, No. 96, Famine Correspondence 4, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
122 Telegram from Salisbury to Lytton, dated 31st July 1877, No.  104, Famine Correspondence 2, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
123 Brennan, ‘The Development of the Indian Famine Codes’, p. 97.
128Lytton left for Madras in early August, accompanied by Sir John Strachey, Finance 
Member of his Executive Council and a Mr. Arbuthnot, the Head of the Famine 
Department of the Government of India.1 2 4
Lytton wrote Salisbury on the 16th of August 1877, complaining that the state 
of things in Madras was ‘frightful’; that there was ‘the greatest zeal and devotion
125 everywhere, but want of unity in administrative authority. ’  Privately, he 
complained to Salisbury about the great waste that he believed was being incurred in 
the name of famine relief, and the fraud of famine relief funds to feed those who, he 
believed, were not truly in need. Salisbury wrote back:  ‘I am afraid there is 
imposition and waste in all relief camps, but the case of Madras is extreme  The
1  0f\ worst is that all this waste in the relief camps does not prevent starvation.’  Lytton 
clearly wanted to believe that the issue was one of lack of Provincial management of 
famine relief, rather than a need for more central funding. In our assessment of the 
situation, it appears that the two, however, were intertwined and contributed jointly to 
the tragic mortality that occurred during this famine  If Imperial funding was stingy 
and delayed, the Provincial Government had few means and even less will to ensure 
that relief measures were implemented in a way that would ensure that mortality was 
prevented.
The Reorganization of Famine Administration in Madras
Lytton accordingly attempted to do what he could to bring administrative 
unity to the administration of famine relief in Madras. The outcome of his visit was
124 This individual was not the same Arbuthnot who was deputed by the Madras Government to visit 
the famine affected districts in October 1876.
125 Telegram, Viceroy to SoS, dated August 16, 1877, No.  140, Famine Correspondence 4, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
126 Letter No. 41 from Salisbury to Lytton dated October 8, 1877, Letters from the Secretary of State, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4B.
129that in the middle of August, the administration of famine matters in Madras was 
reorganized. The most important change was that control of famine matters was 
wrested away from the Madras Board of Revenue and the Madras Famine Department 
under J.H. Garstin. Instead, the Governor of Madras, the Duke of Buckingham and 
Chandos was placed directly in charge of the administration of famine matters. 
Further, the Famine Department of the Government of India was also reorganized 
under Lytton’s personal supervision. Lytton was to complain to Salisbury that ‘it was 
impossible to get anything done as long as the Department remained under 
Arbuthnot.127
Lytton’s mistrust of other individual administrators was clearly marked in his 
views on the Governor of Madras. Both Salisbury and Lytton considered the Duke of 
Buckingham and Chandos to be a nuisance. He was seen as ‘undoubtedly 
unintelligent’128 ‘dreadfully slow129’and ‘an utterly bad man of business.’130 
Accordingly, Lytton was anxious to maintain an Imperial presence- and one that he 
could trust- in Madras. He felt the need for an officer who had ‘the confidence of the 
Supreme Government’; to be placed as the personal assistant to the Governor of 
Madras and advise him in the discharge of famine relief matters. The Governor 
himself was placed directly in charge of the management of famine relief to be ‘free 
from the interference of the Madras Council or the Revenue Board.’1 3 1
127 Letter from Lytton to Mallet, dated Ootacamund, 13th September 1877, Letters to Sir Louis Mallet, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/48b.
128 Letter from Salisbury to Lytton, dated May 25th, 1877, No.  19, Letters from Secretary of State, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4A.
129 Letter from O.P. Bume to Sir Louis Mallet, dated Poona, September 23, 1877, Letters to Sir Louis 
Mallet, Lytton Collection, IOR/ MSS Eur/48b.
130 Letter from O.P. Bume to Sir Louis Mallet, dated Coimabatore, September 10, 1877, Letters to Sir 
Louis Mallet, Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/48b.
131 Telegram, Viceroy to SoS, dated August 16, 1877, Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session
1878/Vol. 59.
130The Deputation of Kennedy
Accordingly, Lieutenant General Michael Kennedy, a Public Works 
Department man from Bombay was sent to Madras.  Kennedy was chosen for his 
‘admirable skill in managing the famine relief operations in Bombay.’132 However, it 
appears that Kennedy had been deputed in a similar capacity in August 1877 as had 
Temple in January of that year: in order to control the expenditure of the Government 
of Madras on famine relief; to tighten administrative accountability and to soften 
reports about the severity of the famine that might leak out to a critical press and 
public in Calcutta and in Britain. Lytton had written to Salisbury that the ‘state of 
things in Madras and Mysore (were) frightful’ that there was the greatest ‘greatest
1  oo
zeal and devotion everywhere, but want of unity in administrative authority. ’
Kennedy was believed to hold out the hope of bringing famine relief administration in
Madras under Imperial reign. However, even the Imperial Government was not
sanguine about Kennedy’s ability to change the situation.  Lytton’s personal secretary
wrote to Louis Mallet:
Poor General Kennedy has a task before him which I do not envy, until he can get matters 
more into one groove or the Duke to grasp great principles instead of small details.134
Yet, the Viceroy’s visit resulted in a tightening of relief measures. The provision of 
relief was made much stricter. In institutional terms, the distinction between 
‘ordinary’ and ‘famine relief works was abolished in twelve famine stricken districts. 
(‘Ordinary works’ referred to PWD-run works which imposed a full task in return for
133 Telegram, Viceroy to SoS, dated August 16, 1877, Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 
1878/Vol. 59.
134 Letter from Col. O.P. Bume to Louis Mallet dated Coimbatore, September 10, 1877, Letters to Sir 
Louis Mallet, Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/ 48b.
131payment of the famine wage; while ‘famine relief works’ on the other hand had earlier 
admitted all who were in need, and willing to work for the famine wage.)
This meant that tests of need were to be strictly applied. District officials were warned 
that ‘relief works to be prevented from becoming unduly attractive’ and that ‘prima 
facie evidence was to be required that an individual really required relief. Penalties 
were to be imposed in cases of ‘incorrigible insubordination’ and ‘short work’
Relief was now to be conducted entirely through a scheme of large relief 
works as its backbone, with all gratuitous relief to be temporary and subsidiary to the 
main objective to getting people on relief works. The Madras Public Works 
Department was to supersede the Board of Revenue in the management of relief 
works. Persons considered to be ‘capable and in fair health’ were to be drafted onto 
Public Works Department works along with their families.  The ‘distance test’ of 
need was to be applied on PWD works, wherein a person was required to prove his 
need for relief by travelling a distance to works. The test of need was considered 
complied with when a labourer went to a PWD-managed relief work and performed 
the full task exacted. On the few remaining civil works, revenue officials were to 
refuse relief to all but the very destitute. Exceptional cases were to be drafted to works 
as soon as a medical officer considered them fit to do so.
District Collectors and the Madras Board of Revenue were to supervise the 
distribution of gratuitous relief which was to be entirely confined to those unable to 
work.  The relegation of the Board of Revenue to such an ‘inferior’ position in famine 
relief was a source of conflict between the Governments, and there soon came reports 
of conflicts between PWD officials and district Collectors in taking on those who 
were less than able bodied. While Collectors were keen to avoid a reliance on
135 Madras Famine Review, p. 51.
132gratuitous relief by employing all who sought work, PWD officers were unwilling to 
employ weak persons on their projects.13 6
Gratuitous relief consisted of relief kitchens and relief camps. To persons 
resident in localities where kitchens were established, relief was offered in the form of 
cooked meals doled out in kitchens once or twice a day on the production of a relief 
ticket.  In addition, village and town authorities were authorized to provide relief to 
persons who were ‘wandering’ in search of food and work. ‘Wanderers’ were to be 
fed in villages and passed on to nearest camp. Relief camps in turn were sheltered 
spaces where food and rest were provided until the residents were strong enough to be 
passed on to relief works. In some cases, light work was imposed as a requisite for 
relief in camps.  Persons requiring special treatment were to be treated under medical 
advice.
Finally, Temple’s ‘safety net’- the provision of relief in villages of those too 
weak to work - was to be confined to persons who were incapable of labour or house- 
ridden by illness; or prevented by caste status from coming to relief kitchens and 
relief houses. On 24th of September, these arrangements were brought in to force 
throughout the Presidency on the 24th of September, 1877.1 3 7
Official Administration and Private Charity: The Mansion House Fund
In August 1877, there had arisen a fresh source of tension between the Provincial 
and Imperial Governments. On the 4th of August, the Duke of Buckingham and 
Chandos convened a meeting in Madras city of a number of European and Indian 
residents of the city. The main reason of the meeting was to discuss an appeal to be 
made in India and England for charitable contributions towards famine relief efforts in
136 Madras Famine Review, p. 58.
137 Extract from Proceedings of the Government of Madras, Revenue Department, No. 2847, dated 24th 
September 1877, contained in Famine Correspondence  4, IOR/V/4/Session  1878/Vol. 59.
133the districts and the town of Madras. This endeavour came to be called the Mansion 
House Relief Fund or the Indian Charitable Relief Fund. Led by members of the 
Indian business community and by William Digby, W. R. Cornish and the Duke of 
Buckingham and Chandos, this Committee resolved unanimously at its first meeting 
that ‘the increasing severity  of the distress arising from the Famine necessitates an 
appeal to private charity’ and that the idea of obtaining this charity be communicated 
at once by telegram and letter to the Lord Mayors of London, York and Dublin; the 
Mayors of Bristol, Liverpool, Birmingham and Manchester, the Lord Provosts of 
Edinburgh and Glasgow.1 3 8
In the light of Temple’s assurances that all was well and under control in Madras in 
February 1877, the formation of the Committee six months later was viewed by 
Lytton with consternation. During his visit to the Presidency in August 1877, he 
informed the Madras Governor that he was ‘unwilling to appeal for public 
subscriptions towards Government efforts to keep people alive through the same 
means and channels of organization that Government had already occupied. ’139 
Lytton informed the Committee that ‘earlier experiments with soliciting private 
charity had shown that when Government relief organizations had been placed under 
a Central Relief Committee, it has led not only to the Committee being burdened with 
additional work, having to render double returns and correspond with an additional 
master, but has also led to unseemly conflicts between Government officials and their 
superiors. ’140 In addition, Lytton was keen that private relief did not interfere with the
138 The Indian Famine Relief Fund 1876-78 (Henceforth IFRF): Proceedings of Committees and 
Personal Agencies, Final Reports &c. August 1877 to April 1879, Madras; Ch.l, p. 4.
139 Letter No.772 (Famine) from Additional Secretary, Government of India, to Secretary, Government 
of Bengal, dated Governor General’s Camp, Madras, 31st August 1877, Famine Correspondence 4, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
140 Ibid.
134strict economy in the relief kitchens and camps. There was a final consideration which
underlay Imperial opposition to the appeal for private charity. This was that Lytton
had already begun planning to tax the Indian business community in Madras and
Bombay, on account of famine relief efforts, despite public pronouncements that the
famine was under control. To appeal to them for private contributions at this juncture
would lay the ground for resentment and protest when the Famine Cess was
announced at a later date.
In order to meet the heavy drain on the finances of India, which the Madras and Bombay 
famines are already causing, the Government of India will sooner or later be obliged to 
resort to heavy taxation.. .the very class whom the Government would be obliged to tax 
might be the same class from whom subscriptions might be levied.1 4 1
The friction between the two Governments over the prospect of applying for
private charitable funds came to a head when the Calcutta Times published a report
stating that the Supreme Government was against soliciting private charity.142
The efforts of the Madras Government to solicit private funds in aid of famine
relief, however, had support from London-based Britons. The effects of the Times
report was reported to the Indian Famine Relief Fund General Committee (henceforth
termed the Committee) by the mayor of London, who forwarded twenty thousand
pounds to the Committee.
Twenty thousand pounds herewith. Telegram in today’s Times deprecating private efforts 
as Government will do all necessary. How does your Grace propose to distribute the 
funds- during the last famine, a Local Committee was appointed.1 43
Nathaniel Rothschild, the Chairman of the Chartered Mercantile Bank in London, 
cautioned the Committee:
Times states this morning from Calcutta Government deprecates private charity, unless 
officially contradicted will prevent further subscription. 44
141 Ibid.
1421FRF1876-78: No. 1, p. 9.
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135The reply of the Central Committee of the Fund in consonance with the Duke of 
Buckingham expressed less than sanguine sentiments about the ability of official 
famine relief to reach the famine stricken. The inability of existing administrative 
officers to cover the entire affected population was quite clear:
Action Supreme Government, unaccountable. Here notorious no Government efforts can 
reach certain classes, private agency can. Central Committee, Madras, manages funds, 
controlling Local Committees interior. Operations quite distinct from Government, not 
conflicting but supplementary.1 4 5
Salisbury would later write to Lytton that
.. .The Duke’s Madras meeting... was in many ways terribly inconvenient. 14 6  
A political crisis between India and Madras was finally avoided by the Central 
Committee resolving to focus on objectives and classes which ‘the ordinary 
machinery of Government could not hope to reach.’147 However, what is important to 
note is that in August 1877, over a year after the first signs of distress, an admission 
of the inability of the state to manage the crisis was forced on the Government of 
India by the Provincial Government.
There was much debate amongst the members of the Committee regarding what the 
objectives of the Fund should be. It was resolved that, since Government relief was 
focused on the relief of those who were in absolute need, the Relief Fund should focus 
on those whom the Government system could not reach. These included grants of 
money to sharecroppers and cultivators who had been reduced to poverty by the
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Salisbury to Lytton, Letter no.37, dated September 13, 1877, Letters from the Secretary of State, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4B.
147 Ibid.
136famine; the clothing of women whose destitution had left them naked; and the care of 
children orphaned by the famine. Essentially, the Fund was intended originally to 
supplement Government efforts to relieve the poorest, by aiming their efforts at 
people who were immediately above the class of the utterly destitute. In addition, the 
Madras Government published a notification in the official Gazette stating that 
Government officials were encouraged to support the Local Committees in their 
endeavours, to the extent that this effort was not detrimental to their official duties.1 4 8  
The Relief Fund continued its operations from September 1877 to the end of 1879. In 
the course of its functioning, Local Committees and sub-Committees were formed in 
every district, and district officials often played a key role in the administration of the 
distribution of the Fund.
The Proceedings of the Fund revealed several cases where Government relief was 
either not provided, or was being provided in a limited and ineffective way. The 
circumstances of its creation, however, constrained the operations of the Committee.
Other Administrative Factors: ‘Informal’ Networks of Relief Distribution
In the chain of administration, informal networks operated in the distribution 
of relief at the district and village level. In some cases, village heads would refuse to 
go into the Pariah settlements within the village in order to inspect the condition of 
the people or to disburse relief.149 William Digby, Editor of the Madras Times and a 
staunch critic of Government policy, quoted from relief reports in which it was noted
148 The Notification issued was as follows :’It is the desire of Government that public servants of all 
grades should give all the assistance they can render without detriment to their official duties, to the 
formation of Local Committees; and generally to promote the objects which the Famine Relief 
Committees and subscribers of the Famine Relief Fund have in view.’  (Proceedings of the Government 
of Madras in the Public Department, dated 24th  September 1877, published in IFRF1876-78, No. 4, 
p.l).
149 Digby, The Famine Campaign Vol.  1, p.  139-140.
137that ‘village heads are beginning to understand to whom they are not to give food. 
Whether they are equally clear as who is entitled to be fed may be open to doubt. ’150 
In several cases, relief meant for agricultural labourers and the untouchable castes was 
intercepted by village heads or by influential people within the village.
There understandably appears to be more evidence of such interception in the case of 
the Indian Famine Charitable Relief Fund than in the case of the management of state 
relief with regard to relief camps and works. However, Government officials were 
perfectly aware of these networks and turned a blind eye to them in their 
administration of private famine relief funds. For example, in June 1878, Reverend 
Henry Little wrote to the Government of Madras expressing anguish at a case of 
extortion involving village officials; and of a subsequent miscarriage of justice 
involving the son of a European district collector. Several ryots had approached him, 
as the Joint Vice President of the Erode sub-divisional committee of the Mansion 
House Fund in the Coimbatore district, with a complaint of extortion against the Patel 
and Karnam of the Vanjaman Gudalur village. The Karnam had, it seems, taken away 
half of the money allotted to them by the Famine Relief Committee for the purpose of 
seed com and bullocks, under a threat of using his influence with the Tahsildar 
against them Upon receiving this complaint, Little contacted the officials in charge of 
famine relief at the district level, and was told that they could not help him
Thereafter, Little asked a Native complainant to try the case in court, but the 
man, a Brahmin named Ramaswami Aiyangar, had refused. Instead, the son of the 
District Collector had tried the case, and the appeal of the ryots was dismissed on 
grounds of insufficient evidence. In his letter, Little explained the facts of the case and
150 Digby, The Famine Campaign in Southern India, Vol.l, Madras,  1878,p.  140.
138established the guilt of the Patel and Karnam. Yet, the Government Pleader expressed 
the opinion that although the law provided for the prosecution of public servants who 
were found guilty of cheating or extortion in the exercise of their official functions; 
distribution of the Mansion House funds was not an official function. Little’s 
complaints went unheeded.1 5 1
In another case where a native Sheristedar accused a priest, Rev Balcou of 
‘misappropriation of the Mansion House funds’; the same official later went on to 
explain that he had intended to complain about the tendency of Christian priests to 
distribute the money to ‘only the untouchable and lower castes’, without ‘sparing a
1  S9 thought for the more respectable classes of the famine stricken. ’  Other cases of 
cheating and extortion were levied against lawyers and merchants in Madras city in 
connection with the Mansion House funds.1 5 3
The distribution of funds was often the source of bribery, bullying and extortion 
amongst local and village officials; which the Government was powerless to prevent 
or restrain due to the lack of a legal status for the Fund.154 What appears to have 
happened is that as official relief failed to tackle the crisis at the most basic level by 
preventing starvation, migration and death amongst the untouchable agricultural 
labouring classes, and excluding small cultivators, the artificial line between those in
151 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Judicial Department, dated 16th January 1878, No. 
107, TNSA.
152 The talook sheristedar, Mr. A. C. Subba Row, had at a meeting of the Mansion House Local 
Committee of the Ami and Polur talooks of the North Arcot district, alleged that ‘Roman Catholic 
priests had systematically misapplied’ famine relief funds.  Subba Rao, when questioned by the district 
Collector, Mr. Whiteside, explained that ‘in his opinion, the relief money was sent to India not for the 
relief of Pariahs or other low castes, but solely for the relief of the respectable upper classes of the 
Native community; and as the Roman Catholic priests had, he believed, expended the money in the 
relief of all classes and castes whom they found to be distressed, he considered himself justified in 
characterising their action as a misapplication of relief money’.(Proceedings of the GoM in the Judicial 
Department, dated 20th April 1878, G.O. No. 822).
153 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Judicial Department dated 30th September 1878, 
Nos.  184-185, G.O. Number 1989, TNSA.
154 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Judicial Department, dated November 16, 1878, 
Nos. 52-53, GO No. 2317, TNSA.
139danger of starvation and those who were merely in distress became increasingly 
difficult to maintain. In these circumstances, even village officials and petty officials 
fell victim to famine. Whilst the initial objectives of the Fund were to avoid 
conflicting with Government relief structures, eventually the Committee landed up 
taking on the people left out of Government structures after the reorganization of 
famine administration in September 1877.1 5 5
The final sum collected by the Relief Fund amounted to Rs.800, 000. Most of this 
money was channelled to the districts through Local Committees, which were heavily 
dominated by missionary organizations. The Fund although administered by Digby, 
Cornish, and other administrators in Madras, also contributed to famine relief in 
Bombay, Mysore and the North-western Provinces.
The amount collected by the Fund was miniscule when compared with officially 
sponsored relief. Yet, its effects were arguably quite significant, although not 
necessarily in terms of its stated objectives. The Committee Members at Madras, 
believing that European missionary organizations were closer and more reliable to 
official administration than private Native charity, channelled most of the money to 
district and local committees which they were in charge of. This decision appears to
155 Reverend  J. Strachan, one of the prominent founding members of the IFRF, received a request from 
Mr. Oldham, the Famine relief Officer of Adoni talooka in Bellary, one of the worst affected districts, 
in early October. Oldham stated that the effect of the Government order of 24th September 
(concentrating relief work in the hands of the PWD and tightening strictures would be to ‘throw a large 
number of people on the Fund’ .Oldham stated that he had received orders to throw 5000 people daily 
off the rolls of gratuitous relief in villages and requested the Fund to make a grant in aid to of Rs. 3000 
each for November and December 1877, from which those on government sponsored relief works 
could be ‘bodily ‘ transferred from Government relief to the Fund. Strachan asked whether the 
members of the General Committee ‘ought to take over those whom Government refuse to support?’  It 
was resolved by the Committee that as a general principle, persons who under the GO dated 24th 
September cease to receive village relief, and who.. .are unable to have recourse to Relief Works or 
Relief Camps.. .must be considered as proper subjects.. .of the Famine Relief Fund’ However the Local 
committees of the Fund were considered as being ‘not justified in taking over in large bodies persons 
whom Government refuse to support.’ (IFRF, No. 4, p.  1.)
140have had important consequences. The Census of 1881 found that the proportion of 
the population who reported themselves as Christian had increased since the 1871 
census and at least partly attributed this to religious conversions during the famine.156 
That the famine had had a significant effect on religious conversions is also 
corroborated by Geoffrey Oddie’s work on Tanjore and Trichinopoly districts. While 
noting that there was a sharp increase in the Christian population between 1871 and 
1881, attributable in large part to famine relief provided by Christian missionaries, 
Oddie also suggests that the economic explanation is not sufficient to account for the 
continuous increase in religious conversions among untouchables in Tanjore and 
Trichinopoly over a series of generations prior to the famine. In other words, religious 
conversions were spurred by more complex motives than merely the desire to keep 
body and soul together to seek upward economic mobility.157 (Further exploration of 
this issue, albeit interesting, is beyond the scope of this thesis.)
It is, of course, difficult to quantify how far the operations of the Mansion House 
Fund in particular  contributed to religious conversions, and the data on
this is understandably vague. Yet, one can argue that the Mansion House Fund, a 
semi-Govemment famine relief fund which was specifically set up on the admission 
of the failure of the state to tackle pauperization and starvation, had significant social 
effects in the sense of lending official support to missionary activities for the purpose 
of famine relief. This would then imply that disorganized Government relief and
156 The Census of 1881, an official document confirmed this. The Census report stated that ‘In 1871, 
one fourth of Christians were in the Famine Districts which contained above two fifths of the total 
population. In this tract in 1881, while the total population had decreased by 13 per cent, the Christian 
population had increased 35 l/i per cent. In only one district did Famine Mortality outstrip the 
numerical results of Missionary labours. In every other district, famine and Non-famine, they have 
increased. The Famine appears to have been the Missionaries’ opportunity, for the number of 
conversions is believed to have been largest in the worst years.’ (Census of India 1881, Vol.  1, Madras 
1883, p. 43).
157 G.A. Oddie, Hindu and Christian in South East Asia,  1991, pp.  153,  154, 157.
141disputes between different levels of Government, which led to starvation, death and 
pauperization on a large scale, provided the space for religious conversions on a scale 
which might not have been possible in non-famine periods. (An interesting question, 
which this study has not been able to address within its scope, would be the extent to 
which state welfare policy contributed to religious conversion and other social 
movements in Southern India).
The Fifth Phase: October 1877 to July 1878
In September and October 1877, there were torrential rains in the Presidency, leading 
to the destruction of existing crops in some parts of the Presidency. Thereafter, the 
numbers on relief works fell, so that more than three fourths of these had left by 
October 1877. Prices however continued to remain high till November. In December 
1877, the Madras Government ordered that the provision of gratuitous relief in relief 
camps be closed.
By November 1877, official famine relief began to be curtailed, as the north 
east monsoon promised to be normal. From November 1877 onwards, the Madras 
Public Works Department began to petition the Government of Madras to abolish the 
distinction between professional and famine relief works, so that the PWD could be 
freed of the responsibility of providing famine relief. The management of famine 
relief works had resulted in friction between the Public Works Department and the 
District Collectors during the middle of 1877.  In Nellore district, there arose a dispute 
between the district Collector and the district engineer over how to deal with paupers 
incapable of performing 50% of the task. The Collector insisted that to refuse work to
142someone on the basis of unfitness to perform a task was to swell the numbers on 
gratuitous relief, whilst the district engineer wished to turn off those who were unfit 
from the relief works.
However, the condition of the people was far from sanguine. The winter crops were 
planted much later than usual; and excessive rainfall of July and August 1877 had 
spoiled a large proportion of the crops that were planted. There were a series of 
attacks by locusts in several places across the Presidency. District officials expressed 
the fear that there would be another famine in the middle of 187 8.158 This fear was 
later stated to be ‘unfounded’.159 Official relief began to wind down in early 1878. In 
February 1878, the Government of Madras stated that it was satisfied that workers on 
Public Works were capable of doing the full task; whilst the weaker labourers were to 
be drafted off onto civil works.  In March and April 1878, ordinary ‘budgeted’ public 
works were started in several districts; whilst civil works continued to employ famine 
labour160. Village relief was completely discontinued in the districts of Madura and 
Tinnevelly from the end of February 1878; and shortly thereafter in the others.
Between March and April 1878, several famine relief works were ordered to be 
stopped; and to absorb the labour thus set free, ordinary Local Fund and Provincial 
works were begun. State sponsored famine relief was officially closed in May that 
year. However, it appears that there was still considerable distress in the Presidency. 
As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, cases of emaciation and starvation were reported 
well into 1878.
158 Digby, The Famine Campaign in Southern India Vol.  1, p. 240.
159 Ibid.
160 ‘Budgeted’ public works referred to works undertaken from the PWD budget of the current year.
143Conclusion: State Intervention and Famine Policy in Madras 1876-78
It will, it is hoped, be evident from this chapter that famine policy in Madras was 
shaped by a variety of influences during 1876-78. Not all of these were determined by 
the Government of India, and in fact, Provincial famine policy was almost a direct 
inversion of Imperial injunctions.
Repeated statements of faith in non-interventionism were a broad edifice within
which stated principles of famine relief were laid out on several occasions through the
nineteenth century by Imperial and Provincial administrators. In theory as well as
practice, however, the state did intervene on several occasions in famine processes.
This was due to a variety of factors, ideological as well as administrative. Non-
, several
interventionism was one o^ompeting ideologies of governance and famine 
administration. It co-existed with older patemahstic ideologies, particularly in 
Madras, in which the state was morally responsible for preventing starvation and mass 
mortality. This belief was in part utilitarian in that prevention of distress through 
employment was seen as preventing a far worse dependence on gratuitous relief. Yet, 
it had humanitarian elements too. Several administrators believed that the state had a 
moral duty to intervene to prevent agrarian distress from accelerating into starvation 
and mass mortality.  Thus, beliefs did matter, but both non-intervention and 
intervention were important components of official beliefs regarding state responses 
to famine.
The above account however also suggests that in the Madras context, administrative 
factors limited the extent to which the Government of India’s non-interventionist
144policy based on large works managed by the Public Works Department could be 
applied. There was considerable ambiguity between India and Madras in determining 
what was meant by ‘large works’. Further, it appears that it was extremely difficult to 
make the PWD the ultimate source of management for famine relief works in a 
context where the Madras Board of Revenue and the district Collectors were seen by 
the Governing Council as having greater administrative authority amongst the 
peasantry. The PWD itself was not happy to accept the responsibility for famine 
relief. (This was strikingly the case in Mysore where the Chief Engineer of the PWD 
obdurately refused to admit weak workers to his works for lower wages until Lytton 
had to intervene by dismissing him.)1 6 1  Another administrative factor that limited the 
application of the Government of India’s non-interventionist policy was the difficulty 
of adapting a system of weekly and monthly payments on PWD works to a famine 
relief system whereby payments had to be made daily to avoid exhaustion, and the 
difficulty of forcing reluctant labourers to large works in the face of a recalcitrant 
Provincial Government. A further obstacle was the unfamiliarity of PWD engineers 
with district realities in Madras, which made for difficulties in enforcing the large 
works policy.
The inability of the Government to enforce a large works policy in Madras- also 
enables us to evaluate the relevance for Madras of the argument, made by Sanjay 
Sharma in the context of famine relief in the North Western Provinces in 1837-38,
161 Lytton wrote to Mallet of the Mysore episode:  ‘I have been obliged to remove Sankey from the 
administration of the Department of Public Works.. .strictly speaking there has not been a single relief 
labourer on public works in Mysore since the beginning of the famine till now- and all because Sankey 
chose to consider famine relief as no business of his. I anticipate that the arrangements now made have 
brought several thousands of the persons now in receipt of gratuitous relief, upon well supervised 
works... ’ (Letter from Lytton to Mallet, dated Ootacamund, 13th September 1877, Letters to Sir Louis 
Mallet, Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/48b).
145that relief provided on large works enabled the structural expansion of the colonial 
state. In Madras, this does not appear to have been the case. Famine relief was 
provided on large works inconsistently, and labour was concentrated on the repair of 
small tanks and wells. The ‘structural expansion of the colonial state’ was thus quite 
limited.
Sharma’s point regarding the role played by the state in reforming traditional forms 
of private charity and disallowing non-institutional and religious forms of charity 
appears to have some resonance in the Madras context. However, it would appear that 
individual officials had different attitudes to private charity, and that at a later stage in 
the famine, institutionalization appears to have been rued by some officials as 
detrimental to the effort of saving lives. Thus, it would appear that institutionalization 
was itself inconsistent. Further, late in 1877, private charitable relief through the 
Mansion House Fund appears to have become a safety net- albeit a flimsy one- for 
those left out of Governmental relief.  Thus, in the Madras context, private charity and 
official initiatives intertwined in ways that were less consistent than Sharma’s account 
has suggested for the North-western Provinces.
Finally, individuals such as the Duke of Buckingham, William Robinson and William 
Robert Cornish- as well as a number of unnamed district administrators- contributed a 
great deal to the way in which famine relief policy was finally worked out in Madras. 
The agency of individual officials in policy decisions at the Provincial and district 
levels has not often been recognized in the context of discussions about ‘the colonial 
state’. Yet, the history of this famine does provide ample evidence of such agency 
shaping policy processes. The Madras Government took a remarkably interventionist
146path during the famine due to the role played by individuals, although it did not 
appear to have attained much success in preventing starvation and achieving 
administrative efficiency in famine relief.  Moreover, within the course of a single 
famine event as well as between different famine events, individuals did change their 
stance on intervention, as did Salisbury between January and May 1877 and Temple 
between 1874 and 1877. These changes had significant consequences, both in an 
immediate as well as a long term setting.  ‘Personalities and politics’ thus played a 
significant role in shaping famine policy both during the famine of 1876-78, as well 
as in subsequent decades.
147Chapter 2 William Robert Cornish and State Intervention during the 
Madras Famine 
I. Introduction
William Robert Cornish was one of the most prominent individuals in the 
history of the famine of 1876-78. Cornish is well-known by famine historians for his 
debate with Richard Temple over the issue of the adequacy of famine relief wages, 
where he suggested that Temple’s standard of a pound of grain per day for men and 
half an anna in cash be replaced by a higher wage of one and a half pounds of grain 
per day and half an anna in cash. The wage became symbolic of a harsh famine 
policy, blamed by contemporary observers for an appallingly high rate of mortality 
amongst famine labourers. Although the reduced wage was adopted, at least in theory, 
for three months, the Government of Madras replaced it in May 1877 with Cornish’s 
standard, despite Imperial support for the “Temple ration”, as it was termed. Besides 
his role in official famine relief policy, Cornish also produced a wealth of medical and 
demographic observations which have been used extensively by social and medical 
historians and historical demographers.1
In this chapter, we look at Cornish as a historical figure in greater detail in 
order to explain, understand and contextualize his contributions to famine relief and 
policy and to the demography of famine. We suggest that there were three important 
factors in understanding Cornish’s role during this famine. The first relates to his 
personal characteristics of industry and professional ambition, as well as a certain 
idealism regarding the practice of public health. The second relates to the prevailing 
relationship between different levels of colonial Government and the medical services
1  See Bhatia, Famines in India, pp. 95-6 Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, op. cit., D. Arnold, ‘Social 
Crisis and Epidemic Disease in the Famines of Nineteenth Century India’, Social History of Medicine. 
6,3 (December 1993): 385-404; idem, ‘The “Discovery” of Malnutrition and Diet in Colonial India’ 
IESHR. 31,1 (1994):  1-26; Dyson, ‘On the Demography of South Asian Famines Part I’, op. cit., Klein, 
‘When the Rains Failed’, op. cit., Lardinois, ‘Famine, Epidemics and Mortality in South India’, op. cit.
148during the famine of 1876-78. This relationship was marked by divisions over 
intervention in social and economic processes and tension over financing of public 
health schemes, and these divisions were crucial to Cornish’s prominence during the 
famine. The third relates to conditions internal to the Indian Medical Services. As 
Mark Harrison has shown, the IMS was marked by professional competition in the top 
rungs of the services, and by animated discussions about the causes of epidemic 
disease and the possibility and desirability of state investment in public health and 
preventive medicine.2 While Harrison’s work shows how these divisions influenced 
the making of medical policy, I will argue that these divisions also shaped famine 
policy through Comish, and arguably the whole question of state economic and 
medical intervention in agrarian crises.
I.  The Man: Ambition, Talent and Professional Recognition
William Robert Comish was bom in 1828, into a farming family in the parish of 
Butleigh in Somerset. All evidence points to the conclusion that he was unusually 
talented and hardworking. Mark Harrison, in his discussion of the social origins of 
IMS recruits, finds that the largest proportion of IMS men were sons of British 
medical practitioners between 1850 and 1914. Between 1855 and 1896, an increasing 
number were sons of businessmen, civil servants, clergymen, and ‘new professionals’. 
What is important is that very few IMS men came from farming families, and in fact, 
the ‘farmer’ proportion of the IMS remained remarkably small between 1855 and
2  Harrison, Public Health in British India, esp. chs. 4 and 5; Idem., Climates and Constitutions, esp. 
chs. 3 and 4.
1491914, as Harrison’s study shows.3  Comish came from this minute proportion of 
farmer families, evidence of his dedication and ambition.
Comish won the IMS appointment as a prize in a competition at St. George’s 
Hospital in London in 1853.4 It remains an interesting question why he was recruited 
into the Madras Medical Department, rather than the Bengal or Bombay departments, 
which, Harrison suggests, were more prestigious.5 One hypothesis would be that he 
lacked the money and status necessary to obtain an appointment in the other 
provinces. Whatever the case, Cornish’s career, both before and after his appointment 
to the IMS, was marked by professional recognition and relative success. He was 
awarded the gold medal for clinical surgery by the Hospital Board at St. George’s 
during his training there in the early 1850’s and obtained the appointment with the 
East India Company in a competitive examination in 1854.6 He was recommended for 
the IMS appointment on account of having ‘distinguished himself by his studies and 
good behaviour and by his persevering industry’ and for ‘the success which has 
uniformly attended his competition for prizes’.7  What is more, at the time of his 
retirement in 1885, Comish belonged to the tiny minority of IMS officers in the 
Madras service who had acquired the prestigious FRCS.8  In 1920-21, almost a quarter
3 Harrison, Public Health in British India, p. 28, 236. Appendix A on p. 236 of Harrison’s study shows 
that between the yearsl855 and 1884, less than 4% of all IMS recruits were sons of farmers. This 
proportion went up to 4.4% between 1885 and 1896; and down to 2.6% between 1897 and 1914.
4 Military Records, Assistant Surgeon Papers, Certificate No.32 of 1853/54, C.B. 18 of 1854, 
IOR/MIL/9/935
5  Harrison, Public Health in British India, pp. 23-25.
6 Obituary: William Robert Comish, F.R.C. S., C.I.E, Etc., Surgeon-General, I.M.S. (Retd.), BMJ, Vol. 
II for 1897, p. 1299-1300.
7 Recommendation dated 15th  February 1854, by Joseph Gunning, of St. George’s Hospital Board, 
Military Records, Assistant Surgeon Papers, IOR/MIL/9/935.
8 This referred to the Fellowship of the Royal College of Surgeons (FRCS) or the Fellowship of the 
Royal College of Physicians (FRCP). Harrison shows that less than 10% of IMS recruits between the 
years of 1851 and 1890 were elected to either fellowship (Public Health in British India, p. 20).
150of a century after his death, he was recognized as a pioneer for his work on ‘famine 
dropsy’ during the 1876-78 famine.9
Cornish was about 25 years old when he joined the IMS.1 0  He was deputed to the 
Madras Medical Department in 1854. By this time, his father had died and his mother 
was living in London. After serving for 3 years as a military surgeon-the common rite 
of passage  for  a  young  IMS  recruit-  he  was  appointed  the  Civil  Surgeon  of the 
Coimbatore district in 1857. In 1858, he was appointed the Secretary to the Principal 
Inspector General (later the Surgeon General) of the Madras Medical Department, in 
which capacity he served till 1870. Cornish’s selection to the post of Secretary to the 
head of a Provincial Medical Department at the young age of 30 is further evidence of 
acumen, ambition, and professional recognition of what his obituarist called his ‘very 
exceptional merit’.1 1  He also authored the first Provincial Census Report in 1871  and 
played a significant role in preparing the second report of 1881, where his calculations 
of population loss due to the famine of 1876-78 were used extensively.
It appears that Cornish enjoyed being in positions of authority, both in his 
professional career and as a member of the European community in Madras. 
Throughout his career in India, he held a number of honorary and official posts.  He 
was Secretary of the Madras Medical Fund- a contributory pension scheme for IMS 
officers and their families- from 1864 tol870.1 2  Cornish edited some issues of the 
Madras Quarterly Journal of  Medical Science, a professional journal of the Madras
9 See J.A. Nixon, ‘Famine dropsy and pioneer work in India’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Medicine Section of  the History of  Medicine,  14 (1920-21): 1-2.
10 This is calculated from the date of baptism, which is 7th  September 1828. (Military Records,
Assistant Surgeon Papers, IOR/MIL/9/935.
1 1  ‘Obituary’, p.  1299.
1 2  Ibid.
151Medical Department which was published irregularly during the 1860s. He founded
the Madras Philharmonic Society, and was a keen horticulturist and enthusiast of the
1  ^ Madras Botanical Gardens.
Cornish was keen to be recognized as a successful and original public health 
administrator by his peers and by the Government. This is made evident through an 
incident which occupied some official attention. In 1872, he devised a scheme which 
sought to ‘bribe’ Indian mothers in the city of Madras with money to permit their 
children to be vaccinated and allow the extraction of vaccine lymph from their arms. 
The Madras Vaccination Depot had for years struggled to maintain an adequate 
supply of lymph in the face of much popular opposition and administrative 
inefficiency, despite the provision of food to mothers and children who came to be 
vaccinated. Cornish communicated his idea about a money payment to Dr. John 
Shortt, a peer of Cornish’s in the IMS, and the Inspector General of the Vaccination 
Department at the time.1 4  The ‘bribery scheme’, as it was called by the Government of 
Madras and by Cornish and Shortt, was hugely successful in the first two years of its 
application. Large numbers of mothers and children came to the Vaccine Depot in 
Madras city. (The scheme fell through a few years later due to a miscalculation of the
1 3  ‘Obituary’, p. 1299.
14  Shortt and Cornish had both joined the Madras Medical Department in 1854. See D. G. Crawford, 
Roll of the Indian Medical Service 1615-1930, London, 1930, p. 343-44. Through the 1870’s until 
Shortt’s retirement in 1877, the two often entered into bitter disputes about vaccination policy. When a 
dedicated Vaccination Department was organized for the first time in 1865, Shortt was appointed 
Inspector General and held this post until 1875, when the Vaccination Department was subordinated to 
the Sanitary Department. Cornish scored an important point with this amalgamation, when the post of 
Inspector General of Vaccination was changed to Deputy Sanitary Commissioner and made 
subordinate to that of the Sanitary Commissioner’s post. An interesting aspect to this professional 
rivalry might have come from the fact that Shortt had not been recruited directly to the Indian Medical 
Service as had Cornish. He obtained a commission in the IMS by nomination from the Subordinate 
Medical Department, and worked his way up the senior service. See Crawford, A History of  the Indian 
Medical Services, Vol. 2, London, 1914, p. 111.
152extent to which a money payment would entice people, as well as lack of official 
financial and administrative support).
Cornish had a public dispute with two other senior medical officials over the 
intellectual origins of the ‘bribery scheme’ immediately after this flush of success. 
These officials were Dr. Shortt and Edward Balfour, then Inspector General of the 
Madras Medical Department. Balfour claimed that the idea of substituting money for 
rice was first suggested to him by John Shortt.1 5  Shortt himself claimed in his report 
for 1872-3 that the experiment was conducted ‘under his personal supervision’.1 6  
Conversely, Cornish insisted that the idea of bribing the people had been put into 
effect by Shortt only after he, Cornish suggested it to him, and that there was evidence 
of this meeting in the form of pencilled notes that Cornish had made in Shortt’s office 
during the meeting, owing to the fact of Shortt being deaf. Shortt in turn informed 
Cornish that he had not kept the notes that Cornish had given him during the 
meeting.1 7
The dispute led to an ugly, personal confrontation in the Government 
Proceedings. Cornish insinuated that Shortt’s physical handicap of deafness may have 
prevented him from fully recollecting the conversation that Cornish carried out with 
him in pencilled notes, wherein the idea of ‘bribery’ was suggested. Shortt, in 
response to this, was ambiguous about Cornish’s role and skirted the issue of who had 
originally suggested the scheme. Cornish’s written defence to the Government of 
Madras was politely -and characteristically-sarcastic: ‘The misunderstanding (was)
1 5  Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated October 15th, 1874, Nos. 
49-51, G.O. No. 1134, TNSA.
16  Annual Report on Vaccination in the Madras Presidency for 1872-3, Madras 1874, p. 9.
1 7  Letter from Dr. W. R. Cornish, Sanitary Commissioner of Madras, to the Secretary to Government, 
Fort St. George, No.  1238 dated Madras, 1st October 1874, enclosed in Proceedings of the Government 
of Madras in the Public Department, dated October 15th, 1874, Nos. 49-51, G.O. No. 1134, TNSA.
153due to Dr. Shortt imperfectly recollecting my communication to him and the 
destruction of the pencilled record of an important conversation on a subject of public
importance. The great success and vigorous pursuit (of the bribery scheme) must have
1 8 occupied his thoughts so much that he forgot its real origins’.
Cornish insisted that he- and not Shortt- be recognized by the Madras Government 
and the Madras Medical Department as the brain behind the scheme, despite the fact 
that Shortt had implemented the scheme. Ultimately, Cornish succeeded in eliciting 
an official apology from Shortt and from Balfour, both of whom recognized his 
claim.1 9  Cornish’s persuasive powers and bureaucratic skills, in evidence during this 
episode, served him in good stead throughout his career as a medical official. One 
important aspect of these skills was his ability to put forth written evidence in a 
logical sequence to convince his medical superiors and non-medical officials in the 
Government of his point of view.
Quite clearly, Cornish had a keen sense of duty and professional commitment. He 
appears not only to have aspired to the proper performance of his tasks as a 
Government servant; but also desired official recognition of his ideas about public 
health, disease transmission and indeed, of the workings of Indian society and health- 
seeking behaviour. These ideas had two aspects: firstly, they can be seen as 
manifesting an understanding of health and disease in which a variety of predisposing 
factors- not just filth or climate- took precedence. But more generally, they can also 
be seen as the product of an interventionist and paternalistic approach, which was one 
of several official attitudes to the governance of Indian society. Based on the belief 
that a scientific and sympathetic study of Indian society, personality and human 
character was the basis for state intervention, and in turn that intervention was a
1 8  Ibid.
19  Ibid.
154product of enlightened European governance, this stance sat uneasily with other 
approaches and beliefs which were more fatalistic about the impossibility, 
pointlessness or the detrimental effects of intervention.
This argument would be further substantiated by a study of intellectual trends and 
non-official activities both of non-medical administrators and of IMS men. Did 
Cornish’s support for what appears to have been a relatively humanitarian 
interventionist famine policy represent merely a personal belief; a desire for 
professional advancement; or can it be seen as representing a broader outlook that 
characterized one section of colonial official thought? Studies of non-medical colonial 
administrators do point to the existence of a sympathetic and paternalistic approach to 
governance amongst British administrators in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century. For example, Eric Stokes’ classic study of political thought amongst British 
administrators casts Thomas Munro, the first Governor of Madras and one of the main 
architects of the ryotwari system, as belonging to one -if the last- generation of men 
who believed that the task of European colonization was ‘to take the peasant in all his 
simplicity, to secure him in the possession of his land, and so to avoid all the 
artificialities of a sophisticated European form of rule- these political aims surely 
spring directly from that current of contemporary thought which literary historians 
have called the Romantic movement’.20 Stokes characterizes the ascendancy of 
utilitarianism after Munro as a victory in the battle between two ideologies: the one 
representing conservative paternalism; the other representing the application of 
‘rational’ principles of European governance (of which political economic theories
20 Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, p. 13.
155were a significant part).2 1  Burton Stein’s biography of Thomas Munro also casts this 
historical figure as ‘a man of an eighteenth century world innocent of Victorian
arrogance and certainties.. ..a hinge connecting the long development of South Indian
22 rural political and cultural institutions with the long nineteenth century imperial era’.
It would perhaps not be going too far to state that some aspects of Munro’s vision -of 
a paternalistic and benevolent European governance which would preserve indigenous 
political and social institutions- survived into the late nineteenth century, both in the 
attitudes of individual administrators as well as in some of the administrative systems 
and usages of the ryotwari system in Madras.
Clive Dewey’s detailed study of the personal papers of two Indian Civil 
Service officials also points to two sets of intellectual trends amongst ICS officers at
9 ‘ X the end of the nineteenth century.  The one saw the task of European governance as 
essentially a paternalistic ‘civilizing mission’; the other emphasized what Dewey 
termed the ‘cult of friendship’. Cornish can be said to have represented a combination 
of conservative paternalism and what can be termed as a desire to understand 
scientifically Indian society and culture which can be linked with eighteenth century 
Orientalism and with early visions of empire voiced by administrators such as 
Munro 24
There are fewer (in fact almost no) secondary works which deal with intellectual 
trends, social position and ideas amongst medical officials recruited by the East India
2 1  Ibid, pp. 19-21. See also Idem, The Political Ideas of  English Imperialism: An Inaugural lecture 
given in the University College of  Rhodesia and Nyasaland, London, 1960.
22 B. Stein, Thomas Munro: The Origins of  the Colonial State and His Vision of  Empire, Delhi, 1989, 
p. 5.
23 Dewey, The Mind of the Indian Civil Service, New Delhi, 1993.
24 ’Stein, Munro, op. cit.
156Company, and after 1858, the Provincial Governments, except for Mark Harrison’s 
studies. Harrison suggests that the low status of the medical profession in Britain was 
combined with the handicap of the indifference of colonial administrations to make 
medical service in India unattractive. In addition, low pay, poor conditions of 
employment and over-staffing led to much dissatisfaction amongst many young IMS 
recruits.25 Accordingly, most recruits entered the service with few ambitions and with 
little predilection for medicine, and the professional aspirations of many IMS men can 
be said to have been modest. Further, Harrison finds that the uncertain official and
legal status of most IMS men positively discouraged innovation in theory and
26 practice, leading to fatalism and indifference to the plight of Indian people.  For most 
IMS men, then, a career as a colonial medical official was a means to a secure, if 
modest remuneration, rather than a calling.
In another work, however, Harrison suggests that despite the general mediocrity of 
the majority of IMS recruits, the impulse towards sanitary reform in the mid­
nineteenth century was seen by some medical officials as an essential component of a 
larger programme for restoring India to prosperity. Environmental improvement was 
thus part of a growing trend towards reform and intervention, in which the medical 
services played an important part. Harrison points out quite rightly that this reformist 
trend amongst medical officials was as critical of an apathetic administration as it was 
of Indian sanitary practices. Yet, those officials who voiced critical opinions were 
clearly in the minority and had few hopes that their sanitary critique of the colonial 
administration would be heeded.27
25 Harrison, Public Health in British India, pp. 9-10.
26 Ibid, pp. 34-35.
27 Harrison, Climates and Constitutions, pp. 170-172; 177.
157Yet other clues come from Richard Grove’s study of the origins of environmentalism 
in the seventeenth century, although we would need to be careful in pushing forth 
such generalizations to the nineteenth century. Grove suggests that there did exist a 
group of government scientists and medical men who combined a ‘reasonably 
sensitive and atypical interest in the culture and welfare of the indigenous population 
with an equivalent concern to develop public works specifically related to the basic 
resource needs of the population’, and that ‘this concern for basic needs far 
outweighed more short term commercial consideration’.28 Grove suggests that for an 
understanding of the intellectual origins of such ideas amongst medical men, we must 
turn to men like Alexander van Humboldt, Joseph Hume and J.B. Boussingalt, 
representing eighteenth century Physiocratic thought and a certain degree of 
evangelical fervour.29 For these men, argues Grove, man’s natural environment was 
seen as possessing value in much wider terms than the purely commercial. This in 
turn fed into what Grove terms an ‘anticolonial’ sentiment amongst a small minority 
of IMS officials.30 Grove’s use of this term would tend to indicate that despite the 
fact that these officials gained authority, status and remuneration through their 
affiliation with the colonial state, they were still critical of the way in which non­
medical administrators governed the people and resources of India.
These studies indicate that Cornish appears to have had some predecessors, who were 
concerned about the welfare of the people in a wider moral and material sense than is 
evident amongst the majority of civil servants or IMS recruits in India. Quite clearly,
28 R. H. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of 
Environmentalism, 1600- I860, Cambridge, 1995, p. 448.
29 On the influence of Alexander von Humboldt on medical thought and colonial medical geography in 
the nineteenth century, see N.A. Rupke, ‘Humboldtian Medicine’, Medical History. 40, 3 (July 1996): 
293-310. Rupke argues that a significant aspect of Humboldtian medicine was its commitment to a 
theory of causation that stressed ‘natural’ rather than ‘social’ causes. (Ibid., pp. 307-309).
30 A Grove, Green Imperialism , p. 426.
158he belonged to a small minority. At the same time, a detailed analysis of the 
intellectual origins of his ideas must remain obscure for lack of sources on his 
personal life and early years.
Cornish seems to have been a talented, hardworking and ambitious man. His
aspirations were rewarded by recognition both within the medical profession and by
the Madras Government. In 1880, he was promoted from the post of Sanitary
*11
Commissioner to that of Surgeon-General with the Government of Madras.  In this, 
he became one of  just six officers in the entire history of the Indian Medical Services 
to have skipped four intermediate ranks to succeed to the highest civil medical post in 
the Presidency. D.G. Crawford, historian of the Indian Medical Service mentions that 
Cornish ‘never held the rank of Deputy Surgeon General, and on appointment as 
Surgeon General, went over all four (existing) Deputy Surgeons General and seven 
senior Brigade Surgeons’.32 Although it is difficult to substantiate this point since we 
have no evidence on how his peers viewed him, his rapid promotion must surely have 
raised several hackles within the Madras Service. It is also extremely likely that this 
rapid rise in professional status might have had to do a lot with his very prominent 
public role in support of the Madras Government’s famine policy against that of the 
Government of India.  In 1880, he was made a Companion of the Indian Empire, an 
honour which was usually reserved for senior bureaucrats.33 He was appointed 
Honorary Surgeon to the Viceroy of India in 1881.34
3 1 ‘Obituary’, p. 1299; Mountstuart Elphinstone (1885?), ‘Draft of  a speech in honour ofW.R. Cornish, 
Surgeon-General ofMadras on his retirement, with notes on his career and distinguished predecessors 
in the Madras Medical Service ’ , Private Papers of Mountstuart Elphinstone as Governor of Madras, 
IOR/MSS/Eur/F234/l 18.
32 D.G. Crawford, Roll of the Indian Medical Service 1615-1930, London, 1930, p. 343.
33 Mountstuart Elphinstone, ‘Draft of  a speech in honour of W.R. Cornish ’ , op. cit.
34 Ibid.
159Despite the recognition of his merit by the Government of India, Comish achieved 
greatest recognition at a Provincial level. In 1882, he assumed the position of 
Chairman of the Committee commissioned to look at Lord Ripon’s proposals for 
Local Self Government in Madras.35 He was appointed additional member of the 
Legislative Council of Fort St. George in 1883.  In this position, he played a 
significant part in compiling the Madras Famine Code of 1882. He retired in 1885 and 
returned to England.
Back in England, Comish continued to be active in professional bodies and to 
occupy positions which highlighted his significant experience in understanding the 
empire, its people and health issues. In the last years of his life, he was a member or 
fellow of several medical societies: the British Institute of Preventive Medicine, the 
Sanitary Assurance Association, the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society, and the 
Epidemiological Society of London. He represented the Madras and South Indian 
branch of the British Medical Association till his death in Worthing in 1897 at the age 
of 69.36
II.  State Intervention, Public Health and the Indian Medical Services
Comish participated and in some cases played a prominent role in the professional 
culture  of the  Indian  Medical  Services  during  the  middle  three  decades  of the 
nineteenth century. Debates over the origins of epidemic disease, their character in an 
Indian setting, and the means of prevention, control or cure were the subject of much 
lively and animated discussion, not just among officers within a Provincial Medical 
department but also across different Provinces.
35 Report of  the Committee on Local Self-Government in Madras, Madras 1882.
36 ‘Obituary’, op. cit.
160While protecting the health of European military and civilian populations was an 
important motivating factor behind these discussions on disease, it seems evident that 
there were other aspects to these endeavours, which have not always been taken into 
account by previous writers on the colonial medical services. It would appear that for 
a number of medical officials, defending the scientific credentials of medicine to a 
cynical administration was a major preoccupation. The repeatedly expressed need for 
accurate vital statistics of the population pointed to this aspect.37 Another aspect of 
medical inquiries into disease causation in a colonial setting pertained to their value 
for ‘rational’ governance; knowledge of colonial populations and Imperial control of 
these populations. Previous historians have tended to take for granted that this value 
was recognized by non-medical administrators, and that the medical services were an
38 important  ‘ideological  and  technological  component’  of  Imperialist  ambitions. 
However, it would appear that non-medical administrators were not always convinced 
either of the scientific status of medical inquiries, or of the value of medical ‘science’ 
itself as a component of governance, at least till the 1890s.
Although  inquiries  into  factors  governing  military,  prisoners’,  plantation 
labourers’  and European health in an Indian climate was a constant preoccupation, 
and environmental theories of disease causation led to attempts to  ‘cleanse’  Indian 
towns and villages, IMS officials were also concerned with wider medical questions 
pertaining  to  the  endemic  disease  amongst  the  general  population,  and  with  the
37 On the origins of social statistics and their status as science, see D. R. Headrick, When Information 
Came of  Age: Technologies of  Knowledge in the Age of  Reason and Revolution, Oxford, 2000, Ch. 3. 
(Transforming Information: The Origin of Statistics).  Headrick’s reading of how statistics transformed 
social policy in the western world would appear somewhat idealistic in the context of nineteenth 
century India, where the ‘avalanche of printed numbers’ does not seem to have corresponded quite so 
closely to visions of orderly progress, as much as they recorded European administrative desperation to 
understand and control a reality that bewildered them.
38 Cf Arnold, ‘Medicine and Colonialism’ in W. F. Bynum and R. Porter (eds.) Companion 
Encyclopaedia of the History of  Medicine Vol. 2., London, 1993, p. 1411.
16139 peculiarities, both medical  and  social,  of diseases  in an  Indian setting.  However, 
their recommendations regarding prevention were not always taken into account and 
were often handicapped by lack of knowledge about the precise character of epidemic 
disease, particularly cholera and fever.
III.  Multicausality and predisposing factors in disease causation
In  1869  and  1870,  Comish  wrote  two  reports  examining  the  history  of the 
cholera  reports  of those  two  years.  In  his  report,  Comish  challenged  the  theory 
propounded  by  the  Statistical  Assistant  with  the  Government  of  India,  Dr.  J.L. 
Bryden,  who  suggested  that  the  movement  of  cholera  had  nothing  to  do  with 
contagion or human contact, but was borne by winds. Comish argued that all evidence 
pointed to the likelihood that cholera was indeed transmitted through human contact, 
directly  influenced  by  congregations  of human  populations,  more  likely  to  attack 
starved and undernourished people, and preventable by the enforcement of sanitary 
legislation and in some cases, sanitary cordons.
Yet,  Comish did not rigidly endorse a contagionist theory of epidemics, where 
human beings were seen as foci of filth and thereby disease. As will be seen in this 
and other chapters, his was  essentially a multicausal  view of disease causation,  in 
which the notion of predisposing factors was an important component.40 During an
39 These debates were particularly pronounced in the case of cholera and fever epidemics, which were a 
source of deep fear and considerable anxiety on the part of medical officials due to their threat to 
European military and civilian health. This anxiety is manifest in the number of pages devoted to 
cholera epidemics in annual sanitary reports. (This usually far outnumbered the number of pages given 
to other diseases or medical concerns). See also Harrison, Public Health in British India, ch.4, ‘Cholera 
Theory and Sanitary Policy’; idem, Climates and Constitutions, ch.4, ‘Epidemics and the Ideology of 
Improvement 1800- I860’. However, the pages of hospital and dispensary reports, as well as medical 
journals such as the Madras Journal of  Medical Science point to the fact that other sorts of activities, 
such as medical curiosities, surgical operations and snakebites, also were of considerable interest.
40 The notion of ‘predisposing causes’ occupied  a central role in eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century medical thought. Chris Hamlin argues that medical theories based on concepts of 
predisposition were important reasons for medical men to oppose Edwin Chadwick’s sanitary 
programme in England which sought to reduce the causes of disease to filth. (See C. Hamlin , 
‘Predisposing Causes and Public Health in Early Nineteenth Century Medical Thought’, Social History 
of Medicine. 5,1(1992): 43-70. Within this notion of disease, causality was complex and sophisticated, 
and could not be reduced to a single factor such as ‘filth’. Disease meant a deviation from health, and
162epidemic of fever in the Godavery and Kistna districts in 1873-4, Comish entered into 
an  argument  with  the  Surgeon  General  of the  Madras  Medical  Department,  Dr. 
Edward Balfour, who believed that irrigation and water-logging in these districts was 
the  main  reason  for  increased  fever  mortality.  Suggestions  that  irrigation  made 
regions unhealthy and promoted the circulation of miasmas had formed an important 
component  of non-interventionist  arguments  by  bureaucrats  and  politicians,  who 
wished to curtail the construction of public works from borrowed money on financial 
grounds.41 However, Comish argued on the basis of a district surgeon’s reports that 
the epidemic had less to do with irrigation than with the movements of miasmatic 
winds  over mountain ranges  and marshy lands before  they entered these districts. 
Thus irrigation works were not causative of fever epidemics.  On the contrary, state 
investment in irrigation works had a positive role to play in the prevention of disease 
by increasing prosperity and well-being.42
It  appears  that  Comish  belonged  to  a  school  of thought  which  propounded  a 
notion of extensive state intervention in sanitation and medical relief but also in the 
improvement of economic welfare. Economic intervention was seen both in utilitarian 
as well as in moral terms. On the one hand, improved economic welfare and agrarian
most discussions of disease recognized two main divisions of cause: the ‘proximate cause’ and the set 
of ‘remote causes’. The ‘proximate cause was the ‘essence’ of the disease itself, the ‘pathological 
process that characterized it’. The remote causes were further classified into ‘predisposing causes’ and 
‘exciting’ causes; all remote causes could, according to Hamlin, be thought of as necessary causes for 
the disease to surface and manifest itself,  (pp. 50-51). Hamlin suggests that this understanding left 
considerable room for medical practitioners in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to 
appreciate the role of social factors in the causation of disease, (p. 52). Mark Harrison also suggests 
that medical conceptions of fevers in India differed from developments in Britain after 1800 in the 
important respect that Anglo-Indians were more likely than their British counterparts to attribute ill- 
health to poverty and dearth, rather than merely to filth amongst the poor and the working classes. 
(Harrison, Climates and Constitutions, pp. 176-177).
4 1 Some of these debates can be gauged from a Parliamentary Report on Public Works in India. See 
Report from the select Committee on East India (Public Works) together with the Proceedings of the 
Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendix, IOR/V/4/Session 1878/ Vol.  12).
42 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated 30th  December 1872, G.O. 
No. 1413, TNSA.
163prosperity prevented epidemic disease by protecting a population’s nutritional status. 
On the  other hand,  agrarian prosperity was  seen  as  a moral  and  civilizing end  of 
enlightened European governance. A multi-causal theory of health/disease in which 
nutritional, sanitary and climatic factors combined to act upon human beings for good 
or  worse  was  an  important  complement  of these  ideas.  However,  there  are  some 
important qualifications to be made in this regard.  Firstly,  there is no  evidence to 
suggest  that  Cornish’s  medical  ideas  or  professional  activities  were  religious  in 
orientation, in the sense of emerging from a motive to religious conversion, as was the 
case with some of his IMS contemporaries.43  Secondly, it appears likely that what we 
might loosely term  an  anthropological  imagination-  in  the  sense  of an  attempt to 
frame and present a construction of the Indian as a subject of social, scientific and 
medical inquiry- was an important part of Cornish’s approach. He was the author of 
the first census of Madras Presidency in 1871, and the censuses themselves have been 
seen  as  grand  anthropological  exercises  in  the  construction  of an  exotic people.44 
Cornish’s  endeavours  in  collecting,  compiling  and  presenting  the  information 
contained  in  the  first  Census  were  noticed  by  the  Government  of Madras  with 
approbation.  He was thanked by the Madras  Government  and by the  Secretary of 
State for his  ‘lucid and valuable report....that indicated his wide research and large 
views’ and awarded an honorarium of Rs. 5,000 ‘to mark their sense of the efficient 
manner in which he had executed his joint functions’.45
Comish believed that accurate vital statistics, physiology, anatomy and surgery 
could form the basis of efficient medical practice and would contribute to health and
43 This would place Comish in contrast to some of his colleagues discussed in the introductory chapter, 
for whom medicine was an explicit means of saving souls, rather than merely bodies.
44 For the classic statement of this view, see B.S. Cohn, ‘The Census, Social Structure and 
Objectification in South Asia’ in idem, An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays, 
Delhi, 1987, pp. 224-254.
45 Mountstuart Elphinstone, ‘  Draft of  a speech in honour ofW.R. Cornish', op. cit.
164well-being of populations through public health and sanitary policy. In an address to
the College of State Medicine in London in 892, he advised public health students:
You  deal  with  human  life  in  the  aggregate,  and  whatever  you  may  be  able  to 
effect...will  be  for  the  benefit  of thousands,  instead  of the  units  who  fall  into  the 
hands of the practising physician.. .if ever the glorious time is to come when men and 
women shall die of old age, just as ripe fruit falls, and enjoy long and healthy days, 
you  will  have  the  satisfaction  of knowing  that  sanitary  science,  which has  already 
appreciably added to the longevity of human life, and to which you give your loving 
duty and service, has been the chief factor.46
Although we are restricted to Cornish’s official correspondence and addresses,  one 
can clearly notice a belief in the idea of public health as a moral and political practice, 
not unlike that sketched by John Eyler for William Farr.47 Eyler writes of Farr that 
‘statistics  were,  for  Farr,  always  a  means  to  an  end,  a  tool  in  a  greater  reform 
campaign’.48 Farr appears to have used far more  sophisticated statistical tools than 
Comish (reflecting perhaps more reliable data,  although some of the English death 
statistics  were  as  troublesome  in  terms  of accuracy  as  the  Indian  ones).  Yet,  a 
similarity of purpose in the uses of statistics and in the social orientation of medicine 
is evident. A similar reformist spirit was also part of the medical ideas of Rudolph 
Virchow.49 It seems plausible to draw common connections between the three men in 
their visions of a state sponsored public health, despite the vast differences in context
46 Abstracts of Introductory Lectures, etc: The College of State Medicine, Introductory Address by 
Surgeon-General W.R. Comish, C.I.E., Q.P.H., The Lancet, Oct. 8, 1892, p.830.
47 On Farr, see J.M. Eyler, The conceptual origins of William Farr’s epidemiology: numerical methods 
and social thought in the 1830s, in A.M. Lilienfield (ed.) Times, Places and Persons. Aspects in the 
History of  Epidemiology, Baltimore, 1980; Idem., William Farr (1807-1883): An Intellectual 
Biography of  a Social Pathologist, Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of 
Wisconsin in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  Idem., 
Victorian Social Medicine: The Ideas and Methods of William Farr, Baltimore, 1979; Idem., ‘Mortality 
Statistics and Victorian Health Policy: Program and Criticism’, Bulletin of the History of  Medicine,
Vol. 50, pp. 335-355.
48 Eyler, Victorian Social Medicine, p. 197.
49'On Virchow’s life, professional activities and political ideas, see I.F. McNeely, Medicine on a Grand 
Scale: Rudolph Virchow, Liberalism and the Public Health, The Wellcome Trust Centre for the History 
of Medicine at UCL, Occasional Publication No.l, 2002. An earlier extensive biography was written 
by Erwin Ackemecht. (Rudolph Virchow: Doctor, Statesman, Anthropologist, Madison, 1953.) To 
Virchow is attributed the statement ‘Medicine is a social science, and politics is nothing more than 
medicine on a grand scale’. (McNeely, p. 1).
165between colonial India and late nineteenth century Europe. However, that context was 
also important in shaping the way in which Cornish’s ideas were put into practice, or 
not, as will be seen below.
IV.  William Robert Cornish and Famine Policy 1876-78.
The ‘Temple Ration’
As discussed earlier, the famine of 1876-78 began as early as in 1875, when 
some districts experienced what was termed as ‘distress’ by the district Collectors and 
the Provincial Government. By the middle of 1876, the signs of famine were clearly 
pronounced in several districts, and resulted in friction between the Imperial and 
Provincial Governments over the question of intervention. As has been described, 
relations between the Provincial and Imperial Governments became turbulent over 
imports of grain and the management of famine relief works. In January 1877,
Richard Temple was deputed to enforce economy in the famine stricken areas of 
Madras.
Signs of friction between the Provincial and Imperial Governments were 
pronounced by January 1877, when Comish, who had been on furlough in England 
from October 1875, returned to his post as Sanitary Commissioner. In a letter dated 
13th February 1877 addressed to the Government of Madras, Comish laid out his 
objections to the Temple scale.50
This was to be the first of a series of exchanges between the two over the 
following three months. Cornish’s objections to the wage rested on the argument that 
the diet was deficient in quantity as well as quality, particularly in terms of its 
nitrogenous elements. While Temple advocated that labourers on relief works should
50 Letter from Surgeon-Major W.R. Comish, F.R.C.S., Sanitary Commissioner for Madras, to the Chief 
Secretary to Government, dated Madras, 13th  February 1877, No.  115, SCR 1877, p. 192.
166receive the equivalent of 16 oz. (1 lb.) of dry grain; Comish stated the normal 
consumption of the adult human being as not less than 24 oz., while many Indians 
could consume up to 48 oz. of dry grain in a day. Further, he also held that the 
nitrogenous proportion of a daily ration should not be under 140-180 grains in a state 
of rest; ordinary labour required 300 grains of nitrogen; while severe exertion required 
500-600 grains of nitrogen. The 16 oz. of grain provided by Temple’s wage would 
provide 68-80 grains of nitrogen if rice was given; 100 grains of nitrogen if ragi or 
cholum was given; and 116 grains of nitrogen if wheat was given. A diet containing 
less than 200 grains of nitrogen, while barely sufficing to provide nutrition for the 
human body at rest, would not permit the severe exertion which was required of 
famine labourers on relief works.  Comish based his argument for a higher wage upon 
a dietary survey he had co-ordinated in 1863 using the agency of district medical 
officers. His study indicated that in ordinary years, the average labourer in the Ceded 
districts (Bellary and Cuddapah) consumed at least 24 oz. of dry grain {ragi or 
cholum) per day; very often consuming up to 48 oz.5 1
The crux of Cornish’s objection to the Temple scale was that, going as it did 
against the results of the 1863 Madras survey, it was unscientific and disregarded the 
current nutritional knowledge about dietary requirements. However, there was another 
aspect of Cornish’s argument which was equally significant: such an ‘experiment’ 
was cmel and dangerous and risked the loss of life in great numbers. He warned that 
current knowledge suggested that the symptoms of starvation were often insidious and 
invisible until the human body had passed the point where life could be saved.52 In 
other words, starvation was difficult to detect through cursory physical inspection by
5 1  W.R. Comish, Reports on the Nature of the Food of the Inhabitants of the Madras Presidency and on 
the Dietaries of  Prisoners in Zillah Jails, Madras, 1863.
52 Ibid.
167medically untrained personnel.  This difficulty was exacerbated amongst gangs of 
relief workers where numbers fluctuated greatly from week to week and continuous 
observation of a stable cohort was difficult, if not impossible. The conditions under 
which people sought relief thereby would make it difficult to monitor the effects of 
the reduced wage and there was a great danger of going against established norms 
regarding minimum nutritional requirements. Clearly, Comish was laying stake not 
only to claims of humanity as a characteristic of the medical and public health 
profession, but also to claims of the expertise of medical ‘science’ in constructing 
standards of nutritional adequacy and appropriateness.53
Cornish’s appeal seems to have had an immediate impact upon members of 
the Madras Council. A few weeks later, the Governor of Madras met Temple with a 
summary of Cornish’s objections and pleaded that the wage not be imposed on famine 
stricken workers.54 As described in an earlier chapter, the Governor ‘dreaded being 
held responsible for some terrible calamity’.55 Yet, Temple persisted in his appeal to 
give the wage a ‘fair trial’ before discarding it as insufficient.56
53 Such ‘expertise’, however, seems to have been contested rather than given, as ideas regarding 
nutritional adequacy appear to have been fluid at this time. See Kenneth J. Carpenter, ‘A Short History 
of Nutritional Science Parts 1-3’, Journal of Nutrition.  133, pp. 638-645, American Society for 
Nutritional Sciences, 2003.
54 In an order dated 1st March 1877, No. 757, the Government of Madras resolved to forward Cornish’s 
letter to the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India; and to ‘anxiously watch’ the 
effects of the reduced wages on the labourers. (SCR 1877, p. 194).
55 Letter No. 14 from Salisbury to Lytton dated April 27th, 1877, Lytton Collection, IOR/ MSS 
Eur/E218/4A. (See also footnote 43 in Chapter 1).
56 Temple pleaded with the Government of Madras that the adequacy of the wage should be tested by 
‘patient practical observation of the labourers’ and not by ‘pre-conceived physiological theories’. (No. 
LVl-Minute by Sir Richard Temple, reviewing the objections of the Sanitary Commissioner, Madras, 
to the reduced scale of wages, No.  144, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/Session 1877/Vol.65.)
168Temple defended his recommendation publicly a few weeks later, and this led 
to a spirited defence on Cornish’s part.57 There followed a series of exchanges 
between the two men over the course of the next six weeks, which mirrored and 
shaped differences of opinion between the Government of Madras and the 
Government of India over the wage; and indeed over the question of state 
intervention. Without going into too much detail about this lengthy correspondence, it 
suffices to state the points on which the debate was conducted. Firstly, Temple 
questioned the value of specialist medical, nutritional, and physiological knowledge 
for famine administration, drawing a distinction between ‘practical observation’ and 
‘medico- chemical theories’ in the composition of an adequate diet for famine stricken 
labourers. Secondly, he argued that in determining standards for adequately 
nourishing diets, lower body weight in general as well as the lower nutritional 
requirements of Indians as compared to Europeans should be taken into account in 
applying standards established by European medical men. (Comish patiently pointed 
out that the theories he enunciated referred to Indian labourers and not European men; 
and that they were not based on chemical theories as much as on physiological 
understanding). Thirdly, he argued that ‘theories’ of nutritional requirements were 
essentially uncertain and that the only test of adequate diet was a ‘patient 
examination’ of the physical condition of the people on the relief works and in the 
relief camps.
In turn, Cornish’s criticisms of Temple’s arguments were wide-ranging and
devastating, particularly when he demonstrated that Temple’s knowledge about the
measurement of nutritional standards was outdated and incomplete. Comish further
remarked on the inconsistency in Temple’s publicly recorded views on the possibility
57 Temple’s minutes and memoranda, which were the main form in which he made his attack on 
Comish, were published in the Government of India’s Gazette  as well as in what was known as the 
‘Blue Books’ or Parliamentary Papers.
169of using nutritional standards as a guide to constructing dietary standards in 1874 and 
1877. As Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in 1874, Temple had calculated that he 
would need to import 3.75 million tonnes of grain to feed the famine-stricken 
population. He had used the census of 1871 as a baseline, then calculated the amount 
of food required by each person so enumerated, and assumed that each person
ro
required a minimum of I V 2 lbs. per diem for a period of nine months.  In 1877, 
Temple claimed that a precise calculation of the amount of food required by a human 
being was not possible, and that ‘patient practical observation’ of the physical 
condition of labourers was the only guide to constructing a dietary standard.59 
Temple’s later stance threw doubt on the assumption that dietary adequacy could be 
determined by calculating the amount of nitrogen and carbon in a given quantity of 
food. The crux of Temple’s argument in 1877 was that dietary adequacy could only 
be determined by noting the physical effects of a given diet on the human frame, 
while his earlier position had suggested that accumulated evidence in jail dietaries 
could provide an accurate guide to constructing dietary standards. Further while the 
census of 1871 was seen as a reliable source of population estimates in 1874, Temple 
in 1877 denied that an accurate estimate of food requirements or dietary adequacy 
could be arrived at.60 Quite clearly, what had changed in the intervening three years 
was not the scientific status of a method of estimating nutritional requirements for a 
large population, but Temple’s own political compulsions.
5 8 See Table 2.1.
59 See Table 2.1.
60 See Table 2.1
170Table 2.1: Richard Temple on Famine Relief in 1874 and 18776 1
Sir R. Temple in 1874 
(Bengal famine)
Sir R. Temple in 1877 
(Madras Famine)
“This rate (3/4 of a seer or about 1  Vi 
lbs. for men, women and children) at 
which grain should be provided was 
assumed after due consideration and 
discussion. The lowest diet provided in 
the Bengal jails for non-labouring 
prisoners is equal to about 1  seer or 2 
lbs. The ordinary diet of a labouring 
adult in Bengal is taken after statistical 
inquiry to be about 1  seer of rice 
besides % seer (about Vi lb.) of fish, 
pulse, pepper and other condiments.
The diet prescribed for adult Bengalee 
immigrants on ship board and for 
Bengalee sailors always exceeds one 
seer a day in total weight, and in some 
cases reaches two seers a day. Many of 
the poor people for whom grain was to 
be provided would be labouring hard on 
the relief works during inclement and 
exhausting weather. Nearly the whole 
of the Government provision of grain 
consisted of rice, which contains less 
strength giving qualities than wheat and 
some other grains. It was known that 
each bag of the expected consignment 
of Burma rice would contain from 8 to 
20% of innutritious husk. In view of all 
these considerations, I framed my 
estimates of total requirements on the 
basis that each person to be relieved 
would on average require % seer (1 Vi 
lbs. grain) per day. In practice it was 
found that even to ordinary paupers, 
who did not do any work, local 
Committees had to give 2/3 of a seer or 
rice daily besides one pie (3/8 penny) 
for the purchase of salt and condiments; 
to women in delicate health and persons 
reduced by previous hunger, a still 
larger daily dole had to be allowed. 
Being responsible for the general
“The present rate of wages is fixed at 2 
annas per diem for an adult and 
proportionately lower for women and 
children. This rate is fixed upon the 
presupposition that it will purchase 1  Vi 
lbs. per diem, a quantity which is 
deemed essential for a man while at 
work. There might indeed be a question 
whether life cannot be sustained with 1  
lb. grain per diem; and whether 
Government is bound to do more than 
sustain life. This is a matter of opinion, 
and I myself think that 1  lb. per diem 
might be sufficient to sustain life, and 
that the experiment ought to be tried. 
Possibly the gangs might not 
perceptibly fall off, or not; if they were 
to seriously fall off, then the point could 
be considered.”
%  s |: %  $ ♦
(11.) “The objection to the new scale, 
which Dr. Comish states in detail is 
properly formulated by the phrase a full 
day’s wages  (that is something more 
than the 1  lb.  and a half anna) for a fair 
day’s work. But the phrase postulates 
that there is a fair day’s work, which is 
just what the vast majority of the relief 
labourers do not render. Therefore they 
are not entitled to, and do not physically 
need, the full day’s wage.”
(14.) * * “The scale laid down appears
to me on the whole sufficient to yield to
people that subsistence which alone
Government  can afford. We would
gladly give more if it were in our
power, but we must content ourselves
with saving life; and cannot pretend to
prevent all forms of distress.”
* * * *
(16.) Having carefully inspected during
61 Reproduced from Letter from Dr. Comish, the Sanitary Commissioner for Madras, to the Chief 
Secretary to the Government, Fort St. George dated Madras 6th  April 1877(Famine Correspondence 3, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1877/ Volume 65).
171character of these estimates, I feel 
bound to record my tribute to the utility 
of census carried out two years 
previously under Sir George Campbell- 
the first regular census which had ever 
been taken in Bengal. If the success of 
the prescribed plan of relief operations 
has in any degree depended on the 
framing of estimates, if these estimates 
have in any degree helped the 
Government to make a proper forecast 
of the supplies and the resources 
necessary to encounter the crisis, then it 
is to be remembered that these 
estimates could never have been framed 
had not that census existed.”
my tour of this Presidency thousands of 
relief labourers, I give it as my opinion 
that with very few exceptions, which 
are not, as a rule, traceable to 
insufficient relief wages, the general 
physical condition of the labourers is as 
good now as in ordinary years.”
* * * *
(17.) In conclusion, it is not possible, I 
submit, to determine a priori on 
scientific data, what amount of food is 
necessary to sustain the particular 
classes who come to our relief. The real 
point to be considered is whether in 
ordinary times they get more than 1  lb. 
a day for a male adult. This is an 
economic question which can be 
determined by calculating the rates of 
wages in the rural districts, not the 
wages of trained professional labourers 
employed by public bodies, not the 
wages of stalwart men of the 
professional class of workmen, but the 
men of lesser physique and lighter 
frame such as that of the village poor- 
the wages received by the labouring 
poor in the villages of the interior; and 
then by taking the prices of common 
grains in ordinary years. Now from 
inquiries made in various districts of the 
Madras Presidency, I apprehend that the 
labouring poor in rural localities can 
hardly get more than 1  lb. a day for a 
male adult in ordinary times.”________
A particularly embarrassing aspect of Cornish’s critique of Temple’s pronouncements 
involved the latter’s misreading of nutritional standards based on a typographical 
error in a standard manual used by medical officers in the Presidency, a mistake 
which Comish pointed out succinctly in his longest reply to Temple.62 Yet another 
point of dispute between the two men related to the methods of estimating the
62 Letter from Dr. Comish, the Sanitary Commissioner for Madras, to the Chief Secretary to the 
Government, Fort St. George dated Madras 6th  April 1877(Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 
1877/ Volume 65).
172presence of starvation amongst workers and recipients of relief  In March and April
1877, Temple had requested two IMS officials travelling with him to inspect the
condition of relief labourers in the Ceded districts and make pronouncements
regarding the adequacy of the wage. Both these men- Dr. Harvey, Temple’s personal
medical adviser, and Dr. Townsend, Officiating Sanitary Commissioner with the
Government of India, corroborated Temple’s insistence that labourers on the works
were in fine physical condition.63 This was cited as evidence of the sufficiency of the
reduced wage. Harvey had on March 25th 1877 informed the Government of India that
I have been agreeably surprised and greatly pleased to find the people of all classes on the 
works, on gratuitous relief, and the poorer classes generally in much better physical condition 
than I expected, or imagined to be possible, considering the extent of the failure of crops, and 
the severity of the scarcity.64
Townsend’s visit to the Madras Presidency in April 1877 further reiterated Harvey’s
assessment of the normal condition of the people. He went further to suggest that
nutritional scientists were divided over the determination of standards of nutritional
adequacy. Townsend pointed out that physiological theories of nutrition were greatly
contested amongst the medical profession:
The question of the sufficiency or otherwise of the allowance could not be decided on 
physiological grounds.. .some years ago, the doctrine on the subject was that muscular 
exertion entailed waste of muscular tissue and that in order to compensate this waste, food 
containing nitrogenous principles must be supplied in proportion to the labour 
undertaken.. .late investigations have tended greatly to modify this teaching, and certainly 
at the present time there is no theory on the subject so generally accepted or founded on 
data so incontrovertible that no economic question involving the expenditure of large sums 
of public money can be decided by it.65
63 Memorandum by Dr. Harvey, on special duty with Sir Richard Temple, on the physical condition of 
the people in the distressed districts of Madras and Bombay, dated Kiergaon, March 25, 1877, and 
Report by Surgeon-Major S.C. Townsend, Officiating Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of 
India, on the Condition of Famine Relief Labourers in the Madras Presidency, dated Bangalore 3rd  
April 1877(IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Volume 65).
64 Memorandum by Dr. Harvey, on special duty with Sir Richard Temple, on the physical condition of 
the people in the distressed districts of Madras and Bombay, dated Kiergaon, March 25, 1877(Famine 
Correspondence Part 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Volume 65.)
65 Report by Surgeon-Major S.C. Townsend, Officiating Sanitary Commissioner with the Government 
of India, on the Condition of Famine Relief Labourers in the Madras Presidency, dated Bangalore 3rd  
April 1877(Famine Correspondence Part 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Volume 65).
173Townsend thus averred that ambiguities in scientific theories made them of limited 
use in the formulation of famine policy. Further, Townsend argued for a test of 
nutritional need based on anatomical investigation rather than on theories of 
physiology or chemicals. Townsend touched upon a question that was central to the 
Imperial concern, of limiting relief only to those who were in danger of death without 
it. How was the state, for purposes of famine relief, to identify the signs of unusual 
starvation? Was it possible to demarcate the point at which extraordinary suffering - 
which would lead to starvation- could be distinguished from ordinary poverty? 
Townsend’s argument was that it was difficult to distinguish between the physical 
effects of ordinary poverty, which the state had no moral responsibility to relieve, and 
extraordinary suffering, which it had only a limited duty towards. Thus, ‘when 
inspecting masses of people with a view to estimating the effects of abnormal scarcity 
amongst them’; a ‘very large allowance must be made for what may be called 
permanent poverty, which it is beyond the power of Government to remove’.66 
Ironically, Townsend’s aim in making this point was to insist that it would be 
perfectly justifiable to err on the side of strictness. (An opposite interpretation might 
have been possible, and was in fact the basis of Cornish’s critique: that it was 
impossible for an observer to discern the point at which inadequacy of food became 
irreversible, and therefore it was better to err on the side of liberality.) Townsend went 
on to detail the ‘ordinary low level of living’ amongst Indians. According to him, 
‘loose skin, paleness and anaemia’- all details noted by Comish in his inspection of 
the poor in camps, on works and generally in the district- were regular features of 
Indian people and not specific to famine conditions.67
66 Ibid.
67 T UiA
174The Government of India concurred in Townsend’s report, and claimed it as evidence 
that  deterioration had taken place in the physical condition of the labourers
/TO
between January and April, when the wage had been in force.
Through March, April and May 1877, Comish toured the districts and reported 
extensively on the presence of unmistakeable signs of starvation and unusually high 
mortality from ordinary diseases, both on relief works and in relief camps.69 He 
observed that after the introduction of the one pound wage, numbers on the relief 
works had begun to dwindle while those of gratuitous relief- considered universally 
by administrators a far more expensive, wasteful and ultimately useless form of
70 intervention- had begun to rise.
Comish chronicled a process of gradual and fatal deterioration of workers on the one 
pound wage. As insufficient nutrition continued for days, weeks or months, they 
gradually became weaker and unable to work and were eventually drafted off into the 
relief camps. The result of Temple’s “shroffing” the works and camps was that the 
numbers of people on relief works fell from 907,316 in the first week of February 
1877 to 662, 195 in March. However, the numbers of people too weak to work, falling 
upon gratuitous relief, rose from 38,163 in the first week of March to 99, 113 in the 
last week of March.7 1  Mortality in the camps meanwhile reached alarming proportions 
and was largely attributed to diarrhoea or dysentery, fatal symptoms of chronic 
starvation.
68 See No. 21 of 1877, From Gol to SoS for India, dated Simla, the 19th  April 1877(Famine 
Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Volume 65, No. 221).
69 See Chapter 4 for references.
70 Letter from Dr. Comish, the Sanitary Commissioner for Madras, to the Chief Secretary to the 
Government, Fort St. George dated Madras 6th  April 1877(Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 
1877/ Volume 65).
7 1  Ibid.
175Temple rejected the suggestion that inadequate wages had led to weakening workers’
health and pushing them into a state of exhaustion so that they were only fit for
gratuitous relief. He vehemently argued that there was no connection between the
recipients of the two forms of relief.
The inmates of the camps who are admitted there as being unable to work are a class 
totally different from those who are admitted to the works as being able to work.. .the 
poor inmates of camps have never gone to relief works at all.. .Indeed, the very 
reason for their being admitted to the camps is this, that they were incapable of going 
to relief works. They are diseased, infirm, or being indisposed to work, have 
wandered about, passing by means of relief close at home, have wandered to a 
distance.7 2
In other words, people who went to the works never reached the camps. People in the 
camps had never been on relief works. Where there was evidence that relief workers 
had indeed left the works, Temple attributed this to their laziness: such people were 
reluctant to perform the required task or to travel a distance to the works, and the 
wage itself was not culpable. He then concluded that there was no mortality on the 
works from inadequate nourishment, any deaths that occurred were due to cholera and 
smallpox caused by inadequate sanitary arrangements in the camps. With regard to 
mortality in the camps and in people’s homes in the villages, he attributed it to the 
inefficiency of the village officials who had been instructed not to allow any mortality 
from starvation in the villages. The imperfect supervision of village officials by the 
district administration and the Provincial Government was thus to blame for famine 
mortality, rather than the inadequate wages recommended by Temple and approved 
by the Government of India.7 3
72 No. 23 of 1877, Gol DRAC to SoS, dated Simla, 3rd  May 1877, Famine Correspondence 3, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
73 Minute XXXIX by Sir Richard Temple, dated Nundydroog, 8th  February 1877, Famine 
Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
176Yet, public criticism of the wage had already begun to alarm the Secretary of State for 
India. In early May 1877, Salisbury wrote to Lytton:
Our telegram of yesterday will tell you that we are beginning to be alarmed lest (Temple) 
should have overdone it, disquieting accounts and opinions come in from every side.74
Clearly, the reduction of the wage was a widespread concern amongst senior civil 
servants. As Salisbury wrote:
.. .Letters from.. .the Provinces.. .cast serious doubt on the sufficiency of Temple’s pound 
of grain.7 5
The Collectors of Bellary, Cuddapah, Nellore, Chingleput, North Arcot, and
Coimbatore were unanimous about the detrimental effects of the wage. Most of these
reports deprecated the wage on the grounds that it was insufficient for work, and
therefore wasteful and expensive in the long run. On the 17th of April, the deputy
collector of the Bellary district, V. Venkatachalam wrote:
It is a known fact to all natives that half a seer of grain is hardly sufficient for a single 
meal for an able bodied coolie (i.e. half a day’s food); the coolies are falling off in strength 
and growing depressed in spirits; 92 deaths have occurred in one party since the new scale 
was introduced. A special deputy collector says women eat more than men and require 
more nourishment, and their wage ought not to be less than a man’s.76
On 18th April, Venkatachalam requested that the Madras Government raise the wage
on the grounds that it was insufficient for the sustenance of workers:
Considering the amount of exhaustion resulting from wastage among the relief labourers,
I would respectfully suggest a gradual increase in the rates of wages until such time as we 
could detect a change for the better in their physique.77
In Cuddapah, the Collector Mr. J. F. Price reported on 17th April: ‘I fear that with the 
present scale of wages (task work) can never be done. Making the coolies in this case
74 Letter No.  15 dated May 4th  1877, Letters to the Secretary of State, Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur 
E218/4A.
75 Ibid.




turn out anything but the veriest pretence of a task will mean killing them’.  Price
later deputed before the Famine Commission to state that
I watched carefully the working of the Temple ration in the Cuddapah district.. ..it was 
applied I believe in March and continued until Government raised the ration in May or 
June. It was certainly in force for over two months. During this time I personally inspected 
10,000 persons, some of the gangs two and three times; and in saying that I observed 
distinct deterioration, I base my observation upon particular observation of particular 
individuals whom I personally remembered.79
In Nellore, the Collector reported a ‘marked falling off in all classes’ in the week 
ending 18th of April.80 The Civil Surgeon of Vellore in North Arcot opined that the
Q  1
condition of labourers on the scale had ‘much deteriorated’.  The Special Relief 
Officer in Coimbatore reported that the condition of the coolies had ‘certainly
OJ
deteriorated owing to the small pittance we pay them’.
Yet, it is difficult to estimate how far these observations were based in truth, although 
mortality rates were well above their normal levels in the three months that the wage 
was in force. There certainly were reports that people on works became weaker after 
the introduction of the wage, but whether this was the case on all relief works was not 
(and is not now) verifiable from existing data, which was not systematically collected 
for all works. It would appear that the prescribed rate was sometimes not given, or the 
labourers themselves were defrauded by overseers and grain sellers. In addition, there 
seems little doubt that many of the labourers were indebted and forced to pay their 
debts at the cost of obtaining adequate food supplies.
78 Ibid, p. 218.
79 Ibid, p. 223.
80 Ibid, p. 225.
8 1  Ibid, p. 228.
82 Ibid, p. 230.
178The reasons for the lack of systematic local data seem to have lain in the 
administration of famine relief. Frequently, gangs of labourers moved from one place 
to the other, and attendance on works fluctuated considerably. Members of a gang 
who were present at one inspection were not present at the next, and it was only 
careful observers like Collector Price who would bother to keep track of the 
individuals from one week to another. Even so, district Collectors were medically 
untrained men whose observations of physical condition, even if recorded regularly 
from week to week, could at best sort people by condition into categories of 
‘condition good’, ‘fair’, ‘indifferent’ (unable to perform small tasks), ‘bad’ and ‘very 
bad’, the categorization of which left very wide margins. While this is not to devalue 
their observations, it does mean that reading the reduced wage as the single most 
important cause of increased mortality would tend to assume that Provincial 
recommendations were completely and carefully implemented and monitored at a 
district and village level. It is thus clear that we need to be cautious about making 
such a sweeping generalization regarding the direct link between the Temple wage 
and famine mortality, and also account for the role played by local factors in 
influencing the nature of relief.
However, the reduced wage does seem to have become a leitmotif for critics of 
Imperial policy. Press reports were severely critical and Salisbury was worried both 
about the physical and the political effects of the wage:
Information of the outside world is not reassuring. All newspaper correspondents seem to 
agree that the ration is exhausting the people and that mortality from disease and 
exhaustion is assuming alarming proportions. The extracts from native newspapers which 
have just come home, take the same line. On the whole we thought that the time had come 
for hanging out a danger signal.8 3
83 Salisbury to Lytton, Letter No 15 dated May 4th, 1877, Letters from the Secretary of State, Lyt 
Collection, IOR/ MSS Eur/ E218/4A.
179What emerges from these sources is that Cornish’s objections had become a rallying 
cry for public criticism of Imperial policy as embodied in the Temple ration. Further 
evidence from the districts of Madras reveals considerable support amongst district 
Collectors for a higher wage, on both humanitarian and utilitarian grounds.
It is also worth noting that these debates were played out in the media and that the 
Government of India was forced to take an ill-defined ‘public opinion’ into account. 
Although this ‘public opinion’ is not the main focus of this study, this issue deserves 
further research, as it is of continuing and possibly greater significance today. (For 
example, ‘starving baby’ pictures force Governments to act and provoke international 
censure of Governments for not preventing hunger even today.)
Prison rations and famine wages
The Temple ration thus came to be associated with harsh Imperial famine policy. The 
battle over the adequacy of wages was fought on a number of grounds: scientific, 
moral and political. Newspaper correspondents and district officials were indignant 
about the fact that prisoners in the jails of the Presidency received a higher wage than 
the ‘innocent famine labourer’. This indignation was apparently present not only 
amongst officials, but also among the famine labourers themselves, indicating that the 
labourers were themselves quite aware of discussions amongst European officials. For 
example, The Deputy Collector of Hospett, V. Venkatachellum, wrote of a famine 
labourer in Bellary district asking an overseer,’ Have I not the virtue of a convict to 
get a bellyful of food?’84  This example seems to indicate the presence of a ‘peasant’ 
understanding of a moral contract with Governmental authority, and also possibly of 
Governmental anxieties regarding the setting of a nutritional standard for the wage. 
These concerns seem to have occupied ‘public’ attention amongst Indians as well. In
84 SCR 1877, p. 218.
180Malabar, one Indian reporter protested against ‘the criminals of our jails being fed
O f
better than innocent and starving cultivators’.
However it would be a mistake to attribute the official desire to provide an adequate 
wage to humanitarianism alone. Official morality differentiated between ‘criminals’, 
‘innocent labourers’ and the indigent famine stricken in camps. Perceptions of  jail 
inmates were thus necessarily more negative than those of relief labourers, despite an 
awareness of the impact that famine had on the rural economy, and thereby on crime. 
Indeed the official perception of famine criminals as being driven to commit offences 
in order to seek out official relief seems also to have had these negative connotations.
Official morality thus clearly differentiated between those whom it was permissible to 
protect, and those whom it was not. Comish himself suggested that a starvation wage 
be tried and its effects on the health of prisoners documented in order to settle the 
question of famine wages once and for all.86 This suggestion was immediately vetoed 
by the Inspector General of Prisons, on the grounds that the prisons were filled with 
the starving poor upon whom such an experiment would be disastrous. (This is further 
evidence that different agencies within the Government took different positions on 
moral and scientific questions).What emerges from this is that Comish believed that it 
was morally permissible to experiment upon prisoners, while crying down the same 
experiment on labourers and inmates of relief camps, indicating that notions of the 
deserving and the undeserving were firmly embedded in the official mind.
Popular opinions: in support of Cornish and criticism of the Temple ration
85 Report on Native Newspapers for the Month of  April 1877, Madras, 1877.
86 SCR 1877, p. 226.
181The debate on the reduced wage captured public opinion in the Presidency as 
well as in Bombay. There were strong moral overtones to criticisms of the wage, and 
this in some senses reflected the moral differentiation between labourers and 
criminals.  In particular, opponents of the wage were furious that it was lower than the 
diet prescribed for convicts in the jails of the Presidency. Thus the plight of ‘innocent
87  . famine stricken’ was repeatedly juxtaposed with that of ‘hardened criminals’.  The 
wage, according to the critics, rewarded criminals and punished the honest.
Vernacular opinion of the wage was particularly scathing, as we have seen. Labourers 
and overseers alike decried the anomaly of criminals receiving a higher wage than the 
famine stricken.8 8
In Britain as well there was much indignation over the wage. Pamphlets 
describing the condition of those suffering from starvation were indignant about the
OQ
apathy of the Government of India.
Medical Opinion in India on the Temple scale: in support of Cornish
Comish received widespread support from amongst senior IMS officials for 
his discussion of science and morality in the formulation of famine policy. Such 
support seems to have been based on two grounds: first, on Cornish’s call to a 
scientific standard in determining nutritional needs; and second, on his claim to 
professional involvement in political and economic questions.  It may thus be argued 
that his arguments and the support that he received from Provincial administrators, 
medical officials and ‘public opinion’ were reflective of a growing idealization of
87 See footnote^P>.
88 See footnotes 84 and 85.
89 It is necessary to point out that criticism of the Government of India’s famine policy was voiced on 
many grounds and from many quarters, both in India and in Britain. One of the fiercest critics was Sir 
Arthur Cotton; a pioneer of irrigation works in India, and an Engineer of the Madras Public Works 
Department who accused the Gol of shortsightedness in their refusal to finance public works from 
Imperial money. Others included Florence Nightingale, Sir John Bright, M.P.; John Wilson, Editor of 
the Indian Daily News; and William Digby, Editor of the Madras Times.
182‘scientific standards’ and indeed of  ‘science’ itself as the new logical basis for 
governance. Within this understanding, the medical establishment gained power and 
authority due to its claim to possess a ‘scientific’ solution to political and economic 
problems.
Medicine thus took on an explicitly interventionist stance in famine relief
policy. It is important to note that this stance was not justified on grounds of its utility
for preventing disease in military cantonments or prisons, but on general
humanitarian, scientific and professional grounds. This will be evident from the
following quote. Comish had, during his debate with Temple, called upon
humanitarian principles in treating the famine stricken:
Sir Richard Temple is like a skilful general commanding a battle. His attention is fixed on 
the main points of attack and defence. If these are safe, his work is accomplished. I, on the 
other hand, as a public health official, whose special duty it is to preserve life, am bound to 
listen to the cry of the wounded and note in what way combatants suffer. I should be 
wanting in my duty to myself and to the Government if I failed to state the facts coming to 
my knowledge and the deductions thence.90
After a visit to the Monegar Choultry Relief Camp in Madras city on the 9th 
of April 1877, Comish reported at length on the physical appearance of people at the 
camp. People on gratuitous relief in camps received a higher food allowance than 
those of relief works owing to their low state of health. The inmates of the Monegar 
Choultry camp had been receiving 1  Vi lbs. of rice in addition to a small quantity of 
vegetables, dal, ghee, curry and meat. Yet, Comish reported that the inmates of the 
camp had seemed ‘in a low state’ and ‘suffering from a peculiar condition of the 
mucous membrane of the mouth and tongue’. 9 1   Following this, the Government of 
Madras invited Dr. C.H. Gordon, the Surgeon-General of the British Medical
90 Letter from Dr. Comish, the Sanitary Commissioner for Madras, to the Chief Secretary to the 
Government, Fort St. George dated Madras 6th  April 1877(Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 
1877/ Volume 65).
9 1  SCR 1877, p. 204.
183Department, and Dr. G. Smith, the Surgeon -General of the Indian Medical 
Department, to report on the necessity for increased diet. Both Surgeons-General 
reported of the more recent inmates of the relief camp that their physique was 
‘inferior’; that their health was ‘deranged’; and that the diet was ‘altogether
Q   7 insufficient’ to enable them to resume work’.
They also declared that in cases of persons presenting a deranged state of 
tongue and gums, the present ration was ‘altogether insufficient to preserve health.’ 
The Surgeons General both agreed that ‘a diet of less than 24 oz. a day was not 
enough to maintain a man in health and work’. If people could not recover health on 
less than 24 oz. of rice per day, 16 oz. a day was unlikely to keep people healthy 
enough to work. Comish interpreted this as evidence in favour of his increased 
wage.93
Sir Joseph Fayrer, the head of the India Office Medical Board from 1876 to 1896, also
strongly supported Comish. In his memoirs, Fayrer mentions that
Early in May (1877), I was present at the Famine Committee of the Indian Council, where 
I strongly supported the recommendations of Dr. Comish of Madras with reference to the
supply of food to the starving  to give them a higher scale of diet than the Indian
authorities had contemplated.94
Fayrer’s support seems to have lent considerable weight to Cornish’s arguments 
within official circles, as the following extract from Salisbury to Lytton in May 1877 
indicates:
92  Report of Drs. Gordon and Smith on the Monegar Choultry Camp, SCR 1877, pp. 205- 208.
93 SCR 1877, p. 208.
94 Surgeon-General Sir Joseph Fayrer, Recollections of  My Life, Edinburgh, 1900, p. 423. Fayrer had, 
during the Bengal famine in 1874, also written papers for Salisbury and Mallet on famine diseases. 
(Ibid., p. 321).
184Sir Joseph Fayrer entertains strong views (about the wage) and therein sustained Comish 
against Townsend.95
Two months later, Salisbury wrote:
Dr. Comish cannot be a very wise person. When a doctor gets to talking about nitrogen, I
know he has not much to say for himself. I should not have been disturbed by him  if Sir
J. Fayrer had not announced himself strongly impressed with similar fears.96
Sir Robert Christison also wrote to Comish from Edinburgh supporting his view that 
Temple’s wage was both unscientific and dangerous.97 Christison advised Comish 
that
Mere practical experience is a dangerous guide to a dietary for a body of men.. ..(in fact) 
what is called practical experience is nothing else but a body of loose 
observation.. ..(which should not be tmsted) but neither should scientific analysis be 
tmsted to singly. It must be tested by practical observation, and the two methods together 
will supply trustworthy results.98
Christison concluded that the dietary proposed by Sir Richard Temple was ‘both 
insufficient in quantity, and ill-chosen’."  Such support for ‘medical theory’, from a 
Scottish doctor, presumably a very ‘practical’ medical man, also indicates that 
Comish had enormous professional support, both within and outside India. In turn, 
professional and administrative support at the Provincial level made it difficult for the 
Imperial Government to push through Temple’s wage against Cornish’s, indicating 
that indeed the official hierarchy was a fluid one.
Medical Opinion in Britain: The British Medical Journal
95 Letter No. 15 from Salisbury to Lytton dated May 4th  1877, Lytton Collection, MSS Eur/E218/4A. it 
will be remembered that Townsend,
96 Letter from Salisbury to Lytton dated June 21, 1877, Eur MSS/E218/4A.
97 Sir Robert Christison was a well-known chemist and toxicologist at Edinburgh University. His 
biography states:’ Christison, Sir Robert, first baronet (1797-1882), toxicologist and physician, was 
bom in Edinburgh. Christison’s life exemplified the heroic age of Edinburgh Victorian medicine during 
which he became an outstanding toxicologist, medical jurist, physician, teacher, and fierce protector of 
what he judged to be the best interests of Edinburgh University.’ See Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography Online, (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5370).
98 SCR 1877, p. 196.
99 Italics in original.
185Cornish’s debate with Temple gained him a mention in the British Medical Journal
in 1877.100 The BMJ lauded Cornish’s use of vital statistics during the famine and
classed Comish with other pioneers of nutritional research. Clearly, administrative
acceptance of medical ‘theories’ in questions of state intervention was not a problem
restricted to Indian administrations. Further, the BMJ endorsed Cornish’s use of
physiological examination combined with the observation of mortality statistics. In
summarizing the correspondence between Temple and Comish, it was noted that
Whenever an argument based on scientific data is urged on a question of public health, the 
invariable reply is, as it is, in this particular case, that it is ‘a medical theory’, which 
“practical” men may safely discard. This was the view taken of the lime juice ration by Sir 
George Nares, with what result we know and Sir George Nares knows. “Practical men”, 
however, like the commander of the Arctic Expedition and Sir Richard Temple, are not 
above framing theories of their own and acting on them.. .Sir Richard Temple is satisfied, 
from his hurried inspections of people on the relief works, that his dietary is sufficient; not 
so the Sanitary Commissioner, who does not, like Sir Richard, pass by the subject of the 
actual mortality of the famine stricken...1 0 1
Cornish’s debate with Temple thus was seen as a common cause dear to the hearts of
public health practitioners across the board:
We must not stop without, in the name of  his profession, thanking the Madras Sanitary 
Commissioner for his courage in challenging the opinions and acts of one of the highest, 
ablest, and most trusted officials backed by all the influence of the Government of India.1 0 2
Cornish’s combined use of vital statistics and physiological arguments were seen as 
weapons ably wielded by a practitioner of public health. Moreover, Comish was seen 
as having shown the way in using nutritional science and medical knowledge as tools 
of rational governance. So, the medical establishment seems to have seen the dispute 
over the wage as a ‘medical’ problem (not as a political one) and thus approved of 
Temple using a ‘scientific’ standard. The debate was seen as lying essentially in the
100 ‘The Famine Minutes of Sir Richard Temple and the Madras Sanitary Commissioners’ , BMJ , I 
(May 26th, 1877).The British Medical Journal was the mouthpiece of the British Medical Association, 
the professional body for most British physicians, formed in the mid-nineteenth century from the 
amalgamation of several regional medical associations.
1 0 1  Ibid.
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186lack of consensus over what constituted the correct method of arriving at this 
standard.
Nor must we withhold from Sir Richard Temple the praise which is his due; he might have 
invoked the Government to rebuke the presumption of a health officer for daring to call 
into question his ‘theories’ and the fatal acts founded on them; but instead of this, he 
descends into the arena and defends himself, if not without success, then at least with skill. 
The combatants on such grounds were unequally matched, but Sir Richard Temple must at 
least feel that there is no disgrace in being worsted in such an argument by so consummate 
a master of his subject as Mr. Comish.1 0 3
Comish had quite successfully managed to win professional approval, Townsend and
Harvey notwithstanding.104 The British Medical Association was indignant when, the
following year, 1878, Comish was not felicitated by the Government of India for his
role during the famine. The Gol awarded the title of ‘Star of India’ to several officers
for their services to the state during the famine, but Cornish’s name was not included.
The BMJ mentioned the ‘boldness’ and ‘honesty’ with which Comish resisted
Temple’s measures, which at one time ‘threatened to destroy more people than the
famine’. The anonymous author of the article declared perhaps with some flourish
that Cornish’s role had ‘won for him the admiration of all classes of South India’.
That Comish had not been awarded the Star of India was seen as a direct result of his
challenge to the ‘Imperial Delegate’ and the Government of India. Comish was seen
as the victim of his own boldness in challenging Temple:
It was confidently expected that Mr. Cornish’s name would have appeared in the honour- 
list of on the Queen’s birthday; but when that list appeared, his name was conspicuous by 
its absence. It is no secret that the Sanitary Commissioner’s name was sent in by the Duke 
of Buckingham and his Council; but when that list was submitted to Lord Lytton and his 
Council, it was remembered that Mr. Comish had had the presumption to dispute with the
104  I b i d ' Harvey and Townsend’s criticisms of Cornish’s method of arriving at the standard, however may be 
seen as a reflection of the uncertainty amongst the medical profession at this time regarding the 
connection between food, energy requirements and the means of measuring this connection. See 
Kenneth J. Carpenter, ‘A Short History of Nutritional Science Parts 1-3’. Journal of Nutrition  133 
(2003): 638-645; Idem, Protein and Energy: A Study of Changing Ideas in Nutrition, Cambridge, 1994.
187great delegate from Calcutta, and his name was struck out and that of another 
substituted.1 0 5
The article continued in a tone of deep moral affront:
The Sanitary Commissioner has the approbation of his own conscience and that of the 
community he has served so well. Of this neither Lord Lytton nor his small-minded 
advisors can deprive him.10 6
It seems quite clear that Comish had become a  Ha*0 for the medical profession 
in general, and that his debate with Temple touched chords not only amongst medical 
men in India but also in Britain. This was supplemented by popular and administrative 
disapproval both of the Temple ration and of the principles on which it was based. It 
is worth considering whether Cornish’s rapid promotion within the Madras Medical 
Establishment from Sanitary Commissioner to Surgeon General (skipping four 
intervening ranks) in 1880 was in some ways a ‘compensation’ for the ‘unfair 
treatment’ he received in the matter of official honours.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that although the evidence is scanty, it is 
difficult to determine whether the wage was strictly enforced on all relief works. In 
fact, it is almost certain that this was not the case, as the following account indicates. 
In the Bellary district, Lieutenant Wilson, a Public Works engineer who was posted as 
a famine relief officer, was summoned to a district magistrate’s court in a case 
involving fraud of famine relief funds. The case centred around the disappearance of 
an unaccounted amount of grain from Government stores. It was discovered that 
Wilson had not wilfully defrauded funds. Owing to his unfamiliarity with the weights 
and measures used by local merchants, Wilson had actually authorized the issue of
1 05 Ibid.
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188over 2 lb. of grain per person per day. Not surprisingly, it was found that more coolies 
flocked to Wilson’s camp than any others in the district!107  Whilst this case may 
indicate that in some camps, more than the prescribed ration was provided, it also 
indicates that strict enforcement of Provincial standards with regard to weights and 
measures was not possible. In some cases, in fact, it is possible that less than the 
prescribed wage was provided.
This case also reveals the disorganized state and the relative lack of Provincial 
control over the provision of famine relief. As late as March 1877, Comish found that 
the scale of diet provided on relief works and in relief camps differed widely from 
what he prescribed as the standard. This was partly due to the fluctuation in the price 
of grain (on 31st January, the Government had directed that labourers would be paid 
on a sliding scale of wages according to the price of grain, provided that in no case 
would the payment fall below a 1  Vi lb.  a day), and partly due to the inability of 
metropolitan scientific standards to penetrate the interiors in a situation of crisis. 
Comish directed in March 1877 that the rate of wages payable on relief works be 
standardized at 1  Vi lb. of grain and 20 oz. of cereal grain and 1  Vi oz. of dal for
1  OR persons in relief camps.  However, as the Wilson case shows, the payment of wages 
on relief works and food in relief camps was by no means standard even six months 
later. This would lead us to conclude that although Comish was historically 
significant in framing public opinion against the notion of the Temple wage in 
principle, it is difficult to ascertain what was actually carried out in the districts.
107 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Judicial Department, dated 31st December 1878, 
Nos. 212-3, Government Order No. 2634, TNSA.
1 08 Letter from Surgeon Major Comish, Sanitary Commissioner for Madras to the Chief Secretary to 
Government dated Vellore, 10th  March 1877, No.l, SCR  1877, p. 199.
189Cornish and the Indian Famine Relief Fund
Comish played a significant role in famine relief well after Temple departed 
from Madras. The Indian Famine Relief Fund began its operations in August 1877. As 
discussed earlier, the Mansion House Fund was primarily established to assist official 
efforts in famine relief in the face of great disapproval amongst the Government of 
India and Lytton in particular. Comish was a founding member of the General 
Committee and continued to play a key role in its operations, both in the manner of 
distribution of funds and through his communications about the mortality in the 
famine stricken districts throughout the period of its operation, to 1879. One of 
Cornish’s observations was that in order for women to be fully capable of going to the 
relief works, children and infants needed to be taken care of and fed on a suitable and 
adequate diet during the working day. He further observed that the mortality returns 
showed that infants and children suffered the brunt of the famine. Although the 
famine wage allowed for parents of young children to receive an extra allowance, the 
allowance was too meagre for the support of these children. Moreover, the 
disorganization and paucity of Government feeding centres for children meant that the 
allowance in several cases did not reach the children as their starved parents spent the 
entire day on the works, too busy to take the children to the feeding centres. Comish 
wrote that:
It is quite clear that.....government outdoor relief.. ..has not been brought home to the
great bulk of the poor requiring food  although  feeding depots have been increased
since February, so scattered is the area of the town that it is quite impossible for parents 
who may be in service to absent themselves and accompany their children to the feeding 
depots.10 9
109  The Madras Famine 1877, Ch. 3, p. 18, in The Indian Famine Relief  Fund 1877: Proceedings of 
Committees and Personal Agencies, Final Report &c., Madras, 1879 (Henceforth IFRF).
190The result was that
.. .children in very large numbers have suffered and are suffering from the consequences of 
chronic starvation, and unless means can be devised to supply the children of the 
necessitous poor with food in excess of the parents, many must die before food prices 
reach their original value.110
Comish therefore recommended that an appropriate manner of utilizing the money
was to encourage the district and sub district committees to set up day nurseries where
children were to be fed and cared for by women employed for the purpose. Comish
prescribed an adequately nourishing diet for children who would be admitted to the
nurseries as follows: 1 1 1
Fresh Brown Bread  4-8 oz.
Ragi conjee  1- Vi oz.
Sugar  !4-l/8 oz.
Salt
Buttermilk  Vi- !4 pint
Over the period that the Mansion House fund was in operation, several day nurseries 
were set up. They were mostly in Madras city, but there were several in the districts as 
well. Cornish’s wife organized one of the first such nurseries at their residence in 
Teynampet in Madras city.  Cornish’s involvement in the running of the nursery 
strengthened his view that benevolent intervention was necessary to save lives. 
Moreover, his observation of human behaviour amongst the families who brought 
children to the nursery sharply contradicted official views that the poor were only too 
ready to become dependent on the state- a staple tenet of classical political economy 
and Poor Law in England. His sympathetic view of the famine stricken is evident in 
the following extract:
!n Ibid' IFRF Ch. 5, p. 4. It is of course difficult to measure the effects of these day nurseries on the 
widespread suffering in the absence of exact numbers and more information.
IFRF Ch. 5, p. 4. (Note that Teynampet is the modem name; while Comish spelt it as Teynampett).
191Comish wrote  to  William  Digby,  the  Chairman  of the  fund  in  October  1877,
stating that ‘A great deal too much is said about the readiness of the poor to sponge on
the bounty of Government, or private charity. Half the tales on this subject are untrue
and the other half garbled or exaggerated’.  1 1 3  Remarking on the generous nature of
the people despite their being starved, he continued:
Exceptional  cases  have  been  known,  but  the  general  experience  of the  Teynampett 
nursery, and I imagine of others, is that mothers, aunts, grandmothers or neighbours will 
bring children up to be fed, and though in want themselves, will never express by word or 
sign a desire to share in the help they know is meant only for young children. Big boys 
will bring little boys, and though lank and hungry, and casting longing eyes on the food, 
are only intent on seeing their charges get their allotted ration. For the past six weeks,  a 
little girl of ten or eleven has been bringing up two sickly children twice a day, nursing 
them with the tenderest care and never asking for a bite or a sip on her own account. She 
showed  no  signs  of starvation  until  the  last  few  days,  when  I  noticed  that  she  was 
beginning to go down, and I have asked the lady in charge of the nursery to bring her on 
the list of those to whom one good meal a day may mean the salvation of life.1 1 4
Cornish’s influence on famine relief policy: The Madras Famine Code
The Famine Commission of 1880 recommended that famine codes be 
formulated and set in place to provide guidance to district civil officials in 
apprehending the early signs of famine.  Provincial Famine Codes were intended to 
make the conduct of famine relief more in consonance with a set of guidelines that 
were roughly similar across different Provinces. At the same time, the civil 
administration of each Province or Presidency was required to modify the all- India 
guidelines in consonance with local conditions.115 Comish was a Member of the 
Legislative Council of Madras and his imprint appears quite clearly upon the earliest 
Madras Famine Code of 18& 3 >  The Madras Famine code based state intervention on 
moral, rather than financial principles. It began with a statement of state responsibility 
for human life:
113 The Madras Famine 1877, Weekly Statement dated October 20, 1877, IFRF Ch. 5, p.  1.
114 Ibid.
115 K. Suresh Singh, The Famine Code: Context and Continuity, pp. 141-161.
192In conducting a famine campaign it must be laid down as a first principle that that 
the object of state intervention is to save life and that all other considerations should 
be subordinated to this.. .it is the duty of the state to take steps to avert disastrous 
consequences to human life which must ensue if means of subsistence are not 
afforded to classes affected.116
More importantly, medical officers were to be explicitly responsible for laying down 
and inspecting nutritional standards of rations in relief works and camps. The 
Provincial Sanitary Commissioner was ‘to inspect poor houses, relief camps and 
works hospitals; to report on the physical condition of inmates; general health 
management of affected population, and to test the adequacy of the rations prescribed 
for labourers and those who receive gratuitous relief.117
The code also gave the medical profession primacy over civil officers in deciding 
questions of a ‘sanitary’ nature. In case of disputes of opinion between district civil 
officers in charge of a relief work, and the Medical Officer attached to the same, 
regarding sanitation or the health of people on the works, the civil or Public Works 
officer was authorized to refer the matter in dispute through Collector, to the Surgeon 
General. But pending the reference, he was ‘bound to act in accordance with the 
medical officer’s opinion’.1 1 8  (It seems likely that there were many civil officials who 
would have been only too glad to hand responsibility in this area to the Medical 
Officials).
116 Madras Famine Code, 18&3., p.l.
1,7 Ibid. p. 30.
118 Ibid. p. 32.
193Conclusion
Studies of state intervention in famine have until recently seen the state as a 
unified entity and famine policy as the product of the actions of this entity. Other 
authors, notably David Hall-Matthews, have argued that the colonial state was deeply 
hierarchical. Yet, it would appear that this hierarchy was extremely uneasy, and the 
divisions over the question of intervention could make for an extremely fragile 
structure of governance. Individual personalities personified these divisions as well as 
shaped the hierarchy itself. Indeed, Cornish’s ‘victory’ in the debate over the Temple 
ration indicates that perhaps this hierarchy could be frequently disrupted. In the 
process, what emerged with regard to famine policy was the medicalization of 
starvation and famine- related disease and a degree of Provincial autonomy in matters 
of famine relief. In this case, however, medicalization can be said to have meant the 
triumph of what be termed a ‘social’ or a ‘public health’ model of famine and famine 
related disease, which resulted in a relatively humane Provincial famine policy.
William Robert Comish was a significant historical figure during the famine 
in Madras during 1876-78. He played a key role in debates between the Imperial and 
Provincial Governments over the moral and scientific basis of intervention, and over 
famine policy as embodied in the Madras Famine Code. Cornish’s prominence in the 
Madras administrative and medical context can be explained in terms of personal 
characteristics of industry, talent and professional ambition and a considerable 
amount of administrative and professional recognition of this talent. What also 
emerges is that Comish was a master of bureaucratic politics between different levels 
of Government. This was an essential skill for an ambitious (and not too well- 
connected) officer.
194In turn, tensions between the Provincial and Imperial Governments over state 
intervention provided the administrative and political background to Cornish’s 
success in gaining professional recognition and popular support during the famine. 
Cornish’s professional debates with other IMS men in the decade previous to the 
famine indicate that he saw social and economic well-being or the lack of it as an 
important causal factor in health and disease. This view of disease causation was 
complemented by a strong belief in a benevolent, scientific and rational state 
intervention, which constructed the Indian labourer as a subject of paternalistic 
medical and sociological inquiry.
Cornish’s prominence during the famine was related primarily to his successful 
marshalling of written scientific evidence against the ‘Temple ration’. Due to 
Cornish’s skill, the ration quickly became a symbol of misguided Imperial famine 
policy, winning for Comish both professional as well as administrative support. 
Professional recognition of Cornish’s abilities came from a variety of medical men, 
and related primarily to his use of vital statistics and his observation of physiological 
characteristics of starvation amongst the famine stricken poor of the Presidency. More 
importantly, Cornish’s objections to Temple can be seen as exemplifying contests 
between non-medical administrators and medical men over firstly, the scientific status 
of nutritional theories, and secondly, over the uses of medical science in formulating 
administrative policies pertaining to the general population. At the same time, 
Cornish’s ‘victory’ in the debate was largely due to popular and administrative 
support within Madras and within the Indian medical profession for the idea that the 
wage was the main cause of increased mortality. Some of Cornish’s arguments were
195not bome out by the future course of events. In terms of mortality, in fact, between 
January and April 1877, the period during which the Temple wage was tried, the 
death ratio fell below its levels in December 1876 and May 1877. ( See Chapter 4 for 
a table of monthly mortality per thousand population). It is also likely that the wage 
was not uniformly adhered to in all relief works and camps.
Yet, this does not detract from Cornish’s significance for Provincial famine relief 
policy in Madras. In the following chapters we will move on to examine his use of 
vital statistics and physiological observations to discuss in greater detail their political 
and medical significance for official famine policy.
196Chapter 3 Vital Statistics, Famine Policy, Colonial Medicine and the State
I.  Introduction
“The question of the mortality from famine is still left very much  in the same doubtful
state as before  the mortality arose partly from sickness extending not only throughout
the year  1877,  but  throughout  the  two previous years  1875  and  1876.  The  mortality 
arising  from the  famine itself cannot be exactly estimated. ”
(Extracts from Proceedings of the Government of India, Famine Department, dated Simla, 8th  
June 1878, No.  1299).
“ It is impossible to say how  far cholera, fever or many other ailments may have been 
influenced by the sufferings of  famine... through all the affected districts. ”
( Extracts from letter from J.H. Garstin, Esq., Additional Secretary  to Government of 
Madras (Famine) to the Additional Secretary to Government of India, Public Works Department 
(Famine), (No. 1257), dated Ootcamund, 1st June 1878. )
Vital registration was begun in the mid- 1860s in all the Provinces of British India as part 
of the extension of state medicine to a wider section of the civilian population. The 
registration of deaths at a village and town level was begun in 1866, and the registration 
of births in 1868. These registers formed the admittedly shaky foundation of colonial 
public health policies.1  Yet, except for brief references, vital statistics have not been 
examined in debates about colonial medicine or the medical profession, or with reference 
to their place within the larger historiography about statistical knowledge, its generation, 
compilation and use in colonial India.
Historians have looked at vital registration and population enumeration in 
different ways. Historical demographers have used them in order to demonstrate patterns 
of life, death, health and disease among historical populations. Despite using them as 
source data however, most modem demographers have been aware of the deep
1  Harrison, Public Health in British India, p. 82.
197inaccuracies of the statistics. They have attempted to take into account the alleged
inaccuracy of registration by quantifying margins of error; or discount it altogether by
•  2 studying some of the Provinces or regions believed to have more complete registration.
Others have seen statistics as part of a body of colonial knowledge, embodying 
direct attempts to know, mould, control and govern subject populations. This school of 
thought has been particularly influential, and has inspired several debates in South Asian 
history.3  It would appear that we can divide the historiography into three categories: 
pessimists, sceptics and optimists.4 First, there appear the pessimists: those who argue 
that the Imperial quest for knowledge and information about Indians was linked to the 
extension of control and domination of Indian society, which had far-reaching 
consequences for the success of an imperial project of control and domination, and for 
social differentiation in post-colonial India. In 1996, Bernard Cohn counted vital 
registration and population enumeration as amongst the ‘investigative modalities of 
colonial rule’, which sought to know and understand India and Indians in order to make 
possible the cultural and political domination of India by Europeans.5  Cohn drew on a
2 See for example, T. Dyson, ‘India’s Historical Demography: Developments and Prospects’ (pp. 1-15) and 
‘The Historical Demography of Berar 1881-1980’ (150-196) in idem., India’ s Historical Demography: 
Studies in Famine, Disease and Society, 1989 idem., ‘On the Demography of South Asian Famines Part I’, 
p. 7;  A. Maharatna, ‘The Demography of Famines: An Indian Historical Perspective’, Oxford, 1996; and 
T. Dyson and C. O’Grada,  Famine Demography, Oxford, 2002.
3  On the use of statistics in England generally since the 18th  century, see Headrick, When Information Came 
of  Age, op. cit.
4 This categorization is admittedly inspired by David Washbrook’s classification of views on the impact of 
commercialization on small farmers in South India (‘The Commercialization of Agriculture in Colonial 
India’, op. cit.)
5  Cohn defined an investigative modality as ‘knowledge (that) enabled the British to classify, categorize 
and bound the vast social world that was India so that it could be controlled’. B. S. Cohn, Colonialism and 
Its Forms of  Knowledge: The British in India, Princeton, 1996, pp. 5-6. An investigative modality, 
according to him, ‘included the definition of a body of information that is needed, the procedures by which 
appropriate knowledge is gathered, its ordering and classification, and then how it is transformed into 
usable forms such as published reports, statistical returns, histories , gazetteers, legal codes and 
encyclopaedias’. Most investigative modalities were constructed in relation to institutions and 
administrative sites with fixed routines; some were transformed into ‘sciences’ and their practitioners
198Foucauldian and Saidian framework which saw European knowledge about India as 
exoticizing and constructing the country as part of the technologies of dominance and 
hegemony. Others such as Ronald Inden, Aijun Appadurai and Nick Dirks, argued that 
colonial knowledge about India was not only part of a desire to know in order to govern, 
but was internalized by Indians and shaped Indian identity.6  In this, both Cohn and 
Appadurai saw the all-India censuses from 1871 onwards (but particularly after 1901) as 
embodying an Imperial attempt to construct social categories which ordered and 
constructed Indians according to the essentialized category of caste.7  The decennial 
censuses were the culmination of a process of quantification, enumeration and 
classification that had begun from the 1840’s, whose objectives were to render Indian 
society knowable to the colonial state in order to dominate and control it. An important 
part of the argument constructed was that the information networks established by British 
Imperialism not only endured in post-colonial India, but crucially shaped the self-image 
and social divisions within Indian society in the twentieth century.
O
Then, we encounter the ‘sceptics’, epitomized by the work of Christopher Bayly. 
Bayly’s work on the colonial ‘information order’ highlighted a number of issues in regard 
to the working of the colonial state and its links with power/ knowledge. Bayly’s first 
point was that the colonial information order borrowed heavily from the Mughal state 
both in its classificatory schemes (especially with regard to land assessment and revenue)
became professionals. Cohn also hypothesized that what was entailed in the construction of the census 
operations was the creation of social categories by which India was ordered for administrative purposes.
6 R.B. Inden, Imagining India, Oxford, 1990.
7 Here it is pertinent to note to differences between these authors in the way in which they see the colonial 
knowledge as constructing Indian sociological reality. While Inden and Dirks take the extreme view that 
colonial knowledge invented caste, in a sense, Appadurai is prepared to grant some amount of objective 
reality to caste as an institution.
8  C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780- 
1870, Cambridge, 1996.
199as well as in its informal networks of spies and informants. In that sense, he emphasized a 
thread of historical continuity which questioned claims of the ingenuity of colonial rule 
and its connections with previous and succeeding regimes. Secondly, although European 
desire to know Indian society was motivated by a desire for control and dominance, the 
completeness of European knowledge about India was undermined at critical points, most 
notably the 1857 Revolt.9  Thus, the colonial information order was aimed at mastering 
knowledge about India for the purpose of control and domination. Yet, the knowledge 
gained thus was incomplete and inadequate for the purposes of military or political 
control. Nevertheless, the changes that swept colonial administration in the 1830’s and 
1840’s, had, according to Bayly, important consequences for the information order in 
colonial India. Bayly suggests that these changes- the movement towards statistical 
surveys away from human intelligence and the rapid diffusion of print media into north 
Indian society- were responded to by the ‘Indian ecumene’ with speed, flexibility and 
discretion, and thusitf!/?  . critical factoitin shaping the growth of a new native 
intelligentsia.1 0  The British quest for ‘useful knowledge’ quickly gained popularity 
among native Indians. At the same time, the contradictory policies of economic 
stringency and gaining knowledge crippled the state’s information gathering apparatus. 
Bayly also suggests that in the north Indian context, statistical information collected from 
1857 onwards proved of little value in predicting popular sentiment or political events.1 1  
The new statistical movement in administration was, as Bayly points out, also very 
uneven in the depth of its local detail. Bayly concluded that the new information order 
was intended to transform the nature of the hybrid Anglo-Indian government inherited
9 Bayly, Empire and Information, p. 221.
1 0  Ibid, p. 212.
1 1  Ibid, p. 220-21.
200from the days of Warren Hastings by enforcing and introducing the new concept of 
‘useful knowledge’. However, its scope eventually stretched far beyond this Orientalist 
discourse, reflecting a much wider change in the international division of labour and 
knowledge. Further, the shift to a more routinized, abstract type of information that the 
statistical movement provided within administrative circles was the undoing of the 
colonial regime in 1857, as it gave rise to a number of sectarian influences amongst 
Indian society.1 2  Although Bayly’s work ended at 1857, he suggested that post 1860, the 
successful mastery of indigenous information networks, and a bureaucratic obsession 
with numerical, statistical and administrative information, were responses to insecurity 
regarding the basis of military dominance as the underpinning of colonial governance.1 3  
At the same time, British knowledge about India had, by the 1870’s, become more static 
and less in touch, so to speak, with Indian political currents than a century before.
Finally, another perspective-representing the ‘optimists’- is provided by Christopher 
Guilmoto, who argues that the beginning of the census in 1871 represented ‘a step 
forward in terms of a broader process of democratisation and individualisation of political 
control’. Guilmoto further argues that ‘the census was an expression of a larger concern 
of the state to intervene in the well-being of its people’.1 4  This view seems overly 
optimistic in its assessment both of colonial objectives and of indigenous responses to the
1 2  Ibid, p.246.
1 3  Ibid.
1 4  C. Guilmoto, 'The Sircar’ s Idle Curiosity: Critical Evaluation of Tamil Nadu’ s Demographic Sources 
1871-1981\ MIDS Working Paper No. 85, Madras Institute of Development Studies, 1988, pp. 5-7.
201census, although some other authors have also seen the census as a tool of social 
mobility.1 5
The works of Cohn, Bayly and Guilmoto can in some sense be seen as 
representing points on a historiographical spectrum, representing positions characteristic 
of different schools of thought among historians of south Asia, namely a ‘subaltern 
studies’ perspective, a ‘Cambridge school’ perspective and what can-admittedly 
somewhat cruelly- be termed as an apologist’s view.1 6  Other scholars have developed the 
basic arguments advanced by them regarding the connections between knowledge, 
information networks and imperial control; the role played by indigenous people in 
shaping and using this information, and the implications that this has for understanding 
the interaction between ‘the colonial state’, ‘Indian society’ and knowledge/information. 
For example, scholars such as Ronald Inden, Aijun Appadurai and Nick Dirks, argued, 
developing the subaltern perspective, that colonial knowledge about India was not only 
part of a desire to know in order to govern, but was internalized by Indians and shaped 
Indian identity.1 7  In this, both Dirks and Appadurai saw the all-India censuses from 1871 
onwards (but particularly after 1901) as embodying an Imperial attempt to construct 
social categories which ordered and constructed Indians according to the essentialized 
category of caste.1 8  The decennial censuses were the culmination of a process of
1 5  For example, see M.N. Srinivas, Caste in Modem India and Other Essays,  1978 (4th  reprint).
1 6  These are, as reiterated in the Introduction, labels which encompass a wide and subtle range of 
scholarship, and do them only partial justice. See ‘Introduction: Colonial Transitions and Indian 
Historiography’ in S. Subrahmanyam (ed.) Land, Politics and Trade in South Asia, New Delhi, 2004. An 
older review is presented by D. Washbrook, ‘Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social 
History, c. 1720-1860’, MAS. 22, 1 (1988): 57-96.
1 7  R.B. Inden, Imagining India, Oxford, 1990.
1 8  Here it is pertinent to note to differences between these authors in the way in which they see the colonial 
knowledge as constructing Indian sociological reality. While Inden and Dirks take the extreme view that 
colonial knowledge invented caste, in a sense, Appadurai is prepared to grant some amount of objective 
reality to caste as an institution.
202quantification, enumeration and classification that had begun from the 1840’s, whose 
objectives were to render Indian society knowable to the colonial state in order to 
dominate and control it. An important part of the argument constructed was that the 
information networks established by British imperialism not only endured in post­
colonial India, but crucially shaped the self-image and social divisions within Indian 
society in the twentieth century.
Appadurai takes on Christopher Bayly by arguing that rather than analytically 
separating ‘exotic’ colonial knowledge and routinized, numerical colonial knowledge, 
one should see exoticization and enumeration as complex strands of a single colonial 
project. This project used numerical and statistical information in two ways: justificatory 
and disciplinary.  The justificatory dimension referred to nested struggles between 
different levels of the state, where numbers were the fuel for internal debates about 
plausibility and relevance of various classifications and numbers attached to them. Yet, 
colonial numbers also had a disciplinary aspect, in that they were the means for 
disciplining vast numbers of subordinate officials by enforcing European conceptions of 
accuracy on them.1 9  The ‘disciplinary’ aspect is also taken up by Richard Smith, who 
argues that the introduction of official statistics in Punjab was an important element in the 
systematization of land revenue and that the land record produced by the subordinate 
native official was an important means of control of this selfsame official by superior
1 9  A. Appadurai, ‘Number in the Colonial Imagination’, in C.A. Breckenridge and P. van der Veer, 
Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, Philadelphia, 1993.
203district officials. A strict control of the information produced by these officials freed the 
European Collector for the more important task of governance.20
An essay by John Roselli provides a counter-perspective to Smith’s argument. 
Both Smith and Rosselli deal with the links between the structure of power in the colonial 
bureaucracy in the second third of the nineteenth century; and the information on land 
tenures produced by this bureaucracy. However, instead of Smith’s view that 
systematization was a means of ‘disciplining’ the native village servant, Rosselli argues 
that the European official in the Western Provinces (later the NWP) was dependent on 
native village officials for information on records of land rights in the absence of means 
to attain a scientific precision.2 1  Thus, systematization- or the attempt to systematize- was 
a response to the insecurity felt by the European bureaucrat. Rosselli thus suggests that in 
fact Imperial control was a myth; and the contribution of Imperial knowledge to such 
control was of doubtful or even harmful value.
Finally, some recent work on official information supplements this view of the 
essential ambiguity and weakness of state information systems as a means to dominance 
and hegemony of a subject population. Sanjoy Bhattacharya has argued, in his analysis of 
the use of official information in wartime Bengal during 1939-45, that the colonial state 
was a complex structure involving interaction between Indian and European officials that 
was not just ‘collusion’ or ‘collaboration’ on the part of the former, but actively shaped 
administrative structures and political outcomes. While Bhattacharya does not endorse
20 R.S. Smith, ‘Rule- by- records and rule- by- reports: complementary aspects of the British Imperial rule 
of law’, op. cit
2 1  John Rosselli, ‘Theory and Practice in North India: the Background to the Land “Settlement” of 1833 ’, 
IESHR. VIII. 2, (1971): 134-165.
204the ‘colonial project’ view of the Subaltern studies school, he also suggests that the role 
of the ‘native informant’, emphasized by Bayly, was less autonomous than a pure 
‘Cambridge School’ perspective would permit. Bhattacharya argues that ‘the colonial 
state’ cannot be seen as analytically separate from its district and village networks where 
Indians were actively involved, and that most previous analyses have dwelt on the 
Province and the Imperial Government as the unit of analysis.  He suggests that despite 
official control over the use of wartime propaganda, what constituted propaganda was 
never clearly defined and there existed considerable ambiguity at different levels of the 
state in this regard. Despite his emphasis on lower levels of bureaucracy, however, 
Bhattacharya suggests that the ‘native’ informant was not always an autonomous or 
freely operating agent.22
This chapter seeks to evaluate each of these claims and look at the connection between 
Imperial dominance, control and information in the specific context of the way in which a 
particular type of official information- vital statistics and population enumeration- were 
viewed and used by policymakers during the famine of 1876-78. Were vital statistics 
‘investigative modalities’ of imperial control; or the means by which the medical 
profession extended its hold over the Indian population? To what extent did these 
attempts to obtain information represent an Imperial or a colonial project; to what extent 
did they succeed in their objectives; and what, if any, influence did these efforts have on 
long term trends in governance and state policy? Finally, can we theorize something 
about the historical role of famines: did events or trends during famine situations reflect
22 S. Bhattacharya, Propaganda and Information in Eastern India 1939-45: A Necessary Weapon of War, 
Surrey, 2001.or magnify longer-term processes or were famines unusual, catastrophic historical
23 movers in themselves?
II. Vital Registration and Population Counts before 1876
As Bayly has noted, the enumeration of populations was a part of Indian 
statesmanship from the earliest available historical periods.24 However, the form and the 
purposes of enumeration varied according to the needs of individual regimes; and the 
collection of demographic information in the form that we know it today related to the 
particular needs and classificatory schemes of the colonial state.
Enumeration and Vital Statistics in Madras 1822 to 1860
The mid- nineteenth century saw the beginnings of state medicine and some 
impetus to the registration of births and deaths. Prior to this, there had been irregular 
attempts at counting the numbers of people in the Madras Presidency. Censuses had been 
conducted by the Government of Madras of different areas within the Presidency since 
1822. These attempts were linked to settling the land and estimating the amount of 
revenue payable to the Government under the ryotwari system; and also to evaluating the 
condition of the agricultural population. In particular, the census of 1838 in four districts 
seems to have been motivated by the desire to gauge the loss of population during the 
famine of 1832-33.26 However, these surveys were limited to particular districts and were 
far from comprehensive in their coverage.27
23 In other words, we seek to explore the relationship between event/crisis and process (Cf Arnold, Famine,
p. 6).
Bayly, Empire and Information, pp. 10-54.
25 Cf. Appadurai, ‘Number in the Colonial Imagination’, op. cit.
26 ‘The Influence of Famine on Population Growth’, Appendix to SCR 1878, Madras, 1879, p. lxxx.
“7  Guilmoto, ' ‘The Sircar’ s Idle Curiosity’, pp. 12-13.
206Vital Registration 1864- 1875
A regular system of reporting births and deaths (vital events)- rather than absolute 
population figures alone- on a monthly basis had been instated in Madras Presidency 
from 1864, when the Sanitary Commissions were set up in each Presidency. This echoed 
developments in England, where from 1837, institutional arrangements for state medicine 
led to a regular system of reporting vital events to local state authorities. The British 
sanitary movement placed great emphasis on mortality rates as measures of the success of 
state intervention.28 The beginning of vital registration in India was also directly linked to 
concerns about the state of military health and miasmatic theories of disease causation. 
Filth was seen as a direct cause of disease and death, and state involvement in cleansing 
environments as a necessary measure for the prevention of disease.
In 1859, the Royal Commission on the Sanitary State of the Army in India 
proclaimed the need for a public health service, and stated that military health could not 
be improved without taking into account civilian health to some extent.29 The 
improvement of civilian and military health was seen as depending on two things- firstly, 
extensive state-sponsored ‘sanitary improvements’- comprising of a host of measures 
intended to cleanse Indian towns and villages of filth and including drainage systems in 
Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, the provision of piped water supplies, the clearance of 
roads and bridges- and secondly, a system for the accurate registration of deaths and
2 8 On the use of statistics in Victorian public health, see G. Rosen, A History of  Public Health, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1958, Ch. VI; Eyler, ‘Mortality Statistics and Victorian Health 
Policy: Program and Criticism’, op. cit.
29 The Report of the Royal Commission declared that ‘While diminution of mortality in the army and 
improvement of its sanitary state was the primary objective of the Government., still the full improvement 
of its sanitary state could not be brought about by measures directed solely to the amelioration of the 
sanitary condition of the soldier as such’, and that ‘the interests of the community at large were as much 
concerned as those of the army; every step wisely taken towards the improvement of the public health 
being a step towards better civilisation and better Government’. {Report on Sanitary Improvements in 
India, IOR/ V/24/3675).
207births so as to measure the influence of these improvements on the health of the civilian 
and military populations.30 At a Provincial level, the Report of the Royal Commission led 
to the setting up of Sanitary Commissions in each Presidency in 1864 to look after the 
health of the general population and to inspect the works set up by the revenue and the 
military authorities, and to scrutinize returns of vital statistics sent by the collectors of 
districts.
Vital registration was intended, then, to be the basis of official attempts to 
improve military health by cleansing Indian towns and villages, and in this sense 
reflected Imperial priorities. The business of registering deaths was entrusted to existing 
administrative agencies at various levels of the colonial state. At a district and village 
level, the registration of deaths was delegated to the existing official agency set up for the 
collection of land revenue. In the Madras Presidency, where two thirds of the land was 
under ryotwari tenure, the agency was the village administration that had been set up in
31 the first decades of the nineteenth century under the ryotwari system.  This consisted of 
the village headman or patel, the accountant or karnam, who collected and recorded the 
revenue received at each harvest, and the munsiff or watchman.  They were intrinsic to 
the system of benevolent despotism envisaged by Col. Munro and Read who settled 
Madras in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Under this system, it was assumed 
that the village officers responsible for settling the annual revenue would have the most
30 Ibid.
3 1  In the zamindari areas such as the Shivaganga estate in Ramnad district and the Venkatagiri zamindari in 
North Arcot, the  zamindar’ s agents collected the returns.  These returns from Zamindari estates were 
notoriously inaccurate.
32 The ‘karnam ’ was called ‘kanakapillai’ in some areas. In some of the quotes used in this chapter, 
‘karnam’ was spelt ‘curnam’ in the original sources. In these quotes, the original spelling is retained.
20833 intimate knowledge of daily events in the lives of the people of their village.  These 
officials were technically the servants of the village, and therefore of the people as well 
as the Government.34 From 1866 onwards, these officials were expected to record deaths 
as they occurred in their villages, and forward a monthly statement of deaths through the 
tahsildar to the district Collector.  At a district level, a mortuary clerk in the office of the 
Collector compiled the mortuary returns from each village in the district, which were then 
forwarded to the Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of Madras, who compiled 
them in the form of an Annual Report. From 1866 onwards, there was a statistical 
assistant in the office of the Sanitary Commissioner who tabulated the district returns. 
Questions of Completeness, Reliability and Accuracy
Right from the inception of registration in 1866 till well into the 1880’s,
Provincial and district officials raised doubts as to the veracity of the death statistics. The 
perceived sources of error were of three kinds: firstly, the completeness of coverage; 
secondly, the reliability of the statistics, and thirdly, the categorization of disease and of 
age. With regard to the completeness of coverage, the anxiety related to whether every 
death was brought to the attention of the village or the town mortuary official by the 
people. Some villages comprised scattered hamlets over huge areas, and revenue officials 
sometimes depended on second-hand information regarding deaths and births. Moreover, 
within some districts, particularly North Arcot, Nellore, Ganjam, and Kistna, large 
portions of land were under Zamindari tenure. In the Zamindari areas, the village
3 3  Nilmani Mukherjee also asserts that ‘there was scarcely a single fraud of any kind which could be 
committed in a village either against the Sircar or the poorer ryots without the Karnam either being 
acquainted with it or taking active part in it’. (The Ryotwari System in Madras, p. 250.) According to 
Mukherjee, the dishonesty and falsity of the Karnam’ s accounts were legendary amongst European district 
Collectors.
34 Mukherjee, The Ryotwari System, p. 249.
209officials were further removed from the agency of the district and Provincial
administration by the interposition of the Zamindar. Here, the state was even more
insecure than in the ryotwari areas about its ability to penetrate Indian society and social
organization.35  Even in Madras town, the Sanitary Commissioner of Madras complained
of the inaccuracy of returns as follows:
The Mortuary Establishment attached to the Office of the Sanitary Commissioner, 
consists of one head writer and two clerks, with six men employed in collecting the 
reports of deaths as they occur in the different Police Divisions, and who bear the official 
designation of Mortuary Conicoplies (kanakapillais) or Accountants.
The system which they adopt is as follows: Each Mortuary Accountant makes a daily 
visit to the different Christian, Mahommedan and Hindu burial grounds lying within the 
division of which he is in charge. The Vettyan (grave digger or the burner of bodies) 
gives them, or more accurately, is supposed to give them numbers of persons who have 
been interred or burnt the day previous, with as much information as he possesses 
concerning the age, sex, occupation and cause of death of the deceased. It often happens 
that the Vettyan, who was on duty the day previous, is absent at the time of the Mortuary 
Accountant’s visit; the information is then obtained second hand from some person who 
has been left in charge of the ground. If the Vettyan is unable to give the particulars 
connected with the deaths among Hindoos on the day following interment, he obtains it 
from the friends of the deceased on a subsequent day (the second or third after the actual 
burial or burning) of the funeral ceremony known as the ‘Milk Day’. The Vettyan, it must 
here be mentioned, keeps no record or book of any sort, all the information he gives is 
from memory. After visiting the burial grounds, the next thing the Mortuary Accountant 
does is attempt to verify the statements of the Vettyan by the best means in his power. 
These are but limited. He first visits the Police Tannah (thana) nearest to the burial 
ground, and past which the funeral procession proceeds, where by an arrangement 
between the Mortuary Accountant and the Police, the relatives of the deceased deposit a 
writing, containing particulars concerning the deaths. In some instances, a pencil and 
slate or cadjan leaf is left at the tannah, upon which the friends record the information 
required for the Mortuary Register. If the particulars concerning the deaths of individuals 
agree with what the Vettyan has told the Mortuary Accountants, they are satisfied without 
further enquiry; but if discrepancies arise, they go to the house of the deceased for further 
information. Great difficulties occur in making this inquiry. The relations of the deceased 
very frequently refuse to give any information, and abuse the Mortuary Accountants. 
These attempts to check the info obtained on burial grounds is obviously.. .most 
unsatisfactory, and presuming that the original information obtained by the Vettyans 
is.. .untrustworthy, it cannot be doubted that many errors are of constant occurrence 
among the entries made in the Mortuary Register.3 6
35 SCR 1870, IOR/V/24/3681.
36 SCR 1866, IOR/V/24/3680, p. 161-2.Secondly, the relationship of the death registers to the actual occurrence of deaths was
also doubted. Town and district officials were often unsure about whether the figures
entered referred to actual deaths, or whether a subordinate simply made a guess and
entered in an arbitrary figure. As a district official proclaimed with disgust over a
proposal to make compulsory the registration of births and deaths in 1867:
The Collectors and their subordinates are already overburdened. This is an age of vital 
statistics, social statistics, agricultural statistics and statistics generally. The Collector 
gets an order; he sends it to the tahsildars, who send it to the villagers. Here it is regarded 
with the greatest suspicion and disgust; but the orders of superiors being emergent, the 
Curnam fills in the paper at a guess and sends it back. The returns of different villages are 
condensed in the talook; those of the talook in the Collector’s office, and those of the 19 
Collectors in the office of the Board of Revenue. How trustworthy the result is (can be 
guessed from the following): the last quinquennial return showed a decrease of some 1  
million ploughing cattle while cultivation in every district had increased 20%....All these 
statistics are based on estimates only; there is nothing accurate about them. I would not 
have them dropped, as they accustom people to the sort of thing; but until education has 
multiplied a hundredfold and the law of division of labour has acted more generally, 
things will remain the same. The village Munsiff.. .is an utter barbarian.. .the village 
Curnam is for the present purpose but little better. He can read and write and cipher, but 
in general intelligence is scarcely more advanced. Such are the twin office bearers of a 
Madras parish; the manipulators of our statistics and the instruments for the introduction 
of our reforms.3 7
There seemed to be no way to supervise or check the returns with regard to the veracity 
of deaths. At the same time, the agency was deemed to be the most suitable for the 
registration of deaths due to its intimate involvement with the daily lives of people.
Finally, the deepest doubts related to the categorization of diseases employed in the death 
returns; and the accuracy of data on age in relation to corresponding age in England. With 
regard to disease categories, the system of classification in force was that adopted by the 
Statistical Congress in Vienna in 1862.38 The most common sources of confusion were
37 Letter From D. F. Carmichael, Coll. Vizagapatam to Secretary to Board of Revenue, dated 13th  March 
1867 No. 102, Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue dated 27th  March 1867, IOR/ P/440/36.
38 SCR 1866, p. 162.
211between various types of fevers and bowel complaints, and the confusion often arose not 
only at the village level. Apart from the common observation that village officials often 
could not distinguish between the many types of fevers in the classificatory schedules, 
there were also disagreements at all levels of Government between civil and medical 
officials over the nature and aetiology of bowel diseases and their relationship to cholera. 
Cholera itself was a source of concern for European Governments and a puzzle for 
medical officials in India and in Europe, and fevers were classified in a number of ways, 
making the distinction of particular types of disease difficult. (See Chapter 4 for a fuller 
discussion of difficulties in classification.)With regard to age, the returns were regarded
■>Q
as extremely inaccurate throughout this period.
The counting of births and deaths thus relied heavily on what was seen at a Provincial 
level as unaccountable native agency. The hereditary (and permanent) nature of village 
offices under the ryotwari system was a source of dissatisfaction to those who would 
make the village officials accountable to the Provincial and district administration. Yet, it 
was believed that to make drastic changes in administrative practice in order to achieve 
accuracy in vital statistics- seen as but an inferior function of these village officials- was 
hardly worth the effort. This is seen from the following evidence.
In 1867, the Madras Board of Revenue asked all district Collectors to give their opinions 
on the collection and submission of mortuary returns being made compulsory, on 
legislation to make the Munsiff (the village watchman) responsible for the registration of 
births, deaths and marriages; and to make the offices of the Karnam (the village
39 See Guilmoto, ‘ 'The Sircar’ s Idle Curiosity’, pp. 30-46, on inaccurate age returns.
212accountant) and Munsiff impeachable instead of hereditary. (When Munro and Read 
settled Madras in the early 1800’s, they had acted on the principle that the village 
officials constituted honourable and hereditary forms of local social organization which it 
was desirable to continue .Thus the office was passed from father to son within a village 
and it was not legally possible to remove the incumbent).40
The abovementioned suggestion to make the posts of village officials impeachable and
legally accountable for the collection, recording and submission of vital events had been
made by the agent and manager of the Shivaganga Zamindari in Ramnad district. This
gentleman believed that this would make the registration more accurate. The responses
received from several districts were not in favour of the change because it was believed
that such measures would endanger the control of the Provincial Government over the
ryotwari areas. Clearly, the dependence of the Provincial Government on the local
influence of these officials was far too great to permit of reforms intended for more
‘scientific’ administration and sanitary activity on the part of the state. For example, D. F.
Carmichael, the Collector of the Vizagapatam district wrote:
Death registering is no part of a Curnam’ s duties. The office of Curnam is of the utmost 
importance to the property and rights of a people. Mr. Fischer desires the power of 
dealing with them summarily, destroying their independence and reducing the tenure of 
an ancient, honourable and hereditary post to that of a ten- rupee copyist.
The same writer was also sceptical of the tenor of the reforms proposed
40 Washbrook, The Emergence of  Provincial Politics, pp. 149-150. Washbrook however makes the point 
that the karnam acted in consonance with the patel or headman (p. 148), and that from the 1850s, it was the 
village headman who was a real source of local power, as Fort St. George began to attack ‘administrative 
cliquism’. (Note also that in some villages, the village watchman or munsiff doubled as the headman.)
4 1  Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue 1867 dated 27th  March 1867, No. 1934: Letter From D. F. 
Carmichael, Coll. Vizagapatam to Secretary to Board of Revenue, dated 13th  March 1867 No. 102, 
IOR/P/440/36.
213Proceeding in the same revolutionary strain, our Projector, passing over these truculent 
Curnams (often the only people in a village who can read and write), is for setting up the 
Village Munsiff as a kind of Deputy Accountant. ‘Let the registration of deaths, marriages 
and births be rendered compulsory, and immediately as these “domestic occurrences” 
happen in a village, let the Munsiff  at once report the fact to the Magistrate, European or 
Native, within whose jurisdiction he resides, mentioning any particulars he thinks 
important. These reports are to be condensed in the District Collector’s office and then 
the statistics which all these reports will furnish might be collected by the Head of the 
Medical Department, who might be appointed registrar General and a monthly report be 
submitted to Government and published in an official Gazette in the same way as is now 
done in England. (Our Projector) is also in favour of a comprehensive Sanitation Act.
Those who urge that everything English should be introduced into this country 
(should) consider not only the obvious differences in the scale of civilization between the 
two countries but also inquire by what machinery and at what cost to the taxpayer any
given system in England is worked  (Can Mr. Fischer) tell us that the English
Registration Act (1836), the Nuisances Removal Act (1855), the Diseases Prevention Act 
(1855)- found feasible in 10,000 parishes of wealthy, civilized and densely populated 
England is likely to prove equally so in 100,000 villages and hamlets of a territory like 
Madras? 4 2
District officials were against pressurizing village officials to render accurate 
statistics, either of revenue or of vital events, because it was feared that such pressure 
would further threaten the delicate control of the Provincial Government of the workings 
of land revenue and rural South Indian society. Inaccurate data, it was believed, was a 
small price to pay for this delicate control. Despite doubts about the accuracy of the 
registration data, however, this data began to be used by Provincial and Imperial sanitary 
officials through the 1860’s and 1870’s in debating both the causes of disease and various 
public health schemes to be undertaken by the state. Vital statistics formed the basis of 
the sanitary activities undertaken from 1866 onwards. As the Sanitary Commissioner of 
Madras noted in 1867, ‘although imperfect, a very fair approximation of the prevailing 
mortality is obtainable from the Returns collected, which are submitted to Government 
each year in the form of an Annual Report.’4 3
42 Ibid.
SCR 1866, p. 161.
214III. Debates on state responsibility during the famine of 1876-78
During the famine of 1876-78, the accuracy of vital statistics became a central bone of 
contention between the Governments of India and Madras and their respective Sanitary 
Commissioners. As discussed in the foregoing chapter, William Robert Comish played a 
key role in debates about timely and adequate state relief. What is more pertinent to this 
chapter, however, is that excess mortality as recorded in the death statistics was central 
to Cornish’s argument; as was a theory of disease causation which saw chronic hunger as 
the root cause of much of this excess mortality. For Comish, the accuracy of the rural 
death statistics was a principal feature of his argument for state intervention to prevent 
famine mortality.
Comish used vital statistics to argue for more liberal and timely state intervention 
in food crises. In the previous chapter, we have argued that personal qualities and 
professional considerations are important in understanding his significant public role 
during 1877 and 1878. Here we delve in greater depth into his arguments regarding the 
use of vital statistics to trace a theory of causation with regard to the great mortality of 
those years.
Firstly, Comish demonstrated in his reports to the Madras Government that 
mortality rates were greatly elevated and birth rates greatly depressed during the famine 
months of 1877 and 1878 in comparison with their monthly levels over a five year mean. 
(See Appendix 3.1: Causes of Death 1877) .Secondly, in his annual reports for 1877 and 
1878, Comish drew a series of graphs showing the close connection between the rise in
215mortality rates, the decline in the birth rate and a rise in food prices in ten districts from 
which distress was reported. These graphs implicated high food prices- and thereby a 
lack of food - in the causation of the elevated mortality and depressed fecundity and 
fertility of these years. (See Appendix 3.2.)
In showing the effects of chronic starvation on rural mortality rates, Comish 
categorized the individual districts of the Presidency into three types: first, those where 
district administrators had reported agrarian distress, migration and starvation in 1876 
(the early famine districts); secondly, those in which distress began to be reported in 
1877 (late famine districts), and thirdly, those in which distress was reported amongst 
starving migrants but not amongst the resident populations (non-famine districts).44 The 
mortality rates for all registered causes of death were much higher in the first two 
categories than in the third category. (See Appendix 3.1.)
Comish stated that starvation was difficult to detect, and easy to mis-classify in the death 
statistics. However, people died in greatly increased proportions from ordinary diseases, 
such as cholera, smallpox, fever and bowel complaints in the famine districts 45 Clearly, 
this implicated lack of food and inadequate state relief as a primary cause of epidemic 
mortality in these districts, although social and environmental factors connected with 
famine migration and relief measures also played some role in exacerbating mortality. 
Moreover, Temple had declared in March 1877 that ‘starvation was successfully
44 It is important to note that these distinctions might not have been completely accurate. The Government 
of Madras in its famine census made a different set of distinctions.
45 SCR 1877, pp. 74-75.
216combated’ all over the Presidency.46 Cornish’s declarations thus caused Lytton and 
Salisbury much embarrassment, because they pointed to the existence of much excess 
mortality, which was directly linked to famine conditions, the existence of which Temple 
had gone to great lengths to deny.
Finally- and this was the point where he came most into conflict with Temple and the 
Government of India- deaths from famine often occurred despite the ability of the state 
to prevent them. They occurred because state sponsored relief was not given early 
enough or in large enough quantities to prevent the slow degeneration of people beyond 
the point of salvation. In his annual report for 1877, Comish wrote that ‘ Scientific and 
practical experience in regard to the food and dietaries of Indian populations (were) 
almost wholly opposed to the policy endorsed by the Government of India for famine 
relief.. ..a very sad experience of the effects of inadequate food is now before 
Government’.47
Cornish’s analysis of mral vital statistics thus was a sharp and articulate critique of 
Imperial famine policy and incorporated what can arguably be called a ‘starvation/ 
social’ model rather than a ‘health crisis/ disease’ model of famine mortality.48 This 
argument was that epidemic disease followed upon starvation, which was the root cause 
of increased mortality in 1877, a famine year. Increased mortality in a year of famine
46 Letter No. 219, dated 21st February 1877, from the Additional Secretary Government of India to the 
Secretary, Government of Madras, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/ Vol. 65.
47 SCR 1877, p. 227. The prevalence of‘chronic starvation’ and its irreversible effects once a certain stage 
was past was a prominent aspect of Cornish’s discussion of the physical condition of famine labourers. (See 
Chapter 4 for more details).
48 See Chapter 4 for further explanation of these terms.
217was in turn a crisis that was preventable by state intervention through the provision of 
adequate wages for work, and some amount of gratuitous relief at an early stage in the 
distress.
One of the central aspects of Cornish’s assessment of the effect of famine on mortality 
rates was that famine as a crisis itself seriously disrupted the vital registration system at 
the village and town level. He argued that all evidence pointed to the fact that during the 
months of high food prices, village servants, whose incomes were in part derived from 
land revenues and land itself, themselves became destitute and dependent on state 
sponsored relief. This meant that their duties in death registration- already a subject of 
much doubt as regards its accuracy- were seriously neglected. As a consequence, 
hundreds of thousands of deaths went unrecorded as the village officials sought work at 
famine relief works or left their villages in search of food and work.49 In addition, 
Temple’s order that village officials should be held accountable, on pain of punishment, 
for preventing every case of starvation that occurred in their jurisdiction would seriously 
influence the reporting and classification of famine deaths.5 0 Thus, all mortality rates 
derived  from official registration data understated the total amount of mortality during 
these months.
However, Comish argued that although the mortality rates were imperfect as 
absolute measures, they could nevertheless be used as relative measures for comparison 
as the amount of error was tolerably constant from year to year. While the mortuary
49 SCR 1877, p. 15.
50 Minute by Sir Richard Temple, respecting passages in the Report of the Sanitary Commissioner of 
Madras, dated Cuddalore, the 18th  April 1877, No. 218, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 
1877/Vol. 65.
218registration would never show the full and exact impact of the famine on the well-being 
of the people, yet it would give a fair indication of its ravages simply by registering the 
great overall increase in mortality. Comish wrote:
Notwithstanding all the disorganization of the village service, and family and social life, it is 
simply marvellous how the death registration has served to portray the intensity of the famine.5 1
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Cornish’s observations about the
Temple ration created a flutter amongst the medical profession as well as the press. By
April 1877, newspapers were filled with reports of the great mortality caused by the
Temple ration. (As has been mentioned in Chapter 1, an analysis of newspaper reports
would have provided a valuable set of illustrations regarding this point, but has not been
possible within the scope of the thesis). Cornish’s publication of mortality rates further
threatened the Imperial Government by exposing the miserable failure of Imperial
Government to control starvation. Despite the Temple ration being discontinued in May
1877, critical public opinion continued to decry Imperial famine policy for months.
That the number and nomenclature of famine deaths had become a problem to be
politically managed is evident from the following extract from a letter from Salisbury to
Lytton in June 1877. Salisbury wrote:
I do not think you rate sufficiently low the importance of the attacks one or two 
newspapers here occasionally make on you.. .However, all’s well that ends well... the 
rain has come, the Madras Government have not resigned in a body, more people have 
not died than can reasonably be attributed to cholera and an unhealthy season and 
George Hamilton is looking forward to his budget in very good spirits.5 2
Ibid.
52 Letter No. 22 from Salisbury to Lytton dated June 15, 1877, Letters from the Secretary of State, Lytton 
Collection, MSS/Eur 218e/4A. (Italics in original).
219By September 1877, there were rumours rife in Madras, Bombay and London regarding
the enormous mortality caused by the Imperial policy of neglect. In the meantime, the
Madras Government appealed to private charity in Bombay, Madras and London for
financial assistance with famine relief, much to the displeasure of Lytton and his council.
On September 13th, Salisbury wrote to Lytton:
The Duke’s Madras meeting.... was in many ways terribly inconvenient  it in a degree
committed the Madras Government to an endorsement of Cornish’s romances... and however 
strongly convinced we might be from internal evidence that they were romances, we had no 
material (nor had anybody else) with which to contradict. It may be possible to prove that half 
a million have died; but it is next to impossible to prove that half a million have not died.5 3
In October 1877, Lytton wrote anxiously to Salisbury:
Reported deaths of the half year thus exceed the reported death rate of 1875 by 16 V z per 
thousand, or 227,123 cases, and they exceed the supposed normal death rate by 13/1000 or 
188,945 cases. This latter number somewhat exceeds total of cholera deaths.5 4
At the same time, he also adopted a defensive tone regarding the mortuary registration on 
which these reports were based: ‘Impossible to say how much additional mortality due to 
famine. Rural registration of  deaths not  fully trusted'.5 5
IV.  The Famine Census of 1878.
Accordingly, Lytton suggested to Salisbury that a census of the famine stricken areas be 
undertaken in Octoberl877 October. Lytton was of the opinion that the census largely in 
order to counter the ‘misapprehension about the mortality in Madras Presidency’ in the 
English press.56 Salisbury endorsed Lytton’s suggestion and ordered a ‘famine census’ in
5 3  Letter from Salisbury to Lytton No. 37, dated September 13,1877, Letters to the Secretary of State, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/E218/4B. (Italics and emphasis in original).
34 Ibid.
3 5  Ibid (Italics in original)
56 Telegram, dated 16th  October 1877,Viceroy, Simla, to SoS, London, No. 275, IOR/V/4/Session 1878/ 
Vol. 59.
220early 1878 as part of his commission for an inquiry into the famine. (This inquiry was 
later to form the basis of the Report of the Famine Commission of 1880).5 7
The object of the Famine Commission and of the census itself was nothing less than a
‘scientific’ evaluation of state relief efforts with the purported aim of formulating a set of
guidelines for state intervention to prevent future crises on such a scale. However, in
commissioning the census Salisbury prefaced his despatch with a deliberate note of
caution regarding the tools that would be used to evaluate these efforts:
It is not easy to ascertain with precision in what cases these praiseworthy efforts were 
rewarded with complete success, or how far they were defeated. The evidence which has 
been offered on this subject is conflicting, and is evidently based much more upon 
estimate than accurate knowledge.5 8
Salisbury further suggested that ‘scientific questions’, instead of clarifying, had ‘coloured 
the extreme views’ which had been expressed by officials in regard to the relief efforts of 
the Government.59 Although not stated, it seems clear that he was referring to Cornish’s 
debate with Temple. While expressing the desirability of a scientific evaluation of relief 
efforts, Salisbury also suggested that the basis for such a scientific evaluation did not 
exist. In other words, while such an evaluation was highly desirable, it was hardly 
possible, given the quality of existing data.
57 See ‘The Famine Code: Context and Continuity’ in J. Floud and A. Rangasami, Famine and Society, op. 
cit. and P. Robb, ‘The Colonial State and Constructions of Indian Identity: An Example on the Northeast 
Frontier in the 1880s’, MAS. 31,2 (1997): 245-83. Lance Brennan has a sceptical view of the actual way in 
which the Famine Commission’s recommendations were translated into policy. He suggests that dominant 
personalities and career ambitions within the top rungs of the Indian Civil Service in the Government of 
India, rather than a realistic appreciation of the requirements of a famine policy for India, was the key 
factor that shaped the Famine Codes. (Brennan, ‘The Development of the Indian Famine Codes’, op. cit.)
58 Copy of a Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council 
dated India Office, 10th  January 1878 No. 2 (Revenue) on the subject of the recent Famine in Western and 
Southern India, IOR/V/4/ Session 1858, Vol. 59.
59 Ibid.
221The simultaneous appearance of epidemic diseases, especially of cholera in a visitation 
of unusual severity, has lent an additional and formidable element of uncertainty to the 
information that we possess in respect to the famine mortality of the past year, for it 
appears that deaths from cholera and from want are attended by symptoms sufficiently 
similar to mislead an untrained observer. At the same time, the datum from which all 
calculations of increased mortality must proceed is in a great measure wanting.  6 0
Commenting on the deduction of the effects of famine from registered mortality rates, he
suggested that the ‘recent introduction’ of death registration made for imperfect
knowledge regarding the number of deaths in ordinary years; and that the number of
deaths in those years had been ‘understated seriously’.6 1  In other words, the imperfection
of the rural statistics in normal years made them of limited or no value in estimating the
mortality that had resulted from want and inadequate relief.
Salisbury further went on to suggest that contrary to Cornish’s assertion that the famine 
had resulted in under-registration of mortality, that registration might in fact have 
improved as a result of the instructions to village and district officials that they were to be 
held responsible for any starvation deaths that did occur.
Where the normal mortality is not certainly known, it is hopeless to attempt to calculate 
the amount of abnormal increase; and as the organization for famine relief would cause a 
more careful observation of mortality, it cannot be assumed that the causes of error which 
have vitiated the statistics of ordinary years would operate with equal force on the year of 
famine.6 2
60 Ibid.
6 1  Ibid.
62 Ibid. Other authors such as Tim Dyson have also suggested that registration might have improved as a 
result of these strictures. Dyson cites Comish on under-registration but also cites the 1881 Census report as 
indicating that death registration in Bombay had improved during 1876-78. A similar improvement was 
cited to have taken place in Punjab in 1939. (Dyson, ‘On the Demography of South Asian Famines Part I’, 
p. 10.) However, given the local influence of village officials in Madras, and the testimony of a number of 
district officials and independent journalists, this does not seem to have been the case in Madras during 
1876-78.
222Finally, Salisbury made a deliberate statement of the futility of an inquiry into famine
mortality, while at the same time commissioning the famine census:
  I am not of opinion that any useful result would be obtained by instituting a special
inquiry (on the question of an abnormal increase in famine mortality), even if there was 
the slightest hope that trustworthy statistics could be collected as to the mortality due to 
famine alone.6 3
The Method of the Famine Census
Despite this statement of futility, a partial census of some selected districts was carried 
out on the night of 14th March 1878.64 Comish assumed charge of the census undertaking 
and designed a sample of talooks where the census was to be taken. The districts where 
the census was undertaken were Bellary, Kumool, Cuddapah, Nellore, Coimbatore,
Salem and Chingleput (assumed to be worst affected), Kistna, Trichinopoly and 
Tinnevelly which were seen as partially distressed, and Tanjore, which was assumed to 
be a non-famine district.
The basis on which these classifications were made is unclear from the sources. In his 
Annual Report for 1877, Comish classified Kumool, Bellary, Cuddapah, Nellore,
Madras, North Arcot, Salem, Chingleput, Coimbatore and Madura as ‘early famine 
districts’ where scarcity and drought existed at the end of 1876 and early 1877; South 
Arcot, Tinnevelly, Neilgherries, Kistna and Trichinopoly as ‘later famine districts’ where 
scarcity and distress developed into famine over the course of 1877; and Ganjam, 
Vizagapatam, Godavery, Tanjore, Malabar and South Canara as ‘non-famine districts’
“ fold.
64 Comish insisted that March was far too early to carry out the census, as the famine dragged on till the 
end of 1878. However, the Governments of Mysore and Bombay carried out their censuses even earlier, in 
January 1878.
223whose ‘resident populations’ were unaffected by famine or scarcity.6 5  The official 
correspondence indicates however that distress was reported from South Arcot 
(purportedly a later famine district) as early as January 1876.66 In addition, a different set 
of classifications appear to have been used by the Government of Madras in its review of 
the famine. This document includes in its list of ‘distressed districts’ all the districts 
classified by Comish as ‘early famine districts’ and Tate famine districts’ as well as 
Tanjore and Malabar, at the end of 1876.6 7
In the last four districts (Kistna, Trichinopoly, Tinnevelly and Tanjore) bordering 
on the distressed areas, one talook each was chosen for the sample. No census was taken 
of any portion of Madura or North Arcot in which the distress was assumed to have been 
about equal to that of Coimbatore and Salem.68 Thus the 19 talooks chosen were Gooty 
(Bellary), Nandikotkur (Kumool), Madanapalli (Cuddapah) Gudur (Nellore), Palladam 
(Coimbatore), Ponneri (Chingleput) in the worst affected districts; Gudivada (Kistna), 
Museri (Trichinopoly), and Ambasundaram (Tinnevelly) in the partially distressed 
districts; Mayaveram in Tanjore district which had hardly been affected; and all nine 
talooks of the Salem district which was held to ‘fairly represent a famine district’.69
65 See Appendix 3.1 (Causes of Death in 1877) for sources.
66 Gol to SoS, Letter no. 13 dated Simla, 31st July 1876, Famine Correspondence 1, IORW/4/Session 
1877/Vol. 65
67 Madras Famine Review, p. 26.
68 Copy of a Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council 
dated India Office, 10th  January 1878 No. 2 (Revenue) on the subject of the recent Famine in Western and 
Southern India, Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/ Session 1858, Vol. 59.
69 Ibid.
224The Results of the Famine Census
Table 3.1  Loss of Population 1871-1878
District Pop- Nov 1871 Pop- Mar 1878 Difference % difference on 
original pop
6 talooks- very 
distressed*
859,132 739,989 -119,143 -13%
9 talooks- 
Salem




496,702 528,574 +31,872 +6%
1  talook- 
Tanjore***
221,749 242,999 +21,250 +9%
Notes:
* Gooty talook (Bellary); Nandikotkur (Kumool); Madanapalli (Cuddapah); Gudur (Nellore); Palladum 
(Coimbatore); Ponneri (Chingeleput).
** Gudivada (Kistna); Musiri (Trichinopoly) Ambasundaram (Tinnevelly).
*** Mayaveram talook.
The Loss of Population 1871-1878
The calculations of famine mortality were made by Comish after the census had been 
taken. A key assumption made by Comish in calculating the change in population 
between the two censuses was that the population had increased at a rate of 1  l /i% each 
year since the census of 1871 till the beginning of the famine year of 1876. In the six 
talooks of the famine districts, the population of the selected subdivisions had declined 
from 871,061 to 739,989. The total loss of population was 131,072, or 15% on the 
numbers of 1871, given this assumed rate.7 0
70 Comish stated that the loss of population was greatest in Cuddapah, and the lowest in Chingleput. 
However, he believed that the selected area in Chingleput did not fairly represent the entire calamity; as 
was also the case with Coimbatore. (‘Influence of Famine on the Growth of Population\  Appendix to SCR 
1878, p. lxxxii).
22571 In the other four talooks, the population had increased by 6.1 % on the 1871 census.  In 
Salem district, which was held to be an average and representative famine district, there 
was a decrease of population to the tune of 20.7% of the 1871 population. In terms of the 
sex and age-wise subdivision of the increase or decrease in population between 1871 and 
1878, the census showed firstly, that the loss of population was greater for males than for 
females. Cornish attributed some of this apparent discrepancy to the observation that 
women were more imperfectly counted than men.72 Yet, this discrepancy was 
corroborated by evidence from the relief camps where men died in greater numbers than 
women. Secondly, in the famine area, children under 10 years disappeared in almost 
double the proportion of those above 10 years age.7 3  (These conclusions will be dealt 
with in more detail in the following chapter.)
The Assumed Rate of Increase
Each of these figures was obtained on the assumption that the population grew at 
the rate of 1  Vi % per annum between 1871 and 1876. Cornish obtained this estimate by 
comparing the population totals obtained in previous censuses of parts of the Presidency 
in 1822, 1838, 1851-2, 1856-7, 1861-2, 1866-7 and 1871 and arriving at an annual rate of 
increase.74 Cornish estimated the amount of increase between 1851 and 1871 was 9 Vi 
million, or 35.8% in twenty years; or a little over this figure.
Quite clearly, Cornish’s estimates were in large part based on conjectural 
assumptions regarding the assumed annual rate of increase, derived from calculations
7 1  The actual increase was higher since eleven villages with a population of 9,480 had been transferred out 
of the boundaries of these districts in 1878. (Ibid, p. lxxxiii).
72 Ibid, p. lxxxiv, lxxxv.
7 3 Ibid, lxxxvi.
74 Ibid.
22675 based on previous census attempts, in themselves widely acknowledged as inaccurate.
The Secretary of the Madras Famine Department, J.H. Garstin, in reviewing the results of 
the census, wrote that ‘the accuracy of registration is too open to doubt to allow of any 
safe opinion being formed as to the existence of and what normal increase between the 
census of 1871 and 1875’, albeit admitting that there had been a large increase in the 
number of deaths registered in 1876 and 1877.76
The Famine Census and the Government of India
Lieutenant-General Kennedy, the head of the Public Works Department in Bombay, had 
been deputed in late August by the Government of India as the personal assistant to the 
Governor of Madras. Kennedy’s appointment came on the heels of Lytton’s visit to the 
famine- stricken districts of Madras in August 1877.
Lytton had felt the need for an officer to be placed in Madras who had ‘the confidence of 
the Supreme Government’ to advise the Governor of Madras in the discharge of famine 
relief matters.77 Kennedy was chosen for his ‘admirable skill in managing the famine 
relief operations in Bombay’.78 However, it was obvious that Kennedy had been deputed 
in a similar capacity in August 1877 as had Temple in January of that year: in order to 
control the expenditure of the Government of Madras on famine relief; to tighten
75 Guilmoto, 'The Sircar’ s Idle Curiosity’, op. cit.
76 Extracts from letter from J.H. Garstin, Esq., Additional Secretary to Government of Madras (Famine) to 
the Additional Secretary to Government of India, Public Works Department (Famine), (No. 1257), dated 
Ootcamund, 1st June 1878, enclosed in ‘Copies of Papers relating to the Mortality during the Late Famine 
in Southern India’, Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
77 Telegram, Viceroy to SoS, dated August 16, 1877, Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 
1878/Vol. 59.
78 Ibid.
227administrative accountability and to soften reports about the severity of the famine that 
might leak out to a critical press and public in Britain.
Kennedy wrote an official memorandum on the results of the famine census, 
wherein he directly refuted the contention that the loss of population between the two 
censuses was due to mortality caused by the famine of 1876-78. Kennedy claimed that 
‘the population of southern India had remained unchecked as a result of peace and 
tranquillity for a number of years prior to the famine’, and that ‘no large arable areas 
(had) been available in late years for increased cultivation’. Under these circumstances, 
he argued , it was probable that ‘the limits of increase of population and produce have 
now been at reached and that the land under the rude system of cultivation prevailing 
now supports and for some years has supported as large a population as can draw a
79 subsistence from it’.
Proceeding from this Malthusian assumption, the ‘normal rate of increase’, he suggested, 
could not have been more than 0.2%.80  Kennedy made this suggestion on the basis of a 
comparison of the birth and death registers since the census of 1871 (as against Cornish, 
who had compared census figures since 1822) and thereby suggested that the figures led 
to an inference that in normal circumstances, the population of the 15 talooks in the 
census would have been 2,871,846 (a figure arrived at by adding to the census population 
of 1871 the actual difference between births and deaths to the end of 1876 and the normal
79
‘Memorandum on the Partial Census in the Madras districts in March 1878’, by Sir Michael Kennedy, 
contained in Copies of  Papers relating to the Mortality during the Late Famine in Southern India, No. 46 
of 1878, Government of India, Public Works Department, (Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 
1878/Vol. 59).
80 Ibid.
228difference between births and deaths for the 12 months of 1877 and 2 months of 1878). 
Instead, the famine census had shown that the actual population of this tract was 
2299885, or a shortfall of 571, 461 to be accounted for. (See Table 3.2)
Table 3.2 Michael Kennedy’s Calculations of Population Loss
Census Population 1871 (15 famine 
talooks)
2836166
Actual difference between births and 
deaths to the end of 1876
29180
Normal Difference in births and deaths for 
24 months (January 1877-December 1878)
6000
Total Population 1878 2871346
Actual Population March 1878 2299885
Difference between estimated and actual 571461
He then proceeded to argue that the bulk of this difference could be attributed to 
migration out of the famine districts into the non- famine districts or to foreign 
destinations by sea.8 1  
The ‘Migration Theory’
Despite there being no detailed figures showing emigration from the famine districts in 
particular, the figures from all the main ports of the Presidency between 1st Oct 1876 to 
30th November 1877 was 287,482. This amounted to an increase over the average for the 
preceding five years of 131,339, or nearly double the five yearly figure.8 2
The lack of detailed figures for migration and emigration notwithstanding, Kennedy used 
the figures from the famine census of 1878 to show the age and sex-wise distribution of 
the population. These were as follows:
Males of 10 years and under:  355,311
8 1  Ibid, p.15.
8 2  Ibid, p. 16.
229Females  do-------------- :  351,084 (Difference of 48,000).
Males above 10 years  :  772,517
Females  do--------------:  820,973 (Difference of 4,000).
While there were 4,000 less boys than girls in this population, there were 48,000 less men 
than women. Kennedy argued that it was obvious that men would migrate in greater 
numbers, while there did not seem to be any reason why men should die in greater 
numbers.8 3   Therefore, he argued, ‘it was only fair to conclude that whatever the number 
of migrants may be, the women exceed the men by at least 48,000’. From this it followed 
that such a large excess of females would not be possible unless a large portion of the 
‘missing people’ had migrated rather than died. Kennedy stated that ‘it was very liberal to 
assume that the number of migrants was 350,000, among whom the males were 33% in 
excess of women’.84 Adding 350,000 to the 1878 total of 2,295,885, the number obtained 
was 2,649,885 leaving 221, 461 persons to be accounted for.
Kennedy then turned to the birth and death returns of the 15 talooks since the 
commencement of the famine to the end of February 1878, showing an ‘excess mortality’ 
of 190814; and a decrease of births amounting to 32,000, i.e. a total diminution in the 
population of 222,839. Kennedy argued that the bulk of the diminution of births was due 
to migration; while deaths had been due to the prevalence of cholera, fever and smallpox, 
leaving merely 68,290 deaths, or less than 2 V 2  % of the population missing and possibly 
dead due to the famine. In other words, Kennedy’s method of estimating the loss of
83 Historical demographic research over the past quarter of a century has suggested, however, that male 
mortality during periods of famine is considerably greater than female mortality. See Chapter 4 for details.
84 ‘Memorandum on the Partial Census in the Madras districts in March 1878’, by Sir Michael Kennedy, 
contained in Copies of  Papers relating to the Mortality during the Late Famine in Southern India, No. 46 
of 1878, Government of India, Public Works Department, Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 
1878/Vol. 59.
230population due to famine relied on three key assumptions: first, the assumption that 
Cornish’s assumed rate of increase was too high (an assumption which was shared by 
other administrators); second, the assumption that a large portion of those ‘missing’ had 
in fact migrated as the number of males in the 1878 census was lower than females, 
particularly in adult age groups; and third, the assumption that the bulk of the excess 
registered deaths and negative births during the famine months was due to the prevalence 
of epidemic disease. The remainder of the loss was attributable to famine, which was 
‘greatly to be regretted’ but ‘considering the vast areas over which the famine extended 
and the helpless nature of a large portion of the population’, on the whole, ‘the substantial 
safety of the people was secured, so far as such a result was practically attainable’.8 5
While Kennedy’s conclusion that Cornish allowed for too high a rate of non-famine 
population growth appears to have had some weight, his confident assertion that the 
‘missing’ people had migrated appears to have been whitewashing the truth. Cornish 
refuted the ‘migration’ theory in his 1878 report by pointing out that in the famine areas, 
the children less than ten years of age had disappeared in nearly double the proportion of 
people of greater ages, the ratios being 25.5% for children and 13.7% for those above ten 
years of age. Cornish reasoned that children under ten years of age were not more likely 
to have migrated in an undue proportion to other classes of the population, and therefore 
the greater loss amongst them was due to the combined effects of death and diminished 
fertility, rather than migration.86
85 Ibid, p.17.
86 ‘The Influence of Famine on the Growth of Population’, pp. lxxxvi.
231Kennedy concluded that ‘considering the vast areas and lengthened periods over which 
the famine has extended and the helpless nature of the population, it may be said that on 
the whole, the substantial safety of the people was secured, so far as such a result was
0 7
practically attainable’.
The question of how many people had died from want during the famine was never 
resolved, with Cornish placing the total mortality ‘directly and indirectly from want’ at 3 
million as opposed to Kennedy’s figure of 68,000. However, the debates about the use 
and accuracy of vital statistics during the famine of 1876-78 had important consequences 
for Provincial famine policy in Madras. In the aftermath of the famine, the Famine 
Commission’s Report authorized the Provincial Governments to promulgate Famine 
Codes modelled on the Draft Code issued by the Imperial Government in 1880. Lance 
Brennan has argued that the Strachey brothers manipulated the composition of the 
Famine Commission in order to make sure that the Commission’s report made Provincial 
Governments responsible financially for expenditure on famine relief in future.8 8  
However, in making the Provincial Governments responsible for famine relief 
expenditure, the Commission also authorized each Provincial Government to draw up its 
own code specifying the administrative, legislative and financial arrangements for 
preventing distress from accelerating into famine. This suggests that the key concern of 
the Government of India was financial expediency rather than increased Imperial control 
or ideological dominance.
87 ‘Memorandum on the Partial Census in the Madras Districts in March 1878’, by Major-General 
Kennedy, in Copies of  Papers relating to the Mortality during the Late Famine in Southern India, No. 46 
of 1878, Gol- PWD, Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
88 Brennan, ‘The Development of the Indian Famine Codes’, op. cit.
232The Madras Famine Code, first issued in 1883, when William Robert Cornish was 
a Member of the Madras Legislative Council, can be seen as an explicitly Provincial 
statement of policy. It explicitly- and perhaps defiantly- juxtaposed financial expenditure 
against mortality statistics as tests of state relief. In its introduction, the Madras Famine 
Code declared,
In such circumstances (of drought and distress) it is the duty of the state to take steps to 
avert disastrous consequences to human life, which must ensue if means of subsistence
89 are not afforded to the classes affected.
The Code continued in a vein directly against that of the Government of India’s stated
instructions in 1877 (that financial considerations constrained the extent of state
intervention). It juxtaposed financial expenditure against mortality statistics as tests of the
efficacy of a given system of relief. Thus:
The success or failure of system of relief at such a crisis cannot be subjected to a 
financial test; bills of  mortality will  furnish the only true criterion. Profuse expenditure 
(which experience has shown does not always prevent suffering and death) is the 
inevitable consequence of the State being brought face to face with the calamity before 
arrangements have been made to meet it, whilst a scheme of relief administration 
carefully devised beforehand will certainly secure more satisfactory results at less 
outlay.
To conclude, the divisions, both between the Imperial and provincial 
Governments, and between the state and its medical services, contributed in fact to create 
a more humane famine policy statement in Madras than in any of the other provinces as 
evinced by the Famine Codes.9 1  It would not be going too far to say that this was an 
occasion when vital statistics, however imperfect, became the basis of an official
8 9 Madras Famine Code, p. 1.
90 Ibid.
9 1  None of the other Codes mentioned state responsibility for human lives.
233statement of responsibility for human lives, juxtaposed against limiting financial 
expenditure as the touchstone of famine relief efforts.
Conclusion: Colonial Vital Statistics and Famine Policy in Madras Presidency.
Vital statistics were an extremely clumsy and blunt tool with which the Provincial 
Governments were forced to base sanitary policy from 1864 onwards. Despite optimistic 
claims by medical officials regarding their value in knowing patterns of disease and death 
amongst the general population, it is clear that from their inception, they were tied to the 
structure of power at the local level within the Madras Presidency (and the administrative 
basis of ryotwari), where the primary duty of the village officials was seen as 
administering the complicated land revenue system satisfactorily, and collecting other 
forms of statistics was viewed as a distraction by district and Provincial non-medical 
administrators. To that extent, even though the compilation and collection of vital 
statistics can be seen as an ‘Imperial project’ aimed at protecting the health of the armies 
and the European civilian population, and of gradually establishing a hegemonic hold 
over the ‘general population’, this project was crippled by administrative factors that 
influenced the accuracy of the statistics and their value as means of actually knowing the 
population, let alone of establishing the hegemony of the colonial state.
Secondly, the relationship between different levels of the state and its medical services 
was clearly not smooth when it came to interpreting and using the statistics as a basis for 
famine or medical policy. The sources of tension consisted largely of differences of
234opinion over the financial and administrative basis of intervention in economic processes, 
as well as contests over the ‘scientific’ status both of the statistics and medical theories 
regarding the causation and prevention of disease, which influenced the interpretation of 
statistical patterns. This would enable us to question studies which uncritically see 
medicine as a ‘tool of Imperialism’, and vital statistics as one of the ‘investigative 
modalities’ of colonial rule which enabled control and domination.  It would further place 
us in the ‘sceptical’ position as regards the potential of information system of the colonial 
state to augment its control, with an important modification.  While much of colonial 
information was ambiguous and of doubtful value and that local networks played an 
important role in generating, shaping and using such information, statistics did indeed 
have a ‘ justificatory’ dimension in conflicts between different levels and agencies of the 
Government, although this cannot be seen as representing a single colonial project.
Finally, we return to the question of whether one can see the debates during this famine 
as merely magnifying ‘ordinary’ processes, or as irrevocably changing the course of 
history. It appears that we can see a little bit of both, lending support to David Arnold’s 
argument that famines were both crisis and process.9 2 The use of vital statistics in famine 
policy reflected the long-term conflicts between different levels and agencies of 
Government over the financial, administrative and moral basis of intervention. At the 
same time, these conflicts had important consequences for future policy. Allegations of 
inaccuracy of the rural statistics- a defence for Imperial non-interventionism- along with 
a distancing of the Imperial Government from financing famine relief led to a paradox. 
Knowledge which was manifestly inaccurate- and depended largely on the whims of local
92 Arnold, Famine, p. 6.
235and Provincial officialdom- came to be enshrined as the cornerstone of a relatively 
humane Provincial famine policy, based on state intervention.
236Appendix 3.1  Causes of Death 1877.
All tables reproduced from W.R. Cornish, Fourteenth Annual Report of the Sanitary 
Commissioner  for Madras, Madras, 1878.
A.  Deaths from principal causes compared with previous years
Years Total
Deaths




1866 600,106 200,961 23,106 110,102 - 9047 256,890
1867 372,026 33,205 27,907 112,511 - 8613 189,790
1868 390,959 8036 34,330 105,692 - 9242 233,659
1869 451,981 21,034 17,448 132,346 - 9310 271,843
1870 451,020 55,867 11,252 151,027 - 12,325 220,549
1871 444,371 17,656 20,823 192,469 38,928 15,323 159,172
1872 508,182 13,247 39,034 214,148 39,387 15,150 187,176
1873 513,232 840 51,784 222,843 36,392 14,251 187,124
1874 521,329 313 48,343 226,220 37,993 13,065 195,395
1875 641,260 94,546 24,775 252,042 37,484 12,421 219,992



























B.  Famine districts in which famine existed at the beginning of 1877





Mean ratio of 
previous 5 years 
(1872-1876)
Kumool 10,451 11.4 0.2
Bellary 30,183 18.1 0.3
Cuddapah 33,102 24.5 0.8
Nellore 19,476 14.1 0.7
Madras 6,246 16.3 0.7
North Arcot 42,145 21.8 0.9
Salem 47.633 24.2 0.9
Coimbatore 36,622 20.7 1.6
Chingleput 4,391 4.6 0.5
Madura 15,647 11.7 1.1
237C. Famine districts where scarcity developed into actual famine over partial areas 
or the whole district during the year 1877.




Mean ratio of 
previous 5 years
South Arcot 25,783 14.7 1.1
Tinnevelly 14,214 8.3 1.1
Neilgherries 476 10.0 0.1
Kistna 12,374 8.5 0.2
Trichinopoly 15,447 12.8 1.5
C.  Districts where resident populations not affected by famine although many 
received emigrants from famine areas
Non-Famine Deaths from Ratio to Mean Ratio of
Districts Cholera 1877 Population previous 5 years
Ganjam 3390 2.8 0.8
Vizagapatam 6932 4.4 0.7
Godavery 7072 4.4 0.2
Tanjore 13,098 6.6 1.9
South Canara 2,900 3.1 0.1
Malabar 9957 4.4 0.3

















6,147,540 68,294 11.1 1.6
3 rd group (non­
famine 
districts)
9,451,189 43,249 4.6 1.3
II. Smallpox
A. Early famine Districts




Mean ratio of 
previous 5 years 
(1872-1876)
Kumool 2077 2.2 1.0
Bellary 4902 2.9 0.9
Cuddapah 4906 3.6 0.7
238Nellore 4466 3.2 0.5
Madras 6679 17.4 1.5
North Arcot 5388 2.7 1.5
Salem 11,257 5.7 1.5
Coimbatore 2366 1.3 0.7
Chingleput 5621 6.01 1.5
Madura 3161 2.3 2.2
B. Later Famine Districts




Mean ratio of 
previous 5 years
South Arcot 3498 1.9 1.7
Tinnevelly 2933 1.7 1.7
Neilgherries 327 6.9 0.2
Kistna 2019 1.4 1.1








Mean Ratio of 
previous 5 years
Ganjam 1646 1.4 0.7
Vizagapatam 124 0.07 0.5
Godavery 888 0.5 1.3
Tanjore 11,148 5.6 1.2
South Canara 7,170 7.8 0.9
Malabar 2,116 0.9 1.1


















6,147,540 14,406 2.3 1.2
3 rd group (non­
famine 
districts)
9,451,189 23,092 2.4 1.4
239III. Fever Mortality (See also table 4.4).
A. Districts in which fever mortality has not varied much from average
These 8 districts contain a population of 12,596,884 furnishing death returns in 1877. 
Total deaths: 89,434. Death Ratio: 7.1 per mille.
Districts Death ratios per mille, 
1877







South Canara 6.6 5.3
Malabar 7.0 5.9
Tinnevelly 6.2 4.3
B. Districts showing excessive fever mortality in 1877
These 13 districts contain a population of 16,612,658 according to 1877 returns. Total 
deaths: 379,807. Per mille death ratio: 22.9
Districts Death Ratios per mille Mean of 5 years ending 
1876
Nellore 19.3 6.6
Madras Town 15.6 6.4
Chingleput 11.2 5.8

















Ratio per mille Mean Ratio of 
previous 5 years
Ganjam 344 0.2 0.5
Vizagapatam 616 0.3 0.3
Godavery 756 0.5 0.5
Kistna 549 0.3 0.4
Tanjore 2629 1.3 1.0
South Canara 5111 5.5 3.5
Malabar 5329 2.3 2.7
B. Famine Districts
Famine Districts Number of Deaths Deaths per mille Mean ratio of 
previous 5 years
Nellore 1,758 1.2 0.5
Madras 14,605 38.2 5.0
Chingleput 15,082 16.1 2.2
South Arcot 2,987 1.7 0.9
Trichinopoly 3,996 3.3 1.2
Madura 9,035 6.8 1.1
Tinnevelly 9,777 5.7 3.8
Kumool 6,646 7.2 0.5
Cuddapah 7,986 5.9 0.6
Bellary 13,463 8.0 1.1
North Arcot 9,703 5.0 1.1
Salem 9,547 4.8 0.9
Coimbatore 12,871 7.3 1.6
Neilgherries 576 12.1 2.4
241C. Relief camps (a large proportion of deaths are not registered in the above returns as 
people are in relief camps).
Districts Registered Deaths from 
Bowel Complaints





South Arcot 2,987 2,626
Madura 9,035 7,003
Tinnevelly 9,777 1,344
Kumool 6, 646 3,250
Cuddapah 7,986 10,624
Bellary 13,463 6,173





Years Suicides Wounding Accidents Snake Bite/ 
Wild Beasts
Total
1866 623 - 6,216 2,208 9,047
1867 615 - 5,853 2,145 8,613
1868 602 - 6,007 2,633 9,242
1869 694 - 6,057 2,559 9,310
1870 1,438 - 8,158 2,729 12,325
1871 2,370 1,093 8,473 3,387 15,323
1872 2,366 944 8,724 3,116 15,150
1873 2,077 918 8,267 2,989 12,251
1874 1,876 828 7,762 2,599 13,065
1875 1,811 880 7,177 2,553 12,421
1876 1,715 896 6,187 2,377 11*175
1877 2,575 1,372 10,425 2,066 16,460
242VI. ‘Other Causes’
A. Non Famine Districts
Non- Famine Districts Deaths from ‘all other 
causes’







South Canara 8,997 9.8
Malabar 15,396 6.9
B. Famine Districts










Kumool 10, 763 11.7
Cuddapah 11,316 8.3
Bellary 74,250 44.5




243Appendix 3.2 The connection between food prices and mortality: from 
The Fourteenth Annual Report of the Sanitary Commissioner for Madras 
for 1877, Madras 1878.
DIAGRAMS  SHOWING THE PRICE OF THE. STAPLE ARTICLE OF FOOD AND THE 
DEATH RATE PER MILLE IN THE UNDERMENTIONED DISTRICTS- OF THE 
MADRAS PRESIDENCY FOR 3 YEARS ENDING 1877, COMPARED 
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243AChapter 4 Starvation, Disease, and Death in Madras (1876-78)
Introduction
The relationship between famines and epidemics has been a theme of 
considerable and continuing interest for historians and historical demographers. 
Several have attempted to show that historical crises of mortality hitherto attributed to 
epidemic disease (for example, plague) were actually crises of subsistence.1  For 
many, the links between the appearance of famine and waves of epidemic mortality 
seem fairly straightforward. The failure of a series of monsoons led to a crisis of 
employment and/ or subsistence; trade was unable to supply the wants of the people; 
the state was unable or unwilling to intervene; this led to starvation, which then 
caused disease, and thereby death, particularly among the marginal and poor.2
This model has been questioned by others, who have seen famine deaths as 
reflecting not just failures of subsistence, but also crises of sanitation, health and 
social dislocation. From this viewpoint, famines killed through a complex ecology of 
disease that attacked not just the poor but also the rich.3  Climatic factors favoured the 
breeding of disease vectors and thereby shaped the course of disease and death.4  The 
failure of governments to provide adequate relief, contain migration and social unrest, 
protect water supplies and provide adequate sanitation in areas where relief was given 
exacerbated this crisis.
This chapter will investigate the epidemiology of the famine of 1876-78 and 
address some of these debates. Although it is difficult to generalize from a case study
1  A. Appleby, Famine in Tudor and Stuart England, Liverpool, 1987. See also J. Walter and R. 
Schofield , ‘Famine, Disease and Crisis Mortality in Early Modem Society’, in idem. Famine, Disease 
and the Social Order in Early Modem Society, Cambridge,  1989, pp.  17-25; 57-73.
2 This view has been particularly characteristic of nationalist readings of famine in colonial India, such 
as R.C. Dutt and B.M. Bhatia. (See Chapter 1 for references).
3 A. de Waal, Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan 1984-1985, Oxford, 1989, .and idem,  ‘Famine 
Mortality: A Case Study of Darfur, Sudan 1984-5’, Population Studies, 43 (1989): 5-24.
4 Whitcombe, ‘Famine Mortality’, op. cit; Dyson, ‘On the Demography of South Asian Famines Part I’, 
op. cit.
244of one particular famine episode, this method has the advantages of being able to 
delve in depth into the historical specificities of this situation. Moreover, at least five 
writers have used this episode in order to investigate the epidemiology of famines in 
nineteenth century India.5  This surely testifies to the importance of this particular case 
in the history of Indian famines; as well as the quality and richness of the 
epidemiological data available for it. (Tim Dyson, for example, believed that the 
Madras famine of 1876-78 was the first for which demographic and epidemiological 
data of a standard worth analysing were available).6
What this chapter seeks to do, then, is to revisit some of the questions that 
previous authors have asked in connection with famine mortality and epidemiology. 
How did this famine kill most of its victims? Was it through the biological impact of 
starvation?  Was the bulk of the mortality due to the ecological and climatic 
sequences of the famine? Or did the dislocation of normal social relations caused by 
economic crisis engender a sanitary and environmental crisis in which dysfunctional 
personal and social behaviour, were heavily implicated? The chapter forms a 
foundation for the following one, which seeks to evaluate the contribution of state 
famine policy to social dislocation and famine mortality.
I
Famine, Disease and Mortality during 1876-78: The ‘Two Phase Model’
The demography of the 1876-78 famine has been studied by several authors.
In 1985, Roland Lardinois suggested that the coincidence between the subsistence 
crisis (as measured by the rise in prices of ragi) and the mortality crisis (as measured
5 Klein, ‘When the Rains Failed’, op. cit., Lardinois,  ‘Famine, Epidemics and Mortality in South India: 
A Reappraisal of the Demographic Crisis of 1876-78’, op. cit; Whitcombe,  ‘Famine Mortality’, op. cit; 
Dyson, ‘On the Demography of South Asian Famines Part I ’, op. cit.
6 Dyson , ‘On the Demography of South Asian Famines Part I ’, op. cit.
245by the peak in mortality) was very sharp in late 1876-early 1877; and again in July- 
August 1877.7 Lardinois suggested that the lack of correspondence between grain 
prices and mortality rates was due to ‘other causes of mortality than the dearness of 
grains’, and that ‘numerous factors favoured the unleashing and propagation of
Q
epidemics’, which consisted of cholera, smallpox, malaria and measles.  Yet,
Lardinois concluded that ‘in the background, the hike in the prices of foodstuffs and 
the rigidity of  their fluctuations lead to high prices of grain being the decisive cause 
of mortality’.9
Other authors were not so convinced of the connection between high prices, 
dearth, disease and mortality. In a 1991 article on the historical demography of Indian 
famines, Tim Dyson charted the main generalizations he had drawn from an analysis 
of five of India’s pre-Independence famines. His focus was on the demographic and 
epidemiological regularities of these famines. Dyson suggested that epidemic disease, 
rather than starvation, constituted the bulk of increase in deaths during famines, over a 
relatively short period of time. He showed that most of these deaths were classified as 
being due to cholera and fevers. Third, most of the mortality increase occurred not 
during the height of the drought and distress. Instead, it happened after the resumption 
of the monsoons and agricultural activities, when presumably, levels of nutrition had 
improved as a consequence of the resumption of field employment and lower prices. 
This implies that high prices- and therefore economic distress- were not directly 
related to the famine mortality in a simple and unproblematic manner, i.e. economic 
distress causing starvation deaths or famine mortality. Further, climatic rather than 
nutritional or social factors played a decisive role in determining the likelihood of 
death. Dyson further found that if cholera were removed from the monthly mortality
7 Lardinois, ‘Famine, Epidemics and Mortality in South India’, p. 456.
8  Ibid, pp. 456-57.
9 Ibid, p. 457.
246figures for November 1876 to December 1877, the bulk of the increase was 
attributable to a steep rise in fever deaths, which accounted for 62% of the deaths for 
which a cause was specified.
There were thus two phases in Dyson’s explanation of famine mortality. The 
first related to the environmental consequences of economic distress. This phase, 
marked by a steep rise in prices, contributed a relatively small increase in the number 
of deaths. The bulk of the ‘excess deaths’ during this early period were caused by 
cholera and dysentery. Both occurred because of the contamination of water sources 
and famine migration in insanitary conditions.
This phase was succeeded by a very heavy monsoon, which created conditions 
of atmospheric moisture which were favourable to mosquito breeding. Dyson argued 
that most of these deaths in the second phase were undoubtedly due to malaria. These 
‘malaria inspired crescendos’ struck at precisely the point when the drought and social 
dislocation caused by the famine ended and people were returning home from relief 
works  to resume normal agricultural activities.  In explaining this apparent anomaly- 
that malaria deaths should increase so greatly at a point when better nutrition should 
in fact have led to improvements in health- Dyson suggested that the increased 
moisture/ vector breeding explanation was only one part of the equation. The other 
concerned the interaction between nutritional status in the host and the development 
of the disease agent. Starvation inhibited the development of the disease agent- the 
plasmodium- in the human body, and hence protected the famine stricken against 
disease. In this explanation, once normal feeding was resumed, the plasmodium was 
able to multiply and cause disease, which then caused death. This was the ‘re-feeding 
malaria’ hypothesis, which requires a little more explanation.
247Re-Feeding Malaria
The ‘re-feeding malaria’ hypothesis was propounded in different versions by
various observers and scientists in the latter half of the twentieth century. One of the
earliest versions of this hypothesis was developed by P. Ramakrishnan, an
experimental biologist, who had observed the phenomenon that undernourished rats
exposed to anopheles mosquitoes often did not develop malaria as quickly as better
nourished rats. 1 0  The Bengal Famine Commission of 1945 had also noted that
Malaria not infrequently developed in patients who had rallied after a few days stay in 
hospital. The temperature would rise and malaria parasites would be found in the blood. 
This may be explained in two ways: either the parasite was unable to multiply in a starved 
body and revived together with its host, or during the phase of starvation, it was present as 
in the later febrile stage but owing to the low state of the patient, produced no febrile 
condition.1 1
The re-feeding malaria hypothesis was put forth again in 1978 by the Murrays, a 
scientist couple who had measured the spleens of populations in malaria- endemic 
Sahel in the mid 1970s.1 2
Dyson focused particularly on the climatic sequences related to fever, and 
went on to suggest that as a general rule, the re-feeding malaria hypothesis could
10 S.P Ramakrishnan,  ‘The course of blood-induced infection in starved albino rats’, Indian Journal of 
Malariology, 7,1(1953): 53-60; S.P. Ramakrishnan , Satya Prakash, A.K. Krishnaswami and Chanan 
Singh , Effects of milk diet on the course of blood-induced infection in albino rats, Indian Journal of 
Malariology. 7, 1(1953): 61-66; S. P. Ramakrishnan, Satya Prakash, A.K. Krishnaswami and Chanan 
Singh , ‘Effect of Glucose, biotin, para-aminobenzoic acid and methionine in the course of blood 
induced infection in starving albino rats’, Indian Journal of Malariology. 7, 3 (1953): 225-228 ; S.P. 
Ramakrishnan, ‘Malaria and Nutrition with special reference to Plasmodium berghei infections in rats’, 
Indian Journal of Malariology. 8, 4 (1954): 327-332.
1 1  Famine Inquiry Commission, Report on Bengal, 1945, p.  117. The Commission observed that 
anaemia was prevalent in patients in famine hospitals at all stages of the famine, largely due to the 
combined effects of undemutrition and malaria. Yet, the commission also remarked that ‘destitutes 
attacked by malaria often failed to respond to appropriate treatment and succumbed readily to the 
disease while healthy people attacked in the same way recovered after treatment in the usual way’ (p. 
120-122). The Commission concluded that both rainfall and high food prices were correlated with the 
occurrence of epidemic malaria.
12 See M.J. Murray, A.B. Murray, N.J. Murray and M.B. Murray,  ‘Refeeding Malaria and 
Hyperferraemia’, The Lancet. 305, 7908 (March 22, 1975): 635-654; M.J. Murray and A.B. Murray, 
‘Starvation and Re-Feeding Activation of Infection: An Ecological Necessity?’ The Lancet, 309, 800 
(January 15, 1977):  123-125. Enlargement of the spleen has long been used as a measure of the severity 
of infection.
248explain the excess mortality in most of the Indian famines he studied. He thus argued 
that the natural ecology of disease transmission- determined primarily by climatic and 
parasitic factors- played the most significant part in causing famine mortality. This 
would imply then, that, if ways to control malaria been known and utilized at the time, 
most of the famine mortality would have been prevented.
Climatic Factors in Malaria Mortality
Dyson’s argument was mirrored by Elizabeth Whitcombe, who suggested that 
there were two distinct phases in famine epidemiology- one marked by high mortality 
from cholera and bowel disorders, the second marked by the predominance of fevers 
as the main cause of deaths.1 3  Primarily a historian of colonial irrigation systems and 
their social impact on north India, Whitcombe’s 1993 study of famine mortality in 
Madras during 1877-78 and Punjab 1896-7 and 1899-1900 remarked on the similarity 
of the epidemiological sequences of these three famine episodes in different portions 
of late nineteenth century India. Using data culled from the Sanitary Commissioner’s 
reports, Whitcombe emphasized the biphasic nature of famine mortality and the 
predominance of a category of fevers as the single largest specified cause of deaths. 
She argued strongly and convincingly that deaths from fever were composed largely 
of malaria.1 4
According to Whitcombe, the paradox of famine was that as long as drought 
and high prices prevailed, conditions were not conducive to the transmission and 
spread of malaria. Drought conditions prevented the breeding of the anopheles 
mosquito. Further, starvation during this phase prevented malaria, ordinarily the 
largest killer, by acting to suppress the nutrition of the plasmodium already present in
13 Whitcombe, ‘Famine Mortality’, op. cit.
14 Ibid.the blood. She thus endorsed the ‘malaria re-feeding hypothesis’. Once the rains 
resumed, the conditions for epidemic malaria were set in motion.  The mosquito 
multiplied when the rains came. Once people returned to work on their fields, levels 
of nutrition improved and conditions became conducive for the multiplication of the 
plasmodium in the blood. In addition, the movement of migrant labourers throughout 
the period of the famine helped spread the incidence of disease across geographical 
areas. Whitcombe concluded that famine mortality was caused by a combination of 
factors in which the ecology of disease rather than the direct consequence of 
starvation were important factors.
In support of her argument, Whitcombe cited Cornish’s observations on the 
‘absence of insect life’ during the first ‘choleraic’ phase of famine when according to 
Cornish, fevers were absent. After the resumption of the rains, however, Cornish 
noted the ‘rapid proliferation of insect life’- an observation all the more remarkable 
because this was before Ross, Manson or Laveran’s discoveries in the 1890s.1 5
Thus, both Dyson and Whitcombe concluded that malaria was of immense 
importance in the mortality patterns during famine years, with cholera and bacillary 
dysentery playing a secondary role. (This was in consonance with non-famine 
patterns). Both alluded to the likelihood that instead of hastening death, drought and a 
certain degree of undernourishment protected famine victims against malaria. 
Paradoxically, the resumption of the monsoons which might have been thought to 
bring relief to them instead proved deadly. Other, earlier epidemiological work also 
pointed to the existence of seasonal influences in the case of malaria.1 6
1 5 For a discussion on the work of these men, see J. Guilleman, ‘Choosing Scientific Parsimony: Sir 
Ronald Ross, Alphonse Laveran and the Mosquito-Vector Hypothesis for Malaria’, Journal of the 
History of Medicine.  57 (2002): 385-409.
16 C.A. Gill, The Seasonal Periodicity of Malaria and the Mechanism of the Epidemic Wave, London, 
1938.
250Social Dislocation, Migration and Famine Mortality
Further work on the epidemiology of famine mortality was done by David 
Arnold at around the same time.1 7  (It is worth noting that his essay relied heavily on a 
discussion of Cornish’s observations during the 1876-78 famine, although he sought 
to generalize the argument for all or most nineteenth century Indian famines). Arnold 
applied to his study of Indian famine epidemiology John Post’s argument regarding 
famine mortality in eighteenth century Europe.1 8
In Arnold’s view, social, rather than nutritional/ climatic/ parasitic factors were at 
issue in excess mortality from famine disease. Famine mortality was thus an 
exaggeration of normal mortality patterns from ordinary diseases. The breakdown of 
‘normal’ social and economic relations during famine periods resulted in 
dysfunctional personal and social behavioural patterns which favoured the 
transmission and spread of disease.1 9   Thus, in Arnold’s explanation, social responses
1 7  Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease in the Famines of Nineteenth Century India’, op. cit.
18 J.D. Post, ‘Nutritional Status and Mortality in Eighteenth Century Europe’ in L.F. Newman et. al. 
(eds), Hunger in History: Food, Shortage, Poverty and Deprivation, Massachusetts, 1990. Post argued 
that ‘epidemiological evidence and present day medical views on the interaction of nutrition and 
disease entities responsible for the epidemics that became rife during the early 1740s and 1770s 
indicate that prolonged undemutrition probably cannot principally account for the elevated incidence or 
higher case fatality rates in the majority of the infections identified’ (p. 259). Post found that smallpox, 
louse-borne typhus and relapsing fevers were the main causes of elevated mortality during the food 
shortages of these years. Smallpox was also directly influenced by changes in ‘normal’ behaviour 
patterns during subsistence crises. Typhoid and bacillary dysentery were directly communicated 
through the fecal-oral route from infected people who failed to wash contaminated hands or fingernails. 
He similarly traced the increase in typhus and relapsing fevers to the fact that it was ‘doubtful that 
destitute people exhausted by hunger and fatigue bothered much about washing themselves’ and 
‘(crowded) together for warmth at home and in public shelters’. Only in the case of dysentery was Post 
prepared to grant some causal significance to nutritional deficiency, (p. 258). Anne Hardy makes a 
similar point regarding the epidemiology of typhus epidemics in the sixth and seventh decades of the 
nineteenth century in London, wherein she suggests that personal habits and lack of cleanliness, rather 
than economic distress, were responsible for these outbreaks. (See A. Hardy,  ‘Urban famine or urban 
crisis? Typhus in the Victorian city’ Medical History, 32 (1988): pp. 401-425).
19 See de Waal, Famine that Kills, op. cit.
251to food crises played a very significant role in hugely magnifying mortality from 
epidemic disease.
Thus, starvation did not involve simply crossing a threshold from a situation 
of ‘some food’ to ‘no food’; but rather a series of increasingly desperate measures to 
stay alive. The first steps were a reduction in the quality and quantity of food 
consumed; rice, the normal staple of the people, was substituted with ragi and 
cholum20; people ate fewer meals and began wandering afar in search of food and 
work. The untouchable and agricultural labouring castes had recourse to plentiful 
supplies of meat in the early days of economic distress when cattle died in large 
numbers. However, these sources of nutrition quickly dried up and themselves might 
produce intestinal disorders and ‘famine diarrhoea’ .2 1
The consumption of ‘famine foods’ had further disastrous consequences.
Many of the wild plants and berries consumed by those on the move were poisonous 
and irritated the bowels. In the early stages, drought led to the drying up of existing 
sources of water, and the few sources that remained were often contaminated, leading 
to outbreaks of cholera and dysentery, from which few towns were immune. Arnold 
further argued that ‘contaminated water, lack of sufficient water to replace body fluids 
rapidly lost through diarrhoea, dysentery and cholera, and scarcity of water to
22 maintain bodily hygiene.. ..were as crucial as the want of food to famine mortality’. 
Arnold’s account focused primarily on cholera (arguing that ‘cholera had a massive 
impact on mortality during the famine’.23 However, he also discussed other causes of
20 Arnold’s account appears to be inaccurate in the context of the Madras famine, although the general 
argument holds. The staple food of the bulk of the people (except the well-off) was not rice, but ragi 
and cholum. Government relief was largely provided in the form of rice imported from Burma and 
Bengal. Rice was widely believed by medical officers to constitute a less nutritious and satisfying meal, 
given the habits of the people. Thus, the normal eating habits of the people were disrupted, but in the 
opposite way as suggested by Arnold.
21 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 391.
22 Ibid, p. 392.
23 Ibid.
252death such as smallpox, malaria, plague and tuberculosis, arguing that all of them 
‘preyed upon the collapse of normal social relations or exploited cultural and
94 behavioural traits that favoured the dissemination of disease’.  Amongst the 
manifestations of social dislocation, migration and congregation or crowding in 
search of work and food played a large role in disseminating disease, in Arnold’s 
account. Migration according to Arnold, ‘weakened the wanderers, helped spread 
disease, brought famine paupers together in vast and insanitary numbers.. .and made
9 S the eventual resumption of agricultural operations far more difficult.  Cholera was 
the main disease associated with such migration and insanitary congregation, but 
other diseases also preyed upon such abnormal conditions. Smallpox, for example, 
preyed on the crowds of people huddled together waiting for relief in camps and 
kitchens. Malaria was also ‘heavily implicated in mortality arising from these 
population movements’, with ‘migrants moving in and out of endemic malaria zones’ 
acting as a ‘contributing factor as malaria carriers moved back into areas where the 
disease had not previously been endemic’.26  In addition, although there is no data for 
bubonic plague and tuberculosis for the 1876-78 famine, Arnold suggested that 
factors connected with movement of grain (and hence rat fleas) favoured the 
dissemination of the former, whilst the crowding of malnourished people into
97 institutions of relief favoured the latter.
24 Ibid, p. 402.
25 Ibid, pp. 397-8.
26 Ibid, p. 401.
27 Ibid, p. 403.
253II
There seems to be a consensus about the occurrence of a classic ‘bi-phasic’ 
pattern of famine mortality, whereby an initial ‘dislocation/ cholera’ phase was 
followed by a phase dominated by fevers, which appear, by their seasonality, to be 
malaria.2 8 Assessment of the relative importance of different epidemiological factors 
in causing this mortality, however, differs. Dyson and Whitcombe favour an 
explanation where the ‘natural/ climatic/ parasitic’ ecology of malarial fevers assumed 
great importance, and perhaps even negated the role of acute hunger, starvation and 
human agency. Arnold’s analysis on the other hand emphasizes the role played by 
dysfunctional human social and personal behaviour, which disrupted a ‘normal’ way 
of life and the balance between disease and rural populations in their normal social 
environment. For him, this displacement was the key to explaining the various 
conditions consequent upon famine that created conditions conducive to the 
generation, transmission and lethality of epidemic disease.
Does Debility and Starvation Influence Disease and Death?
In each of these accounts, it is the transmission of disease rather than debility 
or compromised bodily defences that play the major role in causing famine mortality. 
Arnold’s explanation appears to be the most comprehensive of the three studies of the 
Madras famine. It takes into account a wider range of behavioural and social 
responses in analysing the epidemiology of famine mortality than does the ‘climatic’ 
theory and incorporates remarkable local detail. Yet, while Arnold hesitates to ‘share
28 This account of a ‘classic pattern’ would also appear to be based on the Bengal Famine 
Commission’s Report of 1945. The Commission concluded that there were 2 stages of famine mortality 
and disease, the first characterized by starvation, with or without coincident disease. In the second 
stage, it was noted, epidemic disease took precedence over starvation. By this the Commission seems 
to have meant that acute undemutrition was at its height in the early months of the famine, although 
‘the provision of suitable nourishment to the patients in famine hospitals was of primary importance in 
treatment, although it was in the early stages.. .the problem of resuscitating cases of starvation by 
suitable therapeutic means was most acute.’ (Famine Commission, Report on Bengal, op. cit).
254Post’s apparently confident conclusion that “the principal link between the shortage of 
food and epidemic disease was more social than nutritional’”, we would argue that his 
account tends to overemphasize the social factors more prominently than the 
nutritional.
However, other scholars have questioned this apparent dissociation of a 
physiological link between nutrition and health, starvation and disease. For example, 
Arup Maharatna, while cautiously endorsing the role played by environmental and 
sanitary factors, suggests that the debilitated physical condition of the famine victims 
was the primary factor in the causation of famine mortality. Maharatna suggests that 
the category ‘fever’, upon which so many authors have laid an emphasis, consists of a
29 number of deaths from influenza and pneumonia, in addition to malaria.  Moreover, 
there is little evidence to suggest that levels of nutrition improved immediately as 
field activities resumed, making it difficult to sustain the ‘re-feeding’ malaria 
hypothesis.30 Similarly, Sheila Zurbrigg, in her study of epidemic malaria in Punjab 
over a forty years period, argues that the ‘re-feeding malaria’ hypothesis is based on 
the supposition that lower levels of plasmodium in the blood as measured by the 
spleen index were not necessarily associated with lower risk of death; and that in fact 
rainfall was less of a predictor than food prices in determining the likelihood of 
death.3 1  In another article, Zurbrigg argues that although well-nourished persons 
might exhibit more severe forms of malaria infection as measured by the spleen index 
(the degree of enlargement of the spleen in comparison to the normal), the disease
29 A. Maharatna, The Demography of Famines: An Indian Historical Perspective, Delhi, 1996, p. 57.
30 Ibid, pp. 49-50; 58-9.
31 S. Zurbrigg, ‘Hunger and Epidemic Malaria in Punjab (1860-1940)  Economic and Political 
Weekly. 27, 4 (1992): PE2- PE26; Idem,  ‘The Hungry Rarely Write History and Historians are Rarely 
Hungry: Reclaiming Hunger in The History of Health ’, Paper presented at the Centre for Health 
Studies, York University, 1992; Idem.,  ‘Rethinking Public Health: Food, Hunger and Mortality Decline 
in Indian History’, Paper Presented to the School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
April 29th  1997.
255was more lethal amongst the poorly nourished. Starvation thus not only failed to 
protect its victims from malaria, but increased the likelihood that they would die when
99 infected even with mild forms of the disease.
Further, there exists considerable research on the biological effects of continued 
starvation indicating that starvation predisposes populations to epidemic disease. 
Although few authors would go as far as stating that all excess deaths in a famine 
situation were due to starvation alone, there is evidence that what is termed a 
‘synergy’ between nutrition and infection influences the health of individuals and 
communities, both in situations of long term malnutrition as well as in short term 
situations of acute hunger.
The terms synergism and antagonism in the physiology of nutrition have been
explained by N.S. Scrimshaw et al. as follows.
The combined effects of malnutrition and infection cannot be predicted from the 
occurrence and characteristics of either alone. When infection aggravates malnutrition or 
malnutrition lowers resistance to infection, the relationship between the two can be 
classified as synergistic, i.e. the simultaneous presence of malnutrition and infection 
results in an interaction that is more serious for the host than would be expected from the 
combined effect of the two working independently. An infection, through precipitating 
clinical malnutrition, can result in further synergism as the infection in turn becomes more 
severe in the malnourished host.. ..in some special circumstances, malnutrition is more 
likely to discourage multiplication of the agent than to affect the resistance mechanisms of 
the host. In this event, the interaction between malnutrition and infection can be identified 
as antagonistic, the combined effect being less than would have been expected.33
However, in the context of the discussion presented in the following pages, it is
important to note that Scrimshaw and his associates concluded that synergism is a far
more common and recurrent phenomenon than antagonism; and also that it is a
misconception to assume that poor diet may be interfere with the progress of some
32 S. Zurbrigg, ‘Did Starvation Protect from Malaria? Distinguishing between Severity and Lethality of 
Infectious Disease in Colonial India’, Social Science History, 21, 1 (1997): 27-58.
33 N.S. Scrimshaw, C.E. Taylor and J.E. Gordon, Interactions of Nutrition and Infection, Geneva,  1968,
p. 16.
256infections and thereby be beneficial to man. Another significant finding was that the 
provision of dietary supplements like vitamins and minerals could not be substituted 
for a diet satisfactory in bulk (carbohydrates and proteins). They found that genetic 
factors could not account for differences in human resistance to the same extent as 
adequate diet, and finally concluded that a satisfactory diet had established value as 
an effective part of the clinical management of infectious disease.34
One cannot entirely write out from the historical record the role played by climatic, 
sanitary and contagious factors in causing deaths from malaria, smallpox and bowel 
infections. Yet, it appears that climatic and sanitary factors carried out their deadly 
work upon the ground prepared by starvation and compromise of the body’s defences. 
In the chain of causation, the importance of this predisposing cause of mortality 
cannot be underestimated.35 Moreover, the views of contemporary medical men on 
the causation of famine disease need to be taken into account in analysing cause of 
death data, as do an understanding of the difficulty in using current-day death 
categories to describe or ‘fit’ nineteenth century data. We will argue in the following 
essay that each of these studies has in fact neglected a category which accounts for a
34 Ibid., p. 266, italics mine. The issue of synergism in history has also been addressed by Anne 
Carmichael and Carl E. Taylor in two separate essays in a collection of essays by R.I. Rotberg and T.K. 
Rabb. (See A.G. Carmichael, ‘Infection, Hidden Hunger and History’, pp. 51-67 and C.E. Taylor, 
‘Synergy Among Mass Infections, Famines and Poverty’ in RI. Rotberg and T.K. Rabb, Hunger and 
History: The Impact of Changing Food Production and Consumption Patterns on Society, Cambridge, 
1983). Carmichael suggests that we need to look at the relationship not just between mortality and 
nutrition but also on the domino effect of infectious disease on resistance, i.e. a synergism between 
disease and disease as the seat of a vicious cycle rather than between nutritional status and disease. We 
would agree with Carmichael to some extent but would suggest that the synergism between disease and 
disease does need to be looked at from the point of view of the social classes amongst whom it occurs. 
This, we suspect would make it difficult to separate a disease-disease synergism from a nutrition- 
disease synergism, both historically as well as scientifically, unless one has access to detailed studies of 
food intake over a long period of time.  On the other hand, we would agree with Taylor’s point that 
social conditions and cultural factors need to be brought into the analysis of the relationship between 
nutrition and infection.
35 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of the term ‘predisposing causes’.
257significant one third of famine mortality, the inclusion of which strengthens the case 
for a nutritional/ physiological explanation of famine mortality in 1876-78.
Ill
The Figures: Famine and Disease 
Table 4.1: Deaths by cause 1871- 1878
Years Total
Deaths





































































































Source: Annual Reports of the Sanitary Commissioner of Madras (1871-1878). (Title Varies)
*This is the first year that this category was introduced into the returns.
We present above in table 4.1 the mortality returns for the years 1871-78,
including the three main famine years- 1876, 1877 and 1878. Distress began to be
reported to the Provincial Government from two districts in early 1876; and four
districts around the middle of 1876. By October 1876, eleven districts reported
distress which was threatening to turn into famine. However, the worst year of famine
was 1877.
From the above table we may deduce the following. First, the famine years 
1877 and 1878 saw record numbers of deaths in all categories, although these
258numbers had been rising since 1875. The largest number and proportion of deaths in 
1877 and 1878 were registered under the categories ‘other causes’, ‘fevers’ and 
‘cholera’. In the first year of famine, ‘other causes’ dominated the returns and caused 
a higher proportion of deaths than did fever. In 1878, ‘fevers’ overtook ‘other causes 
in terms of deaths.
Table 4.2 shows the monthly distribution of deaths by cause. We deal with 
each of the registered causes in terms of their contribution to the total mortality in the 
non-famine years.  In addition, we examine the seasonality of each cause.
Fevers
Fevers accounted for the largest proportion of deaths from a specified cause 
during both famine years, as in other years. The classic pattern of mortality noted by 
Dyson, Maharatna and Whitcombe, whereby the initial phases of drought were 
marked by a decline in the proportion of fever mortality, was visible during 1876, to 
some extent. Thus, despite the existence of high prices and reports of starvation in late 
1876 and throughout 1877, deaths from this category started to rise dramatically only 
from June 1877, when the monthly number of registered deaths rise from 25,000 in 
May to 31,000. From July 1877 onwards, deaths from fever soared. Prices reached 
their maximum in September 1877.  The number of deaths rose again sharply to 
65,000 in November and peaked in December that year at 71,000. At the same time, 
the proportion of deaths attributed to fever declined from 39% in 1875 to 33% in 1876 
to 30% in 1877.
In 1878, fevers accounted for a steep 46% and this increase was concentrated in the 
first three months of the year. Through 1878, fevers were the single largest
259Table 4.2 Monthly Distribution of Deaths by Cause 1876-78
Causes  Jan-76  Feb-76  Mar-76
Cholera  14607  11683  8299
Smallpox  2038  2889  3517
Fever  21118  18898  16660
BC  3563  2966  2367
OC  19705  18065  15763
Total Mort  61962  55432  47537
Sep-76  Oct-76  Nov-76
Cholera  5265  3280  7894
Smallpox  1192  1150  1551
Fever  17959  18216  22671
BC  2931  2827  3170
OC  19387  18649  20314
Total Mort  47665  45053  56511
May'77  Jun-77  Jul-77
Cholera  37139  25921  27353
Smallpox  6849  6014  6324
Fever  25670  31418  44366
BC  5400  7677  17670
OC  27656  36115  53634
Total Mort  104086  108517  150719
Jan'78  Feb'78  Mar'78
Cholera  4439  1985  2981
Smallpox  7200  7546  8693
Fever  54,363  34,373  30,769
BC  7989  4855  3929
OC  35002  23292  20509
Total Mort  110243  73301  68131
Sep-78  Oct-78  Nov-78
Cholera  5432  1659  983
Smallpox  2558  2024  1376
Fever  29,433  31,605  32,142
BC  4643  3538  2945
OC  24536  22424  20834
Total Mort  67852  62590  59530
Apr-76 May-76 Jun-76 Jul-76 Aug-76
10834 11463 14681 18641 10363
2460 1750 1462 1398 1244
16166 17036 17953 19778 18687
2582 2950 3355 3802 3430
16271 17566 18368 20963 20339
49244 51696 56750 65513 54994
Dec-76 Jan'77 Feb'77 Mar'77 Apr'77
31183 58712 51211 43753 31005
2812 4989 6863 9653 8837
24950 21556 18713 21801 21404
4233 6087 4994 4841 4274
23918 23479 21564 22232 22241
88027 116195 104717 103652 89133
Aug'77 Sep-77 Oct-77 Nov-77 Dec-77
31737 24501 10390 8416 7292
6798 7392 8302 8034 8266
49034 49085 49226 65683 71275
22129 19826 16155 13180 11173
62863 65818 56177 51708 47973
173933 167994 141622 148393 147351
Apr'78 May'78 Jun-78 July'78 Aug-78
2726 4160 5368 8343 7525
7524 6221 4681 3873 3051
23,914 21,695 22,147 26,429 28,209
3055 2867 3185 3788 4623
17316 17834 18724 20302 25359








260cause of deaths.  At the same time, they never reached the levels of November and 
December 1877 in terms of numbers.
Other Causes
The category in which the maximum numbers of deaths were registered during 
the main famine year 1878 is a category called ‘other causes’. It is important to note 
that none of the authors mentioned above take this category into account in their 
analysis. Lardinois, Dyson and Arnold simply do not refer to it, while Whitcombe 
terms these deaths as ‘defectively registered’!1  ‘Other causes’ was responsible for the 
largest absolute number and proportion of deaths in the main famine year 1877.
The monthly figures for deaths registered under this category are not given.
But it is possible to reach a fair estimate in the following manner. The deaths from 
cholera, smallpox, fevers and bowel complaints are subtracted from the total number 
of deaths for each month. The remaining figure then represents the combined monthly 
total for ‘other causes’ and ‘injuries’. An estimate of the monthly number of deaths 
from injuries is obtained by dividing the yearly total for injuries by 12 and arriving at 
a monthly average. This average is then subtracted from the monthly combined total 
for injuries and other causes. The remaining figure represents the monthly total of 
deaths from ‘other causes’.  Although this method will tend to smooth out the 
monthly or seasonal variations in deaths from injuries by using a flat average, we can 
justify its use on the grounds that the number of deaths from injuries is a very small 
proportion of the total (between 11,000 and 17,000 per year for each of the three 
famine years, or between 1.05 and 1.85% of all deaths). This category would not 
disturb the monthly variation in the combined total of ‘other causes’ and ‘injuries’ to a 
significant extent).
1  Whitcombe, ‘Famine Mortality’, p.  1173.
261Thus ‘other causes’ and ‘fevers’ constituted the majority of deaths throughout 
the famine years, in common with non-famine years, ‘Fevers’ as a category of deaths 
overtook ‘other causes’ in terms of absolute numbers only in November and 
December 1877 and January 1878, and thereafter throughout 1878, as noted above. 
These two categories, therefore, accounted for between half and three fourths of all 
deaths in every year from 1871. In 1877, these causes account for 61% and in 1878, 
this rose to over three fourths of all deaths, due to the increase in fever deaths.
Deaths  under the category ‘other causes’ fell slightly from their 1876 levels in 
early 1877, then started to rise from May 1877. They rose dramatically and dominated 
the death returns in May, June, July, August and September 1877, then began to 
decline gradually and reach early-1876 levels by May 1878. However, the number of 
deaths attributed to this category increased again in July and August 1878, decreased 
slightly in September, October and November 1878, and then rose sharply in 
December 1878.
Cholera
Cholera deaths peaked in January 1877, although small rises are seen again in 
May and August 1877, as seen in Graph G4.1. Cornish and other observers pointed to 
the occurrence of a cholera epidemic in 1875 and 1876.2 This epidemic continued into 
the early months of 1877, and swelled mortality figures. After ‘other causes’ and 
‘fevers’, cholera constituted the third largest cause of deaths in 1877 at 23%. In 1878, 
this proportion fell to 5.6% of all deaths. Thereafter, deaths from cholera declined 
steadily, despite a small rise in August 1877. In 1878, the Presidency reported 
relatively few deaths from this cause.
2 SCR 1877, p. 85.
262Smallpox
Smallpox deaths in 1877 reached a level unheard of in the history of death 
registration in the Presidency, at 88,321. In 1878, the absolute number of deaths 
attributed to smallpox declined from this crescendo, but the proportion of the total 
deaths attributed to smallpox rose from a level of 3.86% in 1875 to 7.06% in 1878. 
Smallpox exhibited distinct seasonal patterns. This indicates that the increase was 
caused by several factors peculiar to the famine situation- particularly the massing of 
people on relief works and camps, and by famine migration (thereby validating 
Arnold’s argument to some extent). However, there also appear to have been seasonal 
factors which played a role in the virulence and transmission of the disease, much as 
in non-famine years.  The greatest number of deaths from smallpox in 1877 occurred 
in March and April, but deaths from this cause increased again in September and 
October 1877 onwards, with another rise in March 1878.
Bowel Complaints
The category ‘bowel complaints’ accounted for between 5 and 9% in every 
year between 1871 and 1878.  This category was introduced into the returns in 1871 
to differentiate between cholera and other diseases whose symptoms also included 
fluxes of the bowels. They therefore referred in the European mind particularly to 
‘dysentery and diarrhoea’, both of which seem to have been linked to each other. In 
1877, bowel complaints caused 8.5% of all deaths, a considerable increase from its 
pre-famine proportions of 1875 and 1876. Deaths from bowel complaints peaked in 
the monsoon months of July, August and September 1877, then decline from October 
1877. Despite a slight increase in July, August and September 1878, they came down
3  SCR 1877, p.  137. Cornish however remarked that in 1877, the seasonal variations were less marked 
than usual: although the maximum mortality occurred in March as in other years, the epidemic did not 
decline as quickly as in other years.
263to pre- 1876 levels by end-1878. This category, then, had a clear correspondence with 
the monsoon months, in common with ‘other causes’ and fevers.
Injuries
Finally the category ‘injuries’ also increased sharply in 1877 over the previous 
year. The number of deaths registered as due to injuries in 1877 was the highest in the 
decade. At the same time, it must be remembered that the proportion of deaths 
attributed to injuries of all sorts fell to a low this year, as other causes of death simply 
overwhelmed it. Since monthly figures for this category are not available, it is not 
possible to trace the variations in mortality from this cause.
IV. Phases of Famine Mortality
This summary of the relative quantities of deaths from different disease 
categories leads us to ask the following questions. Firstly, does the data support the 
existence of two main phases of famine mortality, the first dominated by cholera, 
starvation and bowel disease, and the second dominated by fevers? Secondly, what 
was the relationship of different disease categories to the general death rate, and what 
factors account for the movements of different disease categories?
The Chronology of Famine Mortality
Graph G 4.1 enables us to suggest some answers to these questions as well as 
to raise some fresh ones. This graph is useful because it shows the movements of 
different categories under which deaths were registered over a two- year period. We 
are also able to analyse the relationship and contribution of different causes of death 
to the general death rate over a 2 year period. There appear to have been four, not two 
phases in mortality between January1876 and December 1878, during each of which
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□ OCthe death rate exhibited distinct patterns by disease. The first phase lasted from March 
to November1876. During this phase, the general death rate saw a fairly minor peak 
which occurred in July 1876.  ‘Other causes’ and fevers led the increase in death rates 
pretty evenly in this phase, with cholera slightly behind. Between July and October
1876, the total number of deaths fell to their March levels, mirrored by the fall in 
cholera deaths. However, the total number of deaths from fever and other causes 
remained fairly steady. Whether this early period can be included in our analysis of 
famine mortality is a debatable question, but we must note that the harvests had been 
poor in the Ceded districts even in 1875, and thus there must have been some 
suffering even at that stage.
The second phase may be seen as lasting from November 1876 to April/ May
1877, and can be said to have constituted a ‘cholera’ phase. During the first half of 
this phase, November 1876 to January 1877, there was a sharp and steady increase in 
deaths from cholera, which shaped the general mortality curve remarkably. From our 
examination of the official records, we know that, by this period, distress had begun 
to be felt across the Presidency, and famine was clearly visible. This phase was 
dominated by cholera deaths, which peaked in January 1877. Between January and 
April 1877, the cholera deaths declined and led the general death rate downwards. It is 
important however to remember that this falling mortality rate is only in relation to 
the preceding three months. In fact, the mortality rate in these months was very much 
higher than the same season in previous years, as seen in Table 4.3.
From this falling mortality rate at the end of this second phase, we are led into the 
third phase of famine mortality, which covers the period April/ May to October/
270Table 4.3 Mortality in Famine Districts December 1876 and January 1877
Districts  Cput  Nellore  N Arcot  Kurnool  Cuddapah  Bellary
Pop 1871 938184 1376811 2015278 914432 1351194 1668006
Av. 5 yrs endng Dec 1875 1892 2007 3445 1420 2336 2585
Av. 5 yrs ending Jan 1875 1404 1794 3493 1371 1933 2253
December 1876 2865 5641 6006 11862 6612 7440
January 1877 6094 11142 13686 6253 13361 9361
Mort/1000 5 yrs 21.08 16.6 21.9 18.3 18.9 17.4
Mort/1000 Jan 1877 57.2 73.7 58.7 118.8 88.7 60.4
Source: Letter from Dr. Cornish to the Chief Secretary to Government, dated 6th April 1877. 
(No. 144, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65)
271November 1877. This phase was the most lethal in the entire course of the famine and 
there was a huge increase in the general death rate. It was dominated by ‘other 
causes’, which, along with ‘fevers’ began to increase from March 1877. Deaths from 
‘other causes’ led the increase in the general death rate in this phase, while the 
connection between cholera and the general death rate lost strength dramatically from 
the beginning of this period. Note also that death from ‘bowel complaints’- 
numerically a relatively minor cause of death- mirrored the general death rate in shape 
to a great extent at this stage. Thereafter, the general death rate fell slightly in 
September.
The fourth phase of famine mortality began from November 1877. At this 
point, deaths from fever, which had been increasing from April/ May 1877, overtook 
‘other causes’. The general death rate was led into another peak in December 1877, 
caused primarily by the sharp increase in fever deaths. The highest absolute number 
of deaths from a single cause in any month occurred in December 1877, and was 
attributed to fever. Yet, the peak in the general death rate which occurred as a result of 
this increase in fever deaths was smaller than that of the preceding phase. This means 
that the earlier during the third phase was far more lethal in relative terms. The 
swelling of the death rate from all causes contributed to the August 1877 peak in the 
general death rate, while the later fever peak was neutralized to some extent by falling 
death rates in other categories. From this point onwards, the total death rate declined, 
although there is another minor peak in August 1878, which is again largely due to 
fevers. Fevers dominated the general death rate throughout 1878.
The phases in famine mortality can thus be summarized as: (1) March 1876- 
November 1876: This phase, which may be included in the famine period with some 
doubts, saw a minor peak in July 1876, and was led by other causes, fever and
272cholera. (2) November 1876 to April/ May 1877: This phase may be said to constitute 
a ‘cholera’ phase.  It saw a dramatic rise in deaths from November 1876 which peaks 
in January 1877, and this was dominated by cholera. From January 1877 to 
Aprill877, cholera began to decline, and though death rates for these months was 
well-elevated over preceding years, the absolute number of people dying declined. 
This decline in cholera deaths led the general death rate downwards. (3) April/ May 
to October/ November 1877: This, the third phase, was undoubtedly that of greatest 
suffering, with a very steep increase in the general death rate.  ‘Other causes’ 
dominated this increase, rising from end-April and peaking in August 1877. 
Interestingly, the shape of the death curve from ‘bowel complaints’ although much 
smaller than ‘other causes’ is similar to it at this stage. Both ‘other causes’ and ‘bowel 
complaints’ mirror the general death rate curve in shape. Between September and 
October 1877, the general death rate declined from its August levels, but was still 
high. (4) November 1877 to December 1878: This was the fourth ‘fever’ phase of 
famine mortality . Deaths from fever had been increasing in importance from April/ 
May 1877, overtaking ‘other causes’ in November 1877. The general death rate rose 
in response from end November 1877. Fever mortality peaked in December 1877.
This was the highest number of deaths from any single cause in the course of the three 
famine years. However, this peak did not affect the general mortality trend to the 
extent that ‘other causes’ did in the preceding phase. This seems to have been because 
deaths in all other disease categories were declining.
V
The previous section established the existence of four phases in famine mortality 
rather than the two suggested by Dyson and Whitcombe. Further, we also pointed to
273the importance of a category of death causes either not considered by any of the 
authors who have analysed the mortality trends for this famine, i.e.  ‘other causes’.
The preceding discussion as well as the graph presented above clearly illustrates the 
importance of this category, both in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of the 
main registered cause of death in the most lethal phase of famine mortality. We now 
move on to suggest a hypothesis to explain these patterns of disease and famine 
mortality.
Interpreting Categories of Death-Causes
We need first of all to examine the categories under which death was 
registered. There are several things to be considered. First, is it possible to deduce 
what the category ‘other causes’- shown to be the category in which the maximum 
number of deaths were registered in 1877, and particularly in the third and most lethal 
phase of famine, consisted of? Secondly, did the category ‘fevers’ refer undoubtedly 
to malaria as we know it today and what evidence do we have in this regard? Thirdly, 
how did famine conditions influence the other categories of death causes- cholera, 
bowel complaints, smallpox and injuries? Fourthly, can we possibly conclude whether 
infection or debility played the most important role in causing famine mortality? 
Finally, is there any evidence to suggest that administrative and medical actions 
influenced the course of disease and death; and if so, how?
‘Other Causes’
In the main famine year, 1877, the category ‘other causes’ accounted, as we 
have seen, for the largest proportion of all deaths,  31.5%. Cornish’s evidence on this 
category seems to point to the possibility that a large proportion of this category was 
constituted by what he termed ‘famine diseases’ and starvation deaths. Cornish 
estimated that in the seven non-famine districts, the death ratio was 8.5 per thousand;
274while the fourteen famine districts returned 21.8 per thousand population. He 
suggested that a large proportion of these would more aptly be classified as starvation 
deaths, despite the uncertainty surrounding the actual identity of these causes. 1
Cornish pointed out that there were marked differences in the way in which 
the administration classified death causes in different districts. Thus, in the Ceded 
districts comprising Bellary, Kumool and Cuddapah, all of which were geographically 
contiguous and devastated by famine, Bellary returned a very high proportion of 
deaths from ‘other causes’ and a relatively modest number of deaths from fever. 
Kumool and Cuddapah returned a very high proportion of deaths from fever, but a 
small proportion from ‘other causes.’ However, these differences pointed Cornish to 
the suspicion that both these categories were organically linked to clinical 
manifestations of starvation. Further, he apprehended that the standing order that  no 
person was to be permitted to die from want of food  would prevent the entry of 
starvation deaths in the returns, and that ‘the great bulk of the famine mortality has 
been included under ‘cholera’, ‘fevers’, ‘bowel complaints’ and the general heading 
‘all other causes’.2
...The  exact  truth in regard to  the  effect  of diminished  food  supplies  on  a  population 
cannot be  shown in the  death registration tables....the  diseases  of innutrition,  however 
well-known to  persons  of medical  training,  cannot be  specified by  uneducated  village 
servants  and the fear of getting into trouble with the authorities  would further have the 
effect of making these servants record mortality as due to  ‘old age’,  ‘fever’, or any other 
head of classification, rather than to the proper heading ‘chronic starvation.3
Cornish therefore suggested that the bulk of the mortality was due to the effects of 
chronic starvation on the human body; that the death registration seriously misjudged
1  SCR 1877, p.  146.
2 Ibid. See Chapter 1, pp. 90-91 of this thesis regarding this order and its influence on the accuracy of 
the death returns.
3 Ibid, p.  147.
275and understated its effects; and that several deaths primarily traceable to starvation. 
However, does other evidence support this supposition?
Going back to Table 4.1, it appears that the heading ‘all other causes’ accounted 
for between 31 and 37.5% of deaths in all years, not just famine years. To attribute 
the totality of the deaths under this heading to starvation or its effects would be 
erroneous, for we would have to believe that a third of the registered population were 
starving to death every year from 1871 onwards. This clearly is difficult to believe. It 
remains an interesting anomaly that, in every year, when nearly a third of all deaths 
were attributed to this category, no medical official at the Presidency felt the need to 
explain this large proportion. It was only in 1877 that Cornish made a special note of 
it, indicating that we need to weigh the evidence carefully before attributing it in its 
entirety to starvation.
It seems reasonable therefore to conclude that there was simply a large amount of 
disease and death in ordinary years that colonial medical men had no idea about and 
which we therefore have few clues to. We are faced with the difficulty that despite its 
significant presence in the death returns both in famine and non-famine years, we 
know very little about what actually constituted deaths from ‘other causes’. Cornish 
himself expressed his ignorance, as ‘details of diseases included under “all other 
causes” were seen only by the mortuary clerk in the offices of each of the nineteen 
district Collectors’.4 It clearly contained deaths from old age and debility amongst the 
destitute, even in ordinary years, and possibly all other diseases not clearly recognized 
or identified by village officials. It was only in 1877 that Cornish made a special note 
of it, indicating that the original purpose of these statistics was the monitoring of
4 SCR 1877, p.  146.
276infectious diseases, particularly cholera, and that other conditions not of importance to 
the state could not easily be encompassed by them This again points us to the 
conclusion that the death statistics were themselves very rough-hewn tools to work 
with.
Despite this, however, it still appears reasonable to suspect that starvation deaths
constituted a significant portion of the great increase in deaths registered under this
category in 1877. We have some evidence from a study conducted by Alexander
Porter, Principal of the Madras College, on the bodies of famine victims in
Royapettah Hospital during the famine months of 1876 to 1878. Here it is worth
remembering that this was a sample which was analysed by medical professionals in
Madras city, not by untrained village servants. Porter wrote:
Many cases were admitted with great emaciation and weakness but suffering from no 
appreciable disease. These were generally returned under debility, privation or 
atrophy.. ..they are all grouped under ‘other causes’. 5
It might also have contained deaths from old age and venereal diseases, although 
this is a conjecture. Finally, we know nominally of the existence of various diseases 
which were explained not in European terms, but had a distinct identity in native 
vocabulary. For example, district officials reported great panic amongst people due to 
the outbreak of a disease called ‘soorukumari \ ini 877, which medical officials 
sought to dismiss as cases of fever or cholera, or at worst, native imagination.6  All 
such inexplicable or ambiguous cases would have been included in this category.
Although it is hard to explain the presence of ‘other causes’ in non-famine years, 
we would suggest that it might credibly be argued that Cornish’s reading of this
5 A. Porter, Diseases of the Madras Famine, Madras, 1889, p.  104.
6 Soorukumari was said to be characterized only by a ‘twinge of pain somewhere near the foot which 
rises up towards the trunk’.  It was reported to have attacked over 3000 people in Madras in My 1876. 
The Surgeon General of the Indian Medical Department dismissed these reports:  ‘The whole thing is a 
panic.’ (Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated 2nd August 1876, 
Nos. 5-6, G.O. No. 860, TNSA).
277category- as indicating the existence of starvation and its effects on susceptibility to 
infection- holds some water.
Can we separate famine mortality into starvation/ disease? : A critique of the 
two-phase model
As the preceding paragraphs make clear, ‘other causes’ constituted the largest 
proportion of deaths in the worst phase of famine. Both Porter and Cornish suggested 
that this category contained a large proportion of starvation or starvation-induced 
deaths. It is, therefore, doubtful whether famine mortality can indeed be divided into 
two clear and distinct phases of ‘starvation/cholera/ diarrhoea’ and ‘disease/malaria’. 
The sharp rise in fever deaths that took place in November and December 1877 and 
throughout 1878 was far less than the peak attributed to ‘other causes’ which 
accounted for the maximum number of deaths between April and August 1877, and 
indeed through 1877, the worst year of the famine.
Further, starvation and emaciation were being reported even in the third and fourth 
quarters of 1877, a phase which would properly have fallen into the ‘epidemic malaria 
phase’ under the two-phase schema. In September 1877, district officials in Bellary 
reported that ‘the coolies here are all in a bad way and have fallen off in condition 
very much during the past month; especially the young men.. .have recently become 
mere skeletons of human beings. ’ The Deputy Collector of the District reported a 
‘great deterioration in the physique of the people at large’; that ‘several had sold their 
huts and all household things and even their cumblies and cloths for annas and pice
278and are now left without anything except hunger and starvation’.7  If those on relief 
works were in bad shape, people on money and food doles in villages or in relief 
camps were even worse off.8
What seems to have been happening was that as the famine continued, people 
gradually fell from various stages of subsistence into various stages of starvation. In 
this sense, Arnold’s characterization of responses to famine as a series of increasingly 
desperate strategies to stay alive is appropriate. In the early phases, as Cornish noted, 
cattle mortality as well as distress sales of cattle by small farmers and sharecroppers 
meant that the meat-eating castes (who were usually poor untouchables of Pariah,
Palli or Vanniyar caste) had a source of nutrition which enabled them to survive.9  
However, this source did not last long, and as Arnold has noted, this paradoxically 
meant that they were disqualified from the relief works.1 0  As the famine wore on, 
small landowners and menial government servants fell into destitution. Petty 
Government servants had begun to receive, from November 1876, an additional 
allowance to supplement their meagre income.1 1  The slightly better off ryots  began to 
migrate, sell jewellery, utensils and other belongings. By the middle of 1877, a
7 Letter from J.H. Master, Esq., Collector of Bellary, to C.A. Galton, Esq., Acting Secretary to the 
Board of Revenue, dated Kudlighi, 20th August 1877, No. 670, Proceedings of the Madras Board of 
Revenue for September 1877, TNSA.
8  Early on in the famine, Comish noted that ‘the most marked effects of the famine were to be sought 
among people of this class’  (i.e. those who came to receive food or money doles in the camps) ‘rather 
than those who had strength to work on relief gangs.’ He also found that ‘for the first effects of (the 
reduced wage scale) we must look to the old and infirm and the young children, that is the dependents 
of labourers who are incapable of earning a living for themselves... .these classes are not to be seen on 
the relief works.’ (Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated 9th March 
1877, Nos. 31-34, TNSA).
9 SCR 1877, p. 220.
10 Arnold, ‘Famine in Peasant Consciousness and Peasant Action’, p. 95; ibid, ‘Social Crisis and 
Epidemic Disease’, p. 391.
1 1  Superintendents and Deputy Inspectors General as well as jail servants were granted an increased 
‘batta’ from November and December 1876 onwards. This indicates the range of persons who must 
have felt the pinch of increased prices. Prisoners in police custody were also given an increased 
allowance from December 1876. Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Judicial Department 
dated 20th  November 1876 (Nos.  100-101); 12th December 1876 (No. 261), 28th  December 1876 (Nos. 
172-174).
279number of previously prosperous persons were destitute. The sheer scale of the 
famine suggests that it affected a very wide section of south Indian society.
Non-official and semi-official reports also suggest that starvation was 
occurring long after July 1877, and that state machinery was relatively useless in 
dealing with it. For example, a famine relief officer of the Chingleput district begged 
the Indian Famine Relief Committee (a semi-private organization which appealed for 
assistance from private persons in England and in British colonies) for assistance in 
September 1877, stating that ‘every day, scores of new applicants who are 
unmistakeably famine-stricken pass through our registration, and we find it our
19 painful duty to send these back unrelieved’.
As late as January and February 1878, reports of starvation were coming in from
the districts. A Protestant priest in the Bellary district requested funds from the
Mansion House Relief Committee in January 1878, mentioning that ‘a poor old
woman died of misery before my door. I gave her food and money but the relief came 
1 ^ too late’.  In the North Arcot district, in the middle of February 1878, a man was 
apprehended and sent in to the Ranipet dispensary for committing an act of 
cannibalism (He was found by the police eating the remains of a poorly interred 
corpse in the dry river bed of the Palar river). However, the case resulted in a 
difference of opinion between district revenue and medical officials. That he was sent 
to the dispensary and not prison was due to the fact that district revenue officials saw 
him as being mentally unsound rather than of criminal intent. The medical officer in 
charge of the dispensary, an American missionary priest called Dr. Scudder, however,
1 2 Letter from C. Devaraja Mudliyar, Special Famine Officer, Chingleput district, dated 27th  September 
1877, Proceedings of the Indian Famine Charitable Fund, Chapter 3, p. 6, TNSA.
13 Letter from Rev. A. Kroll to the General Famine Relief Fund, dated 9th January 1878, Proceedings of 
the Indian Famine Charitable Relief Fund, Chapter 16, p. 30, TNSA.
280reported that the man was neither criminal nor a habitual lunatic; he was simply
starving. Dr Scudder wrote:
‘(the man) when brought to the dispensary was extremely emaciated and himself declared 
that he committed this act because he was suffering from hunger and was faint from want 
of food.... for these reasons I connected the word famine with his name, and though he is 
subject to periodic attacks of insanity, 1 still have no doubt that starvation was the 
immediate cause of his act. 1 4
What this would suggest is that quite late in the famine, an indeterminate number 
of people were in fact hanging on to life by a mere thread, or gradually descending 
down the line of hunger. Therefore it is not quite so easy to implicate contagious or 
infectious diseases in these latter phases without reference to debility and starvation. 
Alexander Porter noted that in all the autopsies he had seen in the post mortem room, 
‘the most notable feature was emaciation.’ Fully 86% of men and 83% of women 
whose bodies he saw between November 1876 and May 1878 had wasted to the point 
where they had reached two thirds of their normal weight.1 5  This would indicate that 
starvation was a slow and painful process, and that its ravages were not restricted to 
the first phase of the famine.
Fever deaths, Malarious Fevers and Malaria: Theories of Disease causation and 
Descriptions of Symptoms
Returning to the ‘malaria hypothesis’, we also need to examine the way in which 
fever deaths were classified. Did fever in fact mean malaria as we understand it 
today?
The evidence suggests that ‘fevers’ was a generic term used to describe very many 
syndromes, and similarly ‘malaria’ had different connotations from what we would 
understand of malaria today. In 1870, Cornish wrote: ‘As regards the registration of
14 Proceedings of the GoM in the Judicial Department, dated 28th March 1878, G.O. No.657, TNSA.
15 Porter, Diseases of the Madras Famine, p. 201.
281deaths under the head of ‘fevers,’ no attempt is made to classify the various diseases 
which cause mortality.. ..the prevailing form of fever is the malarious remittent or 
intermittent (possibly in proportion to the degree of malarial poisoning)’.1 6  This quote 
might lead us to believe that indeed the ‘malarious fever’ which Cornish refers to here 
was the malaria we know today, with its symptoms of splenic enlargement, and 
distinct ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ phases of fever.
In fact, the correspondence between the term ‘fever’ and malaria as we know it 
today appears not to have been quite so watertight. The term ‘malarial fevers’ was 
used to represented a class of diseases supposed to be caused by malarial poisoning, 
i.e. exposure to bad air. It did not always refer to a specific disease entity as we 
understand it today. Malarial poisoning was thought to cause disease both indirectly 
and directly through exposure to contaminated or poisonous air, on the one hand, and 
through the exhalations of decayed vegetable matter, on the other. Malarial poisoning 
could then manifest itself in a range of symptoms and disease conditions, caused both 
directly through exposure to bad air, and indirectly through  This is evident from the 
following quote:.
The extent to which... .malarial fevers prevail is very great, and there are considerable 
variations in the intensity of fever prevalence in the various districts. The actual deaths 
registered as due to fevers during the year are about thirty per cent of the whole mortality 
and in this registration, for obvious reasons, no attempt has been made to show the 
mortality actually due to malarial poisoning in the form of anaemia, dropsy and bowel 
complaints. Were the deaths from these indirect effects of malarial poisoning added to 
those which are the direct product of malaria, the proportion one year with another, 
probably would not fall very short of fifty per cent of the whole.1
‘Malarial fevers’ in this context incorporated a theory of disease causation, in 
which a range of symptoms and conditions were seen to be caused by changes in the 
environment. Ideas of disease in the 1870s seem to have incorporated theories of
16 SCR 1870, p.  107.
17
282disease causation as well as descriptions of symptoms. In India, as in England, fevers 
were described in a variety of ways according to their pattern of symptoms, their 
perceived root cause, and their contagiousness.1 8
Cornish did remark that people were more liable to suffer from fever, ‘not during 
the time of greatest famine pressure, but after the rainfall following on prolonged 
drought had set free malarious exhalations, and in many of the famine districts, after 
the worst pressure of famine had been relieved’.1 9  In addition, ‘all classes of the 
people, even the European officials, felt the malarious influences’; ‘in Kumool and 
Cuddapah public business nearly collapsed owing to the subordinate officials being 
stricken down with fever’.20 This might suggest that fever struck indiscriminately; and
91 that there was no connection with starvation and debility.  This certainly seems to be 
the conclusion drawn from the Sanitary Commissioner’s Annual Report of 1877 by 
Elizabeth Whitcombe, who wrote that ‘all classes of the population were 
vulnerable’.22  Cornish also wrote that ‘malarious fevers following on famine are just 
as much natural phenomena as the enormous development of insectivorous life after 
prolonged drought’, lending support to the argument that malaria following on the 
unusual climatic and ecological sequences of famine was unrelated to the economic 
and social disruption caused by famine.
Yet, in the same report, Cornish also remarked that this fever, ‘an ordinary 
malarious ague’ occasioned ‘very little mortality with the strong and well-to-do, but
18 The interested reader is referred to Margaret Pelling’s classic work on how disease categories were 
linked with programmes of sanitary reform. (M. Pelling, Cholera, Fever and English Medicine 1825- 
1865, Oxford, 1978).
19 SCR 1877, p.  141.
20 SCR 1877, p. xxviii.
21 Ibid.
22 Whitcombe,  ‘Famine Mortality’, p.  1173. Whitcombe has referenced this quote erroneously as being 
located in Cornish’s 1878 report, when in fact it is cited in his  1877 report.
283with the ‘weakly and half-starved victims of famine, it was very fatal.’23 Cornish 
further reiterated:
The relation of the fever mortality to the famine appears to be this, that a vast number of 
people had been so debilitated by want that they had no reserve or vital force to enable 
them to withstand a disease which, in ordinary years, is not very fatal in proportion to the 
number of sufferers. The feeble health and depraved condition of the body amongst the 
poor, induced by long privation, were undoubtedly the circumstances predisposing to the 
large mortality from fever. 24
Cornish also stated that in his opinion, ‘it (seemed) very probable that that in the 
famine area, many deaths were ascribed to “fever” which would more appropriately 
have been registered as being due to privation’, indicating once more the fluidity and 
ambiguity of cause of death statistics,  and underlying theories of causation.2 5 This 
evidence would tend to support the argument made by Sheila Zurbrigg that in 
interpreting the effects of disease, there is an important distinction to be made 
between infection as shown by the exhibition of symptoms of disease and lethality as 
expressed in mortality.26
Evidence from the Royapettah Hospital Famine Relief Sheds
Medical officials were well aware of the greater lethality of disease amongst 
the poor and famine stricken, even if they did not have the discoveries of Koch, 
Manson and Ross in the 1870s. Alexander Porter’s investigations between November 
1877 and July 1878 indicate very strongly that ‘fever’ referred to a variety of
23 SCR 1877, p.  142.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Zurbrigg, ‘Did Starvation Protect from Malaria?’ op. cit. See also Maharatna, The Demography of 
Famines, p. 83. Maharatna suggests that poor and starved people were much more susceptible to death 
from malaria during Indian famines. See Maharatna’s more recent essay:  ‘Famines and Epidemics: An 
Indian Historical Perspective’, in T. Dyson and C. O’Grada, Famine Demography: Perspectives from 
the Past and Present, Oxford, 2002. In his more recent work, Maharatna convincingly argues that 
framing the debate in terms of a dichotomy between public health and nutrition, or between a ‘health 
crisis model’ and a ‘starvation model’ is essentially a false dichotomy. (Maharatna, ‘Famines and 
Epidemics’, p.  137).
284syndromes and conditions. Porter believed that pneumonia caused a vast proportion of
deaths attributed to fever in the districts.
I have no doubt that many of these (fever deaths reported by Cornish) were deaths from 
pneumonia, present in a large proportion of famine sick; in fact in the post mortem room 
pneumonia in a more or less advanced stage was found in one case in every four.27
In Porter’s sample, the fevers observed were of short duration, and had a lower death 
rate in comparison with the bowel fluxes. Porter mentioned the existence of cases of 
ague, febricula, ‘simple continued fever’ and sunstroke, all of which were classified 
under fever deaths.28 Cornish concurred with Porter when he stated that most fevers 
were simple agues, except that they were far more lethal to a famine stricken
29 population.  ‘Fever’ was mentioned as a cause of death in only seven out of 459 
autopsies, indicating that it was classified differently by the village registrars and by 
medical official. On the other hand, fever was mentioned as a symptom in numerous 
cases where the cause of death was recorded as fever, pyaemia, phthisis pulmonalis, 
acute pneumonia, and hepatic abscess. One might suspect that particularly in the 
districts, the distinction between fever as a symptom, and fever as a primary cause of 
death was blurred.
At the same time, this is not to suggest that we have no commonalities with past 
societies in experiencing some of the same disease conditions and symptoms, i.e. the 
supposition that past societies did not experience malaria as we do today and in 
similar conditions. For example, in cases where splenic enlargement was mentioned
27 Porter, Diseases of the Madras Famine, p.  131.
28 See also Kohei Wakimura, ‘Famines, Epidemics and Mortality in Northern India,  1870-1921’ in P. 
Robb, Kaoru Sugihara and Haruka Yanagisawa, Local Agrarian Societies in Colonial India: Japanese 
Perspectives, New Delhi, 1997. Wakimura, while noting that fever was the most important cause of 
death during and immediately after the famine of 1877-78, states that hunger weakened the poor (p. 
290).
29 SCR 1877, p.  141. It is worth mentioning that a major inquiry into the nature of fever took place in 
Bombay at the Grant Medical College during 1877. The inquiry was sparked off by a controversy over 
whether the fever prevalent in Bombay had anything to do with the want prevailing. See H. Vandyke 
Carter, Spirillum Fever: synonyms famine or relapsing fever, as seen in western India, London 1882.
285as a concurrent phenomenon along with malarious fever, it is quite likely that this is 
the malaria that we know. Undoubtedly, famine stricken populations in the 1870s 
must have experienced malaria in ways similar to those experienced today, and 
possibly malaria caused as much devastation on a regular basis as it does today in the 
developing world. One would need to guard against taking the category ‘fevers’ to 
signify malaria alone, particularly when the district death returns are used.
It is thus difficult to state with certainty that fevers referred primarily to 
malaria as we understand it after the work of Ross, Laveran and Manson. Moreover, 
even where fevers were linked to climatic conditions and splenic enlargement, the 
likelihood of death was much higher among the starving.
Regional Differentials in Fever Mortality
Even if the incidence of ‘fever’ had a strong climatic element (this association 
between climate and fever mortality is particularly marked during 1878, which falls 
into our fourth phase of famine mortality), it is by no means clear that climatic or 
parasitic changes alone were the most important factor. We return to Cornish’s reports 
to examine the distribution of fever deaths. While noting the strong seasonal 
movement of the mortality, Cornish showed that fevers were most fatal in the districts 
worst hit by famine in 1877.30
30 SCR 1877, p.  140.
286Table 4.4 Fever Mortality in 187731
A. Districts in which fever mortality has not varied much from average
Districts Death ratios per mille, 
1877







South Canara 6.6 5.3
Malabar 7.0 5.9
Tinnevelly 6.2 4.3
B. Districts showing excessive fever mortality in 1877
Districts Death Ratios per mille Mean of 5 years ending 
1876
Nellore 19.3 6.6
Madras Town 15.6 6.4
Chingleput 11.2 5.8










This picture would be considerably sharpened by an examination of the correlation 
between variations in mortality, food prices and rainfall by district. Yet, Table 4.4 
does provide a picture that implicates starvation in the mortality caused by fever, as 
all the districts showing excessive fever mortality were districts where famine had hit 
hard. Interestingly, if the ‘migration’ thesis propounded by Arnold were to hold, we
31 SCR 1877, pp.  143-44.would expect that the ‘non-famine’ districts would experience equal or nearly equal 
death ratios as compared to the famine districts, as migrants from these districts would 
have wandered into the non-famine districts and introduced new strains of disease. 
Instead, the famine stricken districts experience vastly inflated death ratios in 
comparison to the previous five years. (This is, of course allowing for imperfections 
in the classification of districts as such).
The evidence from this famine, considered along with other nineteenth century 
famines and the Bengal famine of 1943, does implicate the role of ‘fever’ in famine 
deaths. It is also possible to suggest that this category must have included a number of 
malaria deaths, which had a strong climatic or seasonal element. However, to argue 
from there that the climatic factors were the main cause of mortality in famine years 
seems to push this argument too far. The mistake, it appears, lies mainly in four areas: 
first, an overestimation of the contribution of fevers to the total number of deaths 
(particularly in connection with ‘other causes’; second, an assumption of a simple 
division of phases of famine mortality into starvation/ infectious disease, when in fact 
starvation continued to be reported well after the middle of 1877; third, the identity of 
fever deaths and their correspondence with malaria; and fourth in the confusion 
between infection and the likelihood of death: the latter being far higher for victims of 
starvation.
288Sanitary and Contagious Factors in the Spread of Disease during Famine
We turn now to consider the role of sanitary and contagious factors in the 
transmission of disease during the famine. The main categories of disease for which 
these factors are claimed include smallpox, cholera and bowel complaints.32 
Smallpox
As we have noted, the total number of deaths from smallpox increased significantly in 
1877 and remained high in 1878. Smallpox is generally  distinct because of its 
recognizable symptoms and its extreme contagiousness. In the returns, it begins to rise 
from November 1876, when the first wave of migrants begin to crowd into urban 
centres in search of relief.  Cornish noted:
The condition of the population was such as to be eminently favourable to the spread of a 
contagious disease like smallpox. Many thousands of the labouring classes wandered away 
from their homes to the nearest towns or markets or to relief works and camps, so that the
people got herded together in large crowds, and at night, every resting place affording shelter
33 was dangerously overcrowded.
Understandably, faced with the choice of smallpox or starvation, people chose
smallpox over the risk of starving to death. Cornish again remarked:
I have seen a man, his body almost nude, and covered from head to foot with smallpox 
pustules, elbowing his way through a crowd at the distribution of food... .in the earlier days of 
relief camps, it was a common sight to witness women and children in stages of smallpox 
sitting close by others free of the disease, awaiting the distribution of food.34
The mortality statistics for smallpox are interesting in that they show the 
clearest linkage of all disease categories with migration and with the establishment of 
relief camps. The mortality from this disease thus supports most strongly the ‘social
32 It is worth noting here that nineteenth century medical theories ascribed a role for sanitary and 
contagious factors in the causation of fevers. However, to go into these debates and theories would 
deflect us from the main focus of this chapter. See Pelling, Cholera, Fever and English Medicine.
33 SCR 1877, p.  137.
34 Ibid.
289dislocation’ thesis. Thus, despite the fact that famine only partially affected some 
districts- termed ‘non-famine’ districts where the effects of famine showed itself 
primarily amongst migrant populations in 1877-  these experienced a rise in the death 
ratio from a mean of 1.4 over the previous five years to 2.4 per thousand population in 
1877. At the same time, the death ratio for the famine districts rose even higher, from 
a five year mean of 1.2 to an average death ratio of 3.0. (We would need to consider a 
range of factors, such as how far people actually went to get relief, where smallpox 
was prevalent, etc., in order to deal with this fully. This is regrettably not possible in 
the scope of this thesis).
Graph G4.1  shows us the seasonal movements in deaths from smallpox during 
the famine. In terms of seasonality, smallpox mortality rises from December 1876 and 
peaks in March 1877. There is another (minor) peak in December 1877, and yet 
another in March 1878. What is also notable about the smallpox death curve is how it 
forms something of a plateau between March 1877 to March 1878, over which period 
the death rate from this disease is roughly even. This might be explained by noting 
that in the early stages of famine and crowding to relief centres, the mortality from the 
disease was very high. Once the measures for famine relief were more stable, the 
deaths remain high but even.
We may thus conclude that the smallpox was least affected in biological terms 
by starvation. Instead, the social disruption caused by famine- migration of the 
starving poor to cities, relief works and centres of relief, the provision of relief in 
crowded centres, and the inability of compelling segregation- were primary factors in 
its transmission and in the great mortality from this disease in 1877 and 1878.
290Cholera and Bowel Complaints
We next move on to cholera and bowel complaints. There are good reasons for 
considering these diseases together.  ‘Cholera’ was a disease that had been known and 
feared since the early nineteenth century by European administrators. Its characteristic 
symptoms included abdominal cramps, loss of body fluids through characteristic ‘rice 
water’ diarrhoeaic bowel discharges, a drop in body temperature, clammy skin, and 
great thirst. A variety of theories were propounded as to the causes and transmission 
of the disease. In 1877, the disease was well-recognized, but still hardly understood.3 5
Cholera and Politics
Cholera was the most politicized of all diseases during the famine. This was 
for several reasons, firstly the larger historical context of cholera epidemics.  From the 
1830s onwards, epidemics of cholera became the focus of conflicting medical theories 
of transmission and international debates over quarantine. This concern resurfaced 
periodically during further international epidemics and conferences in 1848, 1866 and 
1877. However, as several authors have shown, both in India and in Europe, 
quarantine was imposed infrequently and unevenly due to commercial considerations, 
medical disagreements over the causes and transmission of cholera, and 
administrative inefficiency.36 Another reason for administrative concern was the 
devastation caused by cholera epidemics to the European military forces.37 In India,
35 For example, in 1876, there was a detailed inquiry into the causes of an epidemic of cholera in 
Kanakampatty village in Salem district. This became the subject of dispute between the Acting 
Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of Madras and the Army Sanitary Commission with the 
Government of India over the mode of transmission of the disease, with the former asserting that 
cholera was spread by the use of contaminated water, and imported into the village by persons from 
outside. The latter insisted that the epidemic had nothing to do with polluted water, and that the proof 
offered by the Acting Sanitary Commissioner was ‘defective’. (Surgeon-Major Comish, ‘On an 
Outbreak of Cholera in an Indian Village’, The Practitioner: A Journal of Therapeutics and Public 
Health, XXIV (January to June), 1880.
36 Harrison, Public Health in British India, Chapter 3.
37 See R. Ramasubban, ‘Imperial Health in British India’ op. cit.
291despite the statistical importance of fevers and other causes, cholera appears to have 
been the prime force behind the administrative changes of the 1860s, particularly the 
setting up of the Sanitary Commissions in 1866. Throughout the 1860s and 1870s, 
cholera occupies the maximum number of pages in sanitary reports, primarily for 
these reasons.
However, in the immediate context of the famine, there was a far more 
compelling reason for administrative concern with cholera. Early in the famine, at the 
height of the Temple-Comish controversy over the adequacy of famine wages, 
Cornish pointed out the remarkable similarity of symptoms of cholera, bowel 
complaints and starvation.
Famine Diarrhoea
For a moment, we must digress, therefore, into the history of famine. On the 
1st of February 1877, while inspecting relief camps in Madras, Cornish noted the 
presence of ‘diarrhoea of a very severe type’ amongst patients in the hospital attached 
to the relief camp.  Of these, Cornish wrote, ‘I fear that in the majority of these cases,
OO
it will not be possible to save life.’  He stated that, ‘the deaths from cholera and
smallpox  (were) insignificant in comparison with the mortality due to long
privation and want of the necessaries of life. ’ In further inspections around the city a
week later, Comish saw more cases of this diarrhoea and termed it ‘famine diarrhoea.’
He stated that ‘famine-diarrhoea is liable to be mistaken for epidemic cholera.
Mistakes of this kind are not made in hospital or relief-camp returns, but they are
made by the reporters of Municipal registration’.39 An officer accompanying Temple
on his tours of inspection noted of the relief camps in and around Madras:
At each of the camps which Sir Richard Temple inspected were a considerable number of 
women and children in an emaciated and miserable condition. In the relief hospitals were
38 SCR 1877, p.  187.
39 SCR 1877, p.  180.
292being treated some hundreds who were suffering from diarrhoea, brought on or aggravated 
by want of food. The death rate among these poor people was very high; and to some of 
them the relief came too late. There were some, but not many, cases of cholera; but the 
great many fatal cases were caused by diarrhoea which was called by the medical officers 
“famine diarrhoea” and was identifiable as the same complaint that was so fatal in the 
Rajpootana famine hospitals during the year 1869. 4 0
Famine diarrhoea was, in Cornish’s opinion, ‘the main cause of death and the 
gravest feature in the business’.41 It was commonest amongst the young and the old. 
(These age groups lost the most people as ascertained by the 1881 census of 
Madras).42
He described the symptoms of famine diarrhoea in great detail on the 18th of 
February 1877:
.. .The bodies are worn away to skin and bone. All the tissues that can readily be consumed 
have disappeared. The sick lie on the ground, in extreme weakness, curled up like a ball, 
the thighs drawn up against the abdomen, the head bending forward on the chest, and the 
arms folded close against the body. The surface of the body appears to be below the normal 
temperature, and the pulse is weak and barely to be felt. The motions are mostly of a 
dysenteric character, and if they do not contain blood, the bright green tint of the matters 
passed, betoken blood in an altered condition. In these cases I apprehend that the fatal 
termination is really due to ulceration of the large intestine. 4 3
Famine Diarrhoea and Chronic Starvation
Cornish saw famine diarrhoea as the fatal pathological manifestation of chronic 
starvation. Cornish identified two types of starvation- acute and chronic- and 
emphasized the great difference between them in several of his letters to the 
Government of India, and in his annual reports.  ‘Acute starvation’ referred to ‘the 
accidental deprivation or withholding of all nourishment for a short period’ such as 
occurred in shipwrecked sailors.44 This form of ‘rapid starvation’, according to
40 Memorandum XXV dated Chittoor, 30th January 1877 by Mr. Bernard, Secretary to Sir Richard 
Temple, on the condition and prospects of the Chingleput District, Famine Correspondence 2, 
IOR/V/4/Session  1877/Vol. 65.
41 SCR 1877, p.  188.
42 See Lardinois, ‘Famine, Epidemics and Mortality in South India’, p. 460.
43 SCR 1877, p.  188.
44 Comish, ‘The Sanitary and Medical Aspects of Famine’, p. iv.
293Cornish, could be easily remedied by good and adequate food and some medical 
treatment.45 However, chronic starvation, where people subsisted on insufficient food 
for months together, was far more insidious and dangerous as it was frequently 
irreversible. Thus, long use of ‘poor and insufficient nutriment’ led to a ‘gradual 
deterioration of health’.46 Chronic starvation was of particular relevance to public 
health officials, whose duty it was to ‘bring home to the comprehension of famine 
administrators that chronic starvation (was) one of the most terrible disasters that 
(could) happen to a population’.47 Chronic starvation led to anaemia (paleness), 
wasting, emaciation, scurvy, dropsy (swelling), alterations in skin and hair, arrest of 
growth and development, and stunting of the reproductive functions. When these 
physiological changes progressed further, the most common symptom was 
‘intractable diarrhoea’, which was ‘merely a stage in the long process of degeneration 
and wasting’.48
Famine diarrhoea began ‘gradually, without pain or uneasiness’, and only after a 
certain amount of emaciation and wasting. Its symptoms were stools full of mucous, 
mixed with blood, or blood that had undergone pathological change to a bright green 
tint, which stained the stools.49
Famine Diarrhoea and Cholera
‘Famine diarrhoea’ and cholera were frequently confused, even by the medical 
eye. At a relief camp in February 1877, Cornish noted that ‘there is no cholera in this
45 SCR 1877, p.  180.
46 SCR 1877, p.  188.
47 Cornish, ‘The Sanitary and Medical Aspects of Famine’, p. iv.
48 Ibid, p. xxxii.
49 Ibid.
294camp, but the mortality is large from famine diarrhoea’.50 An officer visiting a relief 
camp in Salem district in April 1877 noted that a large proportion of the children were 
emaciated beyond the reach of any intervention, and could not digest the food that 
was given, regardless of the type of grain:
Most of these little things had been two or three months in the relief camp, and had not 
picked up at all. Side by side with them were fat, happy little creatures who got no larger 
allowance than the thin ones. The explanation given by the Relief Officer and the Native 
doctor is that some of the children came into the camp in very bad condition, and they 
cannot assimilate the rice and broth. The Native doctor said that these poor little things 
passed their food in an undigested state, they had been tried with ragi, with rice and 
cholum, and some of them had been treated in hospital with sago, but nothing would bring 
them around. Among the adults too, were some people who had been in the camp for 
months, and yet were still very emaciated.5 1
Cornish wrote that ‘famine diarrhoea is liable to be mistaken for epidemic 
cholera’ in February 1877, when inspecting relief camps in Madras town.52 The same 
month, Surgeon B.R. Thompson reported extensively on famine diarrhoea in the relief 
camps of Madras town.
Thompson’s report claimed that famine diarrhoea, although similar to cholera in 
symptoms, could be distinguished by trained medical men who were familiar with its 
symptoms. Of the 1372 patients in the Monegar Choultry Relief Camp Hospital in 
January and February 1877, all were treated for famine diarrhoea and dysentery rather 
than cholera.
‘I had learnt clearly to distinguish one disease from the other and was thus able when 
cholera broke out subsequently to separate persons suffering from these diseases when 
they were brought in... Not a single case of cholera occurred among the inmates of any of 
the camps...5 3
50 SCR 1877, p.  188.
51 Memorandum by C.E. Bernard on relief affairs in the worst part of Salem district iri April 1877 dated 
Morapet, 16th April 1877, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/session  1877/Vol. 65.
52 ‘Remedial Measures to be adopted in Connection with the High Death Rate in Madras Town due to 
Cholera’, Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department Nos. 68-69, dated 13th  
February 1877, TNSA.
53 Surgeon B. R. Thompson,  ‘A Report on the Diarrhoea in the Famine Relief Camps at Madras’, in 
Madras Town Famine Relief Report by Col. W.S. Drever, Commissioner of Police, dated 20th February 
1877, Madras, Government Press, TNSA.
295Second, Thompson also stated that early treatment was of the utmost 
significance in preventing deaths from famine diarrhoea:  ‘like cholera, Famine 
Diarrhoea has a manageable stage.. .if it occurs when the patient has not long suffered 
from want of food, and the functions of digestion and assimilation are not seriously 
injured’.54 (This seems to indicate that medical officials were themselves unsure of 
how to detect or define the point at which chronic starvation had had progressed 
beyond hope).
Yet another medical official, Surgeon Lancaster reported to Cornish in July
1877,
In the camp, diarrhoea is very common among the children.. .the stools are loose.. .and 
perfectly green... it stains cloth deeply and may be seen staining the ground. It is fearfully 
fatal; when I see it I always think the case hopeless.55.
That the character of famine-related disease was a matter of great significance 
to the Imperial Government is evident from the following extract, written by 
Salisbury to Lytton in May 1877:
The point of dispute is... .whether the deaths from disease which seem to be taking place in 
great numbers are not to be looked on rather as famine deaths than as ordinary mortality 
... .that distress has had some share in swelling the (mortality) rate few will dispute but it is 
possible that inanition may constitute the main cause without the special character of the 
disease itself being lost.5 6
In September 1877, Cornish wrote that ‘cholera is very imperfectly
registered  similarly, deaths from bowel complaints are not representative of the
entire amount of fatal diarrhoea and dysentery  less than one tenth of the deaths
57 can be ascribed to anything other than starvation diseases’.  Other medical officials 
in the famine districts also noted common errors of diagnosis on the part of village
54 Ibid.
55 Comish, ‘The Sanitary and Medical Aspects of Famine’, p. xxxv.
56 Letter No.  15 from Salisbury to Lytton dated May 4th 1877, Letters from the Secretary of State, 
Lytton Collection, IOR/MSS Eur/ E218/4A.
57 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department, dated September 14th,  1877, 
No. 32-34, TNSA.
296officials. Dr. Gray from Chingleput district mentioned, ‘Cases of irritative dysentery 
and diarrhoea (are) being put down as cholera’.58 Another medical official in 
Cuddapah wrote that ‘some coolies supposed to have cholera.. .were all cases of 
famine-diarrhoea’.59 In Nellore district, a journalist interviewing the tahsildar of the 
Gudur taluk reported that the tahsildar professed ignorance that anyone in the talook 
was suffering from starvation. When the journalist asked if the weekly mortuary 
returns did not open his eyes, the tahsildar answered that they ‘did not and could not, 
for in the event of an emaciated corpse being picked up, the village munsiff, whose 
duty it was to report cases would not attribute the death to starvation but would say 
cholera, or dysentery, “or some usual disease” ’.60
It appears that the early rise in cholera mortality must have taken into account a 
large number of deaths which would more correctly have been put down to starvation. 
In other words, the symptoms of starvation- emaciation, wasting and famine 
diarrhoea- were often mistaken by untrained relief officials as cholera, while 
starvation itself was not seen as constituting a diseased condition.
This leads one to ask whether the rise in cholera deaths in the early part of the 
famine was solely due to misrepresentation of starvation deaths. This conclusion is 
probably to push the case too far. Cholera mortality is remarkable for its great 
variations throughout the famine months, as it is in its variations between different 
years, famine and non-famine. While its predilection for the poor and malnourished 
was well-recognized, so was the danger to those who were better off.61   Thompson
58 Cornish, ‘The Sanitary and Medical Aspects of Famine’, p. xxvi.
59 Ibid.
60 Digby, The Famine Campaign, p.  103-4. Comish also reported that the mortality returns from 
Nellore appeared to seriously underestimate the number of  deaths.
61 A number of writers have argued that because cholera was seen as a disease or the poor from which 
the rich had no immunity, cholera was a classic disease of class conflict. See F. Delaporte, Disease and
291noted a sudden increase in cholera deaths in December 1876 and January 1877 in 
Madras town. He also stated that the early cases of cholera in late 1876 were less 
severe and fatal than those in January and February 1877. He attributed this partly to 
‘scarcity of food’ but also to ‘the failure of water supply’.62
Cholera, Famine and Sanitation
An epidemic of cholera had been raging in parts of Madras Presidency prior to the 
onset of famine in 1876. There were, moreover, other reasons for the great increase in 
cholera deaths during the latter half of 1876 and early 1877. These reasons implicated 
more than defective registration and compromise of bodily defences. Primary 
amongst these was the use of polluted water for drinking, as usual sources of water 
supply dried up during the early part of the drought and famine. In Cuddapah district 
in 1877:
Attacks were not confined to the poor; several wealthy merchants and their families suffered, 
and the disease very suddenly appeared in almost every part of the town. At this time, owing 
to the drought, most of the drinking water was taken from a public well fed by springs from 
the bed of the river, or from holes in the river bed. These sources were liable to constant 
pollution.63
Similar reports of pollution of water supply came from Madras town, where ‘the 
reservoir for supplying the town of Madras ran so low that the water had to be 
pumped into the delivery channel.. ..and was very much the consistency of green pea 
soup, offensive to smell and taste’.64
Civilization: The Cholera in Paris, 78J2.London,  1986. See also R.J. Evans, Death in Hamburg: 
Society and Politics in the Cholera Years 1830-1910, London, 1987.
62 Surgeon B. R. Thompson, ‘A Report on the Diarrhoea in the Famine Relief Camps at Madras’, in 
Madras Town Famine Relief Report by Col.  W.5. Drever, Commissioner of Police, dated 2(fh  
February1877, Madras, Government Press, TNSA.
63 SCR 1877, p.  118.
64 SCR 1877, p.  103.
298The Consumption of ‘Unwholesome Food’
Additionally, the consumption of damaged grain and ‘famine foods’- leaves, berries
and fruits that were otherwise considered inedible- played a role in exacerbating the
mortality attributed to cholera and bowel complaints:
The scarcity of grain.. .caused the poorer classes to resort to extraordinary means of filling 
their stomachs. They ate the fibrous pith of the aloe stalk wherever it was to be had. Fmits 
of the Indian fig, prickly pear, margosa, and leaves of many jungle trees- some nutritious 
and digestible, and others having probably only a mechanical action in distending the 
stomach.6 5
To summarize, a large number of cholera deaths were in fact cases of ‘famine 
diarrhoea’, a symptom and manifestation of fatal and long-continued starvation. Yet, 
other factors were also involved in the early rise in cholera mortality. Polluted water 
supplies and the consumption of indigestible foods were some of these. Further, the 
lack of sanitary arrangements in the early relief camps and works seems to have 
created conditions in which cholera was easily transmitted and spread.
The Etymology of ‘Bowel Complaints’ and its translation into the vernacular
‘Bowel complaints’ was a category introduced in the death returns ini875 by the 
Indian Medical Department to refer to diseases other than cholera which presented 
symptoms of morbid bowel discharges. The registration of deaths under this category 
was problematic because ‘bowel complaints’ was not easily translated into Tamil as 
‘dysentery and diarrhoea’, which it signified for the European physician. For him, the 
term ‘bowel complaints’ conjured up all the symptoms that he wanted it to, and most 
likely it was translated literally into Tamil.
For the village official, it was a puzzle. The translation worked out as  ‘vaithuvalli’ or 
‘vairu noy’, which was interpreted as ‘bellyache’ or stomach pain. The term for
65 SCR 1877, p. 87.
299cholera is ‘vaangi bedi’ which literally means ‘vomiting and diarrhoea’. Diarrhoea 
was translated as ‘bedi’, while dysentery was translated as ‘cheethu bedi’, translated 
as ‘diarrhoea with mucous.’ These conditions were therefore identified not as disease 
entities, but in terms of a set of symptoms, for the village official. It is imaginable that 
a native official might have been able to ascertain the differences in symptoms at the 
time of death by questioning relatives (i.e. whether someone had vomiting and 
diarrhoea, diarrhoea alone, and whether the diarrhoea had mucous or not). However, 
he was likely to have been puzzled when trying to assign the death to a category 
which literally translated into something which did not have any reference to these 
symptoms (bellyache). Hence this category contained, Cornish and other medical 
officials believed, fewer deaths than its due share.66 This also points to the deep 
ambiguity in the categorization of cause of death statistics, with conflicts between 
indigenous understandings of diseases as symptomatic and European categories as 
based on clinical entities.
European medical officials also found that their diagnosis of a disease, 
including its aetiology, was often disregarded by European revenue officials. Thus, in 
1875, the Collector of the Malabar district had a dispute with the civil surgeon of the 
district over whether ‘choleraic diarrhoea’ could be entered as a cause of death. The 
civil surgeon was more inclined to believe that the symptoms in the cases referred to 
were not those of true cholera, but should be registered as ‘bowel complaints’. When 
referred to the Government of Madras and the Government of India, the latter ruled 
that in future, in all such cases where deaths from diseases resembling cholera were 
reported, the cause of death would be registered as ‘cholera’, thus eliminating the
66 The translations for this piece of evidence have been worked out through personal knowledge and 
conversations with people. Clinical distinctions between diarrhoea and dysentery reveal some amount 
of ambiguity. In Porter’s study, the difference was said to lie in the fact that ‘dysentery’ implicated that 
part of the gut supplied by the nerves of defecation’, i.e. the large intestine. Diarrhoea was believed to 
be less correlated with the appearance of lesions in the intestines.
300finer distinctions wished for by medical officials.67 This leads one to suspect, as did 
Cornish, that a great many deaths from cholera were in fact not true cholera, 
especially in the famine years.
Bowel Complaints and Famine Diarrhoea
Deaths from bowel complaints in the famine years probably owed some portion of 
their great increase to the consumption of contaminated or poisonous food and foul 
water. Yet, the rise in this category of deaths was closely linked to starvation, 
particularly during August 1877, the worst peak of famine mortality. The death ratio 
from bowel complaints in Madras city, where migrants flooded in throughout the 
famine period, was 38.2 per thousand as against a five year mean of 5.0 in 1877. 
Cornish noted that
in our famine relief camps and hospitals, the most common termination of life was bowel 
flux, either dysenteric in character or diarrhoeal.. .of the 82,993 persons known to have 
died in camps, three fourths of the whole number had some bowel affliction.. .indeed a 
healthy evacuation was the exception, and fluxes the rule, in all who had undergone a 
certain degree of starvation. .. .Diarrhoea and dropsy of the whole body are the usual 
endings of four fifths of the famine stricken, but in many cases the texture of the mucous 
membrane of the bowels is not only wasted but inflamed and ulcerated as in chronic 
dysentery.6 8
Famine Diarrhoea and the Pathology of Starvation
Cornish’s hypothesis that chronic starvation and physiological damage underlay 
deaths from bowel complaints was confirmed by other medical investigations done 
during the famine. Surgeon D. D. Cunningham, Special Assistant to the Sanitary 
Commissioner with the Government of India, reporting on the Madras relief camps,
67 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated January 7th 1878, Nos. 21- 
22, G.O. No. 32, TNSA.
68 SCR 1877, p.  143.
301validated Cornish’s thesis regarding the existence of morbid conditions caused by 
starvation. Cunningham’s report captured the paradox of starvation deaths: in the 
majority of cases, the final termination of life occurred when famine diarrhoea led to 
complications such and dysentery and pneumonia, which were then seen as ‘causing’ 
the deaths:
Morbid conditions exist which may with propriety be termed ‘famine diarrhoea’  and 
‘famine dysentery’  as the case may be. These are without doubt cases in which the 
symptoms of disease observed during life can be referred to no other origin save morbid 
changes and degenerations dependent on malnutrition. Many other cases occurring among 
the inmates of relief camps are however complicated by the supervention of other diseases 
such as acute diarrhoea, dysentery, pneumonia, & c., and although in the majority of such 
cases the conditions leading to true ‘famine diarrhoea’ may be distinctly detected, and in 
some cases the complications may be directly ascribed to their agency, yet the fatal 
termination is caused, or at all events, accelerated by the complications.69
Cunningham’s investigations confirmed a correlation between starvation in life and a
change in the character of tissues in post mortem examinations.
The pathological changes essentially characteristic of ‘famine diarrhoea and dysentery’ 
consist in a softening and subsequent atrophy of the mucous membrane of the intestinal 
canal, apparently due to a process of fatty degeneration of the tissues, and apparently 
leading to the destruction of the apparatus provided for the absorption of nutritive material. 
That such a process is sufficient to account for the phenomena of the disease observed 
during life, is manifest. The disintegration of the intestinal mucous membrane fully 
accounts for the disordered state of the alimentary functions. The pathological appearances 
also account for the failure of curative measures, improved diet, medicines, &c., in the 
treatment of the disease. 70
Cunningham concurred in Cornish’s warning that the process whereby bodily
structures were damaged by starvation over a long period of time, was irreversible:
Where once the complex structures of the intestinal mucous membrane have been so 
seriously affected by degenerative changes dependent on insufficient nutriment, they 
cannot be renewed and no diet, however careful and generous it may be can be of any 
avail when once the means by which alone it can be appropriated to the necessities of the 
body, have been destroyed.71
69 From Surgeon D. D. Cunningham, Special Assistant to the Sanitary Commissioner with the 
Government of India, to Surgeon Major S. C. Townsend, Officiating Sanitary Commissioner with the 
Government of India, dated Calcutta, 18th June 1877 (Famine Correspondence 4, IOR/V/4/Session 
1878/Vol. 59).
70 Ibid.
302Cunningham, Cornish and other medical officials in Madras  thus saw ‘famine
diarrhoea’ and ‘famine dysentery’ as the results of delayed, inadequate and
inappropriate feeding in famine relief camps. Cunningham published a paper in 1879
wherein he stated that
That symptoms of intestinal irritation should set in under such circumstances is only what 
might be expected, and that these symptoms should have been especially liable to occur in 
people shortly after admission into relief camps is readily explicable. While they were 
outside and actually suffering from extreme privation, the primary destruction of tissue 
was no doubt advancing, but the amount of nutritive material ingested was 
correspondingly reduced... .On admission into camp a larger amount of food was supplied; 
the digestive and absorptive apparatus which had formerly sufficed was now relatively 
greatly reduced, and the surplus food- elements became mere sources of irritation.7 2
Further, it appears quite clear that Temple’s ‘experiment’ was the focus of their ire. 
Cunningham continued:
All the phenomena observed in the present series of investigations point to the absolute 
necessity of great caution in regard to dietetic experiments, dietetic systems of 
punishment, & c. They shew it is not safe to push such procedures in the belief that, as 
long as no active evil results present themselves, we can at any time pull up and restore 
things to their normal state.7 3
Post mortem studies of famine victims at the Royapettah Hospital Famine Relief 
Camp in Madras city also named ‘alvine fluxes’ as the cause of death in 347 out of 
459 autopsies.74 Cornish noted that ‘in the camps, a large number of people have 
‘diarrhoea’ which simply means that the food given to them is passing away without 
affording nutrition to the body.’75 Similarly, the reports of civil hospitals and 
dispensaries in the Presidency also showed a high proportion of deaths from
76 diarrhoea, dysentery, and anaemia in 1877.  More modem studies have also
72 D.D. Cunningham, On Certain Effects of Starvation on Vegetable and Animal Tissues, Calcutta, 
1879, p. 46.
73 Ibid.
74 Porter, Diseases of the Madras Famine, p. 3.
75 ‘Remedial Measures Ordered to be Adopted in Connection with the High Death Rate in Madras 
Town Due to Cholera’.
76 Report on the Civil Dispensaries and Hospitals of the Madras Presidency for 1877-78, Madras, 
1879.
303mentioned the presence of ‘famine diarrhoea’ as a physiological manifestation of 
starvation, and not as an infective condition or a result of indigestion. For example,
W. R. Aykroyd mentions that ‘in starvation the intestinal walls lose substance like the 
rest of the body, leading to the common and very serious condition often called
77 “famine diarrhoea’”.  Aykroyd also emphasizes that ‘infective organisms have rarely 
been isolated in famine diarrhoea; the condition is primarily due to wastage and 
ulceration of the intestinal walls. Clearly famine diarrhoea is essentially the same 
condition as the diarrhoea often occurring in marasmic infants.’78 Similarly, J.P.W.
Rivers writes that ‘in severely starved subjects  gut function is disturbed so that
feeding may be associated with severe diarrhoea and food passes through the gut
79 undigested’.  Rivers mentions that ‘secondary dehydration as a result of diarrhoea is
O f\
a.. .likely cause of death’.  In addition, N.S. Scrimshaw mentions severe diarrhoea 
‘secondary to deteriorative changes in the digestive system’ as a ‘portend of death’.8 1
In regard to bowel complaints then, it appears that starvation played an important 
physiological role in weakening bodily defences and in disorienting the digestive 
functions, not just in the early phase of the famine, but well into 1878. This would 
mean that we need to give starvation a primary role in causing famine mortality, 
despite making an allowance for a certain proportion of these deaths being brought on 
by ‘social dislocation’: the consumption of polluted water and food, and the 
transmission of disease within badly organized and crowded camps and relief works.
77 W.R. Aykroyd,  ‘Definition of Different Degrees of Starvation’, in G. Blix, Y. Hofvander and B. 
Vahlquist, Famine: A Symposium Dealing with Nutrition and Relief Operations in Times of Disaster, 
Uppsala, 1971.
78 Ibid.
79 J.P.W. Rivers,  ‘The Nutritional Biology of Famine’, in G.A. Harrison, Famine, Oxford,  1988, p. 78.
80 Ibid, p. 62.
81 N.S. Scrimshaw,  ‘The Phenomenon of Famine’, Annual Review of Nutrition, 7 (1987):  1-21, p. 7.
304The physiological aspects of famine diarrhoea as a result of chronic and irreversible 
starvation need to be appreciated to a greater extent than existing studies have done.
Injuries, Accidents and Famine Conditions
The category ‘injuries’ has not been included in this analysis, as it is supposed that
deaths under this category cannot be grouped along with starvation and epidemic
disease. Also, monthly deaths from this cause are not available or calculable. (See
above under ‘Other Causes’ for a description of how monthly totals are derived).
However, it is clear that the social and economic disruptions caused by the famine
contributed largely to increase the number of deaths in 1877 and 1878.  In 1877, the
number of deaths from injuries amount to the highest ever recorded since 1866. The
number of suicides increases greatly due to the mental depression caused by famine.82
That starvation affects the mental and emotional frame of mind is expected. The great
increase in deaths from wounds and accidents however needs further explanation. In
1877, deaths from injuries and wounds in Madras city alone amounted to 1066, nearly
a tenth of the entire number of deaths from this cause. This was due to the great
increase in the grain traffic in the port town. Once again we refer to Cornish:
Nearly all the rice brought by sea was removed to the railway goods station, nearly two 
miles distant, by carts drawn by men, and very frequently the wheels of heavily laden carts 
caught the naked heels of the pullers. This crushing of the heels generally led to great
83 sloughing and constitutional disturbance, and frequently tetanus supervened.
In the absence of information from other areas in the Presidency, it is difficult to say 
whether this feature of the famine led to similar injuries in other parts of the 
Presidency. However, it is worth noting that in 1878, deaths from ulceration and
82 The increase in suicides and depression had been noted in earlier Indian famines as well. The main 
question for administrators in the 1870s seemed to be the connection between mental depression and 
physical health during famines. See J. C. Geddes, Administrative Experience Recorded in Former 
Famines, Calcutta 1874, pp.  187-88.
83 SCR 1877, p.  145.
305sloughing of wounds were reported widely and ascribed to debility.84 Chronic 
starvation thus impaired the body’s ability to heal wounds.
Who dies? Starvation, Socioeconomic Indices and Famine Mortality
A final note about who died during the famine qualifies our thesis about there 
being a fundamental connection between starvation as a physiological phenomenon 
and its influence on famine disease and mortality. In his essay on famine in Darfur, 
Alex de Waal concluded that socio-economic indicators were poor indices of who 
died during the famine. ~  De Waal suggested that the lack of correspondence between 
pre-famine indicators of wealth and status, and famine mortality led very strongly to 
the conclusion that social class and economic indices were in themselves not adequate 
to explain famine mortality.
Was this the case in Madras Presidency in 1877 and 1878? All reports of 
population loss in Madras Presidency suggest that socioeconomic indicators are 
indeed accurate predictors of who died during the famine. Here, it is important to note 
that in Madras, caste and occupation were very closely intertwined. In Alexander 
Porter’s sample of 459 victims from the Famine Relief Sheds of the Royapettah 
Hospital, the great majority were agricultural labourers from the Pariah and Palli 
castes, as well as several weavers and potters. Government hospital surveys need to 
be treated with caution because they are influenced by cultural and social factors 
governing hospital usage, as well as the keenness of medical officials to inflate 
numbers.86 These, we have suggested in the Introduction, would play quite a 
significant role in shaping the number of patients recorded. It is, however, quite
84 It was reported in 1878 that fatal abscesses and gangrenous ulcerations were unusually prevalent 
amongst the poor (SCR 1878, p.  135).  This was also the case during the second year of famine in 
Bengal in 1943-44.
85 Famine That Kills ,p.  182.
86 It appears that Government hospitals were resorted to largely by the poor in Madras. See Proceedings 
of the Government of Madras in the Public Department No. 79 dated 21st January 1879, G.O. No. 41, 
TNSA.
306reasonable, however, to suggest that in this context, unlike in Darfur in 1984, 
landownership and caste- both strong predictors or indices of social and economic 
status in nineteenth century Madras- greatly determined the chances of life or death 
during the famine of 1876-78.87
Census data also confirm this view- regarding the close correspondence
88 between caste, entitlement to food, and famine mortality.  Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show 
the changes in different groups among the Hindu population between the Censuses of 
1871 and 1881. From this we can see that in terms of absolute losses of population, 
Pariahs, Vanniyans and Idaiyars (the first two were untouchable  labouring castes, the 
latter were shepherds) lost the most numbers between the two Censuses.  In terms of 
proportion, however, a set of anomalies present themselves. Shembadavans (a 
washerman caste) lost the most in terms of proportion, the next worst group was the 
Shetties, a large, heterogeneous and largely urban trading caste. Small traders 
probably faced the destruction of their businesses once depression and starvation set 
in among the local population. After the Shetties, the Satanis, a mixed caste group 
with heterogeneous occupational interests, suffered extensively. Next in order were 
Idaiyars, a shepherd caste, whose livelihoods were destroyed by the drought and 
famine. These data appear to reflect the extent of economic devastation; the 
complexity of the rural and urban occupational structure ; and the disruption of the 
environment. The famine upset the rural and urban economy to such a great extent 
that trade suffered extensively.  However, it is interesting that washermen suffered to
87 See D. Kumar, Land and Caste in South India: Agricultural Labour in the Madras Presidency 
during the Nineteenth Century, New Delhi,  1963.
88 Census officers attributed the change in population between 1871 and 1881 largely to the effects of 
the famine. The Census Report of 1881 states that ‘the mark which that calamity (the famine) made 
upon the population was so deep that it stains every column of these returns, and compels allusion on 
every page of the succeeding chapters.. ..it may be said without exaggeration that this Report is quite as 
much a record of the Famine effect on the population, as it is a review of the Census’ (.Imperial Census 
of 1881: Operations and Results in the Presidency of Madras Vol I, Madras 1883, p. 9).
307such a great extent and could indicate that, in addition to unemployment and high 
food prices, the pollution of water supplies led to more deaths from cholera and bowel 
diseases. It could also mean that the demand for their services declined considerably 
as the famine spread its tentacles.
Interestingly, all the caste groups which gained numbers in terms of 
proportion were urban based, except for the Shanars, a toddy tapping caste who 
converted in large numbers to Christianity during the famine. Among the groups 
which lost numbers, the Shetties and Satanies were largely urban. The Shembadavans 
(washermen) were both urban and rural, as were the Kaikalars or weavers. The other 
groups in this category however were overwhelmingly rural. The Census of 1881 
noted:
Not only was relief sooner at hand in the towns but the work of relief created employment 
in the towns. There was work, perhaps not for goldsmiths, but for carpenters and 
blacksmiths. Men had to be shaved and their clothes had to be washed, and although ‘the 
sky of brass and the soil of iron’  trebled the price of food for the barber, as for the pariah, 
it did not deprive him of the possibility of earning his ordinary wage, and he did this in the 
towns, where food, if dear, was still procurable.8 9
If socio-economic indices were significant in explaining differentials in famine
mortality by caste, we would also need to account for the apparent female survival
advantage during periods of famine.90 Different theories have been propounded to
explain this advantage. Some authors have argued that social disadvantages faced by
women were outweighed by biological advantages.91 Others have suggested that
‘famine amenorrhea’ or diminished fertility was a conscious strategy employed by
89 Imperial Census of 1881: Operations and Results in the Presidency of Madras Vol I, Madras 1883, 
p.  115.
90Dyson,  ‘On The Demography of South Asian Famines Part I’; B. Mohanty,  ‘Orissa Famine of 1866: 
Demographic and Economic Consequences’, Economic and Political Weekly. January 2-9,  1993.
91 M.B. McAlpin, Subject to Famine: Food Crises and Economic Change in Western India, 1860-1920, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983, Chapter 3 (especially pp. 56-64).
308women, which protected them from childbearing, normally a source of danger.92 Still 
others have argued that migration exposed adult males to the risk of disease and 
exhaustion to a greater degree than it did females.93
Although several factors need to be considered in explaining the gender differential in 
survival, we would suggest that socio-economic factors governing sex differentials in 
access to official famine relief could have played a role in conjunction with innate 
biological factors and differentials in exposure to disease pathogens. It appears that 
while women were paid less than men on many relief works, they also outnumbered 
men in the number of applicants seeking relief, both in camps and on works, in 
Madras. For example, N. Murugesam Moodelliar, Deputy Collector of Bellary 
mentioned that ‘the female coolies outnumber the males beyond all proportion’.94 In
Kumool, it was reported that ‘the great majority on works  seemed to be women
and children’.95
David Arnold also mentions that ‘women and children were well-represented 
amongst those seeking work and food’ and that ‘ryots preferred to send their wives 
and children to bear the brunt of the disgrace- and the hard work incident to it rather 
than go themselves’.96 If the higher proportion of women on relief works was a 
constant phenomenon across the Presidency, it would enable us to critically evaluate
92 P. Greenough, ‘Inhibited Conception and Women’s Agency’, Health Transition Review, 2, 1 (1992): 
101-105; J.C. Caldwell et. al., ‘A Note on Conscious Planning’, Health Transition Review, 2,  1 (1992): 
105-106; T. Dyson ‘Famine Reactions’, Health Transition Review, 2,  1 (1992):  107-113.
93 Dyson,  ‘On the Demography of South Asian Famines Part I’, p. 25;  Mohanty,  ‘Orissa Famine of 
1866’ p. 57. See also B. Mohanty, ‘Migration, famines and sex ratio in Orissa division between  1881 
and 1921’.The 1911 Census of India in reviewing the evidence presented during different famines also 
supported the ‘migration’ theory. (Census of India 1911, Appendix to Chapter VI,  ‘Relative Mortality 
of Males and Females in Famine Years’).
94 Letter from N. Murugesam Moodelliar, Deputy Collector, to J.H. Master, Esq., Collector of Bellary, 
dated Kottoor, 18th April 1877, No. 250, SCR 1877, p. 220.
95 Memoranda by Mr. C.E. Bernard, Nos. V and VI, dated 16th January 1877, on the condition and 
prospects of Kumool district, based on Sir R. Temple’s Conference with the Local Officers on 14th and 
15th January 1877, Famine Correspondence 2, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
96 Arnold, ‘Famine in Peasant Consciousness and Peasant Action’, pp.  108-9.
309the thesis that male migration was the most plausible explanation of the sex 
differential. In order to answer this question fully, however, questions regarding the
97 intra-family distribution of food also need to be taken into account.  Quite clearly, 
the famine hit the very young and the very old the hardest, although amongst the adult 
population, the loss was much greater amongst adult men as compared to adult
QO
women.  These questions require investigation which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
Conclusion
By any account, the famine of 1876-78 was an enormous crisis, social, 
nutritional, ecological and sanitary. In tracing the causes of famine mortality, we have 
argued that it is difficult to separate out with any precision the effects of disease from 
those of starvation in causing famine deaths, particularly because of the way in which 
death statistics were collected. It appears from the data reviewed that to divide famine 
mortality into two clearly defined phases, the first constituting starvation, and the 
second constituting infectious disease spread largely through climatic, contagious and 
parasitic factors as we understand them today, is inadequate, given the underlying 
background of nutritional stress that occurred throughout the two main famine years.
Starvation deaths and disease appear to have been a direct consequence of 
economic distress, which in turn appears to have been exacerbated by poorly 
organized systems of relief. Starvation and emaciation occurred throughout the two 
so-called phases of famine mortality. In addition, we find that when all categories
97 B. Harris,  The Intrafamily Distribution of Hunger in South Asia’, in J. Dreze and A. Sen (ed): The 
Political Economy of Hunger Vol. I, Oxford, 1990; R. Bairagi, ‘Food Crisis, Nutrition and Female 
Children’, Population and Development Review,  12, 7 (June 1986); L. Sami, ‘Gender Differentials in 
Famine Mortality: Madras (1876-78) and Punjab (1896-97)’, Economic and Political Weekly, June 
29th, 2002. For an overview of the literature on sex differentials in famine mortality, see K. Macintyre, 
‘Famine and The Female Mortality Advantage’, in Dyson and O’Grada, Famine Demography, op. ciL
98 See Lardinois, ‘Famine, Epidemics and Mortality in South India’, p. 460.
310under which deaths were registered are taken into account, we have four instead of 
two phases of famine mortality. The first phase was marked by a sharp increase in 
cholera, fever and deaths from ‘other causes’; the second by an increase in cholera 
deaths; the third by an increase dominated by ‘other causes’ and the fourth by an 
increase in fever deaths. The third and most lethal phase was the phase in which 
‘other causes’ led the general death rate, and was, we argue, mostly composed of 
diseases directly consequent upon starvation.
It is difficult to implicate malaria as the sole or even the most important cause of 
death through which the famine killed its victims. The data indicate that ‘fevers’ were 
classified in different ways; that there was great disagreement both in nomenclature 
and in classifying fevers as symptoms or causes of death. Even amongst trained 
medical men, the nomenclature and aetiology of fever deaths was uncertain. 
Moreover, fever was most fatal amongst starved famine migrants, despite the fact that 
all classes fell ill. It also appears from the evidence that continued slow starvation 
caused a protracted and unbelievably slow ending for the victims of famine, and fever 
was just one of several clinical manifestations of starvation, under which the cause of 
death was registered. In addition, the sharp differences between the ‘famine’ and 
‘non-famine’ districts in regard to fever mortality indicates that the ‘migration’ thesis- 
that migrants introduced new strains of malaria into districts where they migrated- 
needs to be examined cautiously.
We have argued that despite some of the famine mortality from cholera, bowel 
complaints and ‘other causes’ being attributable to ‘social dislocation’ and its effects- 
consumption of contaminated food and water, as well as inedible foods, and the close 
proximity of migrants in relief camps and works with poor facilities for hygiene- a 
large proportion of mortality from these three causes can be seen as the result of
311‘famine diarrhoea’- a non-infective, physiological manifestation of chronic starvation. 
The spread of contagious diseases such as smallpox through close contact in camps, 
jails and on relief works played some- but a relatively small- role in shaping the huge 
wave of death during the famine years.
There appears to have been a strong correlation between differentials in social 
status- as measured by caste and occupation- and famine mortality. Both 
contemporary accounts and census data indicate that mortality was directly linked 
with caste and occupation. The towns were better provided for in terms of relief as 
well as sanitation and prevention of infection, and offered more chances of 
employment than the rural districts. Yet, some urban groups such as traders and 
washermen lost a large proportion of their population. However the worst affected 
during the famine were the poor and untouchable rural groups such as the Pariahs, 
Pallis and Vanniyars. This indicates that while climatic and ecological factors, social 
dislocation and transmission of epidemic disease might have had some role, it is to 
failures of entitlement and disorganized relief systems that we must largely turn for an 
explanation of famine mortality.
312Table 4.5 Increase or Decrease of Numbers by Caste 1871-1881
1871  1881
Caste No. Prop/ H Pop No. Prop/Total H pop Inc/Dec
Brahmans 1095553 3.76 1122070 3.94 26517
Kshatriyas 182402 0.64 193550 0.68 7148
Shetties 720474 2.47 640047 2.25 -80427
Vellalars 7814042 26.8 7767463 27.25 -46579
Idaiyars 1755197 6.02 1580000 5.54 -175197
Kammalars 787960 2.71 849901 2.98 61941
Kanakkan 107483 0.37 102472 0.36 -5011
Kaikalar 1068873 3.66 979062 3.44 -89811
Vanniyan 3933359 13.48 3751093 13.16 -182266
Kushavan 253878 0.87 263975 0.93 10097
Satani 700833 2.4 625455 2.2 -75378
Shembadavan 1012284 3.47 873448 3.07 -138836
Shanan 1606023 5.51 1621111 5.69 15088
Ambattan 342987 1.18 348390 1.22 5403
Vannan 525951 1.8 528535 1.84 2584
Pariahs 4629672 15.88 4439253 15.58 -190419
Others/NS 2619836 8.98 2811841 9.87 192005
Total 29,160,807 100 28947666 100 -663141


























































p. 115, 1881  Census reportChapter 5 Administrative, Social and Medical Responses to Famine
The preceding chapter traced the epidemiology of the famine of 1876-78, examining 
the links between starvation, social crisis, epidemic disease and mortality. This 
chapter seeks to extend these questions, focusing on the epidemiological 
consequences of administrative, social and medical responses to subsistence crises.
We draw upon and critically evaluate arguments made by some authors, already 
discussed partially in the preceding chapter. John Post argues that governments which 
prevented the movement of people during the famines of the 1740s and the 1770s 
succeeded in containing famine mortality to a far greater extent than those which 
simply attempted to prevent starvation by distributing food to famine sufferers. For 
Post, the primary causal factor in the relationship between climbing food prices and 
rising incidence of fevers and dysentery was that harvest shortfalls inevitably led to 
unemployment, migration, vagrancy and crime. These ‘social upheavals’ spread 
epidemic disease amongst mobile populations, as well as among those huddled 
together for relief facilities without adequate sanitary facilities. Marginal public 
welfare systems were put under severe pressure, and administrations which were 
successful in preventing social upheaval and population movements were better able 
to contain excess mortality than those which focused primarily on the prevention of 
hunger through food distribution systems.1  Administrative sanitary and medical 
responses to food crises were, then, critical factors in exacerbating or limiting the 
social and epidemiological consequences of such crises.
1  John D. Post, ‘The Mortality Crises of the Early 1770s and European Demographic Trends’, JIH, 21,
1 (Summer 1990): 29-62; Idem, ‘Nutritional Status and Mortality in Eighteenth Century Europe’ in 
L.F. Newman et al. (eds.), Hunger in History: Food Shortage, Poverty and Deprivation,
Massachusetts,  1990.
315Historians of south Asian history have also expressed the view that state famine
policy, consciously or inadvertently, created environmental and epidemiological
disasters. Elizabeth Whitcombe, for example, suggests that state encouraged
migration as a way out of what was seen as a Malthusian imbalance, and in doing so,
exacerbated famine mortality through the spread of epidemic disease amongst people
on the move.2 Ira Klein also argues that the application of laissezfaire famine policy
was the direct cause of a much higher mortality than would otherwise have occurred
as a consequence of harvest failure. Klein writes:
The uncompromisingly Malthusian policy of completely subjugating famine relief to high 
priority development projects, and of employing only trained, sturdy labour....totally 
disorganized the supplementary measures meant for the ‘helpless’. Since few qualified for 
relief on the works, huge mobs overwhelmed the few relief kitchens, expanding the
network of death  the most important flaws in the Western famine theory was that it
ignored the environmental circumstances that induced disease among the malnourished, 
and conflicted with the socio-economic realities which dictated survival in the village 
community.3
Finally David Arnold, building on the arguments put forth by Post and Klein, suggests 
that administrative responses to subsistence crises in nineteenth century India had a 
series of dysfunctional epidemiological consequences. He argues that official famine 
policy facilitated the spread of epidemic disease during famine periods in a number of 
ways.4 Mobile famine-stricken populations spread epidemic disease to the army, 
prisons and plantations during periods of famine. However, the epidemiological threat 
posed by famine migrants forced colonial medical attention- otherwise focused on the 
health and wellbeing of European military and civil officials and select labouring
2 Whitcombe,  ‘Famine Mortality’, p.  1170.
3 Klein,  ‘When the Rains Failed’, p.  196, 197-8.
4 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, op. tit.
316populations-  towards the health of people outside these ‘enclaves’.5  In other words, 
the diseases brought upon by dysfunctional administrative and social responses had a 
positive role to play in increasing the depth and extent of medical intervention for the 
general population.
These authors further concur that the conditions and terms on which official famine 
relief was given were in themselves responsible for the spread of epidemic disease 
during subsistence crises. Thus, if relief works had been organized close to the homes 
of the famine stricken, and labourers did not have to travel large distances, much 
epidemic disease would have been prevented.6 Both Klein and Arnold also argue that 
the conditions under which institutional relief was given by the state encouraged the 
spread of epidemic disease through overcrowding and poor sanitation facilities. The 
state refused to respect the caste taboos of people in regard to feeding houses and 
made acceptance of cooked food- always a great defilement to people of caste, 
particularly amongst ryots or landowners- a condition for receiving relief. This meant 
that large numbers of high caste poor were denied relief, while colonial institutions 
such as relief camps and prisons were insanitary breeding grounds for many of the 
diseases that ultimately killed people.7
This chapter examines these arguments in the context of the Madras famine of 1876- 
78. It focuses on the extent to which ‘dysfunctional’ administrative and social 
responses to subsistence crises created epidemiological disasters.
5 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 404.
6 However, it is unclear from both these accounts whether they refer to the spread of disease amongst 
famine stricken people alone, or the areas through which they travelled in general.
7 Klein,  ‘When the Rains Failed’, p.  198; Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 394.
317What follows is a critical review of some aspects of these responses. The first pertains 
to the extent to which population movements were a direct result of famine policy.
The second pertains to the size and direction of such movements during periods of 
famine, and its likely epidemiological consequences, a theme which we addressed 
briefly in the previous chapter. Next, the chapter examines the role played by colonial 
penal, medical and famine relief institutions in facilitating the spread of contagious 
epidemic diseases by crowding large numbers of migrant people together. Finally, it 
looks at medical responses to famine. How did state medicine explain and address the 
mass mortality during subsistence crises? And why were medical men like Cornish so 
concerned with the observation, description and recording of starvation and famine 
diseases?
These questions may be seen more as a set of observations to be explored in further 
research, rather than firm and definitive statements. However, these observations have 
important links with arguments presented in the preceding two chapters regarding the 
epidemiology of famine.
Migration and State Famine Policy
Both Whitcombe and Arnold argue that the state encouraged emigration as a famine
policy, based on the theory that overpopulation was the cause of famine. This in turn
facilitated the spread of epidemic disease. Whitcombe writes that
Government policy encouraged migration to towns where food grains were stockpiled by 
private trade, at the behest of official policy, and to the public works and relief camps.8
8 Whitcombe,  ‘Famine Mortality’, p.  1170.
318Similarly, Arnold states
In the 1860s and 1870s migration was often actively encouraged by the state as a way of 
ameliorating the problem of local shortages and moving available or imported food 
supplies to the people who needed them most.9
However, there is some evidence which suggests that Imperial ‘migration policy’ was
perhaps based more on manipulation than on a belief in its value as a strategy against
overpopulation. The Government of India was keen on forcing people to emigrate
from famine stricken territories because it was believed that such force would push
people the other way: towards the relief works. In other words, it was less a
commitment to a belief in its value as a strategy against overpopulation or food crises,
and more a desperate means of forcing people on to large famine relief works.
Salisbury wrote to the Duke of Buckingham in February 1877 that
There is great danger that we shall demoralize the people, also, if we fix the idea in their
minds that Government will always provide against want  we require to apply the
principle of the New Poor Law- the work house screw in some other form... .a good deal 
might be made of Emigration. The people hate it so absolutely that they will work their 
hardest rather than submit to it. But of course minute calculations are required as to how 
far the transport of labourers to other places.. .can really be made to pay.10
This suggests that the Imperial Government held emigration and deportation out as a 
threat in order to force people to relief works, rather than as a real ‘policy’ against 
overpopulation. Thus, regardless of the effects of migration, it appears to be simplistic 
to argue that it constituted a conscious official strategy.
Further, there also appears to have been disagreement between different levels 
of the state over the consequences of migration in times of famine, and there was 
apprehension over its epidemiological and physical effects. The main instance of 
official encouragement to migration in Madras consists of the work on the
9 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 397-8.
10 Brumpton, A Selection, p. 246.
319Buckingham Canal. In February 1877, Temple recommended that people from 
Nellore and the Ceded districts be induced to work on the East Coast Canal ( also 
called the Buckingham Canal) near Nellore, which, he believed, would employ 
thousands of labourers on a profitable, well-organized large relief work. When relief 
seekers were less than enthusiastic about leaving their districts to go to the canal, 
Temple suggested that they be denied relief unless they agreed to be drafted on to the 
works.1 1  This forcible emigration was tried unsuccessfully for three months from 
early February 1877, and then abandoned in May 1877 as opposition was so great,
19 both among Madras civil servants and amongst the people.  (While there were 
reports of cholera along the canal, these appear to have been controlled fairly early 
on).1 3
On the other hand, evidence suggests that some officials were apprehensive 
about the movement of people into Madras.  Migration from Mysore, a Princely state 
in which the suffering from the famine was even worse than in Madras, was actively 
discouraged on the grounds that the ‘constant and unregulated movement hither and 
thither of large masses of people already weakened by insufficient or inferior food, in 
times of scarcity and of great sickness, is highly undesirable, and cannot but entail 
much additional suffering as well as increased risk of spreading disease’.1 4
1 1  Minute by Sir Richard Temple about drafting off relief labourers from the neighbouring districts to 
the East Coast Navigation Canal dated Nellore, 28th February 1877, Famine Correspondence 3, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
12 Ibid.
13 In the Nellore district, where the Buckingham Canal was being constructed, it was reported that 
‘there was a good deal of cholera in January 1877, but under properly supervised sanitary arrangements 
the health of the labourers during the worst famine months was very fair’(SC/? 1877, p. 99).
14 No. 767 dated Fort St. George, 1st March 1877, from the Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Madras to the Chief Commissioner of Mysore, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 
65.
320Apparently, then, Provincial administrators were aware that people would get 
exhausted and sick on the move. They sensed that this could exacerbate the spread of 
disease amongst the starving, and were keen to avoid such movements, particularly 
when it came to the subjects of a foreign state. This implies therefore that official 
attitudes towards the famine stricken varied; and were contradictory, confused and 
disorganized.
The Size and Direction of Migratory Movements During Famine
The second thing to note is that although migration was probably quite extensive, 
we have very little firm evidence regarding the size or direction of migratory 
movements and how these influenced famine mortality. Arnold mentions that the 
Famine Commission of 1880 recognized three kinds of migration: migration with 
cattle in search of pasture; migration in search of food and employment; and the 
‘aimless wandering’ of the destitute.  He also cites Cornish as stating that ‘mortality 
among male migrants was twenty per cent higher than women who stayed at home’. 
Arnold suggests that such migration inevitably had adverse epidemiological effects.1 5  
Whitcombe mentions that people followed ‘routes long established by seasonal 
migration: from Nellore, Chingleput and North Arcot in the direction of Madras; from 
North Nellore and Kumool to the Kistna delta; from Salem and Trichinopoly to 
Tanjore; from Coimbatore to Trichinopoly and Malabar’.1 6   Emigration from Madras 
to Ceylon was enormous during the famine. Between 1st October 1876 and 30th 
November 1877, the number of people leaving the ports of Madras for Ceylon, Burma 
and other distant places was 2,287,482, or nearly double the average for the preceding 
five years. Of this figure, an estimated 350,000 belonged to the famine districts.17 Yet,
15 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 398.
16 Whitcombe,  ‘Famine Mortality’, p.  1169-70.
17 ‘Memorandum on the Partial Census in the Madras districts in March 1878’, by Sir Michael 
Kennedy, contained in Copies of Papers relating to the Mortality during the Late Famine in Southern
321we would hesitate to give migration in itself as much significance as previous authors 
have done in the causation of famine mortality.
The main epidemic diseases which Arnold and Whitcombe associate with famine 
migration are smallpox, malaria and cholera. We have already dealt with fever and 
smallpox in some detail in the previous chapter, and seek to address the connection 
between cholera and migration here.
In arguing that migration influenced cholera mortality through means other than 
starvation, Arnold shows that Tanjore, a purportedly ‘non-famine’ district, had a 
heavy mortality from cholera every year between 1871 and 1880; and that the 
percentage of total deaths attributed to cholera in Tanjore was in fact higher than that 
in Kumool, in the epicentre of the famine, in 1877 and 1878. In other words, cholera 
caused a higher proportion of the total deaths in Tanjore (a non-famine district which 
saw great numbers of migrants in 1876-78) than in Kumool (a famine district where 
there was great suffering, starvation and out-migration).
Arnold’s table is reproduced as Table 5.1 below. Arnold argues that population 
movements inevitably had adverse epidemiological effects, and that ‘with its water 
channels and migrant labour, Thanjavur was always cholera-prone.. ..and the influx of 
thousands of famine migrants made it, like Kumool, a place of heavy mortality’.1 8
India, No. 46 of 1878, Government of India, Public Works Department, Famine Correspondence 4, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1878/Vol. 59.
18 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 399.Table 5.1 Cholera Mortality in Thanjavur (Tanjore) and Kumool districts
(1871- 1880).
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0.1 0.8 - - 4.1 31.1 12.2 4.3 - -
Source: Arnold,  ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 399.
The data in the table above indicate that a large proportion of the total deaths were 
attributed to cholera in a non-famine district, in non-famine years; but also in a famine 
year. Further, in a famine year, the percentage of deaths attributed to cholera could 
often be higher in a prosperous, non-famine district which saw considerable in- 
migration than in a famine district. While the general point holds, there are some 
qualifying factors that would need to be considered. First- leaving aside the 
ambiguities in registering and identifying cholera in different districts, and 
differentiating it from ‘other causes’ and ‘bowel complaints’ during the famine- it is
323also worthwhile to look at the death rate instead of the percentage of all deaths 
attributed to cholera.  During the main famine year 1877, the mortality rate (expressed 
as the number of deaths from cholera for every thousand of the registered population, 
as against Arnold’s figure which shows the percentage of total deaths ascribed to 
cholera) was much higher in Kumool (at 11.4 deaths per thousand population) and the 
other ‘famine districts’ than in Tanjore (at 6.6 per thousand population) and the other 
‘non-famine districts. (See Appendix 3. l).What this means is that cholera killed a 
much larger proportion of the people in Kumool in 1877 than it did in Tanjore, 
despite the in-migration of famine stricken people into the latter. Thus, there were 
10,451 deaths registered in Kumool in 1877 out of a total population of 914232 (i.e. 
cholera killed 1.1% of the population) while in Tanjore there were 13,098 deaths out 
of a total population of 1972820 (i.e. cholera killed 0.66% of the population).1 9  In 
other words, cholera was twice as fatal in the famine district of Kumool as it was in 
Tanjore in 1877, despite the high number of cholera deaths in the latter. This would 
mean that in 1877, despite the water channels of Tanjore and the massive in- 
migration, the population was in a better condition to withstand the ravages of cholera 
than was the population of poor, drought-ridden Kumool.
Also, there is some evidence that migration during the famine years was not as far- 
flung as we might believe, although the numbers might have been large. The Census 
of 1881 found that almost ninety six per cent of people in the Madras Presidency lived 
in the districts they were bom in:
Whatever may have been the case at the end of the famine, the census of 1881 found the
people fairly well at home. There is no more sign of migration from the Famine to the
Non-famine districts than of the reverse movement- not so much, in fact.20
19 Source: SCR 1877, Appendix II (Vital Statistics of the General Population), Tables II and VI.
20 Census of Madras 1881, p.  130.
324We would of course need to be cautious about interpreting a single piece of evidence, 
and also take into account the fact that the census was taken nearly three years after 
the famine, indicating that migration was short-term and occurred within a district, 
usually to neighbouring towns; or that most migrants died en route’ , or that most 
migrants returned to their home districts.21 While movement of populations might 
have had demographic and epidemiological consequences over the long term, it might 
well be the case that famine migration was short-lived and of limited epidemiological 
or demographic consequence. Clearly, these questions are material for further inquiry, 
and would enable us to evaluate critically the suggestion that famine mortality was in 
part a result to the exposure of weakened migrants to ‘new disease environments’ and 
that the movement of famine stricken populations facilitated the introduction of new 
disease strains into the regions where they went.22
To summarize, migration was undoubtedly a common social response to 
unemployment and the threat of starvation. While population movements during 
famine mirrored patterns of seasonal migration, it is by no means clear that it was 
‘encouraged’ except in a very general way and in isolated instances by the state. Even 
then, there were conflicting opinions between different levels of Government over its 
purpose and value. We would therefore caution against overestimating its significance 
as conscious ‘state policy’. Further, we would suggest that the epidemiological and 
demographic importance of migration during a period of famine needs to be carefully 
investigated further, taking into consideration the duration and direction of population
21 On mortality among famine migrants, see R. Shlomowitz and L. Brennan, ‘Mortality and Migrant 
Labour in Assam,  1865-1921’, IESHR. 27 (1990): 85-110.
22 Shlomowitz and Brennan, ‘Mortality and Migrant Labour’, op. cit.; Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and 
Epidemic Disease’, op. cit.
325movements, and a number of other factors including sanitation, wages, and 
physiological conditions.
State Institutions and the Spread of Epidemic Disease
An important aspect of state intervention and of governance in peace time was the 
maintenance of medical and penal institutions opened and run by the Provincial and 
local administrations. These institutions were points of contact for the state and the 
indigenous population, and inevitably reflected social crises both in terms of numbers 
as well as in the condition of the population therein. In addition, some institutions- 
relief works and camps- were opened specifically to address such crises. Were state 
institutions , as some authors have argued, ‘death traps’ in that conditions within them 
hastened the spread of disease among inmates? 23 Did institutional confinement itself 
spell death for thousands of famine stricken people; or did it instead protect them by 
providing them with a healthy environment and adequate wages?
We examine this question by looking at three different types of institutions: relief 
camps, prisons and hospitals.
Relief Works, Camps and Sanitation
In the early stages of famine, relief camps and works were started haphazardly, 
without any trace of sanitary provisions or cleanliness. This appears to have 
contributed to the rise in cholera mortality from the end of 1876 to the middle of 
1877:
As soon as the food dearth began, the lower classes of villagers left their homes, making 
for die chief food markets or centres of Government relief. The influx of applicants for
23 Klein,  ‘When the Rains Failed’, op. cit; Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, op. cit.
326work or relief was so great that district officials were utterly unable to cope with the 
proper organization of relief measures. The people everywhere were massed under 
unwholesome conditions, crowded in their daily tasks and crowded in their sheltering 
places at night.24
Relief on works and in camps appears to have been more quickly and efficiently 
organized in large towns as compared to the rural districts, although the great influx 
of starving people to towns inflated death rates greatly. In Madras town, Cornish 
reported to the Madras Government in February 1877 that mortality on a large scale 
would be best prevented by feeding the poor to prevent them falling into a condition 
of debility, and supplementing this with measures to control the spread of epidemic 
disease among the ill-fed population. The Madras Government acted quickly on this 
suggestion, and a Special Health Establishment funded jointly by the Madras 
Municipality and the Provincial Government was appointed to inspect dwellings and 
neighbourhoods across the city from February 1877 to December 1877. Starving 
people were removed to relief camps and kitchens, cases of smallpox and cholera 
were removed to infectious disease hospitals, vaccinations were performed and 
dwellings were cleansed. The Special Health establishment was funded by the Madras 
Municipality and the Madras Government.
Sanitary arrangements-particularly the provision of pure water supplies, for relief 
camps and relief works- seem to have been important in curbing some of the death 
and disease from cholera and bowel complaints in several rural and urban areas. At 
the same time, innumerable deaths occurred outside the purview of state institutions- 
on roads and highways, in ditches, and riverbeds. The disposal of the dead created a 
sanitary problem of massive proportions. A civil servant, Mr. Oldham, described a
24 SCR 1877, p. 86-7.
25 SCR 1877, pp.  179,  183-86.
327road in the Adoni talook of Bellary as covered with the dead and dying so that it
9 (\ ‘resembled a battlefield’.  Bodies were disposed of in the dry beds of rivers across 
the Presidency. A large proportion of people died on roads, in ditches, and on jungle
97  ♦ paths throughout 1877.  A journalist visiting Gudur talook in Nellore district in 
March 1877 reported: ‘The burial of the dead is shamefully neglected’.28
In February 1877, Cornish petitioned the Government of Madras to legislate 
for ‘suppressing the practice of disposing dead bodies in the dry sandy beds of rivers.’ 
Cornish suggested that cremation was a more sanitary method of disposal, and 
lamented the fact that ‘it was customary only with certain castes’. Understandably, the 
Government of Madras was averse to pressing this matter, especially at a time when 
‘our poor are famine-stricken and disheartened’. Quite clearly, the Government feared 
that interference of this sort in ‘caste feeling and domestic sympathy’ would incite 
anger. In the end, a typically bureaucratic solution was devised. A circular was sent to 
district magistrates to the effect that they were to ‘impress upon local officials the 
necessity of seeing that corpses are properly interred and do not cause any nuisance or 
injury to the health of the people’.29
The great predominance of famine diarrhoea, which was a symptom of 
irreversible starvation and destruction of tissue, ensured, however, that such 
arrangements were of limited value in their application. Sanitation was a charge on 
Local Fund Boards and Municipalities, and these bodies had formulated their budget 
for 1876-7 and 1877-78 without anticipating the occurrence of famine and the 
consequent outlay on famine relief. This meant that during these years, their budget
26 SCR 1877, p.  121.
27 SCR 1877, p. 75.
28 Digby, The Famine Campaign, p.  102.
29 Cornish reported that the majority of the Hindus and all the Mohammedans buried their dead. 
(Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department dated 5th April 1877, Nos. 25-26, 
TNSA).
328was stretched to the utmost, and very often general works of sanitation were 
neglected. Several of the Municipalities reported that want of funds had impeded any 
sanitary or conservancy works, while in others, these consisted largely of those works 
which could be carried out as famine relief works- for example, minor repairs to roads 
and clearing of prickly pear.30
Thus, urban administrations appear to have responded to famine both as a nutritional 
and epidemiological crisis, and taken steps to address both. However, such measures 
appear not to have had much success, largely due to the inadequacy of rural relief 
measures and to the unevenness of those undertaken by the smaller municipalities and 
local fund boards.  The death rate of the municipal towns was stated to be 
‘exceedingly high’: in Madras, the death ratio was 118 per thousand population; in 
Kumool town, it was 118 per mille; in Erode in Salem district, it was 252 per 
thousand; in Nellore, it was 99 per thousand (here, a margin must be given for under
o   1
registration); and in Tuticorin it was 131 per thousand.  Interestingly, the towns 
showed the same death ratio for cholera as the rural districts (12.2 per thousand) but a 
much higher death ratio for smallpox, bowel complaints and injuries, while the fever 
death ratio was nearly double in the rural districts as compared to the towns.32
Thus, particularly in the early part of the famine, local administrations appeared to 
have been overwhelmed by the scale of distress, and there were significant regional 
imbalances in the provision of famine relief in camps and works. This contributed to 
high death rates in urban areas and limited the utility of institutional relief measures.
30 SCR 1877, pp.  160-178.
31 SCR 1877, p. 84.
32 SCR 1877, pp. 83-4.
329Cooked Food, Commensality and the Provision of Gratuitous Relief in Camps
It has been argued by David Arnold and Ira Klein that the Government refused to
33 respect cultural taboos in relation to caste in managing gratuitous relief measures. 
They suggest that people of the same caste, particularly among the respectable ryots, 
were not allowed to sit together and eat, apart from other castes. Further, the 
consumption of cooked food- which would not be accepted by people of upper caste 
or ‘respectable’ households- was made a condition for receiving state assistance. This 
led to great mortality amongst these individuals and families, who died rather than 
lose their status and religious objections. Thus, Arnold writes:
British officials tended to exploit caste-Hindus’ cultural objections to the receipt of cooked 
food by making it a precondition for state relief. The argument was that if Indians were 
sufficiently desperate for food they would set aside their religious scruples; if they did not, 
the reasoning ran, they were not genuinely in need. 34
The evidence suggests that the practice of making the provision of relief contingent 
upon the disregard of cultural taboos, while followed in some locations across India 
during famine situations (especially in the North west Provinces and Orissa in 1861 
and 1866 respectively) was not uniformly adhered to. In 1866, in Madras, relief was 
provided in the form of cooked food for the very poor and untouchable households as 
well as raw food for those whom caste scruples forbade the partaking of cooked
33 Klein,  ‘When the Rains Failed’, p.  198; Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 394. Arnold 
draws mainly on Klein’s evidence to substantiate this point, and Klein’s evidence relates mostly to 
famine relief in Mysore.
34 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 394.
330food.35 This appears to have been the case during 1876-78 as well. The Government 
of India decreed on February 1st 1877 that
There are exceptional cases which require exceptional treatment, such as the class of 
respectable women who cannot appear in public, and for whom labour tests are 
inappropriate; and men who from caste prejudice would rather die than take employment 
on relief works. In these cases, it may be necessary to give relief without the application of 
tests for need.36
Even such hardcore supporters of non-interventionism as Richard Temple made
concessions when it came to questions of providing raw food for those who refused to
eat cooked food on grounds of caste taboos. On March 12, 1877, Temple argued for
the need to make concessions to caste and family feeling in relief camps and kitchens,
instead of giving relief solely and strictly in the form of cooked food, enforcing the
intermingling of castes, and separating families.  He wrote:
Inmates might be allowed to cook their own food either for themselves or for self-arranged 
gangs, and they might be allowed to eat their food apart and free from observation. ..the 
sheds might be set apart for the principal castes; in such cases the casteless or very low 
caste people would in such cases have sufficient shed accommodation for themselves.37
In most relief camps, the people appear to have been segregated according to caste. 
For example, Cornish described the system in the Cuddapah relief camps: ‘The people 
sat in rows according to their castes waiting the arrival of food. 38 Thus, it appears 
that the government did not uniformly force people to go against their cultural taboos 
as a precondition of relief. There appears to have been great unevenness in the 
conditions for the provision of relief in different areas.
35 Dalyell, Memorandum, p.  109.
36 From the Additional Secretary to Gol, Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce, to 
Secretary to Gob, PWD, dated Calcutta February 2nd 1877, No. 42 of Famine Correspondence 3, 
IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
37 Minute by Sir Richard Temple regarding relief camps and gratuitous relief in the Ceded districts, 
dated March 12, 1877, Famine Correspondence 3, IOR/V/4/Session 1877/Vol. 65.
38 SCR 1877, p.  198.
331However, the type of food provided by the Government of Madras could 
worsen the symptoms of chronic starvation. Dr. H.M. Scudder, the American mission 
doctor, wrote to the Mansion House Committee asking for a grant to purchase ‘a little 
sago or arrowroot’ for his mission dressers to feed dysentery patients. According to 
Scudder, these were often the means of saving life, while the coarse rice and other 
grains provided by the Government only ‘aggravated the disease’.39  This indicates 
that the scarcity of digestible grains and difficulties in procurement might have 
limited the effectiveness of official famine relief.
Prisons, Hospitals, Overcrowding and Disease
If relief camps and works were poorly organized, inadequate and not always 
conducive to the prevention of starvation or the maintenance of sanitation facilities, 
did conditions in other state institutions facilitate epidemiologically dysfunctional 
social responses?
A common observation made by nineteenth century administrators was that ‘the 
strength of prisoner (population)’ was ‘an index of distress among the population’.40 
David Arnold also suggests that high crime levels resulted in enlarged prison 
populations, which led to increased levels of mortality.41
In 1877, there certainly was an enormous increase in the number of prisoners confined 
in the gaols of Madras. In Bellary central gaol, in ordinary times, 400 prisoners could
39 Letter from Dr. H. M. Scudder to the Honorary Secretary to the Madras Famine Relief Committee 
[sic.], dated 20th September 1877, Proceedings of the Indian Famine Charitable Relief Fund, Chapter 3, 
Madras:  1878, TNSA.
40 Dr. G.S. Sutherland in Report of the Indian Jail Conference, Calcutta 1877, quoted in Arnold,
‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 396.
41 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 396.
332be accommodated, while on the 2nd of October 1877, there were 2988 prisoners 
confined.42 Gaol mortality during the famine was appalling, and in many cases higher 
than the mortality amongst the rest of the population. The average death ratio (deaths 
per thousand populations) for gaols in the famine districts (Bellary, Chingleput, North 
Arcot, Cuddapah, Madras, Madura, Nellore, Salem, South Arcot, Trichinopoly) was 
216 per thousand population, while the average for all other gaols was 68.3 per 
thousand population in 1877.43 (The general death rate was 53.2 per thousand 
population in the districts, although this was often higher in towns where the starved 
poor congregated and registration of deaths was, presumably, more accurate).44
There can be no doubt that gaol authorities struggled to maintain basic sanitary 
measures in the face of an influx of starving, emaciated prisoners that was much 
larger than the state infrastructure could deal with. There was an outbreak of hospital 
gangrene in Bellary gaol which was ‘aggravated by overcrowding’.45 Temporary 
gaols were set up in the famine stricken districts to relieve overcrowding, but 
overcrowding ‘helped increase fatal sickness’.46
It is easy to trace this appalling rate of mortality during famine periods to congestion 
or overcrowding alone, but the picture appears to be more complicated. The Collector 
of the Salem District reported in 1877 that ‘the jails and their compounds were often
42 Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Judicial Department dated 30th March 1878, Nos. 
164-166, TNSA.
43 SCR 1877, p. 69.
44 SCR 1877, p. 83.
45 SCR 1877, pp. 72-3.
46 Ibid.
333full to overflowing.. ..but there was little or no mortality which could be traced to 
overcrowding’.47
It appears more likely that conditions outside the prison- mostly long-continued 
starvation- were responsible for famine mortality. Table 5.2 strongly supports the 
conclusion that starvation prior to imprisonment influenced mortality more than the 
sanitary conditions within these institutions.
Table 5.2: Length of Imprisonment and Mortality in 1877 in the Gaols of 
Madras 48
Length of Imprisonment 
Undergone
No. of Deaths 1877 Rate of Mortality
Under 6 months 2212 30.34
6-12 months 642 14.55
1-2 years 301 10.80
2-3 years 150 7.30
3-7 years 211 7.79
Above 7 years 77 5.38
The fact that gaol mortality was related to the larger social and economic 
circumstances of the famine; and to caste and occupation is also borne out by the fact 
that 25, 207 out of 59, 903 of those who were imprisoned during 1877 were labourers; 
while 21,699 were ‘agriculturists’.49 Of the deaths registered amongst prisoners, 1,668 
out of 3,593 were due to ‘dysentery and diarrhoea’; 516 were from cholera; 480 were 
due to ‘anaemia and general debility’; 437 were from ‘other diseases’; 169 from 
respiratory diseases; 118 from intermittent fever; 116 from ulcers and boils; 35 
remittent and continued fever, 27 scrofula and phthisis pulmonalis; 18 smallpox, 1
47 H. Le Fanu, Salem District Gazetteer, Madras,  1918, p. 307.
48 Report on Administration of Jails 1877, p. 29.
49 Report on Administration of Jails in Madras Presidency 1877, Madras,  1878, p. 7.
334suicide, 8 jaundice.50 It seems therefore that it is impossible to discount the effects of 
starvation as a predisposing factor in the appalling prison mortality in these years.
In government hospitals and dispensaries, overcrowding was a common feature of 
reports of the officers in charge. There was an increase of almost 40,000 inpatients in 
the 165 institutions across the Presidency in 1877 over the previous year, also a 
famine year. Some of the increase was attributed to the opening of new institutions, 
but the bulk of the increase was attributed to the increase in patients ‘who were 
beyond the resources of outdoor medical relief. Thus, in 1875-6, the total number of 
in-patients was 28,968; in 1876-77 it was 38,751, and in 1877 it was 82,820.51 In 
Bellary, the Inspection report stated that ‘the hospital building has been, and is now, 
much overcrowded. The sick are put everywhere- in the verandah, bathroom, and 
wherever a covered comer can be found’.52 From Chingleput it was reported that ‘the 
accommodation has been sadly insufficient’.53 In Coonoor, ‘the hospital remained 
overcrowded till the worst of the famine was past’.54
However, most diseases treated in these institutions were related more to starvation 
and social dislocation outside them rather than to overcrowding within. Of the 
diseases which were treated in 1877-78, the maximum were treated for dysentery, 
diarrhoea and injuries, and death rates were correspondingly high. The mortality rate 
for dysentery and diarrhoea was 77 per thousand population (dysentery) and 72.5 per 
thousand population (diarrhoea).
50 Ibid., p.27.
51 Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries for 1877-78, p. 5.
52 Ibid, p. 17.
53 Ibid, p.26.
54 Ibid, p.32.
335The penal and medical institutions seem to have been receiving the epidemiological 
brunt of administrative inefficiency and poor organization in famine relief institutions, 
rather than serving as epidemiological traps in themselves. We would further suggest 
that it is worthwhile to investigate further the claim, made by several native and 
European officials,/people ‘actively’ sought out these institutions in order to get a 
basic subsistence during the famine. Such claims came from deep moral and 
administrative anxieties about the functions of government in crisis management. 
There appears to have been a conflict between the exigencies of crisis management 
and the need to lay out principles of long term governance, both amongst Europeans 
as well as amongst elite Indians. During the famine of 1876-78, in the face of public 
opposition in Madras to the Temple wage, the moral question was one that was 
frequently raised in regard to famine labourers, as has been discussed in Chapter 2.
These concerns were particularly evident in the case of prisons. However, in the case 
of hospitals and dispensaries as well, the question of whether people were “abusing” 
medical institutions as “almshouses” during the famine was a source of great moral 
anxiety for the Madras Government.56
56 In 1877, the Surgeon General of Madras reported to the Madras Government that ‘So far as can be 
ascertained, admissions into dispensaries are strictly confined to the sick. In 1877, many cases were 
admitted for ailments resulting from starvation, but this did not in any way reduce them to the grade of 
almshouses’.  (Annual Report on Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries in Madras for 1877).  In 1878, the 
Surgeon General reported to the Madras Government that ‘Dispensary Committees are expected to see 
that abuses of dispensaries as almshouses do not take place, and there is every reason to believe that 
admissions are restricted to those requiring medical aid’. (Annual Report on The Civil Hospitals and 
Dispensaries in the Madras Presidency for 1878).
336As Arnold points out, however, if people did adopt such a strategy, then it was sadly 
miscalculated.57 But it was miscalculated not because colonial institutions were 
epidemiologically unsound or more insanitary than the conditions experienced by 
people outside them, but because many who reached such institutions were beyond 
redemption. In cases where starvation had not progressed too far, the provision of 
adequate food and medical relief within institutional care probably did save a certain 
number. Where starvation had indeed gone too far, even the provision of food would 
not have prevented destruction of life. Divisions over the functions of governance and 
crisis management led to increased contact between the government and people in 
these institutions, but such contact seems to have had uneven epidemiological 
significance for crisis mortality.58
Medical responses to famine and famine mortality
How did medical men address and respond to the disease and death consequent upon 
subsistence crises?  David Arnold argues that famine ‘constituted one of the few 
occasions when Indians became the focus of state medical concern’ at ‘a time when 
colonial medicine in India still remained closely tied to the needs of the European 
population and the army’ and that ‘famine was one of the factors that encouraged 
colonial medicine to move, albeit hesitantly, towards a more general system of public 
health for the people of India’.59 How, if all, did European medical skill influence the 
course of suffering and death during the famine? And why did medical men like
57 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 396.
58 Two recent articles have attempted to explore the complex relationship of colonial medical 
institutions in Madras with the state. See S. Lang, ‘Drop the Demon Dai: Maternal Mortality and the 
State in Colonial Madras  1840-1875’ and S. Hodges,  ‘“Looting” the Lock Hospital in Colonial Madras 
during the Famine Years of the 1870s’, Social History of Medicine,  18, 3 (2005): 357-378 and 379- 
398.
Arnold,  ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, p. 404.
337Cornish record in such minute detail their observations and investigations of 
starvation and starvation-related disease?
The most striking feature of medical responses to famine and famine disease was
complete helplessness in saving most who came under their observation. This is
evident in Alexander Porter’s statement below:
The only effective treatment of famine diseases is the prevention of famine, or, if this be 
impossible, the efficient organization of famine relief. This to be efficient must be early in 
the famine, before the famine-stricken have begun to suffer from the disorganization of the 
tissues of the alimentary canal.60
At the same time, famine provided the conditions for medical officials to observe and 
record the consequences of starvation in physiological and pathological terms, and 
such observations were recorded in great detail by Cornish as well as by other medical 
officials such as Porter and Cunningham during this famine. It might be argued that 
observations and descriptions of the physical condition and concurrent pathological 
organic changes in the human body followed upon the divisions between Madras and 
India over the adequacy of relief wages, administrative and financial responsibility, 
and moral duty between Madras and India.
These detailed physiological and pathological descriptions were fuelled by 
professional, utilitarian and humanitarian concerns that were critical to the 
relationship between different levels of the state and its medical services, as well as to 
the management of crisis. The state was at one level concerned with administrative 
efficiency: the identification of a system and level of state support and intervention 
which would not result in wasting money without saving fives. There were differences 
between Madras and India over the best system to achieve this. At another level it was
60 Porter, Diseases of the Madras Famine, p. 209.
338divided over moral notions of responsibility between intervention and non 
intervention. In this, the physical body of the famine stricken- both those who were 
able to work as well as the recipients of relief in camps and kitchens- came to signify 
the scientific proof of competing points of view, both medical and non-medical. 
Moreover, notions of ‘science’ and ‘scientific proof were the touchstone- or the 
excuse- for particular courses of action and policy, indicating a preoccupation with 
scientific governance at all levels of administration, despite an awareness that such 
scientific results were elusive.
The determination of the point at which state intervention was to cross the line 
between “necessity” and “extravagance” became central- indeed vital- to Imperial 
attempts to control Provincial expenditure and Provincial attempts to defend its 
interventionist stance. Medical claims to expertise in the determination of such a line 
led were based, in fact, on the lack of precise knowledge regarding the point at which 
this line was crossed, when the provision of relief became futile to the task of saving 
life.
The Weight Test
At Cornish’s behest, the Government of Madras sanctioned a regular 
inspection of workers and of people on relief camps and works by sanitary inspectors 
deputed to famine duty from March 1877. These sanitary inspectors consisted of IMS 
officers deputed from the Madras Medical Service, as well as officers ‘borrowed’ 
from Bengal, the only Province which did not experience famine in 1877 and 1878. 
Nine IMS officers were deputed; one each to Bellary, North Arcot, Salem, 
Chingleput, Coimbatore, Kumool, Nellore, Cuddapah and Madura. The inspection of 
the ‘physical condition’ of labourers, relief camp inmates and the population in
339general formed one of the main aspects of their brief. They were required to note their 
observations on the prevalence of a number of signs and symptoms of starvation, 
including the prevalence of anaemia, wasting, emaciation, physical and muscular 
development amongst teenagers and children, the condition of pregnant mothers and 
newborn children, and whether the prescribed diet was being given to the people on 
works and in camps.6 1
Whilst all sections of people were observed, those of the relief works received 
the most attention, due to the fact that their physical condition was central to resolving 
the dispute between Madras and India over the adequacy of the Temple wage, and 
indeed over intervention in a more general sense. The weighing of labourers on the 
wage was conducted in four places (Nellore, Chittoor, Palaveram and Poonamallee) 
from March 1877. The “scientific” conduct of these observations was crucial to 
arguments that the Government of India’s wage standard was inadequate; and that the 
Government of Madras was justified in providing more liberal scales of relief.
However, the “scientific” character of these inspections was questionable, and this 
constituted a source of frustration for medical officials. In some areas, scales and 
weights were hard to come by; in others, as soon as weighing was begun, a rumour 
spread among the workers that they were being weighed in preparation to be deported,
f\0 and in such circumstances, ‘the first weighing was also the last’.  Regular weighing 
of the same cohort was possible only in Nellore district, where it was found that 
between March and June 1877, workers on the Temple wage lost weight. Cornish 
then proposed that the diet be tried on prisoners in jail, a suggestion which was 
immediately vetoed by the Inspector General of Prisons of Madras, on the grounds
61 SCR 1877, p. 203.
62 SCR 1877, p. 221.
340that prisoners were already suffering the effects of starvation.63 There thus appears to 
have been disagreements not only between different levels, but also different agencies 
of Government over the treatment of the famine stricken. The humanitarianism of 
medical men like Cornish was clearly qualified in the case of different sections of the 
population.
The only form of preventive medicine that was carried out with great persistence 
was vaccination. The congregation of famine stricken people on relief works and 
camps enabled vaccinators- many of whom undoubtedly suffered considerably during 
the famine in consequence of their pittance of a salary- to achieve a spectacular 
increase in both the total numbers vaccinated as well as the number of vaccinations 
among children under the age of one. There was a considerable increase in the 
number of vaccinations performed in 1876-77 and 1877-78 over the numbers in the 
years immediately preceding. From 383,067 in 1875-76, the number of the 
vaccinations increased to 478,727 in 1876-7 and 787,730 in 1877-78. This meant an 
increase of over 26% over 1875-6 in the number of vaccinations performed in the first 
year and over 105% when comparing the number of vaccinations in the second year 
of famine. The vaccination of emaciated and starved people was the subject of much 
public disapproval. As one reporter remarked of the relief camps in North Arcot,
Vaccination, of all things, had been scrupulously attended to, and I noticed several 
emaciated children and diarrhoea patients with marks of recent vaccination on their arms. 
This, I have been told at the Madras relief camps, is very wrong... .no-one is to be 
vaccinated who is not in a tolerably sound condition of body.64
63 SCR 1877, p. 226.
64 Report by the Special Correspondent of the Friend in India, dated March 16, reproduced in W. 
Digby, The Famine Campaign in Southern India, p.  100.
341Yet, famine vaccination had little lasting impact on protection against smallpox, 
perhaps due in some respect to the exceedingly high proportion of infant mortality 
during the famine, and the inflated birth rate in the years immediately following.65 As 
late as 1886, it was believed that only 20% of children bom were subsequently 
vaccinated before their first birthday.66 Clearly, what had been achieved during the 
famine was merely temporary success.
Most of the medical work carried out by the Madras Medical Department 
during the famine was of a palliative nature. This included the provision of food and 
remedies to calm the pain caused by diarrhoea, dysentery and cholera. Famine 
diarrhoea was treated with liquid diets containing milk and soups and mixtures 
containing dilute sulphuric acid, opium, nitric acid, chlorodyne, ipecac and morphine,
67 and European medical practitioners reported early treatment to be fairly successful.
In some places, the dropsy or swelling that was characteristic of starvation was 
relieved by the use of diuretics and sudorifics. At the Monegar Choultry Relief Camp 
Hospital, coconut oil was massaged into the skin to soothe the itching of the dry 
‘famine skin’; and a mixture of cod-liver oil and balsam was given to relieve 
symptoms of dropsy.68  At the Royapettah Hospital, the burning thirst of cholera 
patients was treated by giving them a mixture of dilute sulphuric acid in water. For
65 On the long-term demographic consequences of famine, see J. Menken and C. Campbell, ‘Age 
patterns of famine related mortality increase: Implications for long term population growth’, Health 
Transition Review, 2, 1 (1992): 91-113.
66 Source: Annual Report on Vaccination throughout the Madras Presidency for 1886.
67 ‘Remedial measures Ordered to be Adopted in Connection with the High Death Rate in Madras 
Town Due to Cholera.’ Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department, Nos. 68- 
69 dated 13th  February 1877. The utility of these remedies seems doubtful, and there must have been 
some protests from patients. Porter reported that diarrhoea was concealed by patients in hospital for 
fear that they would be put on a bland diet of milk and soup and deprived of ‘curry’.
68 Comish, ‘The Sanitary and Medical Aspects of Famine’, p. xv.
342acute pneumonia, ‘a stimulating treatment of bark and ammonia, brandy and egg 
mixture and broths’ was believed to be effective.69
Indigenous medical practitioners and their therapies were incorporated into 
state medicine in times of crisis, for two reasons. In times of mass suffering and death, 
the medical services were extremely hard pressed for manpower, and indigenous 
practitioners were seen to constitute a floating labour force. (It was also hoped, 
possibly, that indigenous doctors could be schooled in biomedicine and that they
70 would be able to popularize biomedicine amongst the people).  However, the second 
reason was that indigenous remedies were seen to have particular palliative and 
curative efficacy in the case of famine diarrhoea, which as we have seen, caused a 
substantial portion of famine deaths and suffering. In 1877, Vythians were employed 
by the Collectors of Madura and Coimbatore districts for the reason that ‘(they) treat 
successfully those maladies which are now so rife, diarrhoea and dysentery.. ..we 
cannot cope with disease which is now carrying off so large a percentage of our 
population’.7 1
The paradox is apparent: European medicine was hopeless, in its curative and 
preventive aspects, in dealing with famine disease and famine mortality because most 
famine stricken people were too far gone by the time the doctors reached them Yet, at 
the same time, this famine in a sense allowed for the development of an expert 
medical body of knowledge, using both vital statistics and clinical observation. This
69 Porter, Diseases of the Madras Famine, p. 210.
70 These attempts to ‘school’ native doctors in biomedicine erupted periodically when there was a 
famine or epidemic. There was such a move during the famine of 1866 as well, which was unsuccessful 
due to the unwillingness of the Madras Medical Department to bear the costs of the scheme, and the 
refusal of Indian communities to ‘voluntarily’ be taxed for such a scheme.
71 Letter from A. Wedderbum, Esq., Collector of Coimbatore, to C.A. Galton, Esq., Acting Secretary to 
the Board of Revenue dated 21st August 1877, No. 319, Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue, 
September 3, 1877, TNSA.
343paradox of helplessness/expertise is summarized in Cornish’s lament in December 
1877:
A very large proportion of those applying for relief are so far reduced in frame that the
72 expert can at a glance say of but too large a number,  ‘these must die’.
Medical treatment of what was a social and economic phenomenon, and treatment of 
what had once been preventable, but was now too far gone, was clearly of limited 
value. While this expertise does not seem to have spurred research into nutrition 
immediately after the famine, ironically, this expert knowledge about starvation and 
disease incorporated what could be termed today a social rather than a medical model 
of famine disease. This gave colonial medical men a significant role to play in famine 
prevention and policy through a detailed observation and description of the 
pathological signs of starvation.
Yet, it is perhaps simplistic to argue that ‘epidemics during times of famine forced 
medical men out of the enclave’.73 This would imply that the health of Indians was 
not a concern for the medical services except when famine led to epidemic disease 
that threatened European settlements, the army, prisons and plantations.
However, military health was left almost untouched by the 1876-78 famine, and 
medical practitioners were aware of this immunity. Cornish remarked in his annual 
report for 1877 that
In Madras, Bangalore, Bellary, Trichinopoly and Secunderabad the British soldier could 
not take his walks abroad without encountering the victims of smallpox and cholera, and 
running the risk of personal infection; but we shall see how little these circumstances have 
affected a body of men, provided with wholesome food and drink, and whose domestic 
situation was thoughtfully cared for by the State.74
72 ‘Remedial Measures ordered to be adopted in connection with the high death rate in Madras Town 
due to Cholera,’ Proceedings of the Government of Madras in the Public Department, Nos. 68-69, 
dated 13th  February 1877, Nos. 68-69, TNSA.
73 Arnold, ‘Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease’, op. cit.
74 SCR 1877, p.  17.
344This immunity was reflected in the death rates of different sections of the population, 
which were as follows: European Army 17.25; Native Army 15.2; Jail population 
175. 4; and for the general population 53.2.75 Clearly, then, a more complex 
explanation is required to account for medical concern with famine disease and 
deaths.
Conclusion
Administrative responses to famine were sketchy, disorganized, and marked by 
conflict between different levels and agencies of the state over the necessity and form 
of state intervention, as well as great unevenness in the provision of relief. The towns 
were better provided for than the rural districts, and this appears to have contributed 
to extensive migration and crowding in relief centres.
While famine migration mirrored seasonal responses to scarcity and famine, its 
epidemiological significance requires further investigation. Further, administrative 
attitudes to famine migration were confused and contradictory, and marked by 
conflict between different levels of the state.  In the early stages of famine, poorly 
organized relief camps and works, lack of potable water and general insanitation 
created the conditions for the spread of epidemic disease, especially cholera and 
smallpox, amongst starving people. There however appears to have been great 
unevenness in the way in which relief measures were organized in different areas 
across the Presidency, and this appears to have played a role in inflating death ratios 
in the main urban areas. Further, official relief was often unsuitable for patients who 
were in various stages of bowel disease and required a special diet.
75 See SCR 1877 for details.
345Colonial penal and medical institutions appear to have acted as recipients for the 
victims of administrative inefficiency and indecision. While gaols were overcrowded, 
it appears that most mortality within the gaols occurred amongst those whom it was 
too late to save. Similarly, while hospitals and dispensaries were also overcrowded, 
the nature of diseases treated implies that chronic starvation was the main underlying 
syndrome.
It therefore appears that administrative inefficiency in organizing work and food at an 
early stage of famine was the main factor involved in exacerbating famine mortality. 
In addition, the great unevenness of relief measures as well as the regional imbalances 
in the ability and willingness of local administrations to undertake sanitary measures 
led to high death ratios in some areas.
Medical responses to famine disease were largely palliative, although preventive and 
sanitary measures were also attempted. Vaccination was prosecuted vigorously, if 
with somewhat short-lived effects, and indigenous medical practitioners were enlisted 
in the relief of symptoms of starvation. The most marked response on  the part of 
European medical men was helplessness as regards the ability to save life where 
starvation had created the almost certainty of death in several cases. Yet, the divisions 
between different levels of Government over intervention made for detailed recording 
of the physiological and pathological symptoms of starvation. This created the space 
for medical men to make a claim for expert status in the prevention and management 
of famine and famine disease- concerns which were increasingly important to the 
interventionist state in the decades following the famine. This, we might argue, 
constituted as much the medicalization of famine disease, as it did the ‘socialization’ 
of colonial medicine itself.
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The colonial state was irrevocably divided in moral, administrative and financial 
terms in its responses to famine and the provision of famine relief in Madras during 
1876-78. These divisions made for inconsistencies in the relief of distress, and 
resulted in widespread suffering and starvation. However, they also allowed for 
considerable manoeuvring by the Provincial Government in the implementation of 
Imperial famine policy, and for the medical profession to gain administrative 
authority by claiming expertise in the scientific determination of standards of state 
support for the famine stricken.
The 1876-78 famine heralded the beginning of organized all-India state intervention 
in famine processes through the institution of famine codes and organized 
bureaucratic machinery for the early prevention of agrarian distress through prompt 
state intervention. To this extent, this particular episode was a ‘prime mover’ in the 
history of the medical profession and the history of state intervention in famine relief 
in India.
Famine Policy, Classical Political Economy and State Structures
Famine policy, was as S. Ambirajan puts it, ‘a composite of many things- classical 
political economy, helplessness, frustration, humanitarianism, and even a certain 
callousness towards life’.1  However, colonial famine policy was not- as Ambirajan, 
Ira Klein and David Arnold have argued- simply an application of non-interventionist 
ideals based on theories of classical political economy. To this extent, our conclusions 
coincide with those made by Sanjay Sharma, Ravi Ahuja and David Hall-Matthews,
1  Ambirajan, Classical Political Economy, op. cit. p.  13.
347that non-interventionist political philosophy probably justified financially and 
politically expedient courses of action, rather than determining them through the 
schooling of civil servants.
However, we differ from the above authors in that our findings indicate there were 
great differences between what was espoused by the Government of India and what 
was implemented by the Provincial Government. The divisions within and between 
different levels and agencies of the state- moral, administrative and financial- over 
what was possible, permissible and workable- prevented any wholesale 
implementation of non-interventionist philosophy, even when such philosophy was 
cited by  Imperial authorities to justify particular courses of action. The ultimate 
defiance by Madras of the Government of India’s instructions enables us to see the 
colonial state itself as much less cohesive and hierarchical than Sharma and Hall- 
Matthews do. Political authority in colonial south India appears to have been far more 
fragmented than they have suggested for western and northern India. Policy formation 
was critically influenced by this fragmentation. The thesis thus points to the role 
played by regional and local political structures, and relations between these regional/ 
local and supra-regional/ supra-local structures in shaping administrative responses to 
crisis.
If political authority was fragmented and immediate, individual players were 
significant in shaping and implementing ‘state’ policy at a Provincial and local level. 
Our study would therefore reiterate the point made by Lance Brennan and David Hall- 
Matthews regarding the significance of ‘personalities and politics’ in shaping events 
and in policy formation, although we would need to qualify Brennan’s argument that
348it was the dominant personalities in the India Office who called the shots. The beliefs 
and actions of individuals within the Provincial Government like William Robert 
Cornish, William Robinson and the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos clearly seem 
to have been significant in the making and implementation of Provincial famine 
‘policy’.
The Medical Profession, the State and the Official
The division between the Imperial and Provincial Governments over the question of 
intervention was important in allowing William Robert Cornish a prominent public 
position during the famine. Cornish’s prominence owed largely to his arguments in 
favour of a higher famine wage than that suggested by the Government of India and 
his public critique of Richard Temple’s one pound ration. These arguments were 
supported by the Provincial Government and the district bureaucracy in Madras, and 
received widespread recognition from the medical profession as well as from the press 
both in India and Europe. Clearly, Cornish’s ‘victory’ in the debate owed to 
overwhelming professional, public and political support for what appeared to be a 
‘scientific’ standard in the determination of administrative questions. Cornish’s 
‘victory’ also resulted in significant professional gains for him.
The Colonial State, Medicine and Empire
This would enable us to see the relationship between the colonial state and the 
medical services as more complex than has been suggested by existing authors, 
particularly those who have argued that medicine was a handmaiden or a tool of 
empire. Medicine shared selectively in contesting visions of empire, and played the 
divisions within the state to its advantage during this particular crisis. On the other 
hand, colonial medicine’s- admittedly contested and dubious- ‘scientific’ status
349justified the Provincial Government’s interventionist stance and sustained it against 
Imperial non-interventionism. The refracted nature of Imperial authority is, therefore, 
a crucial element in understanding medicine’s role in colonialism.
Power, Knowledge and ‘Scientific’ Administration
The use of vital statistics was central to Provincial defence of interventionist famine 
policy, and was made possible by a system for the use  collection, compilation, 
publication, interpretation and use of vital statistics in sanitary policy may be seen as 
an extension of the drive towards ‘scientific’ and ‘rational’ administration that Eric 
Stokes, Chris Bayly and others have seen as gaining momentum from the third decade 
of the nineteenth century. However, right from its inception, the accuracy of vital 
statistics was tied up with the limited ability of the Provincial and Imperial 
Governments to intervene in local power structures, and doubts about accuracy 
reflected this insecurity of control. During the famine, debates around the accuracy of 
statistics were linked with assessments of the efficacy of Imperial policy and criticism 
of this policy by administrators in Madras. These debates over accuracy and 
intervention resulted in Provincial policy incorporating inaccurate and clumsy tools as 
the basis of a Provincial famine policy that was relatively humanitarian. Vital 
statistics in particular formed the weak and clumsy knowledge base of colonial 
sanitary science; and after 1880, of Provincial famine policy. It is thus perhaps more 
accurate to see colonial knowledge as a reflection of the refracted nature of colonial 
power and administrative authority rather than a direct corollary of a single imperial 
system. At the same time, vital statistics did play a ‘justificatory’ role, as argued by 
Arjun Appadurai, in debates between different levels of Government.
350Starvation, Disease and Medicine
Because of the ways in which death statistics were collected and used in sanitary and 
famine policy, it is doubtful whether one can assert, as scholars like Tim Dyson, 
Elizabeth Whitcombe and David Arnold have done, that famine mortality consisted of 
two well-defined phases, the first constituting starvation and the second constituting 
disease. The most striking feature of the death statistics, and one which historians and 
historical demographers of this famine have not paid attention to, is the existence of a 
category of registration called ‘other causes’, which accounted for over a third of all 
deaths during the famine, and led the death rate during the worst phase of famine 
mortality. In considering this category of deaths, the thesis thus offers a more 
comprehensive explanation of famine deaths than existing studies.
While fevers accounted for the highest peak in mortality from a single cause during 
the two year period we have studied, it was ‘other causes’ which was responsible for 
the maximum deaths. The evidence seems to indicate that Cornish’s hypothesis that 
‘other causes’ was largely composed of starvation deaths. Further, evidence also 
indicates that there was great confusion over the classification and aetiology of fever 
deaths, making it difficult to attribute these to malaria. In effect, this also draws 
attention to the issue that it is often misleading for the modem historian to extrapolate 
current understandings of disease to nineteenth century death categories.
It follows that modem climatic theories of malaria do not explain a large proportion of 
famine mortality. On the other hand, while ‘social dislocation’ and congregation in 
urban areas, and famine relief works and camps did play an important role in
351exacerbating cholera and smallpox epidemics, an emphasis on these factors tends to 
underestimate the significance of non-infective, non-sanitation nutritional factors in 
causing a significant proportion of famine deaths. Pre-famine social and economic 
indices were important in explaining trends in famine mortality, strengthening the 
hypothesis that entitlement failures, rather than the transmission of epidemic disease 
through social dislocation, were responsible for a greater proportion of famine 
mortality.
Social and Administrative Responses to Famine
It appears that there were great variations in the ways in which local administrations 
tackled subsistence crises. Under the circumstances, famine stricken people migrated 
in large numbers to centres of relief. While this might have created a sanitary crisis 
for ill-equipped doctors and administrators, the significance of migration as an 
epidemiological factor in the causation of famine mortality requires much further 
detailed investigation. It also appears that while numbers in colonial penal, medical 
and famine relief institutions did swell beyond their regular capacity, the condition of 
inmates upon admission rather than conditions within the institutions themselves 
needs to be taken into account.
Medical Responses to Famine: Epidemics, Enclavism and Intervention
Medical responses to famine can largely be summed up in terms of the paradox of 
helplessness/expertise. The helplessness of medical men to arrest or remedy the 
course of starvation and pathological degeneration amongst the majority of the famine 
stricken, led to detailed investigation of the physiology of starvation and its related 
pathological consequences. Their inability to arrest or cure chronic starvation after a
352certain stage created an emphasis on adequate and appropriate state intervention as the 
only effective preventive against famine mortality. Yet, because of the importance of 
the determination of a ‘scientific’ standard for wages and doles which would straddle 
the demands of nutritional adequacy, preventive medicine and financial expediency, 
this ‘social model’ of famine disease enabled colonial medicine to claim an exclusive 
‘expertise’ in determining standards of state support and thereby occupy a more 
significant place within administrative structures than it had hitherto done.
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